nldcsc-elastic-rules 0.0.8__py3-none-any.whl

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/integrations/aws/ml_cloudtrail_rare_method_by_country.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2020/07/13"
+integration = ["aws"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2024/06/18"
+
+[rule]
+anomaly_threshold = 50
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+A machine learning job detected AWS command activity that, while not inherently suspicious or abnormal, is sourcing from
+a geolocation (country) that is unusual for the command. This can be the result of compromised credentials or keys being
+used by a threat actor in a different geography than the authorized user(s).
+"""
+false_positives = [
+    """
+    New or unusual command and user geolocation activity can be due to manual troubleshooting or reconfiguration;
+    changes in cloud automation scripts or workflows; adoption of new services; expansion into new regions; increased
+    adoption of work from home policies; or users who travel frequently.
+    """,
+]
+from = "now-2h"
+interval = "15m"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+machine_learning_job_id = "rare_method_for_a_country"
+name = "Unusual Country For an AWS Command"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+This rule requires the installation of associated Machine Learning jobs, as well as data coming in from AWS.
+
+### Anomaly Detection Setup
+
+Once the rule is enabled, the associated Machine Learning job will start automatically. You can view the Machine Learning job linked under the "Definition" panel of the detection rule. If the job does not start due to an error, the issue must be resolved for the job to commence successfully. For more details on setting up anomaly detection jobs, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/kibana/current/xpack-ml-anomalies.html).
+
+### AWS Integration Setup
+The AWS integration allows you to collect logs and metrics from Amazon Web Services (AWS) with Elastic Agent.
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Agent System integration "aws" to your system:
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click “Add integrations”.
+- In the query bar, search for “AWS” and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click “Add AWS”.
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Review optional and advanced settings accordingly.
+- Add the newly installed “aws” to an existing or a new agent policy, and deploy the agent on your system from which aws log files are desirable.
+- Click “Save and Continue”.
+- For more details on the integration refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/docs/current/integrations/aws).
+"""
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+### Investigating Unusual Country For an AWS Command
+
+CloudTrail logging provides visibility on actions taken within an AWS environment. By monitoring these events and understanding what is considered normal behavior within an organization, you can spot suspicious or malicious activity when deviations occur.
+
+This rule uses a machine learning job to detect an AWS API command that while not inherently suspicious or abnormal, is sourcing from a geolocation (country) that is unusual for the command. This can be the result of compromised credentials or keys used by a threat actor in a different geography than the authorized user(s).
+
+Detection alerts from this rule indicate an AWS API command or method call that is rare and unusual for the geolocation of the source IP address.
+
+#### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Identify the user account involved and the action performed. Verify whether it should perform this kind of action.
+    - Examine the user identity in the `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn` field and the access key ID in the `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.access_key_id` field, which can help identify the precise user context.
+    - The user agent details in the `user_agent.original` field may also indicate what kind of a client made the request.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user account during the past 48 hours.
+- Validate the activity is not related to planned patches, updates, or network administrator activity.
+- Examine the request parameters. These might indicate the source of the program or the nature of its tasks.
+- Considering the source IP address and geolocation of the user who issued the command:
+    - Do they look normal for the calling user?
+    - If the source is an EC2 IP address, is it associated with an EC2 instance in one of your accounts or is the source IP from an EC2 instance that's not under your control?
+    - If it is an authorized EC2 instance, is the activity associated with normal behavior for the instance role or roles? Are there any other alerts or signs of suspicious activity involving this instance?
+- Consider the time of day. If the user is a human (not a program or script), did the activity take place during a normal time of day?
+- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity if suspicious.
+- If you suspect the account has been compromised, scope potentially compromised assets by tracking servers, services, and data accessed by the account in the last 24 hours.
+
+### False Positive Analysis
+
+- False positives can occur if activity is coming from new employees based in a country with no previous history in AWS.
+- Examine the history of the command. If the command only manifested recently, it might be part of a new automation module or script. If it has a consistent cadence (for example, it appears in small numbers on a weekly or monthly cadence), it might be part of a housekeeping or maintenance process. You can find the command in the `event.action field` field.
