nldcsc-elastic-rules 0.0.8__py3-none-any.whl

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/integrations/aws/lateral_movement_sns_topic_message_publish_by_rare_user.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2025/01/07"
+integration = ["aws"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/09/09"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Identifies when an SNS topic message is published by a rare user in AWS. Adversaries may publish messages to SNS topics
+for phishing campaigns, data exfiltration, or lateral movement within the AWS environment. SNS topics are used to send
+notifications and messages to subscribed endpoints such as applications, mobile devices or email addresses, making them a
+valuable target for adversaries to distribute malicious content or exfiltrate sensitive data. This is a New Terms rule that only flags
+when this behavior is observed for the first time by a user or role.
+"""
+false_positives = [
+    """
+    New users or roles may legitimately publish messages to SNS topics for authorized purposes. Ensure that the action
+    is authorized before taking action.
+    """,
+]
+from = "now-6m"
+index = ["filebeat-*", "logs-aws.cloudtrail-*"]
+language = "kuery"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "AWS SNS Topic Message Publish by Rare User"
+note = """## Triage and Analysis
+
+### Investigating AWS SNS Topic Message Publish by Rare User
+
+This rule identifies when a message is published to an SNS topic by a user who has rarely or never published messages before. This activity could indicate adversarial actions, such as using SNS topics for phishing campaigns, data exfiltration, or lateral movement within an AWS environment.
+
+This is a [New Terms](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/rules-ui-create.html#create-new-terms-rule) rule that only flags when this behavior is observed for the first time by a user or role.
+
+#### Possible Investigation Steps
+
+- **Identify the Actor and Resource**:
+  - **User Identity and Role**: Examine the `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn` to identify the user or role responsible for publishing the SNS message. Verify whether this actor is authorized to publish messages to SNS topics.
+  - **Access Key Details**: Review the `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.access_key_id` to determine the access key used.
+  - **SNS Topic ARN**: Analyze `aws.cloudtrail.resources.arn` to confirm whether the SNS topic is critical, sensitive, or used for authorized purposes.
+
+- **Evaluate the Context of the SNS Message**:
+  - **Published Message Details**: AWS redacts the message content in CloudTrail logs, but you can view the message ID, subject, and other metadata. Investigate the message details for any indicators of malicious content.
+  - **Message Recipients**: Investigate the subscriptions associated with the SNS topic to identify if messages were sent to unauthorized or unexpected recipients.
+
+- **Analyze Source Information**:
+  - **Source IP Address**: Examine the `source.ip` field to identify the origin of the activity. Unusual IP addresses or geolocations may indicate unauthorized access.
+  - **User Agent**: Review `user_agent.original` to determine the tool or client used for publishing the SNS message. Automated tools or unexpected clients (e.g., `Boto3` from an unknown host) may signify misuse.
+
+- **Review Historical Activity**:
+  - **Actor’s Past Behavior**: Identify whether the user has published messages to SNS topics before. Review similar past events for context.
+  - **Frequency and Patterns**: Examine the time and frequency of messages published by the same user or to the same SNS topic to detect anomalies.
+
+- **Correlate with Other Events**:
+  - **IAM or CloudTrail Events**: Look for events such as `AssumeRole`, `CreateAccessKey`, or other API actions associated with the same user ARN.
+  - **Unusual IAM Role Activity**: Determine if the actor has assumed roles or performed administrative tasks atypical for their role.
+
+### False Positive Analysis
+
+- **Routine Operational Use**:
+  - Confirm if the publishing activity aligns with standard operational tasks or automation scripts.
+  - Validate whether new or rare users were recently granted permissions for publishing messages to SNS topics.
+
+- **Testing or Monitoring Scripts**:
+  - Automated testing or monitoring tools may trigger this rule if configured to publish messages to SNS topics.
+
+### Response and Remediation
+
+- **Immediate Action**:
+  - If unauthorized activity is confirmed, disable the access key or IAM role associated with the user.
+  - Restrict or remove permissions from the SNS topic to prevent further misuse.
