nldcsc-elastic-rules 0.0.8__py3-none-any.whl

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/persistence_cron_job_creation.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,269 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2023/06/09"
+integration = ["endpoint"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/09/29"
+
+[transform]
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve File Listing Information"
+query = """
+SELECT * FROM file WHERE (path LIKE '/etc/cron.allow.d/%' OR path LIKE '/etc/cron.d/%' OR path LIKE '/etc/cron.hourly/%'
+OR path LIKE '/etc/cron.daily/%' OR path LIKE '/etc/cron.weekly/%' OR path LIKE '/etc/cron.monthly/%' OR path LIKE
+'/var/spool/cron/crontabs/%')
+"""
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Cron File Information"
+query = "SELECT * FROM file WHERE (path = '/etc/cron.allow' OR path = '/etc/cron.deny' OR path = '/etc/crontab')\n"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Additional File Listing Information"
+query = """
+SELECT f.path, u.username AS file_owner, g.groupname AS group_owner, datetime(f.atime, 'unixepoch') AS
+file_last_access_time, datetime(f.mtime, 'unixepoch') AS file_last_modified_time, datetime(f.ctime, 'unixepoch') AS
+file_last_status_change_time, datetime(f.btime, 'unixepoch') AS file_created_time, f.size AS size_bytes FROM file f LEFT
+JOIN users u ON f.uid = u.uid LEFT JOIN groups g ON f.gid = g.gid WHERE ( path LIKE '/etc/cron.allow.d/%' OR path LIKE
+'/etc/cron.d/%' OR path LIKE '/etc/cron.hourly/%' OR path LIKE '/etc/cron.daily/%' OR path LIKE '/etc/cron.weekly/%' OR
+path LIKE '/etc/cron.monthly/%' OR path LIKE '/var/spool/cron/crontabs/%')
+"""
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Running Processes by User"
+query = "SELECT pid, username, name FROM processes p JOIN users u ON u.uid = p.uid ORDER BY username"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Listening Ports"
+query = "SELECT pid, address, port, socket, protocol, path FROM listening_ports"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Open Sockets"
+query = "SELECT pid, family, remote_address, remote_port, socket, state FROM process_open_sockets"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Information for a Specific User"
+query = "SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = {{user.name}}"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Investigate the Account Authentication Status"
+query = "SELECT * FROM logged_in_users WHERE user = {{user.name}}"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+This rule monitors for (ana)cron jobs being created or renamed. Linux cron jobs are scheduled tasks that can be
+leveraged by system administrators to set up scheduled tasks, but may be abused by malicious actors for persistence,
+privilege escalation and command execution. By creating or modifying cron job configurations, attackers can execute
+malicious commands or scripts at predefined intervals, ensuring their continued presence and enabling unauthorized
+activities.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["logs-endpoint.events.file*"]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Cron Job Created or Modified"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+### Investigating Cron Job Created or Modified
+Linux cron jobs are scheduled tasks that run at specified intervals or times, managed by the cron daemon. 
+
+By creating or modifying cron job configurations, attackers can execute malicious commands or scripts at predefined intervals, ensuring their continued presence and enabling unauthorized activities.
+
+This rule monitors the creation of cron jobs by monitoring for file creation and rename events in the most common cron job task location directories.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the [Osquery Markdown Plugin](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/invest-guide-run-osquery.html) introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+> This investigation guide uses [placeholder fields](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/osquery-placeholder-fields.html) to dynamically pass alert data into Osquery queries. Placeholder fields were introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.7.0. If you're using Elastic Stack version 8.6.0 or earlier, you'll need to manually adjust this investigation guide's queries to ensure they properly run.
+
+#### Possible Investigation Steps
+
+- Investigate the cron job file that was created or modified.
+- Investigate whether any other files in any of the available cron job directories have been altered through OSQuery.
+  - $osquery_0
+  - $osquery_1
+  - $osquery_2
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence and whether they are located in expected locations.
+  - $osquery_3
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Validate the activity is not related to planned patches, updates, network administrator activity, or legitimate software installations.
+- Investigate whether the altered scripts call other malicious scripts elsewhere on the file system. 
