nldcsc-elastic-rules 0.0.8__py3-none-any.whl

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/integrations/aws/credential_access_aws_iam_assume_role_brute_force.toml

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+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2020/07/16"
+integration = ["aws"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2024/05/21"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Identifies a high number of failed attempts to assume an AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) role. IAM roles are
+used to delegate access to users or services. An adversary may attempt to enumerate IAM roles in order to determine if a
+role exists before attempting to assume or hijack the discovered role.
+"""
+from = "now-20m"
+index = ["filebeat-*", "logs-aws.cloudtrail-*"]
+language = "kuery"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "AWS IAM Brute Force of Assume Role Policy"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+### Investigating AWS IAM Brute Force of Assume Role Policy
+
+An IAM role is an IAM identity that you can create in your account that has specific permissions. An IAM role is similar to an IAM user, in that it is an AWS identity with permission policies that determine what the identity can and cannot do in AWS. However, instead of being uniquely associated with one person, a role is intended to be assumable by anyone who needs it. Also, a role does not have standard long-term credentials such as a password or access keys associated with it. Instead, when you assume a role, it provides you with temporary security credentials for your role session.
+
+Attackers may attempt to enumerate IAM roles in order to determine if a role exists before attempting to assume or hijack the discovered role.
+
+#### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Verify if the `RoleName` parameter contains a unique value in all requests or if the activity is potentially a brute force attack.
+- Verify if the user account successfully updated a trust policy in the last 24 hours.
+- Examine whether this role existed in the environment by looking for past occurrences in your logs.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user account during the past 48 hours.
+- Contact the account and resource owners and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.
+- Consider the time of day. If the user is a human (not a program or script), did the activity take place during a normal time of day?
+- Examine the account's commands, API calls, and data management actions in the last 24 hours.
+- If you suspect the account has been compromised, scope potentially compromised assets by tracking servers, services, and data accessed by the account in the last 24 hours.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Verify the roles targeted in the failed attempts, and whether the subject role previously existed in the environment. If only one role was targeted in the requests and that role previously existed, it may be a false positive, since automations can continue targeting roles that existed in the environment in the past and cause false positives (FPs).
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Disable or limit the account during the investigation and response.
+- Identify the possible impact of the incident and prioritize accordingly; the following actions can help you gain context:
+    - Identify the account role in the cloud environment.
+    - Assess the criticality of affected services and servers.
+    - Work with your IT team to identify and minimize the impact on users.
+    - Identify if the attacker is moving laterally and compromising other accounts, servers, or services.
+    - Identify any regulatory or legal ramifications related to this activity.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords or delete API keys as needed to revoke the attacker's access to the environment. Work with your IT teams to minimize the impact on business operations during these actions.
+- Check if unauthorized new users were created, remove unauthorized new accounts, and request password resets for other IAM users.
+- Consider enabling multi-factor authentication for users.
+- Review the permissions assigned to the implicated user to ensure that the least privilege principle is being followed.
+- Implement security best practices [outlined](https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/security-best-practices/) by AWS.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection via the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+## Setup
+
+The AWS Fleet integration, Filebeat module, or similarly structured data is required to be compatible with this rule."""
+references = [
+    "https://www.praetorian.com/blog/aws-iam-assume-role-vulnerabilities",
+    "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/assume-worst-aws-assume-role-enumeration/",
+]
+risk_score = 47
+rule_id = "ea248a02-bc47-4043-8e94-2885b19b2636"
+severity = "medium"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Cloud",
+    "Data Source: AWS",
+    "Data Source: Amazon Web Services",
+    "Use Case: Identity and Access Audit",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+    "Tactic: Credential Access",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "threshold"
+
+query = '''
+event.dataset:aws.cloudtrail and
+  event.provider:iam.amazonaws.com and event.action:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy and
+  aws.cloudtrail.error_code:MalformedPolicyDocumentException and event.outcome:failure
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1110"
+name = "Brute Force"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0006"
+name = "Credential Access"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"
+
+[rule.threshold]
+field = []
+value = 25
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/integrations/aws/credential_access_iam_compromisedkeyquarantine_policy_attached_to_user.toml

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+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2024/07/20"
+integration = ["aws"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/11/04"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+This rule looks for use of the IAM `AttachUserPolicy` API operation to attach the `CompromisedKeyQuarantine` or `CompromisedKeyQuarantineV2` AWS managed policies to an existing IAM user.
+This policy denies access to certain actions and is applied by the AWS team in the event that an IAM user's credentials have been compromised or exposed publicly.
+"""
+false_positives = [
+    """
+    This is an intentional action taken by AWS in the event of compromised credentials. Follow the instructions specified in the support case created for you regarding this event.
+    """,
+]
+from = "now-6m"
+index = ["filebeat-*", "logs-aws.cloudtrail-*"]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "AWS IAM CompromisedKeyQuarantine Policy Attached to User"
+note = """
+## Triage and analysis
+
+### Investigating AWS IAM CompromisedKeyQuarantine Policy Attached to User
+
+The AWS IAM `CompromisedKeyQuarantine` and `CompromisedKeyQuarantineV2` managed policies deny certain action and is applied by the AWS team to a user with exposed credentials.
+This action is accompanied by a support case which specifies instructions to follow before detaching the policy.
+
+#### Possible Investigation Steps
+
+- **Identify Potentially Compromised Identity**: Review the `userName` parameter of the `aws.cloudtrail.request_parameters` to determine the quarantined IAM entity.
+- **Contextualize with AWS Support Case**: Review any information from AWS comtaining additional information about the quarantined account and the reasoning for quarantine.
+- **Follow Support Case Instructions**: Do not revert the quarantine policy attachment or delete the compromised keys. Instead folow the instructions given in your support case.
+- **Correlate with Other Activities**: Search for related CloudTrail events before and after this change to see if the same actor or IP address engaged in potentially suspicious activities.
+- **Interview Relevant Personnel**: If the compromised key belongs to a user, verify the intent and authorization for these correlated actions with the person or team responsible for managing the compromised key.
+
+### False Positive Analysis
+
+- There shouldn't be many false positives related to this action as it is inititated by AWS in response to compromised or publicly exposed credentials.
+
+### Response and Remediation
+
+- **Immediate Review and Reversal**: Update the user IAM permissions to remove the quarantine policy and disable the compromised credentials.
+- **Policy Update**: Review and possibly update your organization’s policies on credential storage to tighten control and prevent public exposure.
+- **Incident Response**: If malicious intent is confirmed, consider it a data breach incident and initiate the incident response protocol. This includes further investigation, containment, and recovery.
+
+### Additional Information:
+
+For further guidance on managing and securing credentials in AWS environments, refer to the [AWS IAM User Guide](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/best-practices.html) regarding security best practices and guidance on [Remediating Potentially Compromised AWS Credentials](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/guardduty/latest/ug/compromised-creds.html).
+"""
+references = [
+    "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/aws-managed-policy/latest/reference/AWSCompromisedKeyQuarantine.html/",
+    "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/aws-managed-policy/latest/reference/AWSCompromisedKeyQuarantineV2.html/",
+]
+risk_score = 73
+rule_id = "0b79f5c0-2c31-4fea-86cd-e62644278205"
+severity = "high"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Cloud",
+    "Data Source: AWS",
+    "Data Source: Amazon Web Services",
+    "Data Source: AWS IAM",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+    "Use Case: Identity and Access Audit",
+    "Tactic: Credential Access",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+
+query = '''
+iam where event.dataset == "aws.cloudtrail"
+   and event.action == "AttachUserPolicy"
+   and event.outcome == "success"
+   and stringContains(aws.cloudtrail.request_parameters, "AWSCompromisedKeyQuarantine")
+'''
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1552"
+name = "Unsecured Credentials"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0006"
+name = "Credential Access"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"
+
+[rule.investigation_fields]
+field_names = [
+    "@timestamp",
+    "user.name",
+    "user_agent.original",
+    "source.ip",
+    "aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn",
+    "aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.type",
+    "aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.access_key_id",
+    "event.action",
+    "event.outcome",
+    "cloud.account.id",
+    "cloud.region",
+    "aws.cloudtrail.request_parameters"
+]

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/integrations/aws/credential_access_iam_user_addition_to_group.toml

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+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2020/06/04"
+integration = ["aws"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/10/30"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Identifies the addition of a user to a specified group in AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM). Any user added to a
+group automatically gains the permissions that are assigned to the group. If the target group carries elevated or admin
+privileges, this action can instantly grant high-risk permissions useful for credential misuse, lateral movement, or
+privilege escalation.
