nldcsc-elastic-rules 0.0.8__py3-none-any.whl

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/windows/persistence_evasion_hidden_local_account_creation.toml

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+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2020/12/18"
+integration = ["endpoint", "windows", "m365_defender", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel", "crowdstrike"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/08/26"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Identifies the creation of a hidden local user account by appending the dollar sign to the account name. This is
+sometimes done by attackers to increase access to a system and avoid appearing in the results of accounts listing using
+the net users command.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = [
+    "winlogbeat-*",
+    "logs-endpoint.events.registry-*",
+    "logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*",
+    "endgame-*",
+    "logs-m365_defender.event-*",
+    "logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*",
+    "logs-crowdstrike.fdr*",
+]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Creation of a Hidden Local User Account"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+### Investigating Creation of a Hidden Local User Account
+
+Attackers can create accounts ending with a `$` symbol to make the account hidden to user enumeration utilities and bypass detections that identify computer accounts by this pattern to apply filters.
+
+This rule uses registry events to identify the creation of local hidden accounts.
+
+#### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positive (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Delete the hidden account.
+- Review the privileges assigned to the involved users to ensure that the least privilege principle is being followed.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+"""
+references = [
+    "http://web.archive.org/web/20230329153858/https://blog.menasec.net/2019/02/threat-hunting-6-hiding-in-plain-sights_8.html",
+    "https://github.com/CyberMonitor/APT_CyberCriminal_Campagin_Collections/tree/master/2020/2020.12.15.Lazarus_Campaign",
+]
+risk_score = 73
+rule_id = "2edc8076-291e-41e9-81e4-e3fcbc97ae5e"
+severity = "high"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Windows",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Persistence",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Data Source: Sysmon",
+    "Data Source: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint",
+    "Data Source: SentinelOne",
+    "Data Source: Crowdstrike",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+
+query = '''
+registry where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "change" and
+  registry.path : (
+    "HKLM\\SAM\\SAM\\Domains\\Account\\Users\\Names\\*$\\",
+    "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SAM\\SAM\\Domains\\Account\\Users\\Names\\*$\\",
+    "MACHINE\\SAM\\SAM\\Domains\\Account\\Users\\Names\\*$\\"
+)
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1136"
+name = "Create Account"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1136.001"
+name = "Local Account"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/001/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0003"
+name = "Persistence"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/windows/persistence_evasion_registry_ifeo_injection.toml

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+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2020/11/17"
+integration = ["endpoint", "windows", "m365_defender", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel", "crowdstrike"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/08/26"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+The Debugger and SilentProcessExit registry keys can allow an adversary to intercept the execution of files, causing a
+different process to be executed. This functionality can be abused by an adversary to establish persistence.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = [
+    "logs-endpoint.events.registry-*",
+    "endgame-*",
+    "logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*",
+    "winlogbeat-*",
+    "logs-m365_defender.event-*",
+    "logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*",
+    "logs-crowdstrike.fdr*",
+]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Image File Execution Options Injection"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating Image File Execution Options Injection
+
+Image File Execution Options (IFEO) is a Windows feature allowing developers to debug applications by specifying an alternative executable to run. Adversaries exploit this by setting a debugger to execute malicious code instead, achieving persistence or evasion. The detection rule identifies changes to specific registry keys associated with IFEO, flagging potential misuse by monitoring for unexpected executables being set as debuggers.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Review the registry path and value that triggered the alert to identify the specific executable or process being targeted for debugging or monitoring.
+- Check the registry.data.strings field to determine the unexpected executable set as a debugger or monitor process, and assess its legitimacy.
+- Investigate the origin and purpose of the executable found in the registry.data.strings by checking its file properties, digital signature, and any associated metadata.
+- Correlate the alert with recent system or user activity to identify any suspicious behavior or changes that coincide with the registry modification.
+- Examine the system for additional indicators of compromise, such as unusual network connections, file modifications, or other registry changes, to assess the scope of potential malicious activity.
