nldcsc-elastic-rules 0.0.8__py3-none-any.whl

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/defense_evasion_interactive_shell_from_system_user.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2024/11/04"
+integration = ["endpoint"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/01/24"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+This rule detects interactive shells launched from system users. System users typically do not require interactive shells,
+and their presence may indicate malicious activity.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["logs-endpoint.events.process*"]
+language = "kuery"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Unusual Interactive Shell Launched from System User"
+risk_score = 21
+rule_id = "9c5b2382-19d2-4b5d-8f14-9e1631a3acdb"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+#### Prerequisite Requirements:
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
+"""
+severity = "low"
+tags = [
+        "Domain: Endpoint",
+        "OS: Linux",
+        "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+        "Tactic: Defense Evasion",
+        "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+        "Resources: Investigation Guide"
+        ]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "new_terms"
+query = '''
+event.category:process and host.os.type:linux and event.type:start and event.action:exec and user.name:(
+   daemon or bin or sys or sync or games or man or mail or news or uucp or proxy or backup or list or irc
+   or gnats or _apt or Debian-exim or systemd-timesync or messagebus or uuidd or _chrony or sshd or
+   gamer or shutdown or halt or dbus or polkitd or rtkit or pipewire or tcpdump or clevis or
+   libstoreagemgmt or geoclue or tss or sssd or gnome-initial-setup or pesign or dnsmasq or chrony
+) and process.interactive:true and process.parent.executable:* and not (
+  process.parent.name:(
+    apt-key or apt-config or gpgv or gpgconf or man-db.postinst or sendmail or rpm or nullmailer-inject
+  ) or
+  process.args:(/etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/* or /tmp/apt-key-gpg*) or
+  process.name:(awk or apt-config or dpkg or grep or gpgv or sed) or
+  (user.name:_apt and process.name:(sqv or apt-key or gpgconf or sort or mktemp or find or cmp or gpg-connect-agent)) or
+  (user.name:man and process.name:mandb) or
+  (user.name:daemon and process.name:at)
+)
+'''
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating Unusual Interactive Shell Launched from System User
+
+In Linux environments, system users are typically non-interactive and serve specific system functions. Adversaries may exploit these accounts to launch interactive shells, bypassing security measures and evading detection. The detection rule identifies such anomalies by monitoring process activities linked to system users, excluding legitimate processes, and flagging unexpected interactive shell launches, thus highlighting potential malicious activity.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Review the process details to identify the specific interactive shell that was launched, focusing on the process.interactive:true field.
+- Examine the user.name field to determine which system user account was used to launch the shell and assess whether this account should have interactive shell access.
+- Investigate the process.parent.executable and process.parent.name fields to understand the parent process that initiated the shell, checking for any unusual or unauthorized parent processes.
+- Analyze the process.args field for any suspicious or unexpected command-line arguments that might indicate malicious intent.
+- Cross-reference the event.timestamp with other security logs to identify any correlated activities or anomalies around the same time frame.
+- Check for any recent changes or anomalies in the system user's account settings or permissions that could have facilitated the shell launch.
+- Assess the risk and impact of the activity by considering the context of the system and the potential for further malicious actions.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- System maintenance tasks may trigger interactive shells from system users like 'daemon' or 'systemd-timesync'. To handle these, review the specific maintenance scripts and add exceptions for known benign processes.
+- Automated backup or update processes might launch interactive shells under system users such as 'backup' or 'apt'. Identify these processes and exclude them by adding their parent process names or arguments to the exception list.
+- Some monitoring or logging tools may use system accounts like 'messagebus' or 'dbus' to execute interactive shells. Verify these tools and exclude their activities if they are legitimate and necessary for system operations.
+- Custom scripts or applications running under system users for specific tasks could be misidentified. Document these scripts and add their process names to the exclusion criteria to prevent false alerts.
+- In environments where certain system users are repurposed for non-standard tasks, ensure these tasks are documented and create exceptions for their associated processes to avoid unnecessary alerts.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Immediately isolate the affected system from the network to prevent further unauthorized access or lateral movement by the adversary.