+"""
+false_positives = [
+    """
+    Legitimate operations such as new user onboarding, role changes, or service account updates may trigger this event.
+    Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment. User
+    additions from unfamiliar users or hosts should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it
+    can be exempted from the rule.
+    """,
+]
+from = "now-6m"
+index = ["filebeat-*", "logs-aws.cloudtrail-*"]
+language = "kuery"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "AWS IAM User Addition to Group"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating AWS IAM User Addition to Group
+
+This rule detects when an IAM user is added to an IAM group via the `AddUserToGroup` API call. If the target group holds elevated privileges, this action may immediately grant that user wide-ranging access useful for credential misuse or lateral movement. This rule helps detect unauthorized privilege escalation via group membership change. Treat as high-risk when the destination group has wide scope (e.g., AdministratorAccess or permissive inline policies).
+
+#### Possible investigation steps
+
+- **Identify the actor and target**  
+  - Check `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn` for who added the user.  
+  - From `aws.cloudtrail.request_parameters`, capture `userName` (added user) and `groupName` (destination group).  
+  - Check `source.ip`, `user_agent.original`, `cloud.region` for unusual patterns.
+
+- **Examine the group’s privileges**  
+  - Use `GetGroup`, `ListAttachedGroupPolicies` to see what policies the group holds. Look for `AdministratorAccess`, `iam:*`, `s3:*`, `ec2:*` or cross-account permissions.  
+  - Check whether the group was recently created (`CreateGroup`) or recently escalated (`AttachGroupPolicy`). Common attacker pattern: create > attach policy > add user.
+
+- **Correlate with surrounding activity**  
+  - Look for preceding events by the actor: `AssumeRole`, `GetSessionToken`, `CreateAccessKey`, `AttachGroupPolicy`.  
+  - Follow the added user’s activities after group membership. Look for sensitive operations (e.g., IAM actions, S3 policy changes, EC2 snapshot/AMI activity).
+
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Onboarding or role transitions may legitimately add users to groups.  
+- Automated Identity-Management pipelines may add many users to service groups; validate know
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- **Containment**:
+  - If unapproved, remove the user from the group immediately (`RemoveUserFromGroup`) and rotate their access keys.
+  - Temporarily restrict group policy changes while assessing blast radius.
+- **Investigation and scoping**:
+  - Review all actions executed by the newly added user since the change (ex: PutBucketPolicy, CreateAccessKey, PassRole).
+  - Confirm whether other users were added to the same group within the same window. 
+- **Recovery and hardening**: 
+  - Enforce least privilege by redesigning large-group membership. 
+  - Restrict `iam:AddUserToGroup` to only appropriate service principals with approval workflow. 
+  - Create detections for AttachGroupPolicy to powerful policies and for mass AddUserToGroup patterns.
