nldcsc-elastic-rules 0.0.8__py3-none-any.whl

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/persistence_systemd_service_started.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2024/05/17"
+integration = ["endpoint"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/02/03"
+
+[transform]
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve File Listing Information"
+query = """
+SELECT * FROM file WHERE ( path LIKE '/etc/systemd/system/%' OR path LIKE '/usr/local/lib/systemd/system/%' OR path LIKE
+'/lib/systemd/system/%' OR path LIKE '/usr/lib/systemd/system/%' OR path LIKE '/home/user/.config/systemd/user/%' )
+"""
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Additional File Listing Information"
+query = """
+SELECT f.path, u.username AS file_owner, g.groupname AS group_owner, datetime(f.atime, 'unixepoch') AS
+file_last_access_time, datetime(f.mtime, 'unixepoch') AS file_last_modified_time, datetime(f.ctime, 'unixepoch') AS
+file_last_status_change_time, datetime(f.btime, 'unixepoch') AS file_created_time, f.size AS size_bytes FROM file f LEFT
+JOIN users u ON f.uid = u.uid LEFT JOIN groups g ON f.gid = g.gid WHERE ( path LIKE '/etc/systemd/system/%' OR path LIKE
+'/usr/local/lib/systemd/system/%' OR path LIKE '/lib/systemd/system/%' OR path LIKE '/usr/lib/systemd/system/%' OR path
+LIKE '/home/{{user.name}}/.config/systemd/user/%' )
+"""
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Running Processes by User"
+query = "SELECT pid, username, name FROM processes p JOIN users u ON u.uid = p.uid ORDER BY username"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Crontab Information"
+query = "SELECT * FROM crontab"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Listening Ports"
+query = "SELECT pid, address, port, socket, protocol, path FROM listening_ports"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Open Sockets"
+query = "SELECT pid, family, remote_address, remote_port, socket, state FROM process_open_sockets"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Information for a Specific User"
+query = "SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = {{user.name}}"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Investigate the Account Authentication Status"
+query = "SELECT * FROM logged_in_users WHERE user = {{user.name}}"
+
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Systemctl is a process used in Linux systems to manage systemd processes through service configuration files. Malicious
+actors can leverage systemd services to achieve persistence by creating or modifying service files to execute malicious
+commands or payloads during system startup. This allows them to maintain unauthorized access, execute additional
+malicious activities, or evade detection.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["logs-endpoint.events.*"]
+language = "kuery"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Systemd Service Started by Unusual Parent Process"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+### Investigating Systemd Service Started by Unusual Parent Process
+
+Systemd service files are configuration files in Linux systems used to define and manage systemd services.
+
+Malicious actors can leverage systemd service files to achieve persistence by creating or modifying service files to execute malicious commands or payloads during system startup. This allows them to maintain unauthorized access, execute additional malicious activities, or evade detection.
+
+This rule monitors the execution of the systemctl binary to start, enable or reenable a systemd service, potentially indicating the creation of a persistence mechanism.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the [Osquery Markdown Plugin](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/invest-guide-run-osquery.html) introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+> This investigation guide uses [placeholder fields](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/osquery-placeholder-fields.html) to dynamically pass alert data into Osquery queries. Placeholder fields were introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.7.0. If you're using Elastic Stack version 8.6.0 or earlier, you'll need to manually adjust this investigation guide's queries to ensure they properly run.
+
+#### Possible Investigation Steps
+
+- Investigate the currently enabled systemd services through the following command `sudo systemctl list-unit-files`.
+- Investigate whether any other files in any of the available systemd directories have been altered through OSQuery.
+  - $osquery_0
+  - $osquery_1
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence and whether they are located in expected locations.
+  - $osquery_2
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Validate the activity is not related to planned patches, updates, network administrator activity, or legitimate software installations.
+- Investigate whether the altered scripts call other malicious scripts elsewhere on the file system. 
+  - If scripts or executables were dropped, retrieve the files and determine if they are malicious:
+    - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+      - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+        - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+          - Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
+          - Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
+        - File access, modification, and creation activities.
+        - Cron jobs, services and other persistence mechanisms.
+            - $osquery_3
+- Investigate abnormal behaviors by the subject process/user such as network connections, file modifications, and any other spawned child processes.
+  - Investigate listening ports and open sockets to look for potential command and control traffic or data exfiltration.
+    - $osquery_4
+    - $osquery_5
+  - Identify the user account that performed the action, analyze it, and check whether it should perform this kind of action.
+    - $osquery_6
+- Investigate whether the user is currently logged in and active.
+    - $osquery_7
+
+### False Positive Analysis
+
+- If this activity is related to new benign software installation activity, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of user and command line conditions.
+- If this activity is related to a system administrator who uses systemd services for administrative purposes, consider adding exceptions for this specific administrator user account. 
