nldcsc-elastic-rules 0.0.8__py3-none-any.whl

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/_deprecated/credential_access_collection_sensitive_files_compression_inside_a_container.toml

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+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2023/05/12"
+integration = ["cloud_defend"]
+deprecation_date = "2025/03/14"
+maturity = "deprecated"
+updated_date = "2025/03/14"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Identifies the use of a compression utility to collect known files containing sensitive information, such as credentials
+and system configurations inside a container.
+"""
+from = "now-6m"
+index = ["logs-cloud_defend*"]
+interval = "5m"
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Deprecated - Sensitive Files Compression Inside A Container"
+risk_score = 47
+rule_id = "475b42f0-61fb-4ef0-8a85-597458bfb0a1"
+severity = "medium"
+tags = [
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend for Containers",
+    "Domain: Container",
+    "OS: Linux",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Collection",
+    "Tactic: Credential Access",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+
+query = '''
+process where container.id: "*" and event.type== "start" and
+
+/*account for tools that execute utilities as a subprocess, in this case the target utility name will appear as a process arg*/
+(process.name: ("zip", "tar", "gzip", "hdiutil", "7z") or process.args: ("zip", "tar", "gzip", "hdiutil", "7z"))
+and process.args: (
+"/root/.ssh/id_rsa",
+"/root/.ssh/id_rsa.pub",
+"/root/.ssh/id_ed25519",
+"/root/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub",
+"/root/.ssh/authorized_keys",
+"/root/.ssh/authorized_keys2",
+"/root/.ssh/known_hosts",
+"/root/.bash_history",
+"/etc/hosts",
+"/home/*/.ssh/id_rsa",
+"/home/*/.ssh/id_rsa.pub",
+"/home/*/.ssh/id_ed25519",
+"/home/*/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub",
+"/home/*/.ssh/authorized_keys",
+"/home/*/.ssh/authorized_keys2",
+"/home/*/.ssh/known_hosts",
+"/home/*/.bash_history",
+"/root/.aws/credentials",
+"/root/.aws/config",
+"/home/*/.aws/credentials",
+"/home/*/.aws/config",
+"/root/.docker/config.json",
+"/home/*/.docker/config.json",
+"/etc/group",
+"/etc/passwd",
+"/etc/shadow",
+"/etc/gshadow")
+'''
+note = """## Setup
+
+This rule was deprecated in the 8.18 and 9.0 versions of the Elastic Stack due to deprecation of the 'Defend For Containers' integration. Users using 8.18+ versions should disable this rule and enable linux-based rules tagged "Domain: Container".
+
+## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating Deprecated - Sensitive Files Compression Inside A Container
+
+Containers are lightweight, portable environments used to run applications consistently across different systems. Adversaries may exploit compression utilities within containers to gather and exfiltrate sensitive files, such as credentials and configuration files. The detection rule identifies suspicious compression activities by monitoring for specific utilities and file paths, flagging potential unauthorized data collection attempts.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Review the process details to confirm the use of compression utilities such as zip, tar, gzip, hdiutil, or 7z within the container environment, focusing on the process.name and process.args fields.
+- Examine the specific file paths listed in the process.args to determine if they include sensitive files like SSH keys, AWS credentials, or Docker configurations, which could indicate unauthorized data collection.
+- Identify the container.id associated with the alert to gather more context about the container's purpose, owner, and any recent changes or deployments that might explain the activity.
+- Check the event.type field for "start" to verify the timing of the process initiation and correlate it with any known legitimate activities or scheduled tasks within the container.
+- Investigate the user or service account under which the process was executed to assess whether it has the necessary permissions and if the activity aligns with expected behavior for that account.
+- Look for any related alerts or logs that might indicate a broader pattern of suspicious activity within the same container or across other containers in the environment.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Routine backup operations may trigger the rule if they involve compressing sensitive files for storage. To handle this, identify and exclude backup processes or scripts that are known and trusted.
+- Automated configuration management tools might compress configuration files as part of their normal operation. Exclude these tools by specifying their process names or paths in the exception list.
+- Developers or system administrators might compress sensitive files during legitimate troubleshooting or maintenance activities. Establish a process to log and review these activities, and exclude them if they are verified as non-threatening.
+- Continuous integration and deployment pipelines could involve compressing configuration files for deployment purposes. Identify these pipelines and exclude their associated processes to prevent false positives.
