nldcsc-elastic-rules 0.0.8__py3-none-any.whl

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/windows/execution_posh_malicious_script_agg.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2025/04/16"
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/07/16"
+
+[transform]
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache"
+query = "SELECT * FROM dns_cache"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve All Services"
+query = "SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts"
+query = """
+SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE
+NOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR
+user_account == null)
+"""
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link"
+query = """
+SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,
+services.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =
+authenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'
+"""
+
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = "Identifies PowerShell script blocks associated with multiple distinct detections, indicating likely malicious behavior.\n"
+from = "now-9m"
+language = "esql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Potential Malicious PowerShell Based on Alert Correlation"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+### Investigating Potential Malicious PowerShell Based on Alert Correlation
+
+This detection rule aggregates alert data to identify PowerShell Scripts that have triggered various PowerShell-related detection logic, thereby producing higher-fidelity results.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the [Osquery Markdown Plugin](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/invest-guide-run-osquery.html) introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Analyzing the detections triggered by the script should offer insight into the suspicious behaviors it exhibits. This information can be found in the `distinct_alerts` field.
+- Examine the script content that triggered the detection; look for suspicious DLL imports, collection or exfiltration capabilities, suspicious functions, encoded or compressed data, and other potentially malicious characteristics.
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Examine the script's execution context, such as the user account, privileges, the role of the system on which it was executed, and any relevant timestamps.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Evaluate whether the user needs to use PowerShell to complete tasks.
+- Investigate the origin of the PowerShell script, including its source, download method, and any associated URLs or IP addresses.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze the script using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process's `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - $osquery_0
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - $osquery_1
+      - $osquery_2
+      - $osquery_3
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+- Investigate potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (for example, 4624) to the target host after the registry modification.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- This rule is unlikely to trigger on legitimate activity. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
+
+### Response and Remediation
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+  - If malicious activity is confirmed, perform a broader investigation to identify the scope of the compromise and determine the appropriate remediation steps.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Reimage the host operating system or restore the compromised files to clean versions.
+- Restrict PowerShell usage outside of IT and engineering business units using GPOs, AppLocker, Intune, or similar software.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+"""
+risk_score = 73
+rule_id = "f770ce79-05fd-4d74-9866-1c5d66c9b34b"
+severity = "high"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Windows",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Execution",
+    "Rule Type: Higher-Order Rule",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "esql"
+
+query = '''
+from .alerts-security.* metadata _id
+
+// Filter for PowerShell related alerts
+| where kibana.alert.rule.name like "*PowerShell*"
+
+// as alerts don't have non-ECS fields, parse the script block ID using grok
+| grok message "ScriptBlock ID: (?<Esql.script_block_id>.+)"
+| where Esql.script_block_id is not null
+
+// keep relevant fields for further processing
+| keep kibana.alert.rule.name, Esql.script_block_id, _id
+
+// count distinct alerts and filter for matches above the threshold
+| stats
+    Esql.kibana_alert_rule_name_count_distinct = count_distinct(kibana.alert.rule.name),
+    Esql.kibana_alert_rule_name_values = values(kibana.alert.rule.name),
+    Esql._id_values = values(_id)
+  by Esql.script_block_id
+
+// Apply detection threshold
+| where Esql.kibana_alert_rule_name_count_distinct >= 5
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1059"
+name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1059.001"
+name = "PowerShell"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0002"
+name = "Execution"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/windows/execution_posh_portable_executable.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2021/10/15"
+integration = ["windows"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/03/20"
+
+[transform]
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache"
+query = "SELECT * FROM dns_cache"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve All Services"
+query = "SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts"
+query = """
+SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE
+NOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR
+user_account == null)
+"""
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link"
+query = """
+SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,
+services.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =
+authenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'
+"""
+
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Detects the presence of a portable executable (PE) in a PowerShell script by looking for its encoded header. Attackers
+embed PEs into PowerShell scripts to inject them into memory, avoiding defences by not writing to disk.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-windows.powershell*"]
+language = "kuery"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Suspicious Portable Executable Encoded in Powershell Script"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+### Investigating Suspicious Portable Executable Encoded in Powershell Script
+
+PowerShell is one of the main tools system administrators use for automation, report routines, and other tasks. This makes it available for use in various environments, and creates an attractive way for attackers to execute code.
+
+Attackers can abuse PowerShell in-memory capabilities to inject executables into memory without touching the disk, bypassing file-based security protections. These executables are generally base64 encoded.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the [Osquery Markdown Plugin](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/invest-guide-run-osquery.html) introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+#### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Examine the script content that triggered the detection; look for suspicious DLL imports, collection or exfiltration capabilities, suspicious functions, encoded or compressed data, and other potentially malicious characteristics.
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Evaluate whether the user needs to use PowerShell to complete tasks.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze the script using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - $osquery_0
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - $osquery_1
+      - $osquery_2
+      - $osquery_3
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+- Investigate potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (for example, 4624) to the target host after the registry modification.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
+
+### Related rules
+
+- Suspicious .NET Reflection via PowerShell - e26f042e-c590-4e82-8e05-41e81bd822ad
+- PowerShell Suspicious Payload Encoded and Compressed - 81fe9dc6-a2d7-4192-a2d8-eed98afc766a
+- PowerShell PSReflect Script - 56f2e9b5-4803-4e44-a0a4-a52dc79d57fe
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Reimage the host operating system or restore the compromised files to clean versions.
+- Restrict PowerShell usage outside of IT and engineering business units using GPOs, AppLocker, Intune, or similar software.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+"""
+references = [
+    "https://github.com/atc-project/atc-data/blob/master/docs/Logging_Policies/LP_0109_windows_powershell_script_block_log.md",
+]
+risk_score = 47
+rule_id = "ad84d445-b1ce-4377-82d9-7c633f28bf9a"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+The 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy must be enabled.
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+
+```
+Computer Configuration >
+Administrative Templates >
+Windows PowerShell >
+Turn on PowerShell Script Block Logging (Enable)
+```
+
+Steps to implement the logging policy via registry:
+
+```
+reg add "hklm\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\PowerShell\\ScriptBlockLogging" /v EnableScriptBlockLogging /t REG_DWORD /d 1
+```
+"""
+severity = "medium"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Windows",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Execution",
+    "Tactic: Defense Evasion",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+    "Data Source: PowerShell Logs",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "query"
+
+query = '''
+event.category:process and host.os.type:windows and
+  powershell.file.script_block_text : (
+    TVqQAAMAAAAEAAAA
+  ) and not user.id : "S-1-5-18"
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1059"
+name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1059.001"
+name = "PowerShell"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0002"
+name = "Execution"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1055"
+name = "Process Injection"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0005"
+name = "Defense Evasion"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/windows/execution_posh_psreflect.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2021/10/15"
+integration = ["windows"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/03/20"
+
+[transform]
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache"
+query = "SELECT * FROM dns_cache"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve All Services"
+query = "SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts"
+query = """
+SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE
+NOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR
+user_account == null)
+"""
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link"
+query = """
+SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,
+services.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =
+authenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'
+"""
+
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Detects the use of PSReflect in PowerShell scripts. Attackers leverage PSReflect as a library that enables PowerShell to
+access win32 API functions.
+"""
+false_positives = ["Legitimate PowerShell scripts that make use of PSReflect to access the win32 API"]
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-windows.powershell*"]
+language = "kuery"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "PowerShell PSReflect Script"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+### Investigating PowerShell PSReflect Script
+
+PowerShell is one of the main tools system administrators use for automation, report routines, and other tasks. This makes it available for use in various environments, and creates an attractive way for attackers to execute code.
+
+PSReflect is a library that enables PowerShell to access win32 API functions in an uncomplicated way. It also helps to create enums and structs easily—all without touching the disk.
+
+Although this is an interesting project for every developer and admin out there, it is mainly used in the red team and malware tooling for its capabilities.