+- Try to understand the context of the execution by thinking about the user, machine, or business purpose. A small number of endpoints, such as servers with unique software, might appear unusual but satisfy a specific business need.
+
+### Related Rules
+
+- New Systemd Service Created by Previously Unknown Process - 17b0a495-4d9f-414c-8ad0-92f018b8e001
+- Potential Persistence Through Run Control Detected - 0f4d35e4-925e-4959-ab24-911be207ee6f
+- Potential Persistence Through init.d Detected - 474fd20e-14cc-49c5-8160-d9ab4ba16c8b
+- New Systemd Timer Created - 7fb500fa-8e24-4bd1-9480-2a819352602c
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Delete the service/timer or restore its original configuration.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+"""
+references = [
+    "https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/springtail-kimsuky-backdoor-espionage",
+    "https://pberba.github.io/security/2022/01/30/linux-threat-hunting-for-persistence-systemd-timers-cron/",
+    "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/primer-on-persistence-mechanisms",
+]
+risk_score = 47
+rule_id = "b605f262-f7dc-41b5-9ebc-06bafe7a83b6"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+#### Prerequisite Requirements:
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
+"""
+severity = "medium"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Linux",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Persistence",
+    "Tactic: Privilege Escalation",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "new_terms"
+
+query = '''
+host.os.type:linux and event.category:process and event.type:start and event.action:exec and
+process.executable:/usr/bin/systemctl and process.args:(enable or reenable or start) and 
+process.entry_leader.entry_meta.type:* and
+not (
+  process.entry_leader.entry_meta.type:(container or init or unknown) or
+  process.parent.pid:1 or
+  process.parent.executable:(
+    /bin/adduser or /bin/dnf or /bin/dnf-automatic or /bin/dockerd or /bin/dpkg or /bin/microdnf or /bin/pacman or
+    /bin/podman or /bin/rpm or /bin/snapd or /bin/sudo or /bin/useradd or /bin/yum or /usr/bin/dnf or
+    /usr/bin/dnf-automatic or /usr/bin/dockerd or /usr/bin/dpkg or /usr/bin/microdnf or /usr/bin/pacman or
+    /usr/bin/podman or /usr/bin/rpm or /usr/bin/snapd or /usr/bin/sudo or /usr/bin/yum or /usr/sbin/adduser or
+    /usr/sbin/invoke-rc.d or /usr/sbin/useradd or /var/lib/dpkg/*
+  ) or
+  process.args_count >= 5
+)
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1543"
+name = "Create or Modify System Process"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1543.002"
+name = "Systemd Service"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0003"
+name = "Persistence"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1543"
+name = "Create or Modify System Process"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1543.002"
+name = "Systemd Service"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0004"
+name = "Privilege Escalation"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"
+
+[rule.new_terms]
+field = "new_terms_fields"
+value = ["process.parent.executable"]
+[[rule.new_terms.history_window_start]]
+field = "history_window_start"
+value = "now-7d"
+
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/persistence_systemd_shell_execution.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2025/01/16"
+integration = ["endpoint"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/01/22"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+This rule detects the execution of shell commands by systemd during the boot process on Linux systems. Systemd
+is a system and service manager for Linux operating systems. Attackers may execute shell commands during the
+boot process to maintain persistence on the system. This may be a sign of malicious systemd services, initramfs
+or GRUB bootloader manipulation, or other persistence mechanisms.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["logs-endpoint.events.process*"]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Systemd Shell Execution During Boot"
+risk_score = 47
+rule_id = "0b76ad27-c3f3-4769-9e7e-3237137fdf06"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+#### Prerequisite Requirements:
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
+"""
+severity = "medium"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Linux",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Persistence",
+    "Tactic: Privilege Escalation",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+query = '''
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "info" and event.action == "already_running" and
+process.parent.name == "systemd" and process.name in ("bash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish") and
+process.parent.command_line == "/sbin/init" and process.args_count >= 2
+'''
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating Systemd Shell Execution During Boot
+
+Systemd is a critical component in Linux, managing system and service initialization during boot. Adversaries may exploit systemd to execute shell commands at startup, ensuring persistence and potential privilege escalation. The detection rule identifies suspicious shell executions by monitoring processes initiated by systemd, focusing on those with specific characteristics indicative of unauthorized activity.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Review the process details to confirm the parent process is indeed systemd and the command line used is "/sbin/init" to ensure the alert is not a false positive.
+- Examine the specific shell process name (e.g., bash, sh, etc.) and its arguments to identify any unusual or suspicious commands being executed.
+- Investigate the history and configuration of the systemd service or unit file associated with the suspicious process to determine if it has been modified or created recently.
+- Check for any recent changes or anomalies in the initramfs or GRUB bootloader configurations that could indