nldcsc-elastic-rules 0.0.8__py3-none-any.whl

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/persistence_systemd_netcon.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2024/02/01"
+integration = ["endpoint"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/02/04"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Detects suspicious network events executed by systemd, potentially indicating persistence through a systemd backdoor.
+Systemd is a system and service manager for Linux operating systems, used to initialize and manage system processes.
+Attackers can backdoor systemd for persistence by creating or modifying systemd unit files to execute malicious scripts
+or commands, or by replacing legitimate systemd binaries with compromised ones, ensuring that their malicious code is
+automatically executed at system startup or during certain system events.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["logs-endpoint.events.network*", "logs-endpoint.events.process*"]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Suspicious Network Connection via systemd"
+risk_score = 47
+rule_id = "f3818c85-2207-4b51-8a28-d70fb156ee87"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+#### Prerequisite Requirements:
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
+"""
+severity = "medium"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Linux",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Persistence",
+    "Tactic: Command and Control",
+    "Tactic: Defense Evasion",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+type = "eql"
+query = '''
+sequence by host.id with maxspan=5s
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
+   process.parent.name == "systemd" and process.name in (
+     "python*", "php*", "perl", "ruby", "lua*", "openssl", "nc", "netcat", "ncat", "telnet", "awk"
+   )
+  ] by process.entity_id
+  [network where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "connection_attempted" and event.type == "start" and
+   not process.executable == "/tmp/newroot/bin/curl"] by process.parent.entity_id
+'''
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating Suspicious Network Connection via systemd
+
+Systemd is a critical component in Linux, managing system processes and services. Adversaries exploit it by altering unit files or replacing binaries to ensure malicious scripts run at startup, achieving persistence. The detection rule identifies unusual network activities initiated by systemd, flagging potential backdoor usage by monitoring specific processes and network attempts, thus aiding in early threat detection.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Review the process details to identify the specific script or command executed by systemd, focusing on the process names such as "python*", "php*", "perl", "ruby", "lua*", "openssl", "nc", "netcat", "ncat", "telnet", "awk".
+- Examine the parent process information to confirm that the suspicious process was indeed initiated by systemd, ensuring the parent process name is "systemd".
+- Investigate the network connection attempt details, including the destination IP address and port, to determine if the connection is to a known malicious or suspicious endpoint.
+- Check the process executable path to ensure it is not a known legitimate path, especially looking for unusual paths that might indicate a compromised binary, excluding "/tmp/newroot/bin/curl".
+- Analyze the systemd unit files on the host to identify any unauthorized modifications or additions that could indicate persistence mechanisms.
+- Correlate the event with other security alerts or logs from the same host to identify any patterns or additional indicators of compromise.
+- Consult threat intelligence sources to gather more context on the IP addresses or domains involved in the network connection attempt.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Legitimate administrative scripts or maintenance tasks that use scripting languages like Python, PHP, or Perl may trigger the rule. To handle this, identify and document these scripts, then create exceptions for their specific process names or paths.
+- Automated system monitoring tools that perform network checks using utilities like netcat or telnet might be flagged. Review these tools and whitelist their process names or executable paths to prevent false alerts.
+- Custom applications or services that are legitimately started by systemd and initiate network connections could be misidentified. Verify these applications and add them to an allowlist based on their process names or parent entity IDs.
+- Development or testing environments where developers frequently use scripting languages for network operations may cause false positives. Consider excluding these environments from monitoring or creating specific rules that account for their unique behaviors.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Isolate the affected host immediately from the network to prevent further malicious activity and lateral movement.
+- Terminate any suspicious processes identified in the alert, particularly those initiated by systemd that match the specified process names (e.g., python, php, perl).
+- Review and restore any modified or suspicious systemd unit files to their original state, ensuring no unauthorized scripts or commands are set to execute at startup.
+- Conduct a thorough scan of the affected system for additional indicators of compromise, focusing on persistence mechanisms and unauthorized network connections.