+
+### Related Rules
+
+- Unusual City For an AWS Command - 809b70d3-e2c3-455e-af1b-2626a5a1a276
+- Unusual AWS Command for a User - ac706eae-d5ec-4b14-b4fd-e8ba8086f0e1
+- Rare AWS Error Code - 19de8096-e2b0-4bd8-80c9-34a820813fff
+- Spike in AWS Error Messages - 78d3d8d9-b476-451d-a9e0-7a5addd70670
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Disable or limit the account during the investigation and response.
+- Identify the possible impact of the incident and prioritize accordingly; the following actions can help you gain context:
+    - Identify the account role in the cloud environment.
+    - Assess the criticality of affected services and servers.
+    - Work with your IT team to identify and minimize the impact on users.
+    - Identify if the attacker is moving laterally and compromising other accounts, servers, or services.
+    - Identify any regulatory or legal ramifications related to this activity.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords or delete API keys as needed to revoke the attacker's access to the environment. Work with your IT teams to minimize the impact on business operations during these actions.
+- Check if unauthorized new users were created, remove unauthorized new accounts, and request password resets for other IAM users.
+- Consider enabling multi-factor authentication for users.
+- Review the permissions assigned to the implicated user to ensure that the least privilege principle is being followed.
+- Implement security best practices [outlined](https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/security-best-practices/) by AWS.
+- Take the actions needed to return affected systems, data, or services to their normal operational levels.
+- Identify the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection via the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+"""
+references = ["https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/prebuilt-ml-jobs.html"]
+risk_score = 21
+rule_id = "dca28dee-c999-400f-b640-50a081cc0fd1"
+severity = "low"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Cloud",
+    "Data Source: AWS",
+    "Data Source: Amazon Web Services",
+    "Rule Type: ML",
+    "Rule Type: Machine Learning",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+type = "machine_learning"
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/integrations/aws/ml_cloudtrail_rare_method_by_user.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2020/07/13"
+integration = ["aws"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2024/06/18"
+
+[rule]
+anomaly_threshold = 75
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+A machine learning job detected an AWS API command that, while not inherently suspicious or abnormal, is being made by a
+user context that does not normally use the command. This can be the result of compromised credentials or keys as
+someone uses a valid account to persist, move laterally, or exfiltrate data.
+"""
+false_positives = [
+    """
+    New or unusual user command activity can be due to manual troubleshooting or reconfiguration; changes in cloud
+    automation scripts or workflows; adoption of new services; or changes in the way services are used.
+    """,
+]
+from = "now-2h"
+interval = "15m"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+machine_learning_job_id = "rare_method_for_a_username"
+name = "Unusual AWS Command for a User"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+This rule requires the installation of associated Machine Learning jobs, as well as data coming in from AWS.
+
+### Anomaly Detection Setup
+
+Once the rule is enabled, the associated Machine Learning job will start automatically. You can view the Machine Learning job linked under the "Definition" panel of the detection rule. If the job does not start due to an error, the issue must be resolved for the job to commence successfully. For more details on setting up anomaly detection jobs, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/kibana/current/xpack-ml-anomalies.html).
+
+### AWS Integration Setup
+The AWS integration allows you to collect logs and metrics from Amazon Web Services (AWS) with Elastic Agent.
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Agent System integration "aws" to your system:
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click “Add integrations”.
+- In the query bar, search for “AWS” and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click “Add AWS”.
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Review optional and advanced settings accordingly.
+- Add the newly installed “aws” to an existing or a new agent policy, and deploy the agent on your system from which aws log files are desirable.
+- Click “Save and Continue”.
+- For more details on the integration refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/docs/current/integrations/aws).
+"""
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+### Investigating Unusual AWS Command for a User
+
+CloudTrail logging provides visibility on actions taken within an AWS environment. By monitoring these events and understanding what is considered normal behavior within an organization, you can spot suspicious or malicious activity when deviations occur.