+- Consult threat intelligence sources to determine if the identified executable or behavior is associated with known malware or threat actors.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- ThinKiosk and PSAppDeployToolkit are known to trigger false positives due to their legitimate use of the Debugger registry key. Users can mitigate this by adding exceptions for these applications in the detection rule.
+- Regularly review and update the list of exceptions to include any new legitimate applications that may use the Debugger or MonitorProcess registry keys for valid purposes.
+- Monitor the environment for any new software installations or updates that might interact with the IFEO registry keys and adjust the rule exceptions accordingly to prevent unnecessary alerts.
+- Collaborate with IT and security teams to identify any internal tools or scripts that might be using these registry keys for legitimate reasons and ensure they are accounted for in the rule exceptions.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Immediately isolate the affected system from the network to prevent further spread or communication with potential command and control servers.
+- Terminate any suspicious processes identified as being executed through the IFEO mechanism to halt any ongoing malicious activity.
+- Revert any unauthorized changes to the registry keys associated with Image File Execution Options and SilentProcessExit to their default or intended state.
+- Conduct a thorough scan of the affected system using updated antivirus or endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools to identify and remove any additional malware or persistence mechanisms.
+- Review and restore any altered or deleted system files from a known good backup to ensure system integrity.
+- Escalate the incident to the security operations center (SOC) or incident response team for further analysis and to determine if additional systems are affected.
+- Implement enhanced monitoring and logging for registry changes related to IFEO to detect and respond to similar threats in the future."""
+references = [
+    "https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/10/persistence-using-globalflags-in-image-file-execution-options-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/",
+]
+risk_score = 47
+rule_id = "6839c821-011d-43bd-bd5b-acff00257226"
+severity = "medium"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Windows",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Persistence",
+    "Tactic: Defense Evasion",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Data Source: Sysmon",
+    "Data Source: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint",
+    "Data Source: SentinelOne",
+    "Data Source: Crowdstrike",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+
+query = '''
+registry where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "change" and
+  registry.value : ("Debugger", "MonitorProcess") and length(registry.data.strings) > 0 and
+  registry.path : (
+    "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\*.exe\\Debugger",
+    "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\WOW6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\*\\Debugger",
+    "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\SilentProcessExit\\*\\MonitorProcess",
+    "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\WOW6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\SilentProcessExit\\*\\MonitorProcess",
+    "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\*.exe\\Debugger",
+    "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\WOW6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\*\\Debugger",
+    "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\SilentProcessExit\\*\\MonitorProcess",
+    "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\WOW6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\SilentProcessExit\\*\\MonitorProcess",
+    "MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\*.exe\\Debugger",
+    "MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\WOW6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\*\\Debugger",
+    "MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\SilentProcessExit\\*\\MonitorProcess",
+    "MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\WOW6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\SilentProcessExit\\*\\MonitorProcess"
+  ) and
+    /* add FPs here */
+  not registry.data.strings regex~ ("""C:\\Program Files( \(x86\))?\\ThinKiosk\\thinkiosk\.exe""", """.*\\PSAppDeployToolkit\\.*""")
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1546"
+name = "Event Triggered Execution"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1546.012"
+name = "Image File Execution Options Injection"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/012/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0003"
+name = "Persistence"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1112"
+name = "Modify Registry"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0005"
+name = "Defense Evasion"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/windows/persistence_evasion_registry_startup_shell_folder_modified.toml

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+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2021/03/15"
+integration = ["endpoint", "windows", "m365_defender", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel", "crowdstrike"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/09/11"
+
+[transform]
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache"
+query = "SELECT * FROM dns_cache"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve All Services"
+query = "SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts"
+query = """
+SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE
+NOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR
+user_account == null)
+"""
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link"
+query = """
+SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,
+services.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =
+authenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'
+"""
+
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Identifies suspicious startup shell folder modifications to change the default Startup directory in order to bypass
+detections monitoring file creation in the Windows Startup folder.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = [
+    "logs-endpoint.events.registry-*",
+    "endgame-*",
+    "logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*",
+    "winlogbeat-*",
+    "logs-m365_defender.event-*",
+    "logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*",
+    "logs-crowdstrike.fdr*",
+]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Suspicious Startup Shell Folder Modification"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+### Investigating Suspicious Startup Shell Folder Modification
+
+Techniques used within malware and by adversaries often leverage the Windows registry to store malicious programs for persistence. Startup shell folders are often targeted as they are not as prevalent as normal Startup folder paths so this behavior may evade existing AV/EDR solutions. These programs may also run with higher privileges which can be ideal for an attacker.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the [Osquery Markdown Plugin](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/invest-guide-run-osquery.html) introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+#### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Review the source process and related file tied to the Windows Registry entry.
+- Validate if the activity is not related to planned patches, updates, network administrator activity, or legitimate software installations.
+- Assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences across hosts.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze the file using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - $osquery_0
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - $osquery_1
+      - $osquery_2
+      - $osquery_3
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+- Investigate potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (for example, 4624) to the target host after the registry modification.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- There is a high possibility of benign legitimate programs being added to shell folders. This activity could be based on new software installations, patches, or other network administrator activity. Before undertaking further investigation, it should be verified that this activity is not benign.
+
+### Related rules
+
+- Startup or Run Key Registry Modification - 97fc44d3-8dae-4019-ae83-298c3015600f
+- Persistent Scripts in the Startup Directory - f7c4dc5a-a58d-491d-9f14-9b66507121c0
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- If the malicious file was delivered via phishing:
+  - Block the email sender from sending future emails.
+  - Block the malicious web pages.
+  - Remove emails from the sender from mailboxes.
+  - Consider improvements to the security awareness program.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+"""
+references = [
+    "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/elastic-security-uncovers-blister-malware-campaign",
+    "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/revisiting-blister-new-developments-of-the-blister-loader",
+]
+risk_score = 73
+rule_id = "c8b150f0-0164-475b-a75e-74b47800a9ff"
+severity = "high"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Windows",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Persistence",
+    "Tactic: Defense Evasion",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Data Source: Sysmon",
+    "Data Source: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint",
+    "Data Source: SentinelOne",
+    "Data Source: Crowdstrike",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+
+query = '''
+registry where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "change" and
+ registry.value : ("Common Startup", "Startup") and
+ registry.path : (
+     "HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\User Shell Folders\\Common Startup",
+     "HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Shell Folders\\Common Startup",
+     "HKEY_USERS\\*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\User Shell Folders\\Startup",
+     "HKEY_USERS\\*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Shell Folders\\Startup",
+     "HKU\\*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\User Shell Folders\\Startup",
+     "HKU\\*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Shell Folders\\Startup",
+     "HKCU\\*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\User Shell Folders\\Startup",
+     "HKCU\\*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Shell Folders\\Startup",
+     "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\User Shell Folders\\Common Startup",
+     "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Shell Folders\\Common Startup",
+     "\\REGISTRY\\USER\\*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\User Shell Folders\\Startup",
+     "\\REGISTRY\\USER\\*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Shell Folders\\Startup",
+     "MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\User Shell Folders\\Common Startup",
+     "MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Shell Folders\\Common Startup",
+     "USER\\*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\User Shell Folders\\Startup",
+     "USER\\*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Shell Folders\\Startup"
+     ) and
+  registry.data.strings != null and
+  /* Normal Startup Folder Paths */
+  not registry.data.strings : (
+           "C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup",
+           "%ProgramData%\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup",
+           "%USERPROFILE%\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup",
+           "%%USERPROFILE%%\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup",
+           "C:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup",
+           "\\\\*"
+           )
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1547"
+name = "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1547.001"
+name = "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0003"
+name = "Persistence"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1112"
+name = "Modify Registry"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0005"
+name = "Defense Evasion"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/windows/persistence_group_modification_by_system.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2024/06/26"
+integration = ["system", "windows"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/04/23"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Identifies a user being added to an active directory group by the SYSTEM (S-1-5-18) user. This behavior can indicate
+that the attacker has achieved SYSTEM privileges in a domain controller, which attackers can obtain by exploiting
+vulnerabilities or abusing default group privileges (e.g., Server Operators), and is attempting to pivot to a domain
+account.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["logs-system.security*", "logs-windows.forwarded*", "winlogbeat-*"]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Active Directory Group Modification by SYSTEM"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating Active Directory Group Modification by SYSTEM
+
+Active Directory (AD) is a critical component in Windows environments, managing user and group permissions. SYSTEM, a high-privilege account, can modify AD groups, which attackers exploit to gain unauthorized access. By monitoring specific event logs for SYSTEM-initiated group changes, the detection rule identifies potential privilege escalation, signaling an attacker may have compromised a domain controller.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Review the event log entry with event code 4728 to confirm the SYSTEM account (S-1-5-18) initiated the group modification.