+- Reinstall or verify the integrity of systemd binaries to ensure they have not been replaced or tampered with by malicious actors.
+- Escalate the incident to the security operations team for further investigation and to determine if additional systems are affected.
+- Implement enhanced monitoring and logging for systemd-related activities and network connections to detect similar threats in the future."""
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1543"
+name = "Create or Modify System Process"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1543.002"
+name = "Systemd Service"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002/"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1574"
+name = "Hijack Execution Flow"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/"
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0003"
+name = "Persistence"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0011"
+name = "Command and Control"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/"
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0005"
+name = "Defense Evasion"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/persistence_systemd_scheduled_timer_created.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2023/02/24"
+integration = ["endpoint"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/02/03"
+
+[transform]
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve File Information"
+query = "SELECT * FROM file WHERE path = {{file.path}}"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve File Listing Information"
+query = """
+SELECT * FROM file WHERE (path LIKE '/etc/systemd/system/%' OR path LIKE '/usr/local/lib/systemd/system/%' OR path LIKE
+'/lib/systemd/system/%' OR path LIKE '/usr/lib/systemd/system/%' OR path LIKE
+'/home/{{user.name}}/.config/systemd/user/%' OR path LIKE '/home/{{user.name}}/.local/share/systemd/user/%' OR path LIKE
+'/root/.config/systemd/user/%' OR path LIKE '/root/.local/share/systemd/user/%' OR path LIKE '/etc/systemd/user/%' OR
+path LIKE '/usr/lib/systemd/user/%')
+"""
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Additional File Listing Information"
+query = """
+SELECT f.path, u.username AS file_owner, g.groupname AS group_owner, datetime(f.atime, 'unixepoch') AS
+file_last_access_time, datetime(f.mtime, 'unixepoch') AS file_last_modified_time, datetime(f.ctime, 'unixepoch') AS
+file_last_status_change_time, datetime(f.btime, 'unixepoch') AS file_created_time, f.size AS size_bytes FROM file f LEFT
+JOIN users u ON f.uid = u.uid LEFT JOIN groups g ON f.gid = g.gid WHERE ( path LIKE '/etc/systemd/system/%' OR path LIKE
+'/usr/local/lib/systemd/system/%' OR path LIKE '/lib/systemd/system/%' OR path LIKE '/usr/lib/systemd/system/%' OR path
+LIKE '/home/{{user.name}}/.config/systemd/user/%' OR path LIKE '/home/{{user.name}}/.local/share/systemd/user/%' OR path
+LIKE '/root/.config/systemd/user/%' OR path LIKE '/root/.local/share/systemd/user/%' OR path LIKE '/etc/systemd/user/%'
+OR path LIKE '/usr/lib/systemd/user/%')
+"""
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Running Processes by User"
+query = "SELECT pid, username, name FROM processes p JOIN users u ON u.uid = p.uid ORDER BY username"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Crontab Information"
+query = "SELECT * FROM crontab"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Detects the creation of a systemd timer within any of the default systemd timer directories. Systemd timers can be used
+by an attacker to gain persistence, by scheduling the execution of a command or script. Similarly to cron/at, systemd
+timers can be set up to execute on boot time, or on a specific point in time, which allows attackers to regain access in
+case the connection to the infected asset was lost.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["logs-endpoint.events.file*"]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Systemd Timer Created"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+### Investigating Systemd Timer Created
+
+Systemd timers are used for scheduling and automating recurring tasks or services on Linux systems. 
+
+Attackers can leverage systemd timers to run scripts, commands, or malicious software at system boot or on a set time interval by creating a systemd timer and a corresponding systemd service file. 