+
+This rule uses a machine learning job to detect an AWS API command that while not inherently suspicious or abnormal, is being made by a user context that does not normally use the command. This can be the result of compromised credentials or keys as someone uses a valid account to persist, move laterally, or exfiltrate data.
+
+Detection alerts from this rule indicate an AWS API command or method call that is rare and unusual for the calling IAM user.
+
+#### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Identify the user account involved and the action performed. Verify whether it should perform this kind of action.
+    - Examine the user identity in the `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn` field and the access key ID in the `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.access_key_id` field, which can help identify the precise user context.
+    - The user agent details in the `user_agent.original` field may also indicate what kind of a client made the request.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user account during the past 48 hours.
+- Validate the activity is not related to planned patches, updates, or network administrator activity.
+- Examine the request parameters. These might indicate the source of the program or the nature of its tasks.
+- Considering the source IP address and geolocation of the user who issued the command:
+    - Do they look normal for the calling user?
+    - If the source is an EC2 IP address, is it associated with an EC2 instance in one of your accounts or is the source IP from an EC2 instance that's not under your control?
+    - If it is an authorized EC2 instance, is the activity associated with normal behavior for the instance role or roles? Are there any other alerts or signs of suspicious activity involving this instance?
+- Consider the time of day. If the user is a human (not a program or script), did the activity take place during a normal time of day?
+- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity if suspicious.
+- If you suspect the account has been compromised, scope potentially compromised assets by tracking servers, services, and data accessed by the account in the last 24 hours.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Examine the history of the command. If the command only manifested recently, it might be part of a new automation module or script. If it has a consistent cadence (for example, it appears in small numbers on a weekly or monthly cadence), it might be part of a housekeeping or maintenance process. You can find the command in the `event.action field` field.
+
+### Related Rules
+
+- Unusual City For an AWS Command - 809b70d3-e2c3-455e-af1b-2626a5a1a276
+- Unusual Country For an AWS Command - dca28dee-c999-400f-b640-50a081cc0fd1
+- Rare AWS Error Code - 19de8096-e2b0-4bd8-80c9-34a820813fff
+- Spike in AWS Error Messages - 78d3d8d9-b476-451d-a9e0-7a5addd70670
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Disable or limit the account during the investigation and response.
+- Identify the possible impact of the incident and prioritize accordingly; the following actions can help you gain context:
+    - Identify the account role in the cloud environment.
+    - Assess the criticality of affected services and servers.
+    - Work with your IT team to identify and minimize the impact on users.
+    - Identify if the attacker is moving laterally and compromising other accounts, servers, or services.
+    - Identify any regulatory or legal ramifications related to this activity.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords or delete API keys as needed to revoke the attacker's access to the environment. Work with your IT teams to minimize the impact on business operations during these actions.
+- Check if unauthorized new users were created, remove unauthorized new accounts, and request password resets for other IAM users.
+- Consider enabling multi-factor authentication for users.
+- Review the permissions assigned to the implicated user to ensure that the least privilege principle is being followed.
+- Implement security best practices [outlined](https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/security-best-practices/) by AWS.
+- Take the actions needed to return affected systems, data, or services to their normal operational levels.
+- Identify the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection via the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+"""
+references = ["https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/prebuilt-ml-jobs.html"]
+risk_score = 21
+rule_id = "ac706eae-d5ec-4b14-b4fd-e8ba8086f0e1"
+severity = "low"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Cloud",
+    "Data Source: AWS",
+    "Data Source: Amazon Web Services",
+    "Rule Type: ML",
+    "Rule Type: Machine Learning",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+type = "machine_learning"
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/integrations/aws/persistence_aws_attempt_to_register_virtual_mfa_device.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2025/04/11"
+integration = ["aws"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/11/03"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Detects attempts to create or enable a Virtual MFA device (CreateVirtualMFADevice, EnableMFADevice) using temporary AWS
+credentials (access keys beginning with ASIA). Session credentials are short-lived and tied to existing authenticated
+sessions, so using them to register or enable MFA devices is unusual. Adversaries who compromise temporary credentials
+may abuse this behavior to establish persistence by attaching new MFA devices to maintain access to high-privilege
+accounts despite key rotation or password resets.
