nldcsc-elastic-rules 0.0.8__py3-none-any.whl

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/persistence_apt_package_manager_netcon.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2024/02/01"
+integration = ["endpoint"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/02/04"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Detects suspicious network events executed by the APT package manager, potentially indicating persistence through an APT
+backdoor. In Linux, APT (Advanced Package Tool) is a command-line utility used for handling packages on Debian-based
+systems, providing functions for installing, updating, upgrading, and removing software along with managing package
+repositories. Attackers can backdoor APT to gain persistence by injecting malicious code into scripts that APT runs,
+thereby ensuring continued unauthorized access or control each time APT is used for package management.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["logs-endpoint.events.network*", "logs-endpoint.events.process*"]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Suspicious APT Package Manager Network Connection"
+references = ["https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/sequel-on-persistence-mechanisms"]
+risk_score = 47
+rule_id = "eaef8a35-12e0-4ac0-bc14-81c72b6bd27c"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+#### Prerequisite Requirements:
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
+"""
+severity = "medium"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Linux",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Persistence",
+    "Tactic: Command and Control",
+    "Tactic: Defense Evasion",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+type = "eql"
+
+query = '''
+sequence by host.id with maxspan=5s
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
+   process.parent.name == "apt" and process.args == "-c" and process.name in (
+     "bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish"
+    )
+  ] by process.entity_id
+  [network where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "connection_attempted" and event.type == "start" and not (
+     destination.ip == null or destination.ip == "0.0.0.0" or cidrmatch(
+     destination.ip, "10.0.0.0/8", "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "172.16.0.0/12", "192.0.0.0/24", "192.0.0.0/29",
+     "192.0.0.8/32", "192.0.0.9/32", "192.0.0.10/32", "192.0.0.170/32", "192.0.0.171/32", "192.0.2.0/24",
+     "192.31.196.0/24", "192.52.193.0/24", "192.168.0.0/16", "192.88.99.0/24", "224.0.0.0/4", "100.64.0.0/10",
+     "192.175.48.0/24","198.18.0.0/15", "198.51.100.0/24", "203.0.113.0/24", "240.0.0.0/4", "::1", "FE80::/10",
+     "FF00::/8", "172.31.0.0/16"
+     )
+   ) and not process.executable == "/usr/bin/apt-listbugs"
+  ] by process.parent.entity_id
+'''
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating Suspicious APT Package Manager Network Connection
+
+The APT package manager is crucial for managing software on Debian-based Linux systems. Adversaries may exploit APT by injecting malicious scripts, gaining persistence and control. The detection rule identifies suspicious APT-triggered shell executions followed by unusual network connections, flagging potential backdoor activities and unauthorized access attempts.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Review the process details to confirm the parent process is indeed 'apt' and check the command-line arguments for any unusual or unauthorized scripts being executed.
+- Investigate the network connection details, focusing on the destination IP address to determine if it is known to be malicious or associated with suspicious activity. Cross-reference with threat intelligence sources.
+- Examine the process tree to identify any child processes spawned by the suspicious shell execution, which may provide further insight into the attacker's actions or intentions.
+- Check the system logs for any other recent unusual activities or alerts that might correlate with the suspicious APT activity, such as unauthorized user logins or file modifications.
+- Assess the system for any signs of persistence mechanisms that may have been established, such as cron jobs or modified startup scripts, which could indicate a backdoor installation.
+- If possible, capture and analyze network traffic to and from the destination IP to understand the nature of the communication and identify any data exfiltration or command and control activities.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Legitimate administrative scripts executed by APT may trigger the rule if they involve shell commands followed by network connections. Users can create exceptions for known scripts by specifying their paths or hashes.
+- Automated system updates or package installations that involve network connections might be flagged. Users should monitor and whitelist these routine operations by identifying the specific processes and network destinations involved.
+- Network connections to internal or trusted IP addresses not covered by the existing CIDR exclusions could be mistakenly flagged. Users can expand the CIDR list to include additional trusted IP ranges specific to their environment.
+- Use of alternative shell environments or custom scripts that invoke APT with network operations may cause false positives. Users should document and exclude these specific use cases by process name or command-line arguments.