+
+- **Review Policies and Subscriptions**:
+  - Audit the IAM policies tied to the user and SNS topic to ensure appropriate permissions.
+  - Validate the subscriptions of the SNS topic to confirm all endpoints are authorized.
+
+- **Enhance Monitoring and Alerting**:
+  - Set up additional logging or alerting for SNS publish actions, especially from rare or unknown users.
+  - Monitor for similar actions across other SNS topics within the environment.
+
+- **Conduct a Root Cause Analysis**:
+  - Investigate how the user or role gained access to publish messages to the SNS topic.
+  - Determine if other AWS resources or services have been affected.
+
+### Additional Information
+
+For more information on SNS topic management and securing AWS resources, refer to:
+- [AWS SNS Publish API Documentation](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/sns/latest/api/API_Publish.html)
+- [AWS CloudTrail Documentation](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudtrail-event-reference.html)
+"""
+references = [
+    "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/sns/latest/api/API_Publish.html",
+    "https://hackingthe.cloud/aws/exploitation/Misconfigured_Resource-Based_Policies/exploting_public_resources_attack_playbook/",
+    "https://permiso.io/blog/s/smishing-attack-on-aws-sms-new-phone-who-dis/",
+    "https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/sns-sender-active-campaigns-unleash-messaging-spam-through-the-cloud/",
+]
+risk_score = 47
+rule_id = "2112ecce-cd34-11ef-873f-f661ea17fbcd"
+setup = "AWS SNS topic data event types need to be enabled in the CloudTrail trail configuration to capture the Publish action. Ensure that the AWS CloudTrail service is [configured](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/sns/latest/dg/logging-using-cloudtrail.html#cloudtrail-data-events) to log data events for SNS."
+severity = "medium"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Cloud",
+    "Data Source: AWS",
+    "Data Source: Amazon Web Services",
+    "Data Source: AWS SNS",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+    "Tactic: Lateral Movement",
+    "Tactic: Exfiltration",
+    "Tactic: Impact",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "new_terms"
+
+query = '''
+event.dataset:"aws.cloudtrail"
+    and event.provider:"sns.amazonaws.com"
+    and event.action:"Publish"
+    and event.outcome:"success"
+'''
+
+[rule.investigation_fields]
+field_names = [
+    "@timestamp",
+    "user.name",
+    "user_agent.original",
+    "source.ip",
+    "aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn",
+    "aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.type",
+    "aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.access_key_id",
+    "aws.cloudtrail.resources.arn",     
+    "aws.cloudtrail.resources.type",   
+    "event.action",
+    "event.outcome",
+    "cloud.account.id",
+    "cloud.region",
+    "aws.cloudtrail.request_parameters",
+    "aws.cloudtrail.response_elements"
+]
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1534"
+name = "Internal Spearphishing"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0008"
+name = "Lateral Movement"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/"
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1567"
+name = "Exfiltration Over Web Service"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0010"
+name = "Exfiltration"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010/"
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1496"
+name = "Resource Hijacking"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1496.004"
+name = "Cloud Service Hijacking"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496/004/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0040"
+name = "Impact"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0040/"
+
+[rule.new_terms]
+field = "new_terms_fields"
+value = ["cloud.account.id", "user.name", "aws.cloudtrail.resources.arn"]
+[[rule.new_terms.history_window_start]]
+field = "history_window_start"
+value = "now-10d"
+
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/integrations/aws/ml_cloudtrail_error_message_spike.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2020/07/13"
+integration = ["aws"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2024/06/18"
+
+[rule]
+anomaly_threshold = 50
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+A machine learning job detected a significant spike in the rate of a particular error in the CloudTrail messages. Spikes
+in error messages may accompany attempts at privilege escalation, lateral movement, or discovery.
+"""
+false_positives = [
+    """
+    Spikes in error message activity can also be due to bugs in cloud automation scripts or workflows; changes to cloud
+    automation scripts or workflows; adoption of new services; changes in the way services are used; or changes to IAM
+    privileges.
+    """,
+]
+from = "now-60m"
+interval = "15m"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+machine_learning_job_id = "high_distinct_count_error_message"
+name = "Spike in AWS Error Messages"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+This rule requires the installation of associated Machine Learning jobs, as well as data coming in from AWS.
+
+### Anomaly Detection Setup
+
+Once the rule is enabled, the associated Machine Learning job will start automatically. You can view the Machine Learning job linked under the "Definition" panel of the detection rule. If the job does not start due to an error, the issue must be resolved for the job to commence successfully. For more details on setting up anomaly detection jobs, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/kibana/current/xpack-ml-anomalies.html).
+
+### AWS Integration Setup
+The AWS integration allows you to collect logs and metrics from Amazon Web Services (AWS) with Elastic Agent.
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Agent System integration "aws" to your system:
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click “Add integrations”.
+- In the query bar, search for “AWS” and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click “Add AWS”.
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Review optional and advanced settings accordingly.
+- Add the newly installed “aws” to an existing or a new agent policy, and deploy the agent on your system from which aws log files are desirable.
+- Click “Save and Continue”.
+- For more details on the integration refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/docs/current/integrations/aws).
+"""
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+### Investigating Spike in AWS Error Messages
+
+CloudTrail logging provides visibility on actions taken within an AWS environment. By monitoring these events and understanding what is considered normal behavior within an organization, you can spot suspicious or malicious activity when deviations occur.
+
+This rule uses a machine learning job to detect a significant spike in the rate of a particular error in the CloudTrail messages. Spikes in error messages may accompany attempts at privilege escalation, lateral movement, or discovery.
+
+#### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Examine the history of the error. If the error only manifested recently, it might be related to recent changes in an automation module or script. You can find the error in the `aws.cloudtrail.error_code field` field.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user account during the past 48 hours.
+- Validate the activity is not related to planned patches, updates, or network administrator activity.
+- Examine the request parameters. These may indicate the source of the program or the nature of the task being performed when the error occurred.
+    - Check whether the error is related to unsuccessful attempts to enumerate or access objects, data, or secrets.
+- Considering the source IP address and geolocation of the user who issued the command:
+    - Do they look normal for the calling user?
+    - If the source is an EC2 IP address, is it associated with an EC2 instance in one of your accounts or is the source IP from an EC2 instance that's not under your control?
+    - If it is an authorized EC2 instance, is the activity associated with normal behavior for the instance role or roles? Are there any other alerts or signs of suspicious activity involving this instance?
+- Consider the time of day. If the user is a human (not a program or script), did the activity take place during a normal time of day?
+- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity if suspicious.
+- If you suspect the account has been compromised, scope potentially compromised assets by tracking servers, services, and data accessed by the account in the last 24 hours.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Examine the history of the command. If the command only manifested recently, it might be part of a new automation module or script. If it has a consistent cadence (for example, it appears in small numbers on a weekly or monthly cadence), it might be part of a housekeeping or maintenance process. You can find the command in the `event.action field` field.
+- The adoption of new services or the addition of new functionality to scripts may generate false positives.
+
+### Related Rules
+
+- Unusual City For an AWS Command - 809b70d3-e2c3-455e-af1b-2626a5a1a276
+- Unusual Country For an AWS Command - dca28dee-c999-400f-b640-50a081cc0fd1
+- Unusual AWS Command for a User - ac706eae-d5ec-4b14-b4fd-e8ba8086f0e1
+- Rare AWS Error Code - 19de8096-e2b0-4bd8-80c9-34a820813fff
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Disable or limit the account during the investigation and response.
+- Identify the possible impact of the incident and prioritize accordingly; the following actions can help you gain context:
+    - Identify the account role in the cloud environment.
+    - Assess the criticality of affected services and servers.
+    - Work with your IT team to identify and minimize the impact on users.
+    - Identify if the attacker is moving laterally and compromising other accounts, servers, or services.
+    - Identify any regulatory or legal ramifications related to this activity.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords or delete API keys as needed to revoke the attacker's access to the environment. Work with your IT teams to minimize the impact on business operations during these actions.
+- Check if unauthorized new users were created, remove unauthorized new accounts, and request password resets for other IAM users.