+  - If scripts or executables were dropped, retrieve the files and determine if they are malicious:
+    - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+      - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+        - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+          - Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
+          - Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
+        - File access, modification, and creation activities.
+- Investigate abnormal behaviors by the subject process/user such as network connections, file modifications, and any other spawned child processes.
+  - Investigate listening ports and open sockets to look for potential command and control traffic or data exfiltration.
+    - $osquery_4
+    - $osquery_5
+  - Identify the user account that performed the action, analyze it, and check whether it should perform this kind of action.
+    - $osquery_6
+- Investigate whether the user is currently logged in and active.
+    - $osquery_7
+
+### False Positive Analysis
+
+- If this activity is related to new benign software installation activity, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of user and command line conditions.
+- If this activity is related to a system administrator who uses cron jobs for administrative purposes, consider adding exceptions for this specific administrator user account. 
+- Try to understand the context of the execution by thinking about the user, machine, or business purpose. A small number of endpoints, such as servers with unique software, might appear unusual but satisfy a specific business need.
+
+### Related Rules
+
+- Suspicious File Creation in /etc for Persistence - 1c84dd64-7e6c-4bad-ac73-a5014ee37042
+- Potential Persistence Through Run Control Detected - 0f4d35e4-925e-4959-ab24-911be207ee6f
+- Potential Persistence Through init.d Detected - 474fd20e-14cc-49c5-8160-d9ab4ba16c8b
+- Systemd Timer Created - 7fb500fa-8e24-4bd1-9480-2a819352602c
+- Systemd Service Created - 17b0a495-4d9f-414c-8ad0-92f018b8e001
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Delete the service/timer or restore its original configuration.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+"""
+references = [
+    "https://pberba.github.io/security/2022/01/30/linux-threat-hunting-for-persistence-systemd-timers-cron/",
+    "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/primer-on-persistence-mechanisms",
+]
+risk_score = 47
+rule_id = "ff10d4d8-fea7-422d-afb1-e5a2702369a9"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+#### Prerequisite Requirements:
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
+"""
+severity = "medium"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Linux",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Persistence",
+    "Tactic: Privilege Escalation",
+    "Tactic: Execution",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+
+query = '''
+file where host.os.type == "linux" and
+event.action in ("rename", "creation") and file.path : (
+  "/etc/cron.allow", "/etc/cron.deny", "/etc/cron.d/*", "/etc/cron.hourly/*", "/etc/cron.daily/*", "/etc/cron.weekly/*",
+  "/etc/cron.monthly/*", "/etc/crontab", "/var/spool/cron/crontabs/*", "/var/spool/anacron/*"
+) and not (
+  process.executable in (
+    "/bin/dpkg", "/usr/bin/dpkg", "/bin/dockerd", "/usr/bin/dockerd", "/usr/sbin/dockerd", "/bin/microdnf",
+    "/usr/bin/microdnf", "/bin/rpm", "/usr/bin/rpm", "/bin/snapd", "/usr/bin/snapd", "/bin/yum", "/usr/bin/yum",
+    "/bin/dnf", "/usr/bin/dnf", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/bin/dnf-automatic", "/usr/bin/dnf-automatic",
+    "/bin/pacman", "/usr/bin/pacman", "/usr/bin/dpkg-divert", "/bin/dpkg-divert", "/sbin/apk", "/usr/sbin/apk",
+    "/usr/local/sbin/apk", "/usr/bin/apt", "/usr/sbin/pacman", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/puppet",
+    "/bin/puppet", "/opt/puppetlabs/puppet/bin/puppet", "/usr/bin/chef-client", "/bin/chef-client",
+    "/bin/autossl_check", "/usr/bin/autossl_check", "/proc/self/exe", "/dev/fd/*",  "/usr/bin/pamac-daemon",
+    "/bin/pamac-daemon", "/usr/local/bin/dockerd", "/opt/elasticbeanstalk/bin/platform-engine",
+    "/opt/puppetlabs/puppet/bin/ruby", "/usr/libexec/platform-python", "/opt/imunify360/venv/bin/python3",
+    "/opt/eset/efs/lib/utild", "/usr/sbin/anacron", "/usr/bin/podman", "/kaniko/kaniko-executor",
+    "/usr/bin/pvedaemon", "./usr/bin/podman", "/usr/lib/systemd/systemd"
+  ) or
+  file.path like ("/var/spool/cron/crontabs/tmp.*", "/etc/cron.d/jumpcloud-updater") or
+  file.extension in ("swp", "swpx", "swx", "dpkg-remove") or
+  file.Ext.original.extension == "dpkg-new" or
+  process.executable : (
+    "/nix/store/*", "/var/lib/dpkg/*", "/tmp/vmis.*", "/snap/*", "/dev/fd/*", "/usr/libexec/platform-python*",
+    "/var/lib/waagent/Microsoft*"
+  ) or
+  process.executable == null or
+  process.name in (
+    "crond", "executor", "puppet", "droplet-agent.postinst", "cf-agent", "schedd", "imunify-notifier", "perl",
+    "jumpcloud-agent", "crio", "dnf_install", "utild"
+  ) or
+  (process.name == "sed" and file.name : "sed*") or