+"""
+false_positives = [
+    """
+    Some legitimate administrative workflows or CI/CD automation pipelines may temporarily configure or re-enable MFA
+    devices using session-based credentials. Validate the calling identity’s purpose, source IP, and user agent to
+    confirm whether this activity was authorized. Additionally, when a user creates or enables a Virtual MFA device
+    through the AWS Management Console, the underlying CloudTrail event will also show a temporary credential (access
+    key ID beginning with ASIA), because the console itself issues short-lived STS session credentials for every
+    logged-in user. These events are expected and should not be considered suspicious.
+    """,
+]
+from = "now-6m"
+index = ["filebeat-*", "logs-aws.cloudtrail-*"]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "AWS IAM Virtual MFA Device Registration Attempt with Session Token"
+note = """## Triage and Analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and validated for accuracy and relevance. Always
+> tailor the steps to your organization's environment and operational context.
+
+### Investigating AWS IAM Virtual MFA Device Registration Attempt with Session Token
+
+Temporary credentials that start with the prefix `ASIA` are generated by the AWS Security Token Service (STS). These
+session tokens are used for short-lived operations and should not be used to modify or register IAM
+authentication mechanisms. This rule detects cases where an IAM user or role uses such temporary credentials to invoke either `CreateVirtualMFADevice` or `EnableMFADevice`.
+
+#### Possible investigation steps
+
+- **Identify the actor and session context**
+  - Review `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn` and `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.access_key_id` to determine the identity and confirm the `ASIA` prefix.  
+  - If you ingest `event.original`, look for `sessionCredentialFromConsole: true` to determine if the temporary token is from a console login session (which uses temporary session tokens in the backend) rather than compromised session tokens.
+  - Check `user_agent.original`, `source.ip`, and `cloud.region` to determine if this activity originated from an expected host, VPN, or location.
+  - Cross-reference with prior activity by this identity—especially `GetSessionToken`, `AssumeRole`, or `GetCallerIdentity` calls.
+
+- **Correlate related IAM events**
+  - Search for subsequent or preceding calls to:
+    - `EnableMFADevice` (after `CreateVirtualMFADevice`)
+    - `DeactivateMFADevice` or `DeleteVirtualMFADevice`
+    - `ListMFADevices`, `ListUsers`, or `UpdateLoginProfile`
+  - Review whether new MFA devices were successfully enabled (`event.outcome:success`).
+
+- **Assess session scope and privileges**
+  - Identify what IAM policies are attached to the user or role that issued this request.  
+  - If the temporary credentials were created via `AssumeRole` or `GetSessionToken`, check the originating principal’s permissions.
+
+- **Investigate possible persistence**
+  - Look for new MFA devices listed for privileged users (e.g., account root or admin roles).  
+  - Review login history for those accounts following the MFA change. 
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- **Legitimate Administrative or Automated Actions**  
+  Certain IAM administrative workflows or CI/CD automation tools may register or enable MFA devices using temporary
+  session credentials. Confirm whether the calling principal is part of an authorized automation process or a known
+  identity performing account configuration tasks.
+
+- **Expected Console Behavior**  
+  When users create or enable Virtual MFA devices through the **AWS Management Console**, AWS automatically issues
+  temporary STS credentials (with access key IDs beginning with `ASIA`) for that session. As a result, these events will
+  appear identical to programmatic usage of session tokens in CloudTrail logs.  
+  This is expected and does not indicate compromise.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- **Immediate containment**
+  - Revoke or expire the temporary credentials (`aws sts revoke-session` if applicable).  
+  - Disable or delete any newly created virtual MFA devices using `DeleteVirtualMFADevice`.  
+  - Rotate passwords and long-term access keys for the associated IAM users.
+
+- **Investigation and scoping**
+  - Review CloudTrail logs for related IAM modifications (`UpdateLoginProfile`, `AttachUserPolicy`, `CreateAccessKey`).  