+- Consider enabling multi-factor authentication for users.
+- Review the permissions assigned to the implicated user to ensure that the least privilege principle is being followed.
+- Implement security best practices [outlined](https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/security-best-practices/) by AWS.
+- Take the actions needed to return affected systems, data, or services to their normal operational levels.
+- Identify the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection via the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+"""
+references = ["https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/prebuilt-ml-jobs.html"]
+risk_score = 21
+rule_id = "78d3d8d9-b476-451d-a9e0-7a5addd70670"
+severity = "low"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Cloud",
+    "Data Source: AWS",
+    "Data Source: Amazon Web Services",
+    "Rule Type: ML",
+    "Rule Type: Machine Learning",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+type = "machine_learning"
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/integrations/aws/ml_cloudtrail_rare_error_code.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2020/07/13"
+integration = ["aws"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2024/06/18"
+
+[rule]
+anomaly_threshold = 50
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+A machine learning job detected an unusual error in a CloudTrail message. These can be byproducts of attempted or
+successful persistence, privilege escalation, defense evasion, discovery, lateral movement, or collection.
+"""
+false_positives = [
+    """
+    Rare and unusual errors may indicate an impending service failure state. Rare and unusual user error activity can
+    also be due to manual troubleshooting or reconfiguration attempts by insufficiently privileged users, bugs in cloud
+    automation scripts or workflows, or changes to IAM privileges.
+    """,
+]
+from = "now-2h"
+interval = "15m"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+machine_learning_job_id = "rare_error_code"
+name = "Rare AWS Error Code"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+This rule requires the installation of associated Machine Learning jobs, as well as data coming in from AWS.
+
+### Anomaly Detection Setup
+
+Once the rule is enabled, the associated Machine Learning job will start automatically. You can view the Machine Learning job linked under the "Definition" panel of the detection rule. If the job does not start due to an error, the issue must be resolved for the job to commence successfully. For more details on setting up anomaly detection jobs, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/kibana/current/xpack-ml-anomalies.html).
+
+### AWS Integration Setup
+The AWS integration allows you to collect logs and metrics from Amazon Web Services (AWS) with Elastic Agent.
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Agent System integration "aws" to your system:
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click “Add integrations”.
+- In the query bar, search for “AWS” and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click “Add AWS”.
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Review optional and advanced settings accordingly.
+- Add the newly installed “aws” to an existing or a new agent policy, and deploy the agent on your system from which aws log files are desirable.
+- Click “Save and Continue”.
+- For more details on the integration refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/docs/current/integrations/aws).
+"""
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+### Investigating Rare AWS Error Code
+
+CloudTrail logging provides visibility on actions taken within an AWS environment. By monitoring these events and understanding what is considered normal behavior within an organization, you can spot suspicious or malicious activity when deviations occur.
+
+This rule uses a machine learning job to detect an unusual error in a CloudTrail message. This can be byproducts of attempted or successful persistence, privilege escalation, defense evasion, discovery, lateral movement, or collection.
+
+Detection alerts from this rule indicate a rare and unusual error code that was associated with the response to an AWS API command or method call.
+
+#### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Examine the history of the error. If the error only manifested recently, it might be related to recent changes in an automation module or script. You can find the error in the `aws.cloudtrail.error_code field` field.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user account during the past 48 hours.
+- Validate the activity is not related to planned patches, updates, or network administrator activity.
+- Examine the request parameters. These may indicate the source of the program or the nature of the task being performed when the error occurred.
+    - Check whether the error is related to unsuccessful attempts to enumerate or access objects, data, or secrets.
+- Considering the source IP address and geolocation of the user who issued the command:
+    - Do they look normal for the calling user?
+    - If the source is an EC2 IP address, is it associated with an EC2 instance in one of your accounts or is the source IP from an EC2 instance that's not under your control?
+    - If it is an authorized EC2 instance, is the activity associated with normal behavior for the instance role or roles? Are there any other alerts or signs of suspicious activity involving this instance?
+- Consider the time of day. If the user is a human (not a program or script), did the activity take place during a normal time of day?
+- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity if suspicious.