+
+This rule monitors the creation of new systemd timer files, potentially indicating the creation of a persistence mechanism.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the [Osquery Markdown Plugin](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/invest-guide-run-osquery.html) introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+> This investigation guide uses [placeholder fields](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/osquery-placeholder-fields.html) to dynamically pass alert data into Osquery queries. Placeholder fields were introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.7.0. If you're using Elastic Stack version 8.6.0 or earlier, you'll need to manually adjust this investigation guide's queries to ensure they properly run.
+
+#### Possible Investigation Steps
+
+- Investigate the timer file that was created or modified.
+  - $osquery_0
+- Investigate the currently enabled systemd timers through the following command `sudo systemctl list-timers`.
+- Search for the systemd service file named similarly to the timer that was created.
+- Investigate whether any other files in any of the available systemd directories have been altered through OSQuery.
+  - $osquery_1
+  - $osquery_2
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence and whether they are located in expected locations.
+  - $osquery_3
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Validate the activity is not related to planned patches, updates, network administrator activity, or legitimate software installations.
+- Investigate whether the altered scripts call other malicious scripts elsewhere on the file system. 
+  - If scripts or executables were dropped, retrieve the files and determine if they are malicious:
+    - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+      - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+        - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+          - Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
+          - Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
+        - File access, modification, and creation activities.
+        - Cron jobs, services and other persistence mechanisms.
+            - $osquery_4
+
+### False Positive Analysis
+
+- If this activity is related to new benign software installation activity, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of user and command line conditions.
+- If this activity is related to a system administrator who uses systemd timers for administrative purposes, consider adding exceptions for this specific administrator user account. 
+- Try to understand the context of the execution by thinking about the user, machine, or business purpose. A small number of endpoints, such as servers with unique software, might appear unusual but satisfy a specific business need.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Delete the service/timer or restore its original configuration.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+"""
+references = [
+    "https://opensource.com/article/20/7/systemd-timers",
+    "https://pberba.github.io/security/2022/01/30/linux-threat-hunting-for-persistence-systemd-timers-cron/",
+    "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/primer-on-persistence-mechanisms",
+]
+risk_score = 21
+rule_id = "7fb500fa-8e24-4bd1-9480-2a819352602c"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+#### Prerequisite Requirements:
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
+"""
+severity = "low"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Linux",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Persistence",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+query = '''
+file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("rename", "creation") and file.path : (
+  "/etc/systemd/system/*", "/etc/systemd/user/*", "/usr/local/lib/systemd/system/*",
+  "/lib/systemd/system/*", "/usr/lib/systemd/system/*", "/usr/lib/systemd/user/*",
+  "/home/*/.config/systemd/user/*", "/home/*/.local/share/systemd/user/*",
+  "/root/.config/systemd/user/*", "/root/.local/share/systemd/user/*"
+) and file.extension == "timer" and not (
+  process.executable in (
+    "/bin/dpkg", "/usr/bin/dpkg", "/bin/dockerd", "/usr/bin/dockerd", "/usr/sbin/dockerd", "/bin/microdnf",
+    "/usr/bin/microdnf", "/bin/rpm", "/usr/bin/rpm", "/bin/snapd", "/usr/bin/snapd", "/bin/yum", "/usr/bin/yum",
+    "/bin/dnf", "/usr/bin/dnf", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/bin/dnf-automatic", "/usr/bin/dnf-automatic",
+    "/bin/pacman", "/usr/bin/pacman", "/usr/bin/dpkg-divert", "/bin/dpkg-divert", "/sbin/apk", "/usr/sbin/apk",
+    "/usr/local/sbin/apk", "/usr/bin/apt", "/usr/sbin/pacman", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/puppet",
+    "/bin/puppet", "/opt/puppetlabs/puppet/bin/puppet", "/usr/bin/chef-client", "/bin/chef-client",
