nldcsc-elastic-rules 0.0.8__py3-none-any.whl

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/credential_access_aws_creds_search_inside_container.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2025/03/12"
+integration = ["endpoint"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/03/12"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+This rule detects the use of system search utilities like grep and find to search for AWS credentials inside a
+container. Unauthorized access to these sensitive files could lead to further compromise of the container environment or
+facilitate a container breakout to the underlying cloud environment.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["logs-endpoint.events.process*"]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "AWS Credentials Searched For Inside A Container"
+references = ["https://sysdig.com/blog/threat-detection-aws-cloud-containers/"]
+risk_score = 47
+rule_id = "5749282b-7524-4c9d-af9a-e2b3e814e5d4"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+#### Prerequisite Requirements:
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
+"""
+severity = "medium"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Container",
+    "OS: Linux",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Credential Access",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+query = '''
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
+process.entry_leader.entry_meta.type == "container" and
+process.name in ("grep", "egrep", "fgrep", "find", "locate", "mlocate") and
+process.command_line like~ (
+  "*aws_access_key_id*", "*aws_secret_access_key*", "*aws_session_token*", "*accesskeyid*", "*secretaccesskey*",
+  "*access_key*", "*.aws/credentials*"
+)
+'''
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating AWS Credentials Searched For Inside A Container
+
+Containers often house applications that interact with AWS services, necessitating the storage of AWS credentials. Adversaries may exploit this by using search utilities to locate these credentials, potentially leading to unauthorized access. The detection rule identifies suspicious use of search tools within containers, flagging attempts to locate AWS credentials by monitoring specific process names and arguments, thus helping to prevent credential theft and subsequent attacks.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Review the process details to identify the specific search utility used (e.g., grep, find) and the arguments passed, focusing on those related to AWS credentials such as aws_access_key_id or aws_secret_access_key.
+- Check the user context under which the suspicious process was executed to assess whether it aligns with expected behavior for that user or role within the container.
+- Investigate the source of the container image to ensure it is from a trusted repository and has not been tampered with, which could indicate a supply chain compromise.
+- Analyze recent activity logs for the container to identify any other suspicious behavior or anomalies that might correlate with the search for AWS credentials, such as unexpected network connections or file modifications.
+- Review access logs for AWS services to detect any unauthorized or unusual access patterns that might suggest the use of compromised credentials.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Routine maintenance scripts or automated processes may use search utilities to verify the presence of AWS credentials for legitimate configuration checks. To handle this, identify and whitelist these specific scripts or processes by their unique identifiers or execution paths.
+- Developers or system administrators might manually search for AWS credentials during debugging or configuration tasks. Implement a policy to log and review these activities, and consider excluding known user accounts or roles from triggering alerts during specific time windows or in designated environments.
+- Security audits or compliance checks often involve searching for sensitive information, including AWS credentials, to ensure proper security measures are in place. Coordinate with audit teams to schedule these activities and temporarily suppress alerts during these periods, or exclude specific audit tools from detection.
+- Continuous integration and deployment (CI/CD) pipelines might include steps that search for AWS credentials to validate environment configurations. Identify these pipelines and exclude their associated processes or container environments from triggering alerts, ensuring that only authorized CI/CD tools are used.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Immediately isolate the affected container to prevent further unauthorized access or data exfiltration. This can be done by stopping the container or disconnecting it from the network.
+- Revoke any AWS credentials that were potentially exposed or accessed. This includes rotating keys and updating any services or applications that rely on these credentials.
+- Conduct a thorough review of the container's file system to identify any unauthorized changes or additional malicious files that may have been introduced.
+- Implement stricter access controls and monitoring on AWS credentials within containers, ensuring they are stored securely and accessed only by authorized processes.
+- Escalate the incident to the cloud security team to assess the potential impact on the broader cloud environment and determine if further investigation or response is needed.
+- Enhance logging and monitoring for similar activities across other containers and cloud environments to detect and respond to future attempts promptly.
+- Review and update container security policies to include best practices for credential management and access control, reducing the risk of similar incidents."""
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1552"
+name = "Unsecured Credentials"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1552.001"
+name = "Credentials In Files"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/001/"
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0006"
+name = "Credential Access"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/credential_access_collection_sensitive_files.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2020/12/22"
+integration = ["endpoint"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/01/15"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Identifies the use of a compression utility to collect known files containing sensitive information, such as credentials
+and system configurations.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["auditbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.*", "endgame-*"]
+language = "kuery"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Sensitive Files Compression"
+references = [
+    "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_ca/research/20/l/teamtnt-now-deploying-ddos-capable-irc-bot-tntbotinger.html",
+]
+risk_score = 47
+rule_id = "6b84d470-9036-4cc0-a27c-6d90bbfe81ab"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
+- Elastic Defend
+- Auditbeat
+
+
+### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows
+the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+#### Prerequisite Requirements:
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
+- We suggest to select "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
+
+### Auditbeat Setup
+Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit the activities of users and processes on your systems. For example, you can use Auditbeat to collect and centralize audit events from the Linux Audit Framework. You can also use Auditbeat to detect changes to critical files, like binaries and configuration files, and identify potential security policy violations.
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Auditbeat on a Linux System:
+- Elastic provides repositories available for APT and YUM-based distributions. Note that we provide binary packages, but no source packages.
+- To install the APT and YUM repositories follow the setup instructions in this [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setup-repositories.html).
+- To run Auditbeat on Docker follow the setup instructions in the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-docker.html).
+- To run Auditbeat on Kubernetes follow the setup instructions in the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-kubernetes.html).
+- For complete “Setup and Run Auditbeat” information refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html).
+"""
+severity = "medium"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Linux",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Collection",
+    "Tactic: Credential Access",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "new_terms"
+
+query = '''
+event.category:process and host.os.type:linux and event.type:start and
+  process.name:(zip or tar or gzip or hdiutil or 7z) and
+  process.args:
+    (
+      /root/.ssh/id_rsa or
+      /root/.ssh/id_rsa.pub or
+      /root/.ssh/id_ed25519 or
+      /root/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub or
+      /root/.ssh/authorized_keys or
+      /root/.ssh/authorized_keys2 or
+      /root/.ssh/known_hosts or
+      /root/.bash_history or
+      /etc/hosts or
+      /home/*/.ssh/id_rsa or
+      /home/*/.ssh/id_rsa.pub or
+      /home/*/.ssh/id_ed25519 or
+      /home/*/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub or
+      /home/*/.ssh/authorized_keys or
+      /home/*/.ssh/authorized_keys2 or
+      /home/*/.ssh/known_hosts or
+      /home/*/.bash_history or
+      /root/.aws/credentials or
+      /root/.aws/config or
+      /home/*/.aws/credentials or
+      /home/*/.aws/config or
+      /root/.docker/config.json or
+      /home/*/.docker/config.json or
+      /etc/group or
+      /etc/passwd or
+      /etc/shadow or
+      /etc/gshadow
+    )
+'''
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating Sensitive Files Compression
+
+Compression utilities like zip, tar, and gzip are essential for efficiently managing and transferring files. However, adversaries can exploit these tools to compress and exfiltrate sensitive data, such as SSH keys and configuration files. The detection rule identifies suspicious compression activities by monitoring process executions involving these utilities and targeting known sensitive file paths, thereby flagging potential data collection and credential access attempts.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Review the process execution details to identify the user account associated with the compression activity, focusing on the process.name and process.args fields.
+- Examine the command line arguments (process.args) to determine which specific sensitive files were targeted for compression.
+- Check the event.timestamp to establish a timeline and correlate with other potentially suspicious activities on the host.
+- Investigate the host's recent login history and user activity to identify any unauthorized access attempts or anomalies.
+- Analyze network logs for any outbound connections from the host around the time of the event to detect potential data exfiltration attempts.
+- Assess the integrity and permissions of the sensitive files involved to determine if they have been altered or accessed inappropriately.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Routine system backups or administrative tasks may trigger the rule if they involve compressing sensitive files for legitimate purposes. Users can create exceptions for known backup scripts or administrative processes by excluding specific process names or command-line arguments associated with these tasks.
+- Developers or system administrators might compress configuration files during development or deployment processes. To handle this, users can whitelist specific user accounts or directories commonly used for development activities, ensuring these actions are not flagged as suspicious.
+- Automated scripts or cron jobs that regularly archive logs or configuration files could be mistakenly identified as threats. Users should review and exclude these scheduled tasks by identifying their unique process identifiers or execution patterns.
+- Security tools or monitoring solutions that periodically compress and transfer logs for analysis might be misinterpreted as malicious. Users can exclude these tools by specifying their process names or paths in the detection rule exceptions.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Immediately isolate the affected system from the network to prevent further data exfiltration and unauthorized access.
+- Terminate any suspicious processes identified by the detection rule to halt ongoing compression and potential data exfiltration activities.
+- Conduct a thorough review of the compressed files and their contents to assess the extent of sensitive data exposure and determine if any data has been exfiltrated.