+- If you suspect the account has been compromised, scope potentially compromised assets by tracking servers, services, and data accessed by the account in the last 24 hours.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Examine the history of the command. If the command only manifested recently, it might be part of a new automation module or script. If it has a consistent cadence (for example, it appears in small numbers on a weekly or monthly cadence), it might be part of a housekeeping or maintenance process. You can find the command in the `event.action field` field.
+- The adoption of new services or the addition of new functionality to scripts may generate false positives.
+
+### Related Rules
+
+- Unusual City For an AWS Command - 809b70d3-e2c3-455e-af1b-2626a5a1a276
+- Unusual Country For an AWS Command - dca28dee-c999-400f-b640-50a081cc0fd1
+- Unusual AWS Command for a User - ac706eae-d5ec-4b14-b4fd-e8ba8086f0e1
+- Spike in AWS Error Messages - 78d3d8d9-b476-451d-a9e0-7a5addd70670
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Disable or limit the account during the investigation and response.
+- Identify the possible impact of the incident and prioritize accordingly; the following actions can help you gain context:
+    - Identify the account role in the cloud environment.
+    - Assess the criticality of affected services and servers.
+    - Work with your IT team to identify and minimize the impact on users.
+    - Identify if the attacker is moving laterally and compromising other accounts, servers, or services.
+    - Identify any regulatory or legal ramifications related to this activity.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords or delete API keys as needed to revoke the attacker's access to the environment. Work with your IT teams to minimize the impact on business operations during these actions.
+- Check if unauthorized new users were created, remove unauthorized new accounts, and request password resets for other IAM users.
+- Consider enabling multi-factor authentication for users.
+- Review the permissions assigned to the implicated user to ensure that the least privilege principle is being followed.
+- Implement security best practices [outlined](https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/security-best-practices/) by AWS.
+- Take the actions needed to return affected systems, data, or services to their normal operational levels.
+- Identify the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection via the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+"""
+references = ["https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/prebuilt-ml-jobs.html"]
+risk_score = 21
+rule_id = "19de8096-e2b0-4bd8-80c9-34a820813fff"
+severity = "low"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Cloud",
+    "Data Source: AWS",
+    "Data Source: Amazon Web Services",
+    "Rule Type: ML",
+    "Rule Type: Machine Learning",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+type = "machine_learning"
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/integrations/aws/ml_cloudtrail_rare_method_by_city.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2020/07/13"
+integration = ["aws"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2024/06/18"
+
+[rule]
+anomaly_threshold = 50
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+A machine learning job detected AWS command activity that, while not inherently suspicious or abnormal, is sourcing from
+a geolocation (city) that is unusual for the command. This can be the result of compromised credentials or keys being
+used by a threat actor in a different geography than the authorized user(s).
+"""
+false_positives = [
+    """
+    New or unusual command and user geolocation activity can be due to manual troubleshooting or reconfiguration;
+    changes in cloud automation scripts or workflows; adoption of new services; expansion into new regions; increased
+    adoption of work from home policies; or users who travel frequently.
+    """,
+]
+from = "now-2h"
+interval = "15m"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+machine_learning_job_id = "rare_method_for_a_city"
+name = "Unusual City For an AWS Command"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+This rule requires the installation of associated Machine Learning jobs, as well as data coming in from AWS.
+
+### Anomaly Detection Setup
+
+Once the rule is enabled, the associated Machine Learning job will start automatically. You can view the Machine Learning job linked under the "Definition" panel of the detection rule. If the job does not start due to an error, the issue must be resolved for the job to commence successfully. For more details on setting up anomaly detection jobs, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/kibana/current/xpack-ml-anomalies.html).
+
+### AWS Integration Setup
+The AWS integration allows you to collect logs and metrics from Amazon Web Services (AWS) with Elastic Agent.
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Agent System integration "aws" to your system:
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click “Add integrations”.
+- In the query bar, search for “AWS” and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click “Add AWS”.
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Review optional and advanced settings accordingly.
+- Add the newly installed “aws” to an existing or a new agent policy, and deploy the agent on your system from which aws log files are desirable.