+- Non-standard APT configurations or third-party tools that interact with APT and initiate network connections might be misidentified. Users should review and whitelist these tools by their executable paths or process names.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Isolate the affected host immediately to prevent further unauthorized network connections and potential lateral movement within the network.
+- Terminate any suspicious processes identified as being executed by the APT package manager, especially those involving shell executions.
+- Conduct a thorough review of the APT configuration files and scripts to identify and remove any injected malicious code or unauthorized modifications.
+- Revert any unauthorized changes to the system or software packages by restoring from a known good backup, ensuring the integrity of the system.
+- Update all system packages and apply security patches to close any vulnerabilities that may have been exploited by the attacker.
+- Monitor network traffic for any further suspicious connections or activities originating from the affected host, using enhanced logging and alerting mechanisms.
+- Escalate the incident to the security operations team for further investigation and to determine if additional systems have been compromised, ensuring a comprehensive response."""
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1543"
+name = "Create or Modify System Process"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1546"
+name = "Event Triggered Execution"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1546.016"
+name = "Installer Packages"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/016/"
+
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1574"
+name = "Hijack Execution Flow"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0003"
+name = "Persistence"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0011"
+name = "Command and Control"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/"
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0005"
+name = "Defense Evasion"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/persistence_at_job_creation.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2024/05/31"
+integration = ["endpoint"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/01/15"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+This rule monitors for at jobs being created or renamed. Linux at jobs are scheduled tasks that can be leveraged by
+system administrators to set up scheduled tasks, but may be abused by malicious actors for persistence, privilege
+escalation and command execution. By creating or modifying cron job configurations, attackers can execute malicious
+commands or scripts at predefined intervals, ensuring their continued presence and enabling unauthorized activities.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["logs-endpoint.events.file*"]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "At Job Created or Modified"
+references = ["https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/primer-on-persistence-mechanisms"]
+risk_score = 47
+rule_id = "84755a05-78c8-4430-8681-89cd6c857d71"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+#### Prerequisite Requirements:
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
+"""
+severity = "medium"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Linux",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Persistence",
+    "Tactic: Privilege Escalation",
+    "Tactic: Execution",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+
+query = '''
+file where host.os.type == "linux" and
+event.action in ("rename", "creation") and file.path : "/var/spool/cron/atjobs/*" and not (
+  process.executable in (
+    "/bin/dpkg", "/usr/bin/dpkg", "/bin/dockerd", "/usr/bin/dockerd", "/usr/sbin/dockerd", "/bin/microdnf",
+    "/usr/bin/microdnf", "/bin/rpm", "/usr/bin/rpm", "/bin/snapd", "/usr/bin/snapd", "/bin/yum", "/usr/bin/yum",
+    "/bin/dnf", "/usr/bin/dnf", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/bin/dnf-automatic", "/usr/bin/dnf-automatic",
+    "/bin/pacman", "/usr/bin/pacman", "/usr/bin/dpkg-divert", "/bin/dpkg-divert", "/sbin/apk", "/usr/sbin/apk",
+    "/usr/local/sbin/apk", "/usr/bin/apt", "/usr/sbin/pacman", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/puppet",
+    "/bin/puppet", "/opt/puppetlabs/puppet/bin/puppet", "/usr/bin/chef-client", "/bin/chef-client",
+    "/bin/autossl_check", "/usr/bin/autossl_check", "/proc/self/exe", "/dev/fd/*",  "/usr/bin/pamac-daemon",
+    "/bin/pamac-daemon", "/usr/local/bin/dockerd"
+  ) or
+  file.extension in ("swp", "swpx", "swx", "dpkg-remove") or
+  file.Ext.original.extension == "dpkg-new" or
+  process.executable : ("/nix/store/*", "/var/lib/dpkg/*", "/tmp/vmis.*", "/snap/*", "/dev/fd/*") or
+  process.executable == null or
+  (process.name == "sed" and file.name : "sed*") or
+  (process.name == "perl" and file.name : "e2scrub_all.tmp*")
+)
+'''
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating At Job Created or Modified
+
+The 'at' command in Linux schedules tasks for future execution, aiding system admins in automating routine jobs. However, attackers can exploit this for persistence, privilege escalation, or executing unauthorized commands. The detection rule identifies suspicious 'at' job creations or modifications by monitoring specific file paths and excluding benign processes, helping to flag potential malicious activities.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Review the file path of the created or modified 'at' job to confirm it is within the monitored directory: /var/spool/cron/atjobs/*. Determine if the file path is expected or unusual for the system's typical operations.
+- Identify the process that triggered the alert by examining the process.executable field. Check if the process is known and expected in the context of the system's normal operations.
+- Investigate the user account associated with the process that created or modified the 'at' job. Determine if the account has legitimate reasons to schedule tasks or if it might be compromised.
+- Check the contents of the 'at' job file to understand the commands or scripts scheduled for execution. Look for any suspicious or unauthorized commands that could indicate malicious intent.
+- Correlate the event with other recent alerts or logs from the same host to identify any patterns or additional indicators of compromise, such as privilege escalation attempts or unauthorized access.
+- Verify if there are any known vulnerabilities or exploits associated with the processes or commands involved in the alert, which could provide further context on the potential threat.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- System package managers like dpkg, rpm, and yum can trigger false positives when they create or modify at jobs during software installations or updates. To manage this, ensure these processes are included in the exclusion list within the detection rule.
+- Automated system management tools such as Puppet and Chef may also create or modify at jobs as part of their routine operations. Add these tools to the exclusion list to prevent unnecessary alerts.
+- Temporary files with extensions like swp or dpkg-remove can be mistakenly flagged. Exclude these file extensions from the rule to reduce false positives.
+- Processes running from directories like /nix/store or /snap can be benign and should be considered for exclusion if they are part of regular system operations.
+- If the process executable is null, it might indicate a benign system process that lacks a defined executable path. Consider reviewing these cases to determine if they are legitimate and adjust the rule accordingly.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Immediately isolate the affected system from the network to prevent further unauthorized access or execution of malicious tasks.
+- Terminate any suspicious processes associated with the creation or modification of 'at' jobs that are not part of the excluded benign processes.
+- Review and remove any unauthorized 'at' jobs found in the /var/spool/cron/atjobs/ directory to eliminate persistence mechanisms.
+- Conduct a thorough examination of the system for additional indicators of compromise, such as unauthorized user accounts or unexpected network connections.
+- Restore the system from a known good backup if malicious activity is confirmed and cannot be fully remediated.
+- Escalate the incident to the security operations team for further analysis and to determine if additional systems are affected.
+- Implement enhanced monitoring and logging for 'at' job activities to detect similar threats in the future, ensuring that alerts are promptly reviewed and acted upon."""
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1053"
+name = "Scheduled Task/Job"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1053.002"
+name = "At"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/002/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0003"
+name = "Persistence"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1053"
+name = "Scheduled Task/Job"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1053.002"
+name = "At"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/002/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0004"
+name = "Privilege Escalation"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1053"
+name = "Scheduled Task/Job"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1053.002"
+name = "At"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/002/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0002"
+name = "Execution"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/persistence_boot_file_copy.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2025/01/16"
+integration = ["endpoint", "auditd_manager", "crowdstrike", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/03/20"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+This rule detects the process of copying or moving files from or to the `/boot` directory on Linux systems. The `/boot`
+directory contains files that are essential for the system to boot, such as the kernel and initramfs images. Attackers
+may copy or move files to the `/boot` directory to modify the boot process, which can be leveraged to maintain access to
+the system.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = [
+    "logs-endpoint.events.process*",
+    "endgame-*",
+    "auditbeat-*",
+    "logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*",
+    "logs-crowdstrike.fdr*",
+    "logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*",
+]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Boot File Copy"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating Boot File Copy
+The `/boot` directory in Linux systems is crucial for storing files necessary for booting, such as the kernel. Adversaries may exploit this by copying or moving files to alter the boot process, potentially gaining persistent access. The 'Boot File Copy' detection rule identifies suspicious file operations in this directory, excluding legitimate processes, to flag potential unauthorized modifications.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Review the process details to identify the specific file operation by examining the process name and arguments, particularly focusing on the use of 'cp' or 'mv' commands with paths involving '/boot/*'.