+
+### Additional information
+[AWS Security Best Practices](https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/security-best-practices/)
+"""
+references = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_AddUserToGroup.html"]
+risk_score = 21
+rule_id = "333de828-8190-4cf5-8d7c-7575846f6fe0"
+severity = "low"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Cloud",
+    "Data Source: AWS",
+    "Data Source: Amazon Web Services",
+    "Use Case: Identity and Access Audit",
+    "Tactic: Credential Access",
+    "Tactic: Persistence",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "query"
+
+query = '''
+event.dataset: aws.cloudtrail and 
+    event.provider: iam.amazonaws.com and 
+    event.action: AddUserToGroup and 
+    event.outcome: success
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0006"
+name = "Credential Access"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1098"
+name = "Account Manipulation"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0003"
+name = "Persistence"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
+
+[rule.investigation_fields]
+field_names = [
+    "@timestamp",
+    "user.name",
+    "user_agent.original",
+    "source.ip",
+    "aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn",
+    "aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.type",
+    "aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.access_key_id",
+    "user.target.name",
+    "event.action",
+    "event.outcome",
+    "cloud.account.id",
+    "cloud.region",
+    "aws.cloudtrail.request_parameters",
+]
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/integrations/aws/credential_access_new_terms_secretsmanager_getsecretvalue.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2020/07/06"
+integration = ["aws"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/08/18"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Nick Jones", "Elastic"]
+description = """
+An adversary with access to a compromised AWS service such as an EC2 instance, Lambda function, or other service may
+attempt to leverage the compromised service to access secrets in AWS Secrets Manager. This rule looks for the first time
+a specific user identity has programmatically retrieved a secret value from Secrets Manager using the `GetSecretValue`
+or `BatchGetSecretValue` actions. This rule assumes that AWS services such as Lambda functions and EC2 instances are
+setup with IAM role's assigned that have the necessary permissions to access the secrets in Secrets Manager. An
+adversary with access to a compromised AWS service would rely on its' attached role to access the secrets in Secrets Manager.
+"""
+false_positives = [
+    """
+    Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be using GetSecretString API for the specified
+    SecretId. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule.
+    """,
+]
+from = "now-6m"
+index = ["filebeat-*", "logs-aws.cloudtrail-*"]
+interval = "5m"
+language = "kuery"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "First Time Seen AWS Secret Value Accessed in Secrets Manager"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+### Investigating First Time Seen AWS Secret Value Accessed in Secrets Manager
+
+AWS Secrets Manager is a service that enables the replacement of hardcoded credentials in code, including passwords, with an API call to Secrets Manager to retrieve the secret programmatically.
+
+This rule looks for the retrieval of credentials from Secrets Manager using `GetSecretValue` or `BatchGetSecretValue` API calls. This is a [New Terms](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/rules-ui-create.html#create-new-terms-rule) rule indicating this is the first time a specific user identity has successfuly retrieved a secret value from Secrets Manager.
+
+#### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Identify the account and its role in the environment, and inspect the related policy.
+- Identify the applications that should use this account.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user account during the past 48 hours.
+- Investigate abnormal values in the `user_agent.original` field by comparing them with the intended and authorized usage and historical data. Suspicious user agent values include non-SDK, AWS CLI, custom user agents, etc.
+- Assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences involving other users.
+- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.
+- Considering the source IP address and geolocation of the user who issued the command:
+    - Do they look normal for the calling user?
+    - If the source is an EC2 IP address, is it associated with an EC2 instance in one of your accounts or is the source IP from an EC2 instance that's not under your control?
+    - If it is an authorized EC2 instance, is the activity associated with normal behavior for the instance role or roles? Are there any other alerts or signs of suspicious activity involving this instance?
+- Review IAM permission policies for the user identity and specific secrets accessed.
+- Examine the request parameters. These might indicate the source of the program or the nature of its tasks.
+- If you suspect the account has been compromised, scope potentially compromised assets by tracking servers, services, and data accessed by the account in the last 24 hours.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Review `actor.entity.id` and `target.entity.id` values for expected combinations of identity and secret value access. If this is an expected behavior, consider adding exceptions to the rule.
+- False positives may occur due to the intended usage of the service. Tuning is needed in order to have higher confidence. Consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of user agent and IP address conditions.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Disable or limit the account during the investigation and response.
+- Identify the possible impact of the incident and prioritize accordingly; the following actions can help you gain context:
+    - Identify the account role in the cloud environment.
+    - Assess the criticality of affected services and servers.
+    - Work with your IT team to identify and minimize the impact on users.
+    - Identify if the attacker is moving laterally and compromising other accounts, servers, or services.
+    - Identify any regulatory or legal ramifications related to this activity.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Rotate secrets or delete API keys as needed to revoke the attacker's access to the environment. Work with your IT teams to minimize the impact on business operations during these actions.