+    "/bin/autossl_check", "/usr/bin/autossl_check", "/proc/self/exe", "/dev/fd/*",  "/usr/bin/pamac-daemon",
+    "/bin/pamac-daemon", "/usr/lib/snapd/snapd", "/usr/local/bin/dockerd", "/usr/bin/crio", "/usr/sbin/crond",
+    "/opt/puppetlabs/puppet/bin/ruby", "/usr/libexec/platform-python", "/kaniko/kaniko-executor",
+    "/usr/local/bin/dockerd", "/usr/bin/podman", "/bin/install", "/proc/self/exe", "/kaniko/executor"
+  ) or
+  process.name like (
+    "python*", "crio", "apt-get", "install", "snapd", "cloudflared", "sshd", "convert-usrmerge", "docker-init",
+    "google_metadata_script_runner", "ssm-agent-worker", "pacman", "convert2rhel", "platform-python"
+  ) or
+  file.extension in ("swp", "swpx", "swx", "dpkg-remove") or
+  file.Ext.original.extension == "dpkg-new" or
+  process.executable : (
+    "/nix/store/*", "/var/lib/dpkg/*", "/tmp/vmis.*", "/snap/*", "/dev/fd/*", "/usr/lib/virtualbox/*"
+  ) or
+  process.executable == null or
+  (process.name == "sed" and file.name : "sed*") or
+  (process.name == "perl" and file.name : "e2scrub_all.tmp*") 
+)
+'''
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1053"
+name = "Scheduled Task/Job"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1053.006"
+name = "Systemd Timers"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/006/"
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0003"
+name = "Persistence"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/persistence_systemd_service_creation.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,261 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2023/06/09"
+integration = ["endpoint"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/02/03"
+
+[transform]
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve File Information"
+query = "SELECT * FROM file WHERE path = {{file.path}}"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve File Listing Information"
+query = """
+SELECT * FROM file WHERE (path LIKE '/etc/systemd/system/%' OR path LIKE '/usr/local/lib/systemd/system/%' OR path LIKE
+'/lib/systemd/system/%' OR path LIKE '/usr/lib/systemd/system/%' OR path LIKE
+'/home/{{user.name}}/.config/systemd/user/%' OR path LIKE '/home/{{user.name}}/.local/share/systemd/user/%' OR path LIKE
+'/root/.config/systemd/user/%' OR path LIKE '/root/.local/share/systemd/user/%' OR path LIKE '/etc/systemd/user/%' OR
+path LIKE '/usr/lib/systemd/user/%')
+"""
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Additional File Listing Information"
+query = """
+SELECT f.path, u.username AS file_owner, g.groupname AS group_owner, datetime(f.atime, 'unixepoch') AS
+file_last_access_time, datetime(f.mtime, 'unixepoch') AS file_last_modified_time, datetime(f.ctime, 'unixepoch') AS
+file_last_status_change_time, datetime(f.btime, 'unixepoch') AS file_created_time, f.size AS size_bytes FROM file f LEFT
+JOIN users u ON f.uid = u.uid LEFT JOIN groups g ON f.gid = g.gid WHERE ( path LIKE '/etc/systemd/system/%' OR path LIKE
+'/usr/local/lib/systemd/system/%' OR path LIKE '/lib/systemd/system/%' OR path LIKE '/usr/lib/systemd/system/%' OR path
+LIKE '/home/{{user.name}}/.config/systemd/user/%' OR path LIKE '/home/{{user.name}}/.local/share/systemd/user/%' OR path
+LIKE '/root/.config/systemd/user/%' OR path LIKE '/root/.local/share/systemd/user/%' OR path LIKE '/etc/systemd/user/%'
+OR path LIKE '/usr/lib/systemd/user/%')
+"""
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Running Processes by User"
+query = "SELECT pid, username, name FROM processes p JOIN users u ON u.uid = p.uid ORDER BY username"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Crontab Information"
+query = "SELECT * FROM crontab"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Listening Ports"
+query = "SELECT pid, address, port, socket, protocol, path FROM listening_ports"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Open Sockets"
+query = "SELECT pid, family, remote_address, remote_port, socket, state FROM process_open_sockets"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Information for a Specific User"
+query = "SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = {{user.name}}"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Investigate the Account Authentication Status"
+query = "SELECT * FROM logged_in_users WHERE user = {{user.name}}"
+
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+This rule detects the creation or renaming of a new Systemd file in all of the common Systemd service locations for both
+root and regular users. Systemd service files are configuration files in Linux systems used to define and manage system
+services. Malicious actors can leverage systemd service files to achieve persistence by creating or modifying services
+to execute malicious commands or payloads during system startup or at a predefined interval by adding a systemd timer.