+- Investigate the parent process executable and name to determine if the operation was initiated by a known legitimate process or script, ensuring it is not one of the excluded processes like 'update-initramfs' or 'grub-mkconfig'.
+- Check the user account associated with the process to assess whether it is a privileged account and if the activity aligns with typical user behavior.
+- Analyze recent system logs and audit records for any other suspicious activities or anomalies around the time of the alert to identify potential patterns or related events.
+- Verify the integrity and authenticity of the files in the /boot directory to ensure no unauthorized modifications have been made, focusing on critical files like the kernel and initramfs images.
+- If possible, correlate the alert with other data sources such as Elastic Endgame or Crowdstrike to gather additional context and confirm whether this is part of a broader attack pattern.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- System updates and maintenance tasks often involve legitimate processes that interact with the /boot directory. Processes like update-initramfs, dracut, and grub-mkconfig are common during these operations. Users can exclude these processes by adding them to the exception list in the detection rule.
+- Custom scripts or administrative tasks that require copying or moving files to the /boot directory may trigger false positives. Identify these scripts and add their parent process names or paths to the exclusion criteria.
+- Package management operations, such as those involving dpkg or rpm, may also interact with the /boot directory. Exclude paths like /var/lib/dpkg/info/* and /var/tmp/rpm-tmp.* to prevent these from being flagged.
+- Temporary system recovery or installation processes might use directories like /tmp/newroot. Exclude these paths to avoid unnecessary alerts during legitimate recovery operations.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Immediately isolate the affected system from the network to prevent further unauthorized access or potential lateral movement by the adversary.
+- Terminate any suspicious processes identified by the detection rule, specifically those involving unauthorized 'cp' or 'mv' operations in the /boot directory.
+- Conduct a thorough review of the /boot directory to identify and remove any unauthorized files or modifications. Restore any altered files from a known good backup if necessary.
+- Check for any unauthorized changes to boot configuration files, such as GRUB or LILO, and restore them to their original state.
+- Escalate the incident to the security operations team for further investigation and to determine if additional systems are affected.
+- Implement additional monitoring on the affected system and similar systems to detect any further unauthorized access attempts or modifications.
+- Review and update access controls and permissions for the /boot directory to ensure only authorized processes and users can make changes."""
+risk_score = 21
+rule_id = "5bda8597-69a6-4b9e-87a2-69a7c963ea83"
+setup = """## Setup
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+#### Prerequisite Requirements:
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
+"""
+severity = "low"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Linux",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Persistence",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Data Source: Auditd Manager",
+    "Data Source: Crowdstrike",
+    "Data Source: SentinelOne",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+
+query = '''
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and
+event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "start", "ProcessRollup2", "executed") and
+process.name in ("cp", "mv") and process.parent.executable != null and process.args like~ "/boot/*" and not (
+  process.parent.name in ("update-initramfs", "dracut", "grub-mkconfig", "shim-install", "sudo", "activate-theme", "update-grub-gfxpayload", "grub-pc.postinst") or
+  process.parent.executable like~ ("/usr/lib/kernel/install.d/*", "/tmp/newroot/*", "/var/lib/dpkg/info/*") or
+  process.parent.args like~ ("/usr/bin/mkinitcpio", "/var/tmp/rpm-tmp.*")
+)
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1542"
+name = "Pre-OS Boot"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1543"
+name = "Create or Modify System Process"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1574"
+name = "Hijack Execution Flow"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0003"
+name = "Persistence"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1059"
+name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1059.004"
+name = "Unix Shell"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0002"
+name = "Execution"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0005"
+name = "Defense Evasion"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/persistence_bpf_probe_write_user.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2025/01/28"
+integration = ["system"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/01/28"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+This rule monitors the syslog log file for messages related to instances of a program using the `bpf_probe_write_user` helper.
+The `bpf_probe_write_user` helper is used to write data to user space from a BPF program. Unauthorized use of this helper can
+be indicative of an eBPF rootkit or other malicious activity.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["logs-system.syslog-*"]
+language = "kuery"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Suspicious Usage of bpf_probe_write_user Helper"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating Suspicious Usage of bpf_probe_write_user Helper
+
+The `bpf_probe_write_user` helper is a function within the eBPF (extended Berkeley Packet Filter) framework, allowing BPF programs to write data to user space. While useful for legitimate monitoring and debugging, adversaries can exploit it to manipulate user space memory, potentially deploying rootkits or evading defenses. The detection rule monitors syslog entries for kernel processes invoking this helper, flagging potential unauthorized use indicative of malicious activity.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Review the syslog entries for the specific message "bpf_probe_write_user" to identify the exact time and context of the event.
+- Correlate the timestamp of the alert with other logs and system activities to identify any unusual behavior or patterns around the same time.
+- Investigate the process details associated with the kernel at the time of the alert to determine if there are any anomalies or unauthorized modifications.
+- Check for any recent changes or installations on the system that could have introduced unauthorized BPF programs.
+- Assess the system for signs of persistence mechanisms or defense evasion tactics, as indicated by the MITRE ATT&CK framework references.
+- Conduct a thorough review of user accounts and permissions to ensure no unauthorized access or privilege escalation has occurred.
+- If suspicious activity is confirmed, isolate the affected system and perform a comprehensive forensic analysis to understand the scope and impact of the potential compromise.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Legitimate monitoring tools may use the bpf_probe_write_user helper for debugging purposes. Identify and whitelist these tools by verifying their source and ensuring they are part of authorized software packages.
+- Kernel developers and system administrators might use this helper during system diagnostics or performance tuning. Establish a baseline of expected usage patterns and create exceptions for known maintenance activities.
+- Automated scripts or system processes that perform regular system checks could trigger this rule. Review the scripts and processes to confirm their legitimacy and exclude them from alerts if they are verified as safe.
+- Security software or intrusion detection systems might utilize this helper as part of their normal operations. Coordinate with your security team to recognize these activities and adjust the rule to prevent unnecessary alerts.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Immediately isolate the affected system from the network to prevent further unauthorized access or data manipulation.
+- Terminate any suspicious processes associated with the `bpf_probe_write_user` helper to halt potential malicious activity.
+- Conduct a thorough review of recent system changes and installed software to identify unauthorized modifications or installations.
+- Restore affected systems from a known good backup to ensure the integrity of user space memory and system files.
+- Implement stricter access controls and monitoring on systems with eBPF capabilities to prevent unauthorized use of the `bpf_probe_write_user` helper.
+- Escalate the incident to the security operations team for further analysis and to determine if additional systems are affected.
+- Update detection mechanisms to include additional indicators of compromise related to eBPF rootkits and similar threats, enhancing future threat detection capabilities.
+"""
+risk_score = 21
+rule_id = "c37ffc64-da75-447e-ad1c-cbc64727b3b8"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
+- Filebeat
+
+### Filebeat Setup
+Filebeat is a lightweight shipper for forwarding and centralizing log data. Installed as an agent on your servers, Filebeat monitors the log files or locations that you specify, collects log events, and forwards them either to Elasticsearch or Logstash for indexing.
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Filebeat for the Linux System:
+- Elastic provides repositories available for APT and YUM-based distributions. Note that we provide binary packages, but no source packages.
+- To install the APT and YUM repositories follow the setup instructions in this [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/setup-repositories.html).
+- To run Filebeat on Docker follow the setup instructions in the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/running-on-docker.html).
+- To run Filebeat on Kubernetes follow the setup instructions in the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/running-on-kubernetes.html).
+- For quick start information for Filebeat refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/8.11/filebeat-installation-configuration.html).
+- For complete Setup and Run Filebeat information refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html).
+
+#### Rule Specific Setup Note
+- This rule requires the Filebeat System Module to be enabled.
+- The system module collects and parses logs created by the system logging service of common Unix/Linux based distributions.
+- To run the system module of Filebeat on Linux follow the setup instructions in the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/filebeat-module-system.html).
+"""
+severity = "low"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Linux",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Persistence",
+    "Tactic: Defense Evasion",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "query"
+query = '''
+host.os.type:linux and event.dataset:"system.syslog" and process.name:kernel and message:"bpf_probe_write_user"
+'''
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1547"
+name = "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1547.006"
+name = "Kernel Modules and Extensions"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/006/"
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0003"
+name = "Persistence"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1014"
+name = "Rootkit"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014/"
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0005"
+name = "Defense Evasion"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"