+  (process.name == "perl" and file.name : "e2scrub_all.tmp*")  or
+  (process.name in ("vi", "vim") and file.name like "*~")
+)
+'''
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1053"
+name = "Scheduled Task/Job"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1053.003"
+name = "Cron"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003/"
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0003"
+name = "Persistence"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1053"
+name = "Scheduled Task/Job"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1053.003"
+name = "Cron"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003/"
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0004"
+name = "Privilege Escalation"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1053"
+name = "Scheduled Task/Job"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1053.003"
+name = "Cron"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003/"
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0002"
+name = "Execution"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/persistence_dbus_service_creation.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2025/01/16"
+integration = ["endpoint", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/09/09"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+This rule detects the creation of D-Bus service files on Linux systems. D-Bus is a message bus system that provides a
+way for applications to talk to one another. D-Bus services are defined in service files that are typically located in
+default directories. The rule looks for the creation of service files that are not associated with known package
+managers or system services. Attackers may create malicious D-Bus services to establish persistence or escalate
+privileges on a system.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["logs-endpoint.events.file*", "logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*", "endgame-*"]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "D-Bus Service Created"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating D-Bus Service Created
+
+D-Bus is an inter-process communication system in Linux, enabling applications to communicate. Adversaries may exploit D-Bus by creating unauthorized service files to maintain persistence or escalate privileges. The detection rule identifies suspicious service file creations in key directories, excluding known legitimate processes, to flag potential malicious activity.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Review the file path and extension to confirm if the created file is located in one of the monitored directories such as /usr/share/dbus-1/system-services/ or /etc/dbus-1/system.d/, and ensure it has a .service or .conf extension.
+- Examine the process executable that created the file to determine if it is listed as a known legitimate process in the exclusion list. If not, investigate the process further to understand its origin and purpose.
+- Check the process name and path for any unusual or unexpected patterns, especially if it is not part of the known exclusions like ssm-agent-worker or platform-python*.
+- Investigate the file creation time and correlate it with other system activities or logs to identify any suspicious behavior or patterns around the time of the alert.
+- Look into the user account associated with the process that created the file to determine if it has the necessary permissions and if the activity aligns with the user's typical behavior.
+- Search for any related alerts or logs that might indicate a broader attack pattern, such as other unauthorized file creations or modifications in the system.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Package manager operations can trigger false positives when legitimate service files are created during software installations or updates. To manage this, exclude processes associated with known package managers like dpkg, rpm, and yum from the detection rule.
+- System service updates may also result in false positives. Exclude processes such as systemd and crond that are responsible for legitimate system service management.
+- Development and testing environments often involve the creation of temporary or test service files. Exclude paths and processes specific to these environments, such as those under /tmp or /dev/fd, to reduce noise.
+- Automation tools like Puppet and Chef can create service files as part of their configuration management tasks. Exclude these tools by adding their executable paths to the exception list.
+- Custom scripts or tools that mimic package manager behavior might also cause false positives. Identify and exclude these specific scripts or tools by their process names or paths if they are known to be benign.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Immediately isolate the affected system from the network to prevent further unauthorized access or lateral movement by the adversary.
+- Terminate any suspicious processes associated with the creation of unauthorized D-Bus service files to halt potential malicious activity.