+- Identify the specific Active Directory group that was modified and determine if it is a sensitive or high-privilege group.
+- Check for any recent changes or anomalies in the domain controller's security logs that might indicate SYSTEM privilege escalation.
+- Investigate the timeline of events leading up to the group modification to identify any suspicious activities or patterns.
+- Correlate this event with other security alerts or logs to assess if there is a broader attack pattern or campaign.
+- Verify if there are any known vulnerabilities or misconfigurations in the domain controller that could have been exploited to gain SYSTEM privileges.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Routine administrative tasks performed by automated scripts or scheduled tasks may trigger this rule. Review and document these tasks, then create exceptions for known benign scripts to prevent unnecessary alerts.
+- System maintenance activities, such as software updates or system reconfigurations, might involve legitimate group modifications by SYSTEM. Coordinate with IT teams to identify and whitelist these activities.
+- Certain security tools or monitoring solutions may perform group modifications as part of their normal operation. Verify these tools' actions and exclude them from triggering alerts if they are confirmed to be safe.
+- In environments with custom applications that require SYSTEM-level access for group management, ensure these applications are documented and their actions are excluded from detection to avoid false positives.
+- Regularly review and update the list of exceptions to ensure they remain relevant and do not inadvertently allow malicious activities to go undetected.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Immediately isolate the affected domain controller from the network to prevent further unauthorized access or lateral movement by the attacker.
+- Revoke any unauthorized group memberships added by the SYSTEM account to prevent privilege escalation and unauthorized access.
+- Conduct a thorough review of recent changes in Active Directory, focusing on group modifications and user account activities, to identify any other potential unauthorized changes.
+- Reset passwords for all accounts that were added to groups by the SYSTEM account to mitigate the risk of compromised credentials being used.
+- Apply security patches and updates to the domain controller to address any vulnerabilities that may have been exploited to gain SYSTEM privileges.
+- Monitor for any further suspicious activities or attempts to modify Active Directory groups, using enhanced logging and alerting mechanisms.
+- Escalate the incident to the security operations center (SOC) or incident response team for a comprehensive investigation and to determine the full scope of the breach."""
+risk_score = 47
+rule_id = "6f024bde-7085-489b-8250-5957efdf1caf"
+severity = "medium"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Windows",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Persistence",
+    "Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring",
+    "Data Source: Active Directory",
+    "Data Source: Windows Security Event Logs",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+
+query = '''
+iam where host.os.type == "windows" and event.code == "4728" and
+winlog.event_data.SubjectUserSid : "S-1-5-18" and
+
+/* DOMAIN_USERS and local groups */
+not group.id : "S-1-5-21-*-513"
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1098"
+name = "Account Manipulation"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0003"
+name = "Persistence"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1098"
+name = "Account Manipulation"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0004"
+name = "Privilege Escalation"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/windows/persistence_local_scheduled_job_creation.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2021/03/15"
+integration = ["endpoint", "windows", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel", "m365_defender"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/03/20"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+A job can be used to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a specified date and time. Adversaries may abuse
+task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code.
+"""
+false_positives = ["Legitimate scheduled jobs may be created during installation of new software."]