+- Terminate any suspicious interactive shell sessions initiated by system users to halt potential malicious activities.
+- Conduct a thorough review of the affected system's logs and processes to identify any additional indicators of compromise or unauthorized changes.
+- Reset credentials for the compromised system user accounts and any other accounts that may have been accessed or affected.
+- Implement stricter access controls and monitoring for system user accounts to prevent unauthorized interactive shell launches in the future.
+- Escalate the incident to the security operations center (SOC) or incident response team for further investigation and to determine if additional systems are affected.
+- Update detection mechanisms and rules to enhance monitoring for similar threats, ensuring that any future attempts are quickly identified and addressed."""
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+name = "Defense Evasion"
+id = "TA0005"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1564"
+name = "Hide Artifacts"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1564.002"
+name = "Hidden Users"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/002/"
+
+[rule.new_terms]
+field = "new_terms_fields"
+value = ["process.executable"]
+
+[[rule.new_terms.history_window_start]]
+field = "history_window_start"
+value = "now-14d"

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/defense_evasion_interpreter_launched_from_decoded_payload.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2025/02/21"
+integration = ["endpoint", "crowdstrike"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/10/17"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+This rule detects when a base64 decoded payload is piped to an interpreter on Linux systems. Adversaries may use
+base64 encoding to obfuscate data and pipe it to an interpreter to execute malicious code. This technique may
+be used to evade detection by host- or network-based security controls.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["logs-endpoint.events.process*", "logs-crowdstrike.fdr*"]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Base64 Decoded Payload Piped to Interpreter"
+note = """ ## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating Base64 Decoded Payload Piped to Interpreter
+
+Base64 encoding is a method to encode binary data into ASCII text, often used for data obfuscation. Adversaries exploit this by encoding malicious payloads and decoding them on a target system, piping the output to interpreters like bash or python for execution. The detection rule identifies such activities by monitoring for processes that decode Base64 and subsequently execute scripts, indicating potential malicious behavior.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Review the process command line arguments to identify the specific Base64 decoding activity, focusing on the presence of flags like `-d` or `-a` in conjunction with tools such as `base64`, `openssl`, or scripting languages like `python`, `perl`, or `ruby`.
+- Examine the parent process entity ID and command line to understand the context in which the Base64 decoding was initiated, identifying any potentially suspicious parent processes.
+- Investigate the subsequent interpreter process that was executed, such as `bash`, `python`, or `ruby`, to determine the nature of the script or command being run, looking for any signs of malicious activity.
+- Check the timing and sequence of the processes involved to confirm if the Base64 decoding and interpreter execution occurred within the specified maxspan of 3 seconds, indicating a likely automated or scripted action.
+- Analyze the host ID and any associated user accounts to determine if the activity aligns with expected behavior for that system or user, or if it suggests unauthorized access or compromise.
+- Correlate the alert with other security events or logs from the same host or user to identify any additional indicators of compromise or related suspicious activities.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Legitimate administrative scripts may use Base64 encoding to handle data securely. Review the context of the script execution and consider excluding specific scripts or directories from monitoring if they are verified as safe.
+- Automated backup or data transfer processes might use Base64 encoding for data integrity. Identify these processes and create exceptions for known, trusted applications or scripts.
+- Development environments often use Base64 encoding for testing purposes. If a development tool or script is frequently triggering alerts, consider excluding the specific development environment or user accounts from this rule.
+- Security tools or monitoring solutions may use Base64 encoding as part of their normal operations. Verify the source of the alert and exclude known security tools from triggering this rule.
+- System updates or package installations might involve Base64 operations. Monitor the timing and context of these alerts and exclude specific update processes if they are consistently identified as false positives.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Isolate the affected system from the network to prevent further execution of potentially malicious code and lateral movement.
+- Terminate any suspicious processes identified by the detection rule, particularly those involving base64 decoding and piping to interpreters.
+- Conduct a forensic analysis of the affected system to identify any additional indicators of compromise, such as unauthorized file modifications or network connections.