+- Remove any unauthorized D-Bus service files identified in the specified directories to eliminate persistence mechanisms.
+- Conduct a thorough review of user accounts and privileges on the affected system to ensure no unauthorized privilege escalation has occurred.
+- Restore the system from a known good backup if unauthorized changes or damage to the system are detected.
+- Monitor the system and network for any signs of re-infection or similar suspicious activities, using enhanced logging and alerting mechanisms.
+- Escalate the incident to the security operations team for further investigation and to determine if additional systems are affected."""
+risk_score = 21
+rule_id = "952c92af-d67f-4f01-8a9c-725efefa7e07"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+#### Prerequisite Requirements:
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
+"""
+severity = "low"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Linux",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Persistence",
+    "Tactic: Privilege Escalation",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Data Source: SentinelOne",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+
+query = '''
+file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "creation" and process.executable != null and
+file.extension in ("service", "conf") and file.path like~ (
+  "/usr/share/dbus-1/system-services/*", "/etc/dbus-1/system.d/*",
+  "/lib/dbus-1/system-services/*", "/run/dbus/system.d/*",
+  "/home/*/.local/share/dbus-1/services/*", "/home/*/.dbus/session-bus/*",
+  "/usr/share/dbus-1/services/*", "/etc/dbus-1/session.d/*"
+) and not (
+  process.executable in (
+    "/bin/dpkg", "/usr/bin/dpkg", "/bin/dockerd", "/usr/bin/dockerd", "/usr/sbin/dockerd", "/bin/microdnf",
+    "/usr/bin/microdnf", "/bin/rpm", "/usr/bin/rpm", "/bin/snapd", "/usr/bin/snapd", "/bin/yum", "/usr/bin/yum",
+    "/bin/dnf", "/usr/bin/dnf", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/bin/dnf-automatic", "/usr/bin/dnf-automatic",
+    "/bin/pacman", "/usr/bin/pacman", "/usr/bin/dpkg-divert", "/bin/dpkg-divert", "/sbin/apk", "/usr/sbin/apk",
+    "/usr/local/sbin/apk", "/usr/bin/apt", "/usr/sbin/pacman", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/puppet",
+    "/bin/puppet", "/opt/puppetlabs/puppet/bin/puppet", "/usr/bin/chef-client", "/bin/chef-client",
+    "/bin/autossl_check", "/usr/bin/autossl_check", "/proc/self/exe", "/dev/fd/*",  "/usr/bin/pamac-daemon",
+    "/bin/pamac-daemon", "/usr/lib/snapd/snapd", "/usr/local/bin/dockerd", "/usr/bin/crio", "/usr/sbin/crond",
+    "/opt/puppetlabs/puppet/bin/ruby", "/usr/libexec/platform-python", "/kaniko/kaniko-executor",
+    "/usr/local/bin/dockerd", "/usr/bin/podman", "/bin/install", "/proc/self/exe", "/usr/lib/systemd/systemd",
+    "/usr/sbin/sshd", "/usr/bin/gitlab-runner", "/opt/gitlab/embedded/bin/ruby", "/usr/sbin/gdm", "/usr/bin/install",
+    "/usr/local/manageengine/uems_agent/bin/dcregister"
+  ) or
+  process.executable : (
+    "/nix/store/*", "/var/lib/dpkg/*", "/tmp/vmis.*", "/snap/*", "/dev/fd/*", "/usr/lib/virtualbox/*"
+  ) or
+  process.name like (
+    "ssm-agent-worker", "platform-python*", "dnf_install", "cloudflared", "lxc-pve-prestart-hook",
+    "convert-usrmerge", "elastic-agent", "google_metadata_script_runner", "update-alternatives", "gitlab-runner",
+    "install", "crio", "apt-get", "package-cleanup", "dcservice", "dcregister", "jumpcloud-agent", "executor"
+  ) or
+  (process.name == "sed" and file.name : "sed*") or
+  (process.name == "perl" and file.name : "e2scrub_all.tmp*") 
+)
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1543"
+name = "Create or Modify System Process"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0003"
+name = "Persistence"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1543"
+name = "Create or Modify System Process"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0004"
+name = "Privilege Escalation"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/persistence_dbus_unsual_daemon_parent_execution.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2025/01/21"
+integration = ["endpoint", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/03/20"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+This rule detects when an unusual child process is spawned from the `dbus-daemon` parent process. The `dbus-daemon`
+process is a message bus system that provides a way for applications to talk to each other. Attackers may abuse this
+process to execute malicious code or escalate privileges.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["logs-endpoint.events.process*", "endgame-*", "logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*"]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Unusual D-Bus Daemon Child Process"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating Unusual D-Bus Daemon Child Process
+
+The D-Bus daemon is a crucial component in Linux environments, facilitating inter-process communication by allowing applications to exchange information. Adversaries may exploit this by spawning unauthorized child processes to execute malicious code or gain elevated privileges. The detection rule identifies anomalies by monitoring child processes of the D-Bus daemon, excluding known benign processes and paths, thus highlighting potential threats.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Review the process details to identify the unusual child process spawned from the dbus-daemon, focusing on the process name and executable path to determine if it is known or potentially malicious.