+- Security tools that perform regular audits or scans might compress files for analysis. Ensure these tools are recognized and excluded from triggering the rule.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Immediately isolate the affected container to prevent further data exfiltration or unauthorized access. This can be done by stopping the container or disconnecting it from the network.
+- Conduct a thorough review of the compressed files and their contents to assess the extent of sensitive data exposure. Focus on the specific file paths identified in the alert.
+- Change credentials and keys that may have been compromised, including SSH keys, AWS credentials, and Docker configurations. Ensure that new credentials are distributed securely.
+- Review and update access controls and permissions for sensitive files within containers to minimize exposure. Ensure that only necessary processes and users have access to these files.
+- Implement monitoring and alerting for similar compression activities in other containers to detect potential threats early. Use the identified process names and arguments as indicators.
+- Escalate the incident to the security operations team for further investigation and to determine if additional systems or data have been affected.
+- Conduct a post-incident review to identify gaps in security controls and update container security policies to prevent recurrence."""
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1552"
+name = "Unsecured Credentials"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1552.001"
+name = "Credentials In Files"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/001/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0006"
+name = "Credential Access"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1560"
+name = "Archive Collected Data"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1560.001"
+name = "Archive via Utility"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/001/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0009"
+name = "Collection"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009/"
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/_deprecated/credential_access_entra_signin_brute_force_microsoft_365_repeat_source.toml

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+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2024/09/06"
+deprecation_date = "2025/07/16"
+integration = ["azure"]
+maturity = "deprecated"
+updated_date = "2025/07/16"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Identifies potential brute-force attempts against Microsoft 365 user accounts by detecting a high number of failed
+interactive or non-interactive login attempts within a 30-minute window from a single source. Attackers may attempt to
+brute force user accounts to gain unauthorized access to Microsoft 365 services via different services such as Exchange,
+SharePoint, or Teams.
+"""
+false_positives = [
+    """
+    Automated processes that attempt to authenticate using expired credentials or have misconfigured authentication
+    settings may lead to false positives.
+    """,
+]
+from = "now-30m"
+interval = "10m"
+language = "esql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Deprecated - Azure Entra Sign-in Brute Force Microsoft 365 Accounts by Repeat Source"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating Deprecated - Azure Entra Sign-in Brute Force Microsoft 365 Accounts by Repeat Source
+
+Azure Entra ID, integral to Microsoft 365, manages identity and access, ensuring secure authentication. Adversaries exploit this by attempting numerous failed logins to breach accounts. The detection rule identifies such brute-force attempts by monitoring failed logins from a single IP within a short timeframe, flagging potential unauthorized access efforts.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Review the source IP address identified in the alert to determine if it is associated with known malicious activity or if it belongs to a legitimate user or organization.
+- Examine the list of user principal names targeted by the failed login attempts to identify any patterns or specific users that may be at higher risk.
+- Check the azure.signinlogs.properties.resource_display_name to understand which Microsoft 365 services were targeted, such as Exchange, SharePoint, or Teams, and assess the potential impact on those services.
+- Investigate the error codes in azure.signinlogs.properties.status.error_code for additional context on why the login attempts failed, which may provide insights into the attacker's methods.
+- Correlate the failed login attempts with any successful logins from the same source IP or user accounts to identify potential unauthorized access.
+- Assess the risk and exposure of the affected user accounts and consider implementing additional security measures, such as multi-factor authentication, if not already in place.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- High volume of legitimate login attempts from a single IP, such as a corporate proxy or VPN, can trigger false positives. To mitigate, exclude known IP addresses of trusted network infrastructure from the rule.
+- Automated scripts or applications performing frequent login operations on behalf of users may be misidentified as brute force attempts. Identify and whitelist these applications by their source IPs or user agents.
+- Shared workstations or kiosks where multiple users log in from the same IP address can result in false positives. Implement user-based exclusions for these environments to prevent unnecessary alerts.
+- Frequent password resets or account recovery processes can generate multiple failed login attempts. Monitor and exclude these activities by correlating with password reset logs or helpdesk tickets.
+- Training or testing environments where multiple failed logins are expected should be excluded by identifying and filtering out the associated IP ranges or user accounts.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Immediately block the source IP address identified in the alert to prevent further unauthorized access attempts.
+- Reset passwords for all affected user accounts that experienced failed login attempts from the flagged IP address to ensure account security.
+- Enable multi-factor authentication (MFA) for the affected accounts if not already in place, to add an additional layer of security against unauthorized access.
+- Review and update conditional access policies to restrict access from suspicious or untrusted locations, enhancing security posture.
+- Notify the security operations team and relevant stakeholders about the incident for awareness and further investigation.
+- Monitor the affected accounts and source IP for any additional suspicious activity, ensuring no further attempts are made.
+- Document the incident details, including the source IP, affected accounts, and actions taken, for future reference and compliance purposes.
+
+This rule relies on Azure Entra ID sign-in logs, but filters for Microsoft 365 resources."""
+references = [
+    "https://cloud.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-cloud/azure-security/az-unauthenticated-enum-and-initial-entry/az-password-spraying",
+    "https://github.com/0xZDH/o365spray",
+]
+risk_score = 47
+rule_id = "c6655282-6c79-11ef-bbb5-f661ea17fbcc"
+severity = "medium"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Cloud",
+    "Domain: SaaS",
+    "Data Source: Azure",
+    "Data Source: Entra ID",
+    "Data Source: Entra ID Sign-in",
+    "Use Case: Identity and Access Audit",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Credential Access",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "esql"
+
+query = '''
+from logs-azure.signinlogs*
+| WHERE
+  event.dataset == "azure.signinlogs"
+  and event.category == "authentication"
+  and to_lower(azure.signinlogs.properties.resource_display_name) rlike "(.*)365(.*)"
+  and azure.signinlogs.category in ("NonInteractiveUserSignInLogs", "SignInLogs")
+  and event.outcome != "success"
+
+  // For tuning, review azure.signinlogs.properties.status.error_code
+  // https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity-platform/reference-error-codes
+
+// keep only relevant fields
+| keep event.dataset, event.category, azure.signinlogs.properties.resource_display_name, azure.signinlogs.category, event.outcome, azure.signinlogs.properties.user_principal_name, source.ip
+
+// Count the number of unique targets per source IP
+| stats
+  target_count = count_distinct(azure.signinlogs.properties.user_principal_name) by source.ip
+
+// Filter for at least 10 distinct failed login attempts from a single source
+| where target_count >= 10
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1110"
+name = "Brute Force"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0006"
+name = "Credential Access"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/_deprecated/credential_access_microsoft_365_potential_password_spraying_attack.toml

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+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2020/12/01"
+integration = ["o365"]
+maturity = "deprecated"
+deprecation_date = "2025/01/17"
+updated_date = "2025/01/17"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Identifies a high number (25) of failed Microsoft 365 user authentication attempts from a single IP address within 30
+minutes, which could be indicative of a password spraying attack. An adversary may attempt a password spraying attack to
+obtain unauthorized access to user accounts.
+"""
+false_positives = [
+    """
+    Automated processes that attempt to authenticate using expired credentials and unbounded retries may lead to false
+    positives.
+    """,
+]
+from = "now-30m"
+index = ["filebeat-*", "logs-o365*"]
+language = "kuery"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Deprecated - Potential Password Spraying of Microsoft 365 User Accounts"
+note = """This rule has been deprecated in favor of `Attempts to Brute Force a Microsoft 365 User Account` (26f68dba-ce29-497b-8e13-b4fde1db5a2d)."""
+risk_score = 73
+rule_id = "3efee4f0-182a-40a8-a835-102c68a4175d"
+severity = "high"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Cloud",
+    "Data Source: Microsoft 365",
+    "Use Case: Identity and Access Audit",
+    "Tactic: Credential Access",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "threshold"
+
+query = '''
+event.dataset:o365.audit and event.provider:(Exchange or AzureActiveDirectory) and event.category:authentication and
+event.action:("UserLoginFailed" or "PasswordLogonInitialAuthUsingPassword")
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1110"
+name = "Brute Force"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0006"
+name = "Credential Access"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"
+
+[rule.threshold]
+field = ["source.ip"]
+value = 25
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/_deprecated/credential_access_potential_linux_ssh_bruteforce_root.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2022/09/14"
+deprecation_date = "2023/06/22"
+integration = ["system"]
+maturity = "deprecated"
+min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
+min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
+updated_date = "2023/06/22"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Identifies multiple consecutive login failures targeting a root user account from the same source address and within a
+short time interval. Adversaries will often brute force login attempts on privileged accounts with a common or known
+password, in an attempt to gain privileged access to systems.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["auditbeat-*", "logs-system.auth-*"]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Potential SSH Brute Force Detected on Privileged Account"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+### Investigating Potential SSH Brute Force Attack on Privileged Account
+
+The rule identifies consecutive SSH login failures targeting a privileged (root) account from the same source IP address to the same target host indicating brute force login attempts.
+
+#### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Investigate the login failure on privileged account(s).
+- Investigate the source IP address of the failed ssh login attempt(s).
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Identify the source and the target computer and their roles in the IT environment.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Authentication misconfiguration or obsolete credentials.
+- Service account password expired.
+- Infrastructure or availability issue.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+"""
+risk_score = 73
+rule_id = "a5f0d057-d540-44f5-924d-c6a2ae92f045"
+severity = "high"
+tags = ["Domain: Endpoint", "OS: Linux", "Use Case: Threat Detection", "Tactic: Lateral Movement", "Tactic: Credential Access"]
+type = "eql"
+
+query = '''
+sequence by host.id, source.ip with maxspan=10s
+  [authentication where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action  in ("ssh_login", "user_login") and
+   event.outcome == "failure" and source.ip != null and source.ip != "0.0.0.0" and
+   source.ip != "::" and  user.name : ("*root*" , "*admin*")] with runs=3
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1110"
+name = "Brute Force"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1110.001"
+name = "Password Guessing"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/001/"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1110.003"
+name = "Password Spraying"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0006"
+name = "Credential Access"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1021"
+name = "Remote Services"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1021.004"
+name = "SSH"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0008"
+name = "Lateral Movement"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/"
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/_deprecated/credential_access_sensitive_keys_or_passwords_search_inside_a_container.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2023/05/12"
+integration = ["cloud_defend"]
+deprecation_date = "2025/03/14"
+maturity = "deprecated"
+updated_date = "2025/03/14"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+This rule detects the use of system search utilities like grep and find to search for private SSH keys or passwords
+inside a container. Unauthorized access to these sensitive files could lead to further compromise of the container
+environment or facilitate a container breakout to the underlying host machine.
+"""
+from = "now-6m"
+index = ["logs-cloud_defend*"]
+interval = "5m"
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Deprecated - Sensitive Keys Or Passwords Searched For Inside A Container"
+references = ["https://sysdig.com/blog/cve-2021-25741-kubelet-falco/"]
+risk_score = 47
+rule_id = "9661ed8b-001c-40dc-a777-0983b7b0c91a"
+severity = "medium"
+tags = [
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend for Containers",
+    "Domain: Container",
+    "OS: Linux",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Credential Access",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+
+query = '''
+process where container.id: "*" and event.type== "start" and
+((
+/*account for tools that execute utilities as a subprocess, in this case the target utility name will appear as a process arg*/
+  (process.name in ("grep", "egrep", "fgrep") or process.args in ("grep", "egrep", "fgrep"))
+    and process.args : ("*BEGIN PRIVATE*", "*BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE*", "*BEGIN RSA PRIVATE*",
+"*BEGIN DSA PRIVATE*", "*BEGIN EC PRIVATE*", "*pass*", "*ssh*", "*user*")
+)
+or
+(
+/*account for tools that execute utilities as a subprocess, in this case the target utility name will appear as a process arg*/
+  (process.name in ("find", "locate", "mlocate") or process.args in ("find", "locate", "mlocate"))
+    and process.args : ("*id_rsa*", "*id_dsa*")
+))
+'''
+note = """## Setup
+
+This rule was deprecated in the 8.18 and 9.0 versions of the Elastic Stack due to deprecation of the 'Defend For Containers' integration. Users using 8.18+ versions should disable this rule and enable linux-based rules tagged "Domain: Container".
+
+## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating Deprecated - Sensitive Keys Or Passwords Searched For Inside A Container
+
+Containers encapsulate applications, providing isolated environments. Adversaries may exploit search utilities like grep or find to locate sensitive credentials within containers, potentially leading to unauthorized access or container escape. The detection rule identifies suspicious searches for private keys or passwords, flagging potential credential access attempts by monitoring process activities and arguments.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Review the process details to identify the specific container where the search activity occurred, using the container.id field to gather context about the environment.
+- Examine the process.name and process.args fields to determine the exact command executed and assess whether it aligns with typical usage patterns or indicates malicious intent.
+- Check the user context under which the process was executed to understand if the activity was performed by a legitimate user or an unauthorized entity.
+- Investigate the container's recent activity logs to identify any other suspicious behavior or anomalies that might correlate with the search for sensitive keys or passwords.
+- Assess the potential impact by determining if any sensitive files, such as private keys or password files, were accessed or exfiltrated following the search activity.
+- If possible, correlate the event with network logs to identify any outbound connections that might suggest data exfiltration attempts.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Routine administrative tasks may trigger the rule when system administrators use grep or find to audit or manage SSH keys and passwords within containers. To mitigate this, create exceptions for known administrative scripts or processes that regularly perform these tasks.
+- Automated backup or configuration management tools might search for sensitive files as part of their normal operation. Identify these tools and exclude their process IDs or specific command patterns from triggering the rule.
+- Security scanning tools that check for the presence of sensitive files could be flagged. Whitelist these tools by their process names or arguments to prevent false positives.
+- Developers or DevOps personnel might use search utilities during debugging or development processes. Establish a list of trusted users or roles and exclude their activities from the rule to reduce noise.
+- Continuous integration/continuous deployment (CI/CD) pipelines may include steps that search for keys or passwords for validation purposes. Exclude these pipeline processes by identifying their unique process arguments or container IDs.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Immediately isolate the affected container to prevent further unauthorized access or potential container escape to the host system. This can be done by stopping the container or disconnecting it from the network.
+- Conduct a thorough review of the container's logs and process activities to identify any unauthorized access or data exfiltration attempts. Pay special attention to the processes and arguments flagged by the detection rule.
+- Rotate any potentially compromised credentials, including SSH keys and passwords, that were stored or accessed within the container. Ensure that new credentials are securely stored and managed.
+- Assess the container's configuration and access controls to identify and rectify any security misconfigurations that may have allowed the unauthorized search for sensitive information.
+- Implement additional monitoring and alerting for similar suspicious activities across other containers and the host environment to detect and respond to potential threats promptly.
+- Escalate the incident to the security operations team for further investigation and to determine if the threat has spread beyond the initial container.
+- Review and update container security policies and practices to prevent recurrence, including enforcing least privilege access and using secrets management solutions to handle sensitive information securely."""
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1552"
+name = "Unsecured Credentials"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1552.001"
+name = "Credentials In Files"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/001/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0006"
+name = "Credential Access"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/_deprecated/credential_access_tcpdump_activity.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2020/02/18"
+deprecation_date = "2021/04/15"
+maturity = "deprecated"
+updated_date = "2021/04/15"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+The Tcpdump program ran on a Linux host. Tcpdump is a network monitoring or packet sniffing tool that can be used to
+capture insecure credentials or data in motion. Sniffing can also be used to discover details of network services as a
+prelude to lateral movement or defense evasion.
+"""
+false_positives = [
+    """
+    Some normal use of this command may originate from server or network administrators engaged in network
+    troubleshooting.
+    """,
+]
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["auditbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.*"]
+language = "kuery"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Network Sniffing via Tcpdump"
+risk_score = 21
+rule_id = "7a137d76-ce3d-48e2-947d-2747796a78c0"
+severity = "low"
+tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "Linux", "Threat Detection", "Credential Access"]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "query"
+
+query = '''
+event.category:process and event.type:(start or process_started) and process.name:tcpdump
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1040"
+name = "Network Sniffing"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0006"
+name = "Credential Access"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1040"
+name = "Network Sniffing"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0007"
+name = "Discovery"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/"
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/_deprecated/defense_evasion_attempt_to_disable_iptables_or_firewall.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2020/04/24"
+deprecation_date = "2022/07/25"
+maturity = "deprecated"
+updated_date = "2022/07/25"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Adversaries may attempt to disable the iptables or firewall service in an attempt to affect how a host is allowed to
+receive or send network traffic.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["auditbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.*"]
+language = "kuery"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Attempt to Disable IPTables or Firewall"
+risk_score = 47
+rule_id = "125417b8-d3df-479f-8418-12d7e034fee3"
+severity = "medium"
+tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "Linux", "Threat Detection", "Defense Evasion"]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "query"
+
+query = '''
+event.category:process and event.type:(start or process_started) and
+  process.name:ufw and process.args:(allow or disable or reset) or
+
+  (((process.name:service and process.args:stop) or
+     (process.name:chkconfig and process.args:off) or
+     (process.name:systemctl and process.args:(disable or stop or kill))) and
+   process.args:(firewalld or ip6tables or iptables))
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1562"
+name = "Impair Defenses"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1562.001"
+name = "Disable or Modify Tools"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0005"
+name = "Defense Evasion"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
+