nldcsc-elastic-rules 0.0.8__py3-none-any.whl

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/persistence_linux_shell_activity_via_web_server.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2023/03/04"
+integration = ["endpoint", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/03/20"
+
+[transform]
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Listening Ports"
+query = "SELECT pid, address, port, socket, protocol, path FROM listening_ports"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Open Sockets"
+query = "SELECT pid, family, remote_address, remote_port, socket, state FROM process_open_sockets"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Process Info"
+query = "SELECT name, cmdline, parent, path, uid FROM processes"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Process Info for Webapp User"
+query = "SELECT name, cmdline, parent, path, uid FROM processes WHERE uid = {{process.user.id}}"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Crontab Information"
+query = "SELECT * FROM crontab"
+
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Identifies suspicious commands executed via a web server, which may suggest a vulnerability and remote shell access.
+Attackers may exploit a vulnerability in a web application to execute commands via a web server, or place a backdoor
+file that can be abused to gain code execution as a mechanism for persistence.
+"""
+false_positives = [
+    """
+    Network monitoring or management products may have a web server component that runs shell commands as part of normal
+    behavior.
+    """,
+]
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["endgame-*", "logs-endpoint.events.process*", "logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*"]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Potential Remote Code Execution via Web Server"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+### Investigating Potential Remote Code Execution via Web Server
+
+Adversaries may backdoor web servers with web shells to establish persistent access to systems. A web shell is a malicious script, often embedded into a compromised web server, that grants an attacker remote access and control over the server. This enables the execution of arbitrary commands, data exfiltration, and further exploitation of the target network.
+
+This rule detects a web server process spawning script and command line interface programs, potentially indicating attackers executing commands using the web shell.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the [Osquery Markdown Plugin](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/invest-guide-run-osquery.html) introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+> This investigation guide uses [placeholder fields](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/osquery-placeholder-fields.html) to dynamically pass alert data into Osquery queries. Placeholder fields were introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.7.0. If you're using Elastic Stack version 8.6.0 or earlier, you'll need to manually adjust this investigation guide's queries to ensure they properly run.
+
+#### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Investigate abnormal behaviors by the subject process such as network connections, file modifications, and any other spawned child processes.
+  - Investigate listening ports and open sockets to look for potential reverse shells or data exfiltration.
+    - $osquery_0
+    - $osquery_1
+  - Investigate the process information for malicious or uncommon processes/process trees.
+    - $osquery_2
+  - Investigate the process tree spawned from the user that is used to run the web application service. A user that is running a web application should not spawn other child processes.
+    - $osquery_3
+- Examine the command line to determine which commands or scripts were executed.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- If scripts or executables were dropped, retrieve the files and determine if they are malicious:
+  - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+    - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+      - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+        - Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
+        - Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
+      - File access, modification, and creation activities.
+      - Cron jobs, services and other persistence mechanisms.
+        - $osquery_4
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Any activity that triggered the alert and is not inherently malicious must be monitored by the security team.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+"""
+references = [
+    "https://pentestlab.blog/tag/web-shell/",
+    "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/elastic-response-to-the-the-spring4shell-vulnerability-cve-2022-22965",
+]
+risk_score = 73
+rule_id = "f16fca20-4d6c-43f9-aec1-20b6de3b0aeb"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+#### Prerequisite Requirements:
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
+"""
+severity = "high"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Linux",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Persistence",
+    "Tactic: Initial Access",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
+    "Use Case: Vulnerability",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Data Source: SentinelOne",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+
+query = '''
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and
+event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "start") and process.parent.executable : (
+  "/usr/sbin/nginx", "/usr/local/sbin/nginx",
+  "/usr/sbin/apache", "/usr/local/sbin/apache",
+  "/usr/sbin/apache2", "/usr/local/sbin/apache2",
+  "/usr/sbin/php*", "/usr/local/sbin/php*",
+  "/usr/sbin/lighttpd", "/usr/local/sbin/lighttpd",
+  "/usr/sbin/hiawatha", "/usr/local/sbin/hiawatha",
+  "/usr/local/bin/caddy", 
+  "/usr/local/lsws/bin/lswsctrl",
+  "*/bin/catalina.sh"
+) and
+process.name : (
+  "bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish", "python*", "php*", "perl", "ruby", "lua*", "openssl", "nc",
+  "netcat", "ncat", "telnet", "awk", "socat"
+  ) and process.args : (
+  "whoami", "id", "uname", "cat", "hostname", "ip", "curl", "wget", "pwd", "ls", "cd", "python*", "php*", "perl",
+  "ruby", "lua*", "openssl", "nc", "netcat", "ncat", "telnet", "awk", "socat"
+  ) and not process.name == "phpquery"
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1505"
+name = "Server Software Component"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1505.003"
+name = "Web Shell"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0003"
+name = "Persistence"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1190"
+name = "Exploit Public-Facing Application"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0001"
+name = "Initial Access"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/"
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/persistence_linux_user_account_creation.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2023/02/13"
+integration = ["system"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/02/03"
+
+[transform]
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Information for a Specific User"
+query = "SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = {{user.name}}"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Investigate the Account Authentication Status"
+query = "SELECT * FROM logged_in_users WHERE user = {{user.name}}"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Information for a Specific Group"
+query = "SELECT * FROM groups WHERE groupname = {{group.name}}"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Running Processes by User"
+query = "SELECT pid, username, name FROM processes p JOIN users u ON u.uid = p.uid ORDER BY username"
+
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = "Identifies attempts to create new users. Attackers may add new users to establish persistence on a system.\n"
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["filebeat-*", "logs-system.auth-*"]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Linux User Account Creation"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+### Investigating Linux User Account Creation
+
+The `useradd` and `adduser` commands are used to create new user accounts in Linux-based operating systems.
