nldcsc-elastic-rules 0.0.8__py3-none-any.whl

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/promotions/splunk_external_alerts.toml

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+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2025/07/31"
+integration = ["splunk"]
+maturity = "production"
+promotion = true
+updated_date = "2025/10/17"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Generates a detection alert for each Splunk alert written to the configured indices. Enabling this rule allows you to
+immediately begin investigating Splunk alerts in the app.
+"""
+from = "now-2m"
+index = ["logs-splunk.alert-*"]
+interval = "1m"
+language = "kuery"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+max_signals = 1000
+name = "Splunk External Alerts"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+### Investigating Splunk External Alerts
+
+Splunk monitors and analyzes data, often used in security environments to track and respond to potential threats. The rule identifies such manipulations by flagging alerts enabling timely investigation and response.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Examine the specific indices where the alert was written to identify any unusual or unauthorized activity.
+- Cross-reference the alert with recent changes or activities in the Splunk environment to determine if the alert could be a result of legitimate administrative actions.
+- Investigate the source and context of the alert to identify any patterns or anomalies that could indicate manipulation or false positives.
+- Check for any related alerts or logs that might provide additional context or evidence of adversarial behavior.
+- Consult the Splunk investigation guide and resources tagged in the alert for specific guidance on handling similar threats.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Alerts triggered by routine Splunk maintenance activities can be false positives. To manage these, identify and document regular maintenance schedules and create exceptions for alerts generated during these times.
+- Frequent alerts from specific indices that are known to contain non-threatening data can be excluded by adjusting the rule to ignore these indices, ensuring only relevant alerts are investigated.
+- Alerts generated by automated scripts or tools that interact with Splunk for legitimate purposes can be false positives. Review and whitelist these scripts or tools to prevent unnecessary alerts.
+- If certain user actions consistently trigger alerts but are verified as non-malicious, consider creating user-specific exceptions to reduce noise and focus on genuine threats.
+- Regularly review and update the list of exceptions to ensure they remain relevant and do not inadvertently exclude new or evolving threats.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Immediately isolate affected systems to prevent further manipulation of Splunk alerts and potential spread of malicious activity.
+- Review and validate the integrity of the Splunk alert indices to ensure no unauthorized changes have been made.
+- Restore any compromised Splunk alert configurations from a known good backup to ensure accurate monitoring and alerting.
+- Conduct a thorough audit of user access and permissions within Splunk to identify and revoke any unauthorized access.
+- Escalate the incident to the security operations center (SOC) for further analysis and to determine if additional systems or data have been affected.
+- Implement enhanced monitoring on Splunk indices to detect any future unauthorized changes or suspicious activities.
+- Document the incident details and response actions taken for future reference and to improve incident response procedures.
+"""
+references = ["https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/splunk"]
+risk_score = 47
+rule_id = "d3b6222f-537e-4b84-956a-3ebae2dcf811"
+rule_name_override = "splunk.alert.source"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+### Splunk Alert Integration
+This rule is designed to capture alert events generated by the Splunk integration and promote them as Elastic detection alerts.
+
+To capture Splunk alerts, install and configure the Splunk integration to ingest alert events into the `logs-splunk.alert-*` index pattern.
+
+If this rule is enabled alongside the External Alerts promotion rule (UUID: eb079c62-4481-4d6e-9643-3ca499df7aaa), you may receive duplicate alerts for the same Splunk events. Consider adding a rule exception for the External Alert rule to exclude data_stream.dataset:splunk.alert to avoid receiving duplicate alerts.
+
+### Additional notes
+
+For information on troubleshooting the maximum alerts warning please refer to this [guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/alerts-ui-monitor.html#troubleshoot-max-alerts).