+- Change all credentials associated with the compromised files, such as SSH keys and AWS credentials, to prevent unauthorized access using stolen credentials.
+- Restore any altered or deleted configuration files from a known good backup to ensure system integrity and functionality.
+- Escalate the incident to the security operations center (SOC) or incident response team for further investigation and to determine if additional systems are affected.
+- Implement enhanced monitoring and logging for compression utilities and sensitive file access to detect and respond to similar threats more effectively in the future."""
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1552"
+name = "Unsecured Credentials"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1552.001"
+name = "Credentials In Files"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/001/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0006"
+name = "Credential Access"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1560"
+name = "Archive Collected Data"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1560.001"
+name = "Archive via Utility"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/001/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0009"
+name = "Collection"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009/"
+
+[rule.new_terms]
+field = "new_terms_fields"
+value = ["host.id", "process.command_line", "process.parent.executable"]
+[[rule.new_terms.history_window_start]]
+field = "history_window_start"
+value = "now-10d"
+
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/credential_access_collection_sensitive_files_compression_inside_container.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2025/03/12"
+integration = ["endpoint"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/03/12"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Identifies the use of a compression utility to collect known files containing sensitive information, such as credentials
+and system configurations inside a container.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["logs-endpoint.events.process*"]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Sensitive Files Compression Inside A Container"
+risk_score = 47
+rule_id = "d9faf1ba-a216-4c29-b8e0-a05a9d14b027"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+#### Prerequisite Requirements:
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
+"""
+severity = "medium"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Container",
+    "OS: Linux",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Credential Access",
+    "Tactic: Collection",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+query = '''
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
+process.entry_leader.entry_meta.type == "container" and process.name in ("zip", "tar", "gzip", "hdiutil", "7z") and
+process.command_line like~ (
+  "*/root/.ssh/*", "*/home/*/.ssh/*", "*/root/.bash_history*", "*/etc/hosts*", "*/root/.aws/*", "*/home/*/.aws/*",
+  "*/root/.docker/*", "*/home/*/.docker/*", "*/etc/group*", "*/etc/passwd*", "*/etc/shadow*", "*/etc/gshadow*"
+)
+'''
+note = """### Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating Sensitive Files Compression Inside A Container
+
+Containers are lightweight, portable environments used to run applications consistently across different systems. Adversaries may exploit compression utilities within containers to gather and exfiltrate sensitive files, such as credentials and configuration files. The detection rule identifies suspicious compression activities by monitoring for specific utilities and file paths, flagging potential unauthorized data collection attempts.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Review the process details to confirm the use of compression utilities such as zip, tar, gzip, hdiutil, or 7z within the container environment, focusing on the process.name and process.args fields.
+- Examine the specific file paths listed in the process.args to determine if they include sensitive files like SSH keys, AWS credentials, or Docker configurations, which could indicate unauthorized data collection.
+- Check the event.type field for "start" to verify the timing of the process initiation and correlate it with any known legitimate activities or scheduled tasks within the container.
+- Investigate the user or service account under which the process was executed to assess whether it has the necessary permissions and if the activity aligns with expected behavior for that account.
+- Look for any related alerts or logs that might indicate a broader pattern of suspicious activity within the same container or across other containers in the environment.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Routine backup operations may trigger the rule if they involve compressing sensitive files for storage. To handle this, identify and exclude backup processes or scripts that are known and trusted.
+- Automated configuration management tools might compress configuration files as part of their normal operation. Exclude these tools by specifying their process names or paths in the exception list.
+- Developers or system administrators might compress sensitive files during legitimate troubleshooting or maintenance activities. Establish a process to log and review these activities, and exclude them if they are verified as non-threatening.
+- Continuous integration and deployment pipelines could involve compressing configuration files for deployment purposes. Identify these pipelines and exclude their associated processes to prevent false positives.
+- Security tools that perform regular audits or scans might compress files for analysis. Ensure these tools are recognized and excluded from triggering the rule.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Immediately isolate the affected container to prevent further data exfiltration or unauthorized access. This can be done by stopping the container or disconnecting it from the network.
+- Conduct a thorough review of the compressed files and their contents to assess the extent of sensitive data exposure. Focus on the specific file paths identified in the alert.
+- Change credentials and keys that may have been compromised, including SSH keys, AWS credentials, and Docker configurations. Ensure that new credentials are distributed securely.
+- Review and update access controls and permissions for sensitive files within containers to minimize exposure. Ensure that only necessary processes and users have access to these files.
+- Implement monitoring and alerting for similar compression activities in other containers to detect potential threats early. Use the identified process names and arguments as indicators.