+- Restore the system from a known good backup if malicious activity is confirmed and the integrity of the system is compromised.
+- Update and patch all software and systems to mitigate vulnerabilities that could be exploited by similar techniques.
+- Implement enhanced monitoring and logging for base64 decoding activities and interpreter executions to detect similar threats in the future.
+- Escalate the incident to the security operations center (SOC) or incident response team for further investigation and to determine if broader organizational impacts exist.
+"""
+risk_score = 47
+rule_id = "5bdad1d5-5001-4a13-ae99-fa8619500f1a"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+#### Prerequisite Requirements:
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
+"""
+severity = "medium"
+tags = [
+  "Domain: Endpoint",
+  "OS: Linux",
+  "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+  "Tactic: Defense Evasion",
+  "Tactic: Execution",
+  "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+  "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+  "Data Source: Crowdstrike",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+query = '''
+sequence by host.id, process.parent.entity_id with maxspan=3s
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "ProcessRollup2") and (
+    (process.name in ("base64", "base64plain", "base64url", "base64mime", "base64pem", "base32", "base16") and process.command_line like~ "*-*d*") or
+    (process.name == "openssl" and process.args == "enc" and process.args in ("-d", "-base64", "-a")) or
+    (process.name like "python*" and
+    (process.args == "base64" and process.args in ("-d", "-u", "-t")) or
+    (process.args == "-c" and process.args like "*base64*" and process.command_line like~ "*b64decode*")
+    ) or
+    (process.name like "perl*" and process.command_line like~ "*decode_base64*") or
+    (process.name like "ruby*" and process.args == "-e" and process.command_line like~ "*Base64.decode64*")
+  )]
+ [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "ProcessRollup2") and process.name like~ (
+    "bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish", "python*", "perl*", "ruby*", "lua*", "php*"
+ )]
+'''
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+
+  [rule.threat.tactic]
+  name = "Defense Evasion"
+  id = "TA0005"
+  reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
+
+    [[rule.threat.technique]]
+    name = "Obfuscated Files or Information"
+    id = "T1027"
+    reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/"
+
+    [[rule.threat.technique]]
+    name = "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information"
+    id = "T1140"
+    reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140/"
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+
+  [rule.threat.tactic]
+  name = "Execution"
+  id = "TA0002"
+  reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
+
+    [[rule.threat.technique]]
+    id = "T1059"
+    name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
+    reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
+
+      [[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+      name = "Unix Shell"
+      id = "T1059.004"
+      reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/"
+
+    [[rule.threat.technique]]
+    name = "User Execution"
+    id = "T1204"
+    reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/"
+
+      [[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+      name = "Malicious File"
+      id = "T1204.002"
+      reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002/"

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/defense_evasion_journalctl_clear_logs.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2025/10/01"
+integration = ["endpoint", "auditd_manager", "crowdstrike", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/10/06"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+This rule monitors for attempts to clear logs using the "journalctl" command on Linux systems. Adversaries may use this
+technique to cover their tracks by deleting or truncating log files, making it harder for defenders to investigate their
+activities. The rule looks for the execution of "journalctl" with arguments that indicate log clearing actions, such as
+"--vacuum-time", "--vacuum-size", or "--vacuum-files".
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = [
+    "auditbeat-*",
+    "endgame-*",
+    "logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*",
+    "logs-crowdstrike.fdr*",
+    "logs-endpoint.events.process*",
+    "logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*",
+]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Attempt to Clear Logs via Journalctl"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating Attempt to Clear Logs via Journalctl
+
+This detection flags attempts to purge systemd journal logs by invoking journalctl with vacuum options, which attackers use to erase evidence and impede investigations. A common pattern is a compromised user escalating to root and immediately running sudo journalctl --vacuum-time=1s or --vacuum-size=1M, sometimes via a script or cron job, to rapidly truncate the journal across all boots and hide prior execution traces.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Enrich with user/UID, effective privileges, parent and command-line, session/TTY, and origin (SSH IP or local), and determine if execution came from a scheduled job (cron/systemd timer) or a script.
+- Quantify destructiveness by extracting the exact vacuum parameter value(s) and immediately checking journal state (journalctl --disk-usage and --list-boots) and /var/log/journal size/mtime to see how much history was removed.
+- Inspect configuration and persistence paths for intentional log suppression, including recent changes in /etc/systemd/journald.conf (Storage=volatile, SystemMaxUse, SystemMaxFileSize, MaxRetentionSec) and any new systemd units or scripts invoking journalctl vacuum.
+- Correlate the vacuum timestamp with preceding activity to identify what might be concealed (privilege escalation, new accounts, sudoers edits, suspicious binaries), using auditd/EDR telemetry and shell history to rebuild the timeline.
+- Verify remote log forwarding and SIEM ingestion for this host, compare gaps around the vacuum time, and recover pre-vacuum events from central storage to assess impact and intent.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- A sysadmin or maintenance script ran journalctl --vacuum-time or --vacuum-size to reclaim space on a host under log disk pressure, which should correlate with low-free-space alerts, approved retention policy, and a scheduled systemd timer or cron job.
+- OS provisioning or image-preparation steps vacuumed the journal with journalctl --vacuum-files to sanitize logs before snapshotting, typically a one-time root action occurring near installation and matching documented build procedures.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Immediately kill any active journalctl vacuum invocation (e.g., pkill -x journalctl), lock or remove sudo for the initiating user, and network-quarantine the host to prevent further tampering.
+- Remove persistence by disabling systemd units/timers and cron jobs that call "journalctl --vacuum-*", inspecting /etc/systemd/system/* for ExecStart=journalctl vacuum and /etc/crontab, /etc/cron.*, and user crontabs, then deleting the offending scripts.
+- Recover logging by setting Storage=persistent and policy-compliant SystemMaxUse/SystemMaxFileSize/MaxRetentionSec in /etc/systemd/journald.conf, restarting systemd-journald, and backfilling missing events from central log archives.
+- Harden by enabling remote forwarding (ForwardToSyslog=yes and rsyslog/syslog-ng to SIEM), adding auditd rules to alert on "journalctl --vacuum-*", and tightening sudoers to require MFA and record command I/O for journalctl on critical hosts.
+- Preserve evidence by archiving remaining /var/log/journal entries, journald.conf and its mtime, modified unit files under /etc/systemd/system, and shell/auth logs, and capture a disk snapshot before making further changes.
+- Escalate to incident response if root executed "journalctl --vacuum-time/size/files" outside a documented maintenance window, if Storage=volatile was set or retention reduced below policy, or if the same actor performed vacuums on multiple hosts within 24 hours.
+"""
+risk_score = 21
+rule_id = "09073bf4-a8ea-4bce-9fd5-2bb56b4d31f4"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+#### Prerequisite Requirements:
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
+"""
+severity = "low"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Linux",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Defense Evasion",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
+    "Data Source: Auditd Manager",
+    "Data Source: Crowdstrike",
+    "Data Source: SentinelOne",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+query = '''
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and
+event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "start", "ProcessRollup2", "executed", "process_started") and
+process.name == "journalctl" and process.args like ("--vacuum-time=*", "--vacuum-size=*", "--vacuum-files=*")
+'''
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1070"
+name = "Indicator Removal"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1070.002"
+name = "Clear Linux or Mac System Logs"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/002/"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1562"
+name = "Impair Defenses"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1562.001"
+name = "Disable or Modify Tools"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001/"
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0005"
+name = "Defense Evasion"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/defense_evasion_kernel_module_removal.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2020/04/24"
+integration = ["endpoint", "crowdstrike", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/03/20"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Kernel modules are pieces of code that can be loaded and unloaded into the kernel upon demand. They extend the
+functionality of the kernel without the need to reboot the system. This rule identifies attempts to remove a kernel
+module.
+"""
+false_positives = [
+    """
+    There is usually no reason to remove modules, but some buggy modules require it. These can be exempted by username.
+    Note that some Linux distributions are not built to support the removal of modules at all.