+"""
+severity = "medium"
+tags = [
+    "Data Source: Splunk",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+    "Promotion: External Alerts",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "query"
+
+query = '''
+event.kind: alert and data_stream.dataset: splunk.alert
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.risk_score_mapping]]
+field = "event.risk_score"
+operator = "equals"
+value = ""
+
+[[rule.severity_mapping]]
+field = "event.severity"
+operator = "equals"
+severity = "low"
+value = "21"
+
+[[rule.severity_mapping]]
+field = "event.severity"
+operator = "equals"
+severity = "medium"
+value = "47"
+
+[[rule.severity_mapping]]
+field = "event.severity"
+operator = "equals"
+severity = "high"
+value = "73"
+
+[[rule.severity_mapping]]
+field = "event.severity"
+operator = "equals"
+severity = "critical"
+value = "99"
+
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/threat_intel/threat_intel_indicator_match_address.toml

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+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2023/05/22"
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/04/22"
+
+[transform]
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache"
+query = "SELECT * FROM dns_cache"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve All Services"
+query = "SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts"
+query = """
+SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE
+NOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR
+user_account == null)
+"""
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link"
+query = """
+SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,
+services.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =
+authenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'
+"""
+
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+This rule is triggered when an IP address indicator from the Threat Intel Filebeat module or integrations has a match
+against a network event.
+"""
+from = "now-65m"
+index = ["auditbeat-*", "endgame-*", "filebeat-*", "logs-*", "packetbeat-*", "winlogbeat-*"]
+interval = "1h"
+language = "kuery"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Threat Intel IP Address Indicator Match"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+### Investigating Threat Intel IP Address Indicator Match
+
+Threat Intel indicator match rules allow matching from a local observation, such as an endpoint event that records a file hash with an entry of a file hash stored within the Threat Intel integrations index.
+
+Matches are based on threat intelligence data that's been ingested during the last 30 days. Some integrations don't place expiration dates on their threat indicators, so we strongly recommend validating ingested threat indicators and reviewing match results. When reviewing match results, check associated activity to determine whether the event requires additional investigation.
+
+This rule is triggered when an IP address indicator from the Threat Intel Filebeat module or a threat intelligence integration matches against a network event.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the [Osquery Markdown Plugin](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/invest-guide-run-osquery.html) introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+#### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Gain context about the field that matched the local observation so you can understand the nature of the connection. This information can be found in the `threat.indicator.matched.field` field.
+- Investigate the IP address, which can be found in the `threat.indicator.matched.atomic` field:
+  - Check the reputation of the IP address in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+  - Execute a reverse DNS lookup to retrieve hostnames associated with the given IP address.
+- Assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences across hosts.
+- Identify the process responsible for the connection, and investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Retrieve the involved process executable and examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze the process executable using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - $osquery_0
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - $osquery_1
+      - $osquery_2
+      - $osquery_3
+- Using the data collected through the analysis, scope users targeted and other machines infected in the environment.
+
+### False Positive Analysis
+
+- When a match is found, it's important to consider the indicator's initial release date. Threat intelligence is useful for augmenting existing security processes but can quickly become outdated. In other words, some threat intelligence only represents a specific set of activity observed at a specific time. For example, an IP address may have hosted malware observed in a Dridex campaign months ago, but it's possible that IP has been remediated and no longer represents any threat.
+- False positives might occur after large and publicly written campaigns if curious employees interact with attacker infrastructure.
+- Some feeds may include internal or known benign addresses by mistake (e.g., 8.8.8.8, google.com, 127.0.0.1, etc.). Make sure you understand how blocking a specific domain or address might impact the organization or normal system functioning.
+
+### Response and Remediation
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+"""
+references = [
+    "https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/filebeat-module-threatintel.html",
+    "https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html",
+    "https://www.elastic.co/security/tip",
+]
+risk_score = 73
+rule_id = "0c41e478-5263-4c69-8f9e-7dfd2c22da64"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+This rule needs threat intelligence indicators to work.
+Threat intelligence indicators can be collected using an [Elastic Agent integration](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#agent-ti-integration),
+the [Threat Intel module](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#ti-mod-integration),
+or a [custom integration](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#custom-ti-integration).
+
+More information can be found [here](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html).