+This allows them to maintain unauthorized access, execute additional malicious activities, or evade detection.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["logs-endpoint.events.file*"]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Systemd Service Created"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+### Investigating Systemd Service Created
+
+Systemd service files are configuration files in Linux systems used to define and manage system services.
+
+Malicious actors can leverage systemd service files to achieve persistence by creating or modifying service files to execute malicious commands or payloads during system startup. This allows them to maintain unauthorized access, execute additional malicious activities, or evade detection.
+
+This rule monitors the creation of new systemd service files, potentially indicating the creation of a persistence mechanism.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the [Osquery Markdown Plugin](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/invest-guide-run-osquery.html) introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+> This investigation guide uses [placeholder fields](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/osquery-placeholder-fields.html) to dynamically pass alert data into Osquery queries. Placeholder fields were introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.7.0. If you're using Elastic Stack version 8.6.0 or earlier, you'll need to manually adjust this investigation guide's queries to ensure they properly run.
+
+#### Possible Investigation Steps
+
+- Investigate the systemd service file that was created or modified.
+  - $osquery_0
+- Investigate the currently enabled systemd services through the following command `sudo systemctl list-unit-files`.
+- Investigate whether any other files in any of the available systemd directories have been altered through OSQuery.
+  - $osquery_1
+  - $osquery_2
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence and whether they are located in expected locations.
+  - $osquery_3
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Validate the activity is not related to planned patches, updates, network administrator activity, or legitimate software installations.
+- Investigate whether the altered scripts call other malicious scripts elsewhere on the file system. 
+  - If scripts or executables were dropped, retrieve the files and determine if they are malicious:
+    - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+      - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+        - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+          - Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
+          - Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
+        - File access, modification, and creation activities.
+        - Cron jobs, services and other persistence mechanisms.
+            - $osquery_4
+- Investigate abnormal behaviors by the subject process/user such as network connections, file modifications, and any other spawned child processes.
+  - Investigate listening ports and open sockets to look for potential command and control traffic or data exfiltration.
+    - $osquery_5
+    - $osquery_6
+  - Identify the user account that performed the action, analyze it, and check whether it should perform this kind of action.
+    - $osquery_7
+- Investigate whether the user is currently logged in and active.
+    - $osquery_8
+
+### False Positive Analysis
+
+- If this activity is related to new benign software installation activity, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of user and command line conditions.
+- If this activity is related to a system administrator who uses systemd services for administrative purposes, consider adding exceptions for this specific administrator user account. 
+- Try to understand the context of the execution by thinking about the user, machine, or business purpose. A small number of endpoints, such as servers with unique software, might appear unusual but satisfy a specific business need.