+- Escalate the incident to the security operations team for further investigation and to determine if additional systems or data have been affected.
+- Conduct a post-incident review to identify gaps in security controls and update container security policies to prevent recurrence."""
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1552"
+name = "Unsecured Credentials"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1552.001"
+name = "Credentials In Files"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/001/"
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0006"
+name = "Credential Access"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1560"
+name = "Archive Collected Data"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1560.001"
+name = "Archive via Utility"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/001/"
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0009"
+name = "Collection"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009/"

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/credential_access_credential_dumping.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2023/02/27"
+integration = ["endpoint", "crowdstrike", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/03/20"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Identifies the execution of the unshadow utility which is part of John the Ripper, a password-cracking tool on the host
+machine. Malicious actors can use the utility to retrieve the combined contents of the '/etc/shadow' and '/etc/password'
+files. Using the combined file generated from the utility, the malicious threat actors can use them as input for
+password-cracking utilities or prepare themselves for future operations by gathering credential information of the
+victim.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = [
+    "endgame-*",
+    "logs-crowdstrike.fdr*",
+    "logs-endpoint.events.process*",
+    "logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*",
+]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Potential Linux Credential Dumping via Unshadow"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating Potential Linux Credential Dumping via Unshadow
+
+Unshadow is a utility within the John the Ripper suite, used to merge `/etc/shadow` and `/etc/passwd` files, making them vulnerable to password cracking. Adversaries exploit this to extract and crack user credentials, gaining unauthorized access. The detection rule identifies suspicious execution of Unshadow by monitoring process activities, focusing on specific execution patterns and argument counts, thus flagging potential credential dumping attempts.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Review the process execution details to confirm the presence of the unshadow utility by checking the process name and arguments, ensuring that the process.args_count is 3 or more.
+- Investigate the user account under which the unshadow process was executed to determine if it aligns with expected administrative activities or if it indicates potential unauthorized access.
+- Examine the command line arguments used with the unshadow process to identify the specific files targeted, such as /etc/shadow and /etc/passwd, and verify if these files were accessed or modified.
+- Check for any subsequent processes or activities that might indicate password cracking attempts, such as the execution of John the Ripper or similar tools, following the unshadow execution.
+- Correlate the event with other security alerts or logs from the same host or user to identify any patterns or additional suspicious activities that might suggest a broader attack campaign.
+- Assess the risk and impact by determining if any sensitive credentials were potentially exposed and consider implementing additional monitoring or access controls to prevent future incidents.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- System administrators or security teams may use the unshadow utility for legitimate auditing or recovery purposes. To handle this, create exceptions for known administrative accounts or specific maintenance windows.
+- Automated scripts or backup processes might invoke unshadow as part of routine operations. Identify these scripts and exclude their execution paths or associated user accounts from triggering alerts.
+- Security testing or penetration testing activities could involve the use of unshadow. Coordinate with the testing team to whitelist their activities during the testing period to avoid false positives.
+- Development or testing environments might have unshadow executed as part of security tool evaluations. Exclude these environments from monitoring or adjust the rule to focus on production systems only.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Immediately isolate the affected host from the network to prevent further unauthorized access or data exfiltration.
+- Terminate any suspicious processes related to the unshadow utility to halt ongoing credential dumping activities.
+- Conduct a thorough review of the affected system's `/etc/shadow` and `/etc/passwd` files to identify any unauthorized modifications or access.
+- Change passwords for all user accounts on the affected system, prioritizing those with elevated privileges, to mitigate the risk of compromised credentials.
+- Review and update access controls and permissions for sensitive files, ensuring that only authorized users have access to `/etc/shadow` and `/etc/passwd`.
+- Escalate the incident to the security operations center (SOC) or incident response team for further investigation and to determine if additional systems are affected.
+- Implement enhanced monitoring and logging for similar activities across the network to detect and respond to future credential dumping attempts promptly."""
+references = ["https://www.cyberciti.biz/faq/unix-linux-password-cracking-john-the-ripper/"]
+risk_score = 47
+rule_id = "e7cb3cfd-aaa3-4d7b-af18-23b89955062c"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+#### Prerequisite Requirements:
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
+"""
+severity = "medium"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Linux",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Credential Access",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
+    "Data Source: Crowdstrike",
+    "Data Source: SentinelOne",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+
+query = '''
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "start", "ProcessRollup2") and
+process.name == "unshadow" and process.args_count >= 3
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1003"
+name = "OS Credential Dumping"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1003.008"
+name = "/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/008/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0006"
+name = "Credential Access"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"
+