+  - Identify any new API keys or tokens created after the MFA registration.  
+  - Cross-check whether the attacker leveraged the new MFA binding for session persistence or login.
+
+- **Recovery and hardening**
+  - Enforce the `iam:EnableMFADevice` and `iam:CreateVirtualMFADevice` permissions only for trusted admin roles.  
+  - Implement `aws:MultiFactorAuthPresent` conditions in IAM policies.  
+  - Monitor for any future `ASIA` credential–based IAM configuration changes.
+
+### Additional information
+- **[AWS IR Playbooks](https://github.com/aws-samples/aws-incident-response-playbooks/blob/c151b0dc091755fffd4d662a8f29e2f6794da52c/playbooks/)** 
+- **[AWS Customer Playbook Framework](https://github.com/aws-samples/aws-customer-playbook-framework/tree/a8c7b313636b406a375952ac00b2d68e89a991f2/docs)** 
+- **[Managing MFA Devices in IAM](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_credentials_mfa.html)** 
+"""
+references = ["https://www.sygnia.co/blog/sygnia-investigation-bybit-hack/"]
+risk_score = 47
+rule_id = "e4feea34-3b62-4c83-b77f-018fbef48c00"
+severity = "medium"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Cloud",
+    "Data Source: AWS",
+    "Data Source: Amazon Web Services",
+    "Data Source: AWS CloudTrail",
+    "Data Source: AWS IAM",
+    "Tactic: Persistence",
+    "Use Case: Identity and Access Audit",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+
+query = '''
+iam where event.dataset == "aws.cloudtrail"
+  and event.provider == "iam.amazonaws.com"
+  and event.outcome == "success"
+  and event.action in ("CreateVirtualMFADevice", "EnableMFADevice")
+  and startsWith (aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.access_key_id, "ASIA")
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1098"
+name = "Account Manipulation"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1098.005"
+name = "Device Registration"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/005/"
+
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1556"
+name = "Modify Authentication Process"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1556.006"
+name = "Multi-Factor Authentication"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/006/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0003"
+name = "Persistence"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
+
+[rule.investigation_fields]
+field_names = [
+    "@timestamp",
+    "user.name",
+    "user_agent.original",
+    "source.ip",
+    "aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn",
+    "aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.type",
+    "aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.access_key_id",
+    "event.action",
+    "event.outcome",
+    "cloud.account.id",
+    "cloud.region",
+    "aws.cloudtrail.request_parameters",
+    "aws.cloudtrail.response_elements",
+]
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/integrations/aws/persistence_ec2_network_acl_creation.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2020/06/04"
+integration = ["aws"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/06/05"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Identifies the creation of an AWS EC2 network access control list (ACL) or an entry in a network ACL with a specified rule number. Adversaries may exploit ACLs to establish persistence or exfiltrate data by creating permissive rules.
+"""
+false_positives = [
+    """
+    Network ACL's may be created by a network administrator. Verify whether the user identity should be making changes in your environment. Network ACL creations by unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule.
+    """,
+]
+from = "now-6m"
+index = ["filebeat-*", "logs-aws.cloudtrail-*"]
+interval = "5m"
+language = "kuery"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "AWS EC2 Network Access Control List Creation"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating AWS EC2 Network Access Control List Creation
+
+AWS EC2 Network ACLs are stateless firewalls for controlling inbound and outbound traffic at the subnet level. Adversaries may exploit ACLs to establish persistence or exfiltrate data by creating permissive rules. The detection rule monitors successful creation events of ACLs or entries, flagging potential unauthorized modifications that align with persistence tactics, aiding in early threat identification.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Review the CloudTrail logs for the specific event.dataset:aws.cloudtrail entries to identify the user or role (event.user) that initiated the CreateNetworkAcl or CreateNetworkAclEntry actions.
+- Examine the event.provider:ec2.amazonaws.com logs to determine the IP addresses and locations associated with the request to assess if they are expected or suspicious.
+- Check the event.action details to understand the specific rules created in the Network ACL, focusing on any overly permissive rules that could indicate a security risk.