+from = "now-9m"
+index = [
+    "winlogbeat-*",
+    "logs-endpoint.events.file-*",
+    "logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*",
+    "endgame-*",
+    "logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*",
+    "logs-m365_defender.event-*",
+]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Persistence via Scheduled Job Creation"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating Persistence via Scheduled Job Creation
+
+Scheduled jobs in Windows environments allow tasks to be automated by executing scripts or programs at specified times. Adversaries exploit this feature to maintain persistence by scheduling malicious code execution. The detection rule identifies suspicious job creation by monitoring specific file paths and extensions, excluding known legitimate processes, to flag potential abuse while minimizing false positives.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Review the file path and extension to confirm the presence of a scheduled job in the "?:\\Windows\\Tasks\\" directory with a ".job" extension, which is indicative of a scheduled task.
+- Examine the process executable path to determine if the job creation is associated with any known legitimate processes, such as CCleaner or ManageEngine, which are excluded in the detection rule.
+- Investigate the origin of the process that created the scheduled job by checking the process execution history and command line arguments to identify any potentially malicious behavior.
+- Analyze the scheduled job's content and associated scripts or programs to identify any suspicious or unauthorized code that may indicate malicious intent.
+- Correlate the event with other security logs and alerts from data sources like Elastic Endgame, Sysmon, or Microsoft Defender for Endpoint to gather additional context and identify any related malicious activity.
+- Assess the risk and impact of the scheduled job by determining if it aligns with known adversary tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) related to persistence, as outlined in the MITRE ATT&CK framework.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Scheduled jobs created by CCleaner for crash reporting can trigger false positives. Exclude the path "?:\\Windows\\Tasks\\CCleanerCrashReporting.job" when the process executable is "?:\\Program Files\\CCleaner\\CCleaner64.exe".
+- ManageEngine UEMS Agent and DesktopCentral Agent may create scheduled jobs for updates, leading to false positives. Exclude the path "?:\\Windows\\Tasks\\DCAgentUpdater.job" when the process executable is "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\ManageEngine\\UEMS_Agent\\bin\\dcagentregister.exe" or "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\DesktopCentral_Agent\\bin\\dcagentregister.exe".
+- Regularly review and update exclusion lists to ensure they reflect the current environment and legitimate software behavior.
+- Consider implementing a whitelist of known legitimate processes and paths to further reduce false positives while maintaining effective threat detection.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Immediately isolate the affected system from the network to prevent further execution of potentially malicious scheduled jobs and limit lateral movement.
+- Terminate any suspicious processes associated with the identified scheduled job, using tools like Task Manager or PowerShell, to halt any ongoing malicious activity.
+- Delete the suspicious scheduled job file from the system to prevent future execution. This can be done using the Task Scheduler or command-line tools.
+- Conduct a thorough scan of the affected system using updated antivirus or endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions to identify and remove any additional malicious files or remnants.
+- Review and audit other scheduled tasks on the system to ensure no additional unauthorized or suspicious jobs are present.
+- Escalate the incident to the security operations center (SOC) or incident response team for further investigation and to determine if other systems are affected.
+- Implement enhanced monitoring and alerting for scheduled job creation activities across the network to detect similar threats in the future, leveraging the specific query fields used in the detection rule."""
+risk_score = 47
+rule_id = "1327384f-00f3-44d5-9a8c-2373ba071e92"
+severity = "medium"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Windows",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Persistence",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Data Source: Sysmon",
+    "Data Source: SentinelOne",
+    "Data Source: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+
+query = '''
+file where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type != "deletion" and
+  file.path : "?:\\Windows\\Tasks\\*" and file.extension : "job" and
+  not (
+    (
+      process.executable : "?:\\Program Files\\CCleaner\\CCleaner64.exe" and
+      file.path : "?:\\Windows\\Tasks\\CCleanerCrashReporting.job"
+    ) or
+    (
+      process.executable : (
+        "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\ManageEngine\\UEMS_Agent\\bin\\dcagentregister.exe",
+        "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\DesktopCentral_Agent\\bin\\dcagentregister.exe"
+      ) and
+      file.path : "?:\\Windows\\Tasks\\DCAgentUpdater.job"
+    )
+  )
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1053"
+name = "Scheduled Task/Job"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1053.005"
+name = "Scheduled Task"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0003"
+name = "Persistence"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
+