+"""
+severity = "high"
+tags = ["OS: Windows", "Data Source: Elastic Endgame", "Rule Type: Threat Match", "Resources: Investigation Guide"]
+threat_index = ["filebeat-*", "logs-ti_*"]
+threat_indicator_path = "threat.indicator"
+threat_language = "kuery"
+threat_query = """
+@timestamp >= "now-30d/d" and event.module:(threatintel or ti_*) and threat.indicator.ip:* and not
+labels.is_ioc_transform_source:"true"
+"""
+timeline_id = "495ad7a7-316e-4544-8a0f-9c098daee76e"
+timeline_title = "Generic Threat Match Timeline"
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "threat_match"
+
+query = '''
+source.ip:* or destination.ip:*
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat_filters]]
+
+[rule.threat_filters."$state"]
+store = "appState"
+[rule.threat_filters.meta]
+disabled = false
+key = "event.category"
+negate = false
+type = "phrase"
+[rule.threat_filters.meta.params]
+query = "threat"
+[rule.threat_filters.query.match_phrase]
+"event.category" = "threat"
+[[rule.threat_filters]]
+
+[rule.threat_filters."$state"]
+store = "appState"
+[rule.threat_filters.meta]
+disabled = false
+key = "event.kind"
+negate = false
+type = "phrase"
+[rule.threat_filters.meta.params]
+query = "enrichment"
+[rule.threat_filters.query.match_phrase]
+"event.kind" = "enrichment"
+[[rule.threat_filters]]
+
+[rule.threat_filters."$state"]
+store = "appState"
+[rule.threat_filters.meta]
+disabled = false
+key = "event.type"
+negate = false
+type = "phrase"
+[rule.threat_filters.meta.params]
+query = "indicator"
+[rule.threat_filters.query.match_phrase]
+"event.type" = "indicator"
+[[rule.threat_mapping]]
+
+[[rule.threat_mapping.entries]]
+field = "source.ip"
+type = "mapping"
+value = "threat.indicator.ip"
+
+[[rule.threat_mapping]]
+
+[[rule.threat_mapping.entries]]
+field = "destination.ip"
+type = "mapping"
+value = "threat.indicator.ip"
+
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/threat_intel/threat_intel_indicator_match_email.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2025/04/11"
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/04/22"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+This rule is triggered when an email indicator from the Threat Intel Filebeat module or integrations matches an event
+containing email-related data, such as logs from email security gateways or email service providers.
+"""
+from = "now-65m"
+index = ["filebeat-*", "logs-*"]
+interval = "1h"
+language = "kuery"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Threat Intel Email Indicator Match"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+### Investigating Threat Intel Email Indicator Match Match
+
+Threat Intel indicator match rules allow matching from a local observation, such as an endpoint event that records a file hash, with an entry of a file hash stored within the Threat Intel integrations index.
+
+Matches are based on threat intelligence data that's been ingested during the last 30 days. Some integrations don't place expiration dates on their threat indicators, so we strongly recommend validating ingested threat indicators and reviewing match results. When reviewing match results, check associated activity to determine whether the event requires additional investigation.
+
+This rule is triggered when an email indicator from the Threat Intel Filebeat module or integrations matches an event containing email-related data, such as logs from email security gateways or email service providers.
+
+#### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Investigate the email indicator, which can be found in the threat.indicator.matched.atomic field:
+  - Determine the nature of the email-based threat (phishing, spam, BEC, malware attachment, etc.).
+  - Check the reputation of the email address, domain, and IP in threat intel platforms such as VirusTotal, AbuseIPDB, Cisco Talos, and others.
+  - Perform a WHOIS lookup on the sending domain to gather registration info and potential abuse contacts.
+  - Review historical context: Has this email indicator been observed in other events or associated with known campaigns?
+- If the event is potentially phishing or BEC-related:
+  - Contact the recipient to gather additional context (did they interact with the email, click links, open attachments, reply, etc.).
+  - Review the email headers and content to identify spoofing tactics, display name impersonation, or suspicious links/domains.
+  - Analyze the email body and any attachments for signs of malicious intent or social engineering techniques.
+  - Extract and investigate any embedded links, attachments, or payloads for further IOCs.
+- Check logs from email security gateways and mail servers for:
+  - Additional recipients or similar messages sent in the same timeframe.
+  - Delivery status and any filtering or quarantine actions taken.
+
+### False Positive Analysis
+
+- False positives may occur when email indicators match legitimate communications.
+- Some threat intelligence feeds may mistakenly include benign or internal email addresses, domains, or sender infrastructure (e.g., noreply@yourdomain.com, legitimate SaaS providers, or shared mail services). Always validate indicators before taking enforcement actions.