+- Investigate the event.outcome:success entries to confirm the successful creation of the ACL or ACL entry and correlate with any other suspicious activities in the AWS environment.
+- Cross-reference the event with other security alerts or logs to identify any patterns or anomalies that could suggest malicious intent or unauthorized access.
+- Assess the impact of the new ACL rules on the network security posture, ensuring they do not inadvertently allow unauthorized access or data exfiltration.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Routine infrastructure updates or deployments may trigger the creation of new network ACLs or entries. To manage this, establish a baseline of expected changes during scheduled maintenance windows and exclude these from alerts.
+- Automated scripts or infrastructure-as-code tools like Terraform or CloudFormation can create network ACLs as part of normal operations. Identify and whitelist these automated processes to prevent unnecessary alerts.
+- Changes made by trusted administrators or security teams for legitimate purposes can be mistaken for suspicious activity. Implement a process to log and review approved changes, allowing you to exclude these from detection.
+- Temporary ACLs created for troubleshooting or testing purposes can generate alerts. Document and track these activities, and use tags or naming conventions to easily identify and exclude them from monitoring.
+- Third-party services or integrations that require specific network configurations might create ACLs. Review and validate these services, and if deemed safe, add them to an exception list to reduce false positives.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Immediately review the AWS CloudTrail logs to confirm the creation of the Network ACL or entry and identify the IAM user or role responsible for the action. This helps determine if the action was authorized or potentially malicious.
+- Revoke any suspicious or unauthorized IAM credentials associated with the creation of the Network ACL or entry to prevent further unauthorized access.
+- Modify or delete the newly created Network ACL or entry if it is determined to be unauthorized or overly permissive, ensuring that it aligns with your organization's security policies.
+- Conduct a security review of the affected AWS environment to identify any other unauthorized changes or indicators of compromise, focusing on persistence mechanisms.
+- Implement additional monitoring and alerting for changes to Network ACLs and other critical AWS resources to enhance detection of similar threats in the future.
+- Escalate the incident to the security operations team or incident response team for further investigation and to determine if additional containment or remediation actions are necessary.
+- Review and update IAM policies and permissions to ensure the principle of least privilege is enforced, reducing the risk of unauthorized changes to network configurations.
+
+## Setup
+
+The AWS Fleet integration, Filebeat module, or similarly structured data is required to be compatible with this rule."""
+references = [
+    "https://awscli.amazonaws.com/v2/documentation/api/latest/reference/ec2/create-network-acl.html",
+    "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/APIReference/API_CreateNetworkAcl.html",
+    "https://awscli.amazonaws.com/v2/documentation/api/latest/reference/ec2/create-network-acl-entry.html",
+    "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/APIReference/API_CreateNetworkAclEntry.html",
+]
+risk_score = 21
+rule_id = "39144f38-5284-4f8e-a2ae-e3fd628d90b0"
+severity = "low"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Cloud",
+    "Data Source: AWS",
+    "Data Source: Amazon Web Services",
+    "Data Source: AWS EC2",
+    "Use Case: Network Security Monitoring",
+    "Tactic: Persistence",
+    "Tactic: Defense Evasion",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "query"
+
+query = '''
+event.dataset:aws.cloudtrail and event.provider:ec2.amazonaws.com and event.action:(CreateNetworkAcl or CreateNetworkAclEntry) and event.outcome:success
+'''
+
+[rule.investigation_fields]
+field_names = [
+    "@timestamp",
+    "user.name",
+    "user_agent.original",
+    "source.address",
+    "aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn",
+    "aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.type",
+    "aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.access_key_id",
+    "event.action",
+    "event.outcome",
+    "cloud.account.id",
+    "cloud.region",
+    "aws.cloudtrail.request_parameters",
+    "aws.cloudtrail.response_elements"
+]
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1133"
+name = "External Remote Services"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0003"
+name = "Persistence"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1562"
+name = "Impair Defenses"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1562.007"
+name = "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/007/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0005"
+name = "Defense Evasion"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
+