+- Examine the command-line arguments (process.args) of the unusual child process to understand its intended function and assess if it aligns with typical usage patterns.
+- Investigate the parent process arguments (process.parent.args) to confirm whether the dbus-daemon was running in a session context or another mode that might explain the unusual child process.
+- Check the process start time and correlate it with other system events or logs to identify any related activities or anomalies occurring around the same time.
+- Look into the user context under which the unusual child process was executed to determine if it was initiated by a legitimate user or potentially compromised account.
+- Search for any network connections or file modifications associated with the unusual child process to identify potential data exfiltration or lateral movement activities.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Known benign processes such as gnome-keyring-daemon and abrt-dbus may trigger the rule. Users can exclude these processes by adding them to the exception list in the detection rule.
+- Processes executed from common library paths like /usr/lib/ or /usr/local/lib/ are typically non-threatening. Users should review these paths and consider excluding them if they are consistently generating false positives.
+- The dbus-daemon with the --session argument is generally safe. Users can ensure this argument is included in the exception criteria to prevent unnecessary alerts.
+- Specific applications like software-properties-dbus and serviceHelper.py are known to be benign. Users should verify these applications' legitimacy in their environment and exclude them if they are frequently flagged.
+- Regularly review and update the exception list to include any new benign processes or paths that are identified over time, ensuring the rule remains effective without generating excessive false positives.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Immediately isolate the affected system from the network to prevent potential lateral movement by the adversary.
+- Terminate any suspicious child processes spawned by the dbus-daemon that are not recognized as legitimate or necessary for system operations.
+- Conduct a thorough review of the affected system's logs to identify any unauthorized access or changes made by the suspicious process.
+- Restore any altered or compromised system files from a known good backup to ensure system integrity.
+- Update and patch the affected system and any related software to close vulnerabilities that may have been exploited.
+- Implement stricter access controls and monitoring on the dbus-daemon to prevent unauthorized process execution in the future.
+- Escalate the incident to the security operations team for further investigation and to determine if additional systems are affected."""
+risk_score = 21
+rule_id = "9705b458-689a-4ec6-afe8-b4648d090612"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+#### Prerequisite Requirements:
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
+"""
+severity = "low"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Linux",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Persistence",
+    "Tactic: Privilege Escalation",
+    "Tactic: Execution",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Data Source: SentinelOne",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+
+query = '''
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "start") and
+process.parent.name == "dbus-daemon" and process.args_count > 1 and not (
+  process.parent.args == "--session" or
+  process.args in ("/usr/lib/software-properties/software-properties-dbus", "/usr/share/backintime/qt/serviceHelper.py") or
+  process.name in ("dbus-daemon-launch-helper", "gnome-keyring-daemon", "abrt-dbus", "aptd", "usb-creator-helper") or
+  process.executable like~ ("/usr/lib/*", "/usr/local/lib/*", "/usr/libexec/*", "/tmp/newroot/*")
+)
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1543"
+name = "Create or Modify System Process"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0003"
+name = "Persistence"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1543"
+name = "Create or Modify System Process"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0004"
+name = "Privilege Escalation"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1059"
+name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1059.004"
+name = "Unix Shell"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0002"
+name = "Execution"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
+