+
+Attackers may create new accounts (both local and domain) to maintain access to victim systems.
+
+This rule identifies the usage of `useradd` and `adduser` to create new accounts.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the [Osquery Markdown Plugin](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/invest-guide-run-osquery.html) introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+> This investigation guide uses [placeholder fields](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/osquery-placeholder-fields.html) to dynamically pass alert data into Osquery queries. Placeholder fields were introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.7.0. If you're using Elastic Stack version 8.6.0 or earlier, you'll need to manually adjust this investigation guide's queries to ensure they properly run.
+
+#### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Investigate whether the user was created succesfully.
+  - $osquery_0
+- Investigate whether the user is currently logged in and active.
+  - $osquery_1
+- Identify if the account was added to privileged groups or assigned special privileges after creation.
+  - $osquery_2
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence and whether they are located in expected locations.
+  - $osquery_3
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Account creation is a common administrative task, so there is a high chance of the activity being legitimate. Before investigating further, verify that this activity is not benign.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Review the privileges assigned to the involved users to ensure that the least privilege principle is being followed.
+- Delete the created account.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+"""
+references = ["https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/primer-on-persistence-mechanisms"]
+risk_score = 21
+rule_id = "edfd5ca9-9d6c-44d9-b615-1e56b920219c"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Filebeat.
+
+### Filebeat Setup
+Filebeat is a lightweight shipper for forwarding and centralizing log data. Installed as an agent on your servers, Filebeat monitors the log files or locations that you specify, collects log events, and forwards them either to Elasticsearch or Logstash for indexing.
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Filebeat on a Linux System:
+- Elastic provides repositories available for APT and YUM-based distributions. Note that we provide binary packages, but no source packages.
+- To install the APT and YUM repositories follow the setup instructions in this [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/setup-repositories.html).
+- To run Filebeat on Docker follow the setup instructions in the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/running-on-docker.html).
+- To run Filebeat on Kubernetes follow the setup instructions in the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/running-on-kubernetes.html).
+- For quick start information for Filebeat refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/8.11/filebeat-installation-configuration.html).
+- For complete “Setup and Run Filebeat” information refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html).
+
+#### Rule Specific Setup Note
+- This rule requires the “Filebeat System Module” to be enabled.
+- The system module collects and parses logs created by the system logging service of common Unix/Linux based distributions.
+- To run the system module of Filebeat on Linux follow the setup instructions in the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/filebeat-module-system.html).
+"""
+severity = "low"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Linux",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Persistence",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+
+query = '''
+iam where host.os.type == "linux" and (event.type == "user" and event.type == "creation") and
+process.name in ("useradd", "adduser") and user.name != null
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1136"
+name = "Create Account"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1136.001"
+name = "Local Account"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/001/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0003"
+name = "Persistence"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/persistence_linux_user_added_to_privileged_group.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2023/02/13"
+integration = ["endpoint", "auditd_manager", "crowdstrike", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/03/20"
+
+[transform]
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Information for a Specific User"
+query = "SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = {{user.name}}"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Investigate the Account Authentication Status"
+query = "SELECT * FROM logged_in_users WHERE user = {{user.name}}"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Information for a Specific Group"
+query = "SELECT * FROM groups WHERE groupname = {{group.name}}"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Running Processes by User"
+query = "SELECT pid, username, name FROM processes p JOIN users u ON u.uid = p.uid ORDER BY username"
+
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Identifies attempts to add a user to a privileged group. Attackers may add users to a privileged group in order to
+establish persistence on a system.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = [
+    "auditbeat-*",
+    "endgame-*",
+    "logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*",
+    "logs-crowdstrike.fdr*",
+    "logs-endpoint.events.process*",
+    "logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*",
+]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Linux User Added to Privileged Group"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+### Investigating Linux User Added to Privileged Group
+
+The `usermod`, `adduser`, and `gpasswd` commands can be used to assign user accounts to new groups in Linux-based operating systems.