+- Check if unauthorized new users were created, remove unauthorized new accounts, and request password resets for other IAM users.
+- Consider enabling multi-factor authentication for users.
+- Review the permissions assigned to the implicated user to ensure that the least privilege principle is being followed.
+- Implement security best practices [outlined](https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/security-best-practices/) by AWS.
+- Take the actions needed to return affected systems, data, or services to their normal operational levels.
+- Identify the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection via the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+"""
+references = [
+    "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/secretsmanager/latest/apireference/API_GetSecretValue.html",
+    "https://detectioninthe.cloud/ttps/credential_access/access_secret_in_secrets_manager/",
+    "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/secretsmanager/latest/apireference/API_BatchGetSecretValue.html",
+    "https://cloud.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-cloud/aws-security/aws-services/aws-secrets-manager-enum",
+]
+risk_score = 47
+rule_id = "a00681e3-9ed6-447c-ab2c-be648821c622"
+severity = "medium"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Cloud",
+    "Data Source: AWS",
+    "Data Source: Amazon Web Services",
+    "Data Source: AWS Secrets Manager",
+    "Tactic: Credential Access",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "new_terms"
+
+query = '''
+event.dataset:aws.cloudtrail and event.provider:secretsmanager.amazonaws.com and
+    event.action: (GetSecretValue or BatchGetSecretValue) and event.outcome:success and
+    not user_agent.name: ("Chrome" or "Firefox" or "Safari" or "Edge" or "Brave" or "Opera")
+'''
+
+[rule.investigation_fields]
+field_names = [
+    "@timestamp",
+    "user.name",
+    "user_agent.original",
+    "source.ip",
+    "aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn",
+    "aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.type",
+    "aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.access_key_id",
+    "event.action",
+    "event.outcome",
+    "cloud.account.id",
+    "cloud.region",
+    "aws.cloudtrail.request_parameters"
+]
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1555"
+name = "Credentials from Password Stores"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1555.006"
+name = "Cloud Secrets Management Stores"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/006/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0006"
+name = "Credential Access"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"
+
+[rule.new_terms]
+field = "new_terms_fields"
+value = ["cloud.account.id", "user.name"]
+[[rule.new_terms.history_window_start]]
+field = "history_window_start"
+value = "now-10d"
+
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/integrations/aws/credential_access_rapid_secret_retrieval_attempts_from_secretsmanager.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2024/04/11"
+integration = ["aws"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/11/07"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Identifies rapid secret retrieval activity from AWS Secrets Manager using the GetSecretValue or BatchGetSecretValue API
+actions. Adversaries who compromise an IAM user, instance role, or temporary credentials may attempt to enumerate or
+exfiltrate secrets in bulk to escalate privileges, move laterally, or gain persistence. This rule detects 20 or more
+unique secret retrievals by the same user identity within a short time window, which may indicate credential compromise
+or automated secret harvesting.
+"""
+false_positives = [
+    """
+    Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be using GetSecretValue or BatchGetSecretValue
+    APIs for the specified SecretId. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule.
+    """,
+]
+from = "now-6m"
+index = ["filebeat-*", "logs-aws.cloudtrail*"]
+language = "kuery"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "AWS Secrets Manager Rapid Secrets Retrieval"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. 
+> While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, validate and adapt it for your operational needs.
+
+### Investigating AWS Secrets Manager Rapid Secrets Retrieval
+
+AWS Secrets Manager stores sensitive credentials such as database passwords, API keys, OAuth tokens, and service 
+configuration values. In credential compromise scenarios, attackers frequently attempt to retrieve as many secrets as 
+possible in a short timeframe to escalate privileges or move laterally across the environment.
+
+This threshold rule triggers when a single user identity successfully retrieves 20 or more unique secrets using 
+`GetSecretValue` or `BatchGetSecretValue` within a short timespan. Retrieval of many different secrets in rapid succession is highly unusual and strongly associated with reconnaissance, secret harvesting, or compromised automation.
+
+Note: `BatchGetSecretValue` API calls the `GetSecretValue` API for each secret value; this alert only captures the `GetSecretValue` calls rather than the `BatchGetSecretValue` call itself.