+
+Detecting the core implementation of PSReflect means detecting most of the tooling that uses Windows API through PowerShell, enabling defenders to discover tools being dropped in the environment.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the [Osquery Markdown Plugin](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/invest-guide-run-osquery.html) introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+#### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Examine the script content that triggered the detection; look for suspicious DLL imports, collection or exfiltration capabilities, suspicious functions, encoded or compressed data, and other potentially malicious characteristics. The script content that may be split into multiple script blocks (you can use the field `powershell.file.script_block_id` for filtering).
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Check for additional PowerShell and command-line logs that indicate that imported functions were run.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Evaluate whether the user needs to use PowerShell to complete tasks.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze the script using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - $osquery_0
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - $osquery_1
+      - $osquery_2
+      - $osquery_3
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+- Investigate potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (for example, 4624) to the target host after the registry modification.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
+
+### Related rules
+
+- PowerShell Suspicious Discovery Related Windows API Functions - 61ac3638-40a3-44b2-855a-985636ca985e
+- PowerShell Keylogging Script - bd2c86a0-8b61-4457-ab38-96943984e889
+- PowerShell Suspicious Script with Audio Capture Capabilities - 2f2f4939-0b34-40c2-a0a3-844eb7889f43
+- Potential Process Injection via PowerShell - 2e29e96a-b67c-455a-afe4-de6183431d0d
+- Suspicious .NET Reflection via PowerShell - e26f042e-c590-4e82-8e05-41e81bd822ad
+- PowerShell Suspicious Payload Encoded and Compressed - 81fe9dc6-a2d7-4192-a2d8-eed98afc766a
+- PowerShell Suspicious Script with Screenshot Capabilities - 959a7353-1129-4aa7-9084-30746b256a70
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Restrict PowerShell usage outside of IT and engineering business units using GPOs, AppLocker, Intune, or similar software.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+"""
+references = [
+    "https://github.com/mattifestation/PSReflect/blob/master/PSReflect.psm1",
+    "https://github.com/atc-project/atc-data/blob/master/docs/Logging_Policies/LP_0109_windows_powershell_script_block_log.md",
+]
+risk_score = 73
+rule_id = "56f2e9b5-4803-4e44-a0a4-a52dc79d57fe"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+The 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy must be configured (Enable).
+
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+
+```
+Computer Configuration >
+Administrative Templates >
+Windows PowerShell >
+Turn on PowerShell Script Block Logging (Enable)
+```
+
+Steps to implement the logging policy via registry:
+
+```
+reg add "hklm\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\PowerShell\\ScriptBlockLogging" /v EnableScriptBlockLogging /t REG_DWORD /d 1
+```
+"""
+severity = "high"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Windows",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Execution",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+    "Data Source: PowerShell Logs",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "query"
+
+query = '''
+event.category:process and host.os.type:windows and
+  powershell.file.script_block_text:(
+    "New-InMemoryModule" or
+    "Add-Win32Type" or
+    psenum or
+    DefineDynamicAssembly or
+    DefineDynamicModule or
+    "Reflection.TypeAttributes" or
+    "Reflection.Emit.OpCodes" or
+    "Reflection.Emit.CustomAttributeBuilder" or
+    "Runtime.InteropServices.DllImportAttribute"
+  ) and
+  not user.id : "S-1-5-18"
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.filters]]
+
+[rule.filters.meta]
+negate = true
+[rule.filters.query.wildcard."file.path"]
+case_insensitive = true
+value = "?:\\\\ProgramData\\\\MaaS360\\\\Cloud Extender\\\\AR\\\\Scripts\\\\ASModuleCommon.ps1"
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1059"
+name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1059.001"
+name = "PowerShell"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/"
+
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1106"
+name = "Native API"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0002"
+name = "Execution"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/windows/execution_powershell_susp_args_via_winscript.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2024/09/09"
+integration = ["windows", "system", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel", "m365_defender", "crowdstrike"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/09/11"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = "Identifies PowerShell.exe or Cmd.exe execution spawning from Windows Script Host processes Wscript.exe."