+
+Attackers may add users to a privileged group in order to escalate privileges or establish persistence on a system or domain.
+
+This rule identifies the usages of `usermod`, `adduser` and `gpasswd` to assign user accounts to a privileged group.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the [Osquery Markdown Plugin](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/invest-guide-run-osquery.html) introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+> This investigation guide uses [placeholder fields](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/osquery-placeholder-fields.html) to dynamically pass alert data into Osquery queries. Placeholder fields were introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.7.0. If you're using Elastic Stack version 8.6.0 or earlier, you'll need to manually adjust this investigation guide's queries to ensure they properly run.
+
+#### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Investigate whether the user was succesfully added to the privileged group.
+  - $osquery_0
+- Investigate whether the user is currently logged in and active.
+  - $osquery_1
+- Retrieve information about the privileged group to which the user was added.
+  - $osquery_2
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence and whether they are located in expected locations.
+  - $osquery_3
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Adding accounts to a group is a common administrative task, so there is a high chance of the activity being legitimate. Before investigating further, verify that this activity is not benign.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Review the privileges assigned to the involved users to ensure that the least privilege principle is being followed.
+- Delete the account that seems to be involved in malicious activity.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+"""
+references = ["https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/primer-on-persistence-mechanisms"]
+risk_score = 21
+rule_id = "43d6ec12-2b1c-47b5-8f35-e9de65551d3b"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+#### Prerequisite Requirements:
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
+"""
+severity = "low"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Linux",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Persistence",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Data Source: Auditd Manager",
+    "Data Source: Crowdstrike",
+    "Data Source: SentinelOne",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+
+query = '''
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and
+  event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "start", "ProcessRollup2", "executed", "process_started") and
+  process.args in (
+    "root", "admin", "wheel", "staff", "sudo","disk", "video", "shadow", "lxc", "lxd"
+  ) and
+  (
+    process.name in ("usermod", "adduser") or
+    (process.name == "gpasswd" and process.args in ("-a", "--add", "-M", "--members"))
+  )
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1136"
+name = "Create Account"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1136.001"
+name = "Local Account"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/001/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0003"
+name = "Persistence"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/persistence_lkm_configuration_file_creation.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2024/12/17"
+integration = ["endpoint"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/06/03"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+This rule detects the creation of Loadable Kernel Module (LKM) configuration files. Attackers may create or modify these
+files to allow their LKMs to be loaded upon reboot, ensuring persistence on a compromised system.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["logs-endpoint.events.file*"]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Loadable Kernel Module Configuration File Creation"
+risk_score = 21
+rule_id = "6e2355cc-c60a-4d92-a80c-e54a45ad2400"
+severity = "low"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Linux",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Persistence",
+    "Tactic: Defense Evasion",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+query = '''
+file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("rename", "creation") and process.executable != null and
+file.path like (
+  "/etc/modules", "/etc/modprobe.d/*", "/run/modprobe.d/*", "/usr/local/lib/modprobe.d/*", "/usr/lib/modprobe.d/*",
+  "/lib/modprobe.d/*", "/etc/modules-load.d/*", "/run/modules-load.d/*", "/usr/local/lib/modules-load.d/*",
+  "/usr/lib/modules-load.d/*"
+) and not (
+  process.executable in (
+    "/bin/dpkg", "/usr/bin/dpkg", "/bin/dockerd", "/usr/bin/dockerd", "/usr/sbin/dockerd", "/bin/microdnf",
+    "/usr/bin/microdnf", "/bin/rpm", "/usr/bin/rpm", "/bin/snapd", "/usr/bin/snapd", "/bin/yum", "/usr/bin/yum",
+    "/bin/dnf", "/usr/bin/dnf", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/bin/dnf-automatic", "/usr/bin/dnf-automatic",
+    "/bin/pacman", "/usr/bin/pacman", "/usr/bin/dpkg-divert", "/bin/dpkg-divert", "/sbin/apk", "/usr/sbin/apk",
+    "/usr/local/sbin/apk", "/usr/bin/apt", "/usr/sbin/pacman", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/puppet",
+    "/bin/puppet", "/opt/puppetlabs/puppet/bin/puppet", "/usr/bin/chef-client", "/bin/chef-client",
+    "/bin/autossl_check", "/usr/bin/autossl_check", "/proc/self/exe", "/dev/fd/*",  "/usr/bin/pamac-daemon",
+    "/bin/pamac-daemon", "/usr/local/bin/dockerd", "/opt/elasticbeanstalk/bin/platform-engine",
+    "/opt/puppetlabs/puppet/bin/ruby", "/usr/libexec/platform-python", "/opt/imunify360/venv/bin/python3",
+    "/opt/eset/efs/lib/utild", "/usr/sbin/anacron", "/usr/bin/podman", "/kaniko/kaniko-executor", "/usr/bin/prime-select"
+  ) or
+  file.extension in ("swp", "swpx", "swx", "dpkg-remove") or
+  file.Ext.original.extension == "dpkg-new" or
+  process.executable like (
+    "/nix/store/*", "/var/lib/dpkg/info/kmod.postinst", "/tmp/vmis.*", "/snap/*", "/dev/fd/*",
+    "/usr/libexec/platform-python*"
+  ) or
+  process.executable == null or
+  process.name in (
+    "crond", "executor", "puppet", "droplet-agent.postinst", "cf-agent", "schedd", "imunify-notifier", "perl",
+    "jumpcloud-agent", "crio", "dnf_install", "utild"
+  ) or
+  (process.name == "sed" and file.name : "sed*") or
+  (process.name == "perl" and file.name : "e2scrub_all.tmp*")
+)
+'''
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating Loadable Kernel Module Configuration File Creation
+
+Loadable Kernel Modules (LKMs) are components that can be dynamically loaded into the Linux kernel to extend its functionality without rebooting. Adversaries exploit this by creating or altering LKM configuration files to ensure their malicious modules load at startup, achieving persistence. The detection rule identifies suspicious file creation or renaming activities in key directories, excluding benign processes, to flag potential threats.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Review the file path and name to determine if it matches any known or expected LKM configuration files, focusing on paths like /etc/modules, /etc/modprobe.d/*, and others specified in the query.
+- Examine the process executable responsible for the file creation or renaming to identify if it is a known or trusted application, especially if it is not in the list of excluded executables.
+- Check the process name and executable path for any anomalies or signs of masquerading, particularly if they are not in the list of excluded names or paths.
+- Investigate the user account associated with the process to determine if it has legitimate access or if it might be compromised.
+- Correlate the event with other recent system activities to identify any patterns or additional suspicious behavior, such as other file modifications or network connections.
+- Review system logs for any related entries that might provide additional context or evidence of malicious activity.
+- Assess the risk and impact of the detected activity on the system's security posture and determine if further containment or remediation actions are necessary.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- System package managers like dpkg, rpm, and yum may trigger false positives when they update or install legitimate kernel modules. To handle this, exclude these processes by adding them to the exception list in the detection rule.
+- Automated system management tools such as Puppet, Chef, and Ansible can create or modify LKM configuration files during routine operations. Exclude these processes by specifying their executables in the exception criteria.
+- Temporary files created by text editors or system processes, such as those with extensions like swp or swx, can be mistaken for suspicious activity. Exclude these file extensions to reduce false positives.
+- Processes running from specific directories like /nix/store or /snap may be part of legitimate software installations. Add these paths to the exclusion list to prevent unnecessary alerts.
+- Scheduled tasks or cron jobs that involve file operations in the monitored directories might be flagged. Identify and exclude these processes by their names or paths to minimize false positives.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Isolate the affected system from the network to prevent further propagation of the malicious loadable kernel module.
+- Terminate any suspicious processes identified in the alert that are associated with the creation or modification of LKM configuration files.
+- Remove or revert any unauthorized changes to LKM configuration files in the specified directories to prevent the malicious module from loading on reboot.
+- Conduct a thorough scan of the system using updated antivirus or endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools to identify and remove any additional malicious components.
+- Review system logs and the history of executed commands to identify the initial vector of compromise and any other affected systems.
+- Escalate the incident to the security operations center (SOC) or incident response team for further investigation and to determine if additional systems are compromised.
+- Implement additional monitoring and alerting for similar suspicious activities to enhance detection and response capabilities for future incidents."""
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1547"
+name = "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1547.006"
+name = "Kernel Modules and Extensions"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/006/"
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0003"
+name = "Persistence"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1014"
+name = "Rootkit"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014/"
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0005"
+name = "Defense Evasion"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"