+    """,
+]
+from = "now-9m"
+index = [
+    "endgame-*",
+    "logs-crowdstrike.fdr*",
+    "logs-endpoint.events.process*",
+    "logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*",
+]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Kernel Module Removal"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating Kernel Module Removal
+
+Kernel modules dynamically extend a Linux kernel's capabilities without rebooting. Adversaries may exploit this by removing modules to disable security features or hide malicious activities. The detection rule identifies suspicious module removal attempts by monitoring processes like `rmmod` or `modprobe` with removal arguments, especially when initiated by common shell environments, indicating potential defense evasion tactics.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Review the process details to confirm the execution of `rmmod` or `modprobe` with removal arguments. Check the command line arguments to ensure they match the suspicious activity criteria.
+- Identify the parent process of the suspicious activity, focusing on shell environments like `sudo`, `bash`, `dash`, `ash`, `sh`, `tcsh`, `csh`, `zsh`, `ksh`, or `fish`, to understand the context in which the module removal was initiated.
+- Investigate the user account associated with the process to determine if the activity aligns with expected behavior or if it indicates potential unauthorized access.
+- Check system logs and audit logs for any preceding or subsequent suspicious activities that might correlate with the module removal attempt, such as privilege escalation or other defense evasion tactics.
+- Assess the impact of the module removal on system security features and functionality, and determine if any critical security modules were targeted.
+- Review recent changes or updates to the system that might explain the module removal, such as legitimate maintenance or updates, to rule out false positives.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Routine administrative tasks may trigger the rule when system administrators use `rmmod` or `modprobe` for legitimate maintenance. To handle this, create exceptions for specific user accounts or scripts known to perform these tasks regularly.
+- Automated scripts or configuration management tools that manage kernel modules might cause false positives. Identify these tools and exclude their processes from the rule to prevent unnecessary alerts.
+- Some Linux distributions or custom setups might use shell scripts that invoke `rmmod` or `modprobe` during system updates or package installations. Monitor these activities and whitelist the associated parent processes if they are verified as non-threatening.
+- Development environments where kernel module testing is frequent can generate alerts. Exclude specific development machines or user accounts involved in module testing to reduce noise.
+- Security tools that perform regular checks or updates on kernel modules might inadvertently trigger the rule. Verify these tools and add them to the exception list to avoid false positives.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Immediately isolate the affected system from the network to prevent further unauthorized access or potential lateral movement by the adversary.
+- Terminate any suspicious processes identified as attempting to remove kernel modules, such as those initiated by `rmmod` or `modprobe` with removal arguments.
+- Conduct a thorough review of user accounts and privileges on the affected system to ensure no unauthorized access or privilege escalation has occurred.
+- Restore any disabled security features or kernel modules to their original state to ensure the system's defenses are intact.
+- Analyze system logs and audit trails to identify any additional indicators of compromise or related malicious activities.
+- Escalate the incident to the security operations center (SOC) or incident response team for further investigation and to determine if the threat is part of a larger attack campaign.
+- Implement enhanced monitoring and alerting for similar activities across the network to detect and respond to future attempts promptly."""
+references = ["http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/modprobe.8.html"]
+risk_score = 47
+rule_id = "cd66a5af-e34b-4bb0-8931-57d0a043f2ef"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+#### Prerequisite Requirements:
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
+"""
+severity = "medium"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Linux",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Defense Evasion",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Data Source: Crowdstrike",
+    "Data Source: SentinelOne",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+
+query = '''
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and
+  event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "start", "ProcessRollup2") and
+  (
+    process.name == "rmmod" or
+    (process.name == "modprobe" and process.args in ("--remove", "-r"))
+  ) and
+  process.parent.name in ("sudo", "bash", "dash", "ash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish")
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1562"
+name = "Impair Defenses"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1562.001"
+name = "Disable or Modify Tools"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0005"
+name = "Defense Evasion"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1547"
+name = "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1547.006"
+name = "Kernel Modules and Extensions"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/006/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0003"
+name = "Persistence"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
+