+from = "now-9m"
+index = [
+    "logs-m365_defender.event-*",
+    "logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*",
+    "logs-system.security*",
+    "logs-windows.forwarded*",
+    "logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*",
+    "winlogbeat-*",
+    "endgame-*",
+    "logs-crowdstrike.fdr*",
+]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter via Windows Scripts"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating Command and Scripting Interpreter via Windows Scripts
+
+PowerShell, a powerful scripting language in Windows, is often targeted by adversaries for executing malicious scripts. Attackers exploit Windows Script Host processes like cscript or wscript to launch PowerShell with obfuscated commands, evading detection. The detection rule identifies such suspicious activity by monitoring PowerShell executions with specific patterns and parent processes, while filtering out known legitimate use cases to reduce false positives.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Review the process command line and arguments to identify any obfuscation patterns or suspicious commands, such as Base64 encoding or web requests, that match the query's suspicious patterns.
+- Examine the parent process details, specifically focusing on wscript.exe, cscript.exe, or mshta.exe, to determine if the PowerShell execution was initiated by a legitimate script or a potentially malicious one.
+- Check the process execution context, including the user account and host, to assess if the activity aligns with expected behavior for that user or system.
+- Investigate any network connections or file downloads initiated by the PowerShell process, especially those involving external IP addresses or domains, to identify potential data exfiltration or further malicious activity.
+- Correlate the alert with other security events or logs from the same host or user to identify any preceding or subsequent suspicious activities that could indicate a broader attack campaign.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Legitimate PowerShell commands using non-shortened execution flags may trigger false positives. To manage this, exclude processes with arguments like "-EncodedCommand", "Import-Module*", and "-NonInteractive" unless they are associated with suspicious activity.
+- Third-party installation scripts, such as those related to Microsoft System Center or WebLogic, can cause false positives. Exclude these by filtering out specific parent process arguments or command lines, such as "Microsoft.SystemCenter.ICMPProbe.WithConsecutiveSamples.vbs" and "WEBLOGIC_ARGS_CURRENT_1.DATA".
+- Routine administrative tasks, like gathering network information, may be flagged. Exclude known scripts like "gatherNetworkInfo.vbs" from detection to prevent unnecessary alerts.
+- Exclude specific user scripts or tools that are known to be safe, such as those located in user directories like "C:\\Users\\Prestige\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\Rar$*\\KMS_VL_ALL_AIO.cmd" if they are verified as non-malicious.
+- Regularly review and update exclusion lists to ensure they reflect current legitimate activities and do not inadvertently allow new threats.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Isolate the affected system from the network to prevent further malicious activity and lateral movement.
+- Terminate any suspicious PowerShell processes identified by the alert to stop ongoing malicious execution.
+- Conduct a thorough review of the affected system's PowerShell execution logs to identify any additional malicious scripts or commands that may have been executed.
+- Remove any malicious scripts or files identified during the investigation from the system to prevent re-execution.
+- Restore the system from a known good backup if any critical system files or configurations have been altered by the malicious activity.
+- Update and patch the system to the latest security standards to close any vulnerabilities that may have been exploited.
+- Escalate the incident to the security operations center (SOC) or incident response team for further analysis and to determine if additional systems are affected."""
+risk_score = 73
+rule_id = "2d62889e-e758-4c5e-b57e-c735914ee32a"
+severity = "high"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Windows",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Execution",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+    "Data Source: Windows Security Event Logs",
+    "Data Source: Sysmon",
+    "Data Source: SentinelOne",
+    "Data Source: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
+    "Data Source: Crowdstrike",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+
+query = '''
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+  process.command_line != null and
+  (
+    process.name : ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "powershell_ise.exe", "cmd.exe") or
+    ?process.pe.original_file_name : ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.dll", "powershell_ise.exe", "Cmd.Exe")
+  ) and
+  process.parent.name : ("wscript.exe", "mshta.exe")
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1059"
+name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1059.001"
+name = "PowerShell"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1059.003"
+name = "Windows Command Shell"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003/"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1059.005"
+name = "Visual Basic"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0002"
+name = "Execution"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
+