+
+### Related Rules
+
+- Potential Persistence Through Run Control Detected - 0f4d35e4-925e-4959-ab24-911be207ee6f
+- Potential Persistence Through init.d Detected - 474fd20e-14cc-49c5-8160-d9ab4ba16c8b
+- Systemd Timer Created - 7fb500fa-8e24-4bd1-9480-2a819352602c
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Delete the service/timer or restore its original configuration.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+"""
+references = [
+    "https://pberba.github.io/security/2022/01/30/linux-threat-hunting-for-persistence-systemd-timers-cron/",
+    "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/primer-on-persistence-mechanisms",
+]
+risk_score = 47
+rule_id = "17b0a495-4d9f-414c-8ad0-92f018b8e001"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+#### Prerequisite Requirements:
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
+"""
+severity = "medium"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Linux",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Persistence",
+    "Tactic: Privilege Escalation",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+query = '''
+file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("rename", "creation") and file.path : (
+  "/etc/systemd/system/*", "/etc/systemd/user/*", "/usr/local/lib/systemd/system/*",
+  "/lib/systemd/system/*", "/usr/lib/systemd/system/*", "/usr/lib/systemd/user/*",
+  "/home/*/.config/systemd/user/*", "/home/*/.local/share/systemd/user/*",
+  "/root/.config/systemd/user/*", "/root/.local/share/systemd/user/*"
+) and file.extension == "service" and not (
+  process.executable in (
+    "/bin/dpkg", "/usr/bin/dpkg", "/bin/dockerd", "/usr/bin/dockerd", "/usr/sbin/dockerd", "/bin/microdnf",
+    "/usr/bin/microdnf", "/bin/rpm", "/usr/bin/rpm", "/bin/snapd", "/usr/bin/snapd", "/bin/yum", "/usr/bin/yum",
+    "/bin/dnf", "/usr/bin/dnf", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/bin/dnf-automatic", "/usr/bin/dnf-automatic",
+    "/usr/bin/dpkg-divert", "/bin/dpkg-divert", "/sbin/apk", "/usr/sbin/apk",
+    "/usr/local/sbin/apk", "/usr/bin/apt", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/puppet",
+    "/bin/puppet", "/opt/puppetlabs/puppet/bin/puppet", "/usr/bin/chef-client", "/bin/chef-client",
+    "/bin/autossl_check", "/usr/bin/autossl_check", "/proc/self/exe", "/dev/fd/*",  "/usr/bin/pamac-daemon",
+    "/bin/pamac-daemon", "/usr/lib/snapd/snapd", "/usr/local/bin/dockerd", "/usr/bin/crio", "/usr/sbin/crond",
+    "/opt/puppetlabs/puppet/bin/ruby", "/usr/libexec/platform-python", "/kaniko/kaniko-executor",
+    "/usr/local/bin/dockerd", "/usr/bin/podman", "/bin/install", "/proc/self/exe", "/usr/lib/systemd/systemd",
+    "/usr/sbin/sshd", "/usr/bin/gitlab-runner", "/opt/gitlab/embedded/bin/ruby", "/usr/sbin/gdm", "/usr/bin/install",
+    "/usr/local/manageengine/uems_agent/bin/dcregister"
+  ) or
+  file.extension in ("swp", "swpx", "swx", "dpkg-remove") or
+  file.Ext.original.extension == "dpkg-new" or
+  process.executable : (
+    "/nix/store/*", "/var/lib/dpkg/*", "/tmp/vmis.*", "/snap/*", "/dev/fd/*", "/usr/lib/virtualbox/*"
+  ) or
+  process.executable == null or
+  process.name like (
+    "ssm-agent-worker", "python*", "platform-python*", "dnf_install", "cloudflared", "lxc-pve-prestart-hook",
+    "convert-usrmerge", "elastic-agent", "google_metadata_script_runner", "update-alternatives", "gitlab-runner",
+    "install", "crio", "apt-get", "package-cleanup", "dcservice", "dcregister", "jumpcloud-agent", "executor",
+    "pacman", "convert2rhel", "packagekitd"
+  ) or
+  (process.name == "sed" and file.name : "sed*") or
+  (process.name == "perl" and file.name : "e2scrub_all.tmp*") 
+)
+'''
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1543"
+name = "Create or Modify System Process"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1543.002"
+name = "Systemd Service"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002/"
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0003"
+name = "Persistence"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1543"
+name = "Create or Modify System Process"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1543.002"
+name = "Systemd Service"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002/"
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0004"
+name = "Privilege Escalation"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"