+- Click “Save and Continue”.
+- For more details on the integration refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/docs/current/integrations/aws).
+"""
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+### Investigating Unusual City For an AWS Command
+
+CloudTrail logging provides visibility on actions taken within an AWS environment. By monitoring these events and understanding what is considered normal behavior within an organization, you can spot suspicious or malicious activity when deviations occur.
+
+This rule uses a machine learning job to detect an AWS API command that while not inherently suspicious or abnormal, is sourcing from a geolocation (city) that is unusual for the command. This can be the result of compromised credentials or keys used by a threat actor in a different geography than the authorized user(s).
+
+Detection alerts from this rule indicate an AWS API command or method call that is rare and unusual for the geolocation of the source IP address.
+
+#### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Identify the user account involved and the action performed. Verify whether it should perform this kind of action.
+    - Examine the user identity in the `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn` field and the access key ID in the `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.access_key_id` field, which can help identify the precise user context.
+    - The user agent details in the `user_agent.original` field may also indicate what kind of a client made the request.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user account during the past 48 hours.
+- Validate the activity is not related to planned patches, updates, or network administrator activity.
+- Examine the request parameters. These might indicate the source of the program or the nature of its tasks.
+- Considering the source IP address and geolocation of the user who issued the command:
+    - Do they look normal for the calling user?
+    - If the source is an EC2 IP address, is it associated with an EC2 instance in one of your accounts or is the source IP from an EC2 instance that's not under your control?
+    - If it is an authorized EC2 instance, is the activity associated with normal behavior for the instance role or roles? Are there any other alerts or signs of suspicious activity involving this instance?
+- Consider the time of day. If the user is a human (not a program or script), did the activity take place during a normal time of day?
+- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity if suspicious.
+- If you suspect the account has been compromised, scope potentially compromised assets by tracking servers, services, and data accessed by the account in the last 24 hours.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- False positives can occur if activity is coming from new employees based in a city with no previous history in AWS.
+- Examine the history of the command. If the command only manifested recently, it might be part of a new automation module or script. If it has a consistent cadence (for example, it appears in small numbers on a weekly or monthly cadence), it might be part of a housekeeping or maintenance process. You can find the command in the `event.action field` field.
+
+### Related Rules
+
+- Unusual Country For an AWS Command - dca28dee-c999-400f-b640-50a081cc0fd1
+- Unusual AWS Command for a User - ac706eae-d5ec-4b14-b4fd-e8ba8086f0e1
+- Rare AWS Error Code - 19de8096-e2b0-4bd8-80c9-34a820813fff
+- Spike in AWS Error Messages - 78d3d8d9-b476-451d-a9e0-7a5addd70670
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Disable or limit the account during the investigation and response.
+- Identify the possible impact of the incident and prioritize accordingly; the following actions can help you gain context:
+    - Identify the account role in the cloud environment.
+    - Assess the criticality of affected services and servers.
+    - Work with your IT team to identify and minimize the impact on users.
+    - Identify if the attacker is moving laterally and compromising other accounts, servers, or services.
+    - Identify any regulatory or legal ramifications related to this activity.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords or delete API keys as needed to revoke the attacker's access to the environment. Work with your IT teams to minimize the impact on business operations during these actions.
+- Check if unauthorized new users were created, remove unauthorized new accounts, and request password resets for other IAM users.
+- Consider enabling multi-factor authentication for users.
+- Review the permissions assigned to the implicated user to ensure that the least privilege principle is being followed.
+- Implement security best practices [outlined](https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/security-best-practices/) by AWS.
+- Take the actions needed to return affected systems, data, or services to their normal operational levels.
+- Identify the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection via the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+"""
+references = ["https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/prebuilt-ml-jobs.html"]
+risk_score = 21
+rule_id = "809b70d3-e2c3-455e-af1b-2626a5a1a276"
+severity = "low"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Cloud",
+    "Data Source: AWS",
+    "Data Source: Amazon Web Services",
+    "Rule Type: ML",
+    "Rule Type: Machine Learning",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+type = "machine_learning"
+