+- Review the context of the match: Consider whether the sender domain or address is part of a known legitimate service, commonly used internally, or associated with a partner/vendor.
+- Blocking or alerting based on common email domains or infrastructure (e.g., mail gateways, newsletters, cloud-based platforms) without proper validation can lead to disruptions in communication.
+
+### Response and Remediation
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- If a user interacted with the malicious email (clicked a link, opened an attachment, replied, etc.), isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary email filters and segmentation to prevent further delivery or spread.
+  - Stop suspicious processes associated with any attachments or payloads.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs), including sender addresses, domains, URLs, and file hashes.
+  - Inspect affected systems for additional backdoors, such as reverse shells, droppers, or tunneling tools that could enable reinfection or remote access.
+- Consider reporting the sender address or domain for abuse using WHOIS or relevant abuse reporting services.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage, including phishing emails, attachments, and URLs.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts, persistence mechanisms, or malware components on the system.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker—e.g., bypassed email filters, spoofed domain, etc.—and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+"""
+references = [
+    "https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/filebeat-module-threatintel.html",
+    "https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html",
+    "https://www.elastic.co/security/tip",
+]
+risk_score = 73
+rule_id = "fcf18de8-ad7d-4d01-b3f7-a11d5b3883af"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+This rule needs threat intelligence indicators to work.
+Threat intelligence indicators can be collected using an [Elastic Agent integration](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#agent-ti-integration),
+the [Threat Intel module](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#ti-mod-integration),
+or a [custom integration](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#custom-ti-integration).
+
+More information can be found [here](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html).
+"""
+severity = "high"
+tags = ["Rule Type: Threat Match", "Resources: Investigation Guide"]
+threat_index = ["filebeat-*", "logs-ti_*"]
+threat_indicator_path = "threat.indicator"
+threat_language = "kuery"
+threat_query = """
+@timestamp >= "now-30d/d" and event.module:(threatintel or ti_*) and threat.indicator.email.address:* and not
+labels.is_ioc_transform_source:"true"
+"""
+timeline_id = "495ad7a7-316e-4544-8a0f-9c098daee76e"
+timeline_title = "Generic Threat Match Timeline"
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "threat_match"
+
+query = '''
+email.from.address:* or email.sender.address:* or email.reply_to.address:* or email.to.address:*
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat_filters]]
+
+[rule.threat_filters."$state"]
+store = "appState"
+[rule.threat_filters.meta]
+disabled = false
+key = "event.category"
+negate = false
+type = "phrase"
+[rule.threat_filters.meta.params]
+query = "threat"
+[rule.threat_filters.query.match_phrase]
+"event.category" = "threat"
+[[rule.threat_filters]]
+
+[rule.threat_filters."$state"]
+store = "appState"
+[rule.threat_filters.meta]
+disabled = false
+key = "event.kind"
+negate = false
+type = "phrase"
+[rule.threat_filters.meta.params]
+query = "enrichment"
+[rule.threat_filters.query.match_phrase]
+"event.kind" = "enrichment"
+[[rule.threat_filters]]
+
+[rule.threat_filters."$state"]
+store = "appState"
+[rule.threat_filters.meta]
+disabled = false
+key = "event.type"
+negate = false
+type = "phrase"
+[rule.threat_filters.meta.params]
+query = "indicator"
+[rule.threat_filters.query.match_phrase]
+"event.type" = "indicator"
+[[rule.threat_mapping]]
+
+[[rule.threat_mapping.entries]]
+type = "mapping"
+field = "email.from.address"
+value = "threat.indicator.email.address"
+
+[[rule.threat_mapping]]
+
+[[rule.threat_mapping.entries]]
+type = "mapping"
+field = "email.to.address"
+value = "threat.indicator.email.address"
+
+
+[[rule.threat_mapping]]
+
+[[rule.threat_mapping.entries]]
+type = "mapping"
+field = "email.sender.address"
+value = "threat.indicator.email.address"
+
+[[rule.threat_mapping]]
+
+[[rule.threat_mapping.entries]]
+type = "mapping"
+field = "email.reply_to.address"
+value = "threat.indicator.email.address"