+
+#### Possible investigation steps
+
+- **Identify the user or role**
+  - Review `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn`, `user.name`, and `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.type`.
+  - Determine whether the identity normally accesses Secrets Manager or is tied to a known automation workload.
+
+- **Analyze the set of secrets retrieved**
+  - Expand the alert in Timeline and review `aws.cloudtrail.request_parameters` for all `SecretId` values in the grouped threshold event.
+  - Identify whether the accessed secrets include:
+    - Privileged database credentials  
+    - IAM user or service account credentials  
+    - Production application secrets  
+    - Rarely accessed or high-sensitivity secrets  
+
+- **Assess the runtime context**
+  - Investigate `source.ip`, `source.geo.location`, and `user_agent.original`.
+  - Validate whether the calls originated from known internal automation (e.g., ECS task, Lambda runtime, EC2 instance profile) 
+    or from an unexpected IP or user agent.
+
+- **Correlate with other activity from the same identity**
+  - Look for related reconnaissance or credential-access events:
+    - `ListSecrets`, `DescribeSecret`
+    - IAM enumeration (`ListUsers`, `GetCallerIdentity`)
+    - Role-chaining or unusual `AssumeRole` flows  
+  - Check for subsequent use of exposed credentials (RDS login attempts, API activity, abnormal resource access).
+
+- **Determine whether unusual automation or deployment activity is occurring**
+  - Confirm with application owners whether a new deployment, config reload, or migration might explain the multi-secret access.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Legitimate application initialization or rollouts may retrieve many secrets once on startup.
+- CI/CD pipelines or configuration management tools may enumerate secrets as part of environment bootstrapping.
+
+To reduce noise, consider exceptions based on:
+- Known service roles  
+- Expected source IP ranges  
+- Specific application identities tied to secret orchestration  
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- **Containment**
+  - Immediately revoke or disable the IAM user, role session, or instance profile if compromise is suspected.
+  - Quarantine EC2/ECS/Lambda resources originating suspicious calls.
+
+- **Investigation**
+  - Identify all secrets accessed in the grouped alert and determine where those credentials are used.
+  - Review CloudTrail for any suspicious follow-on activity using the retrieved secrets.
+  - Assess whether additional identities or workloads show similar enumeration behavior.
+
+- **Recovery and hardening**
+  - Rotate all accessed secrets and update dependent systems.
+  - Rotate IAM access keys or temporary credentials for the impacted identity.
+  - Restrict permissions to Secrets Manager following least privilege.
+  - Review automation and application behavior to ensure secrets are accessed only when required.
+"""
+references = [
+    "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/secretsmanager/latest/apireference/API_GetSecretValue.html",
+    "https://detectioninthe.cloud/ttps/credential_access/access_secret_in_secrets_manager/",
+    "https://cloud.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-cloud/aws-security/aws-services/aws-secrets-manager-enum",
+]
+risk_score = 47
+rule_id = "185c782e-f86a-11ee-9d9f-f661ea17fbce"
+severity = "medium"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Cloud",
+    "Data Source: AWS",
+    "Data Source: Amazon Web Services",
+    "Data Source: AWS Secrets Manager",
+    "Tactic: Credential Access",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "threshold"
+
+query = '''
+event.dataset: "aws.cloudtrail" 
+    and event.provider: "secretsmanager.amazonaws.com" 
+    and event.action: "GetSecretValue" 
+    and event.outcome: "success" 
+    and not (
+        user_agent.name: ("Chrome" or "Firefox" or "Safari" or "Edge" or "Brave" or "Opera") 
+        or source.address: ("kafka.amazonaws.com" or "apidestinations.events.amazonaws.com")
+    )
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1555"
+name = "Credentials from Password Stores"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1555.006"
+name = "Cloud Secrets Management Stores"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/006/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0006"
+name = "Credential Access"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"
+
+[rule.threshold]
+field = ["user.id"]
+value = 1
+[[rule.threshold.cardinality]]
+field = "aws.cloudtrail.request_parameters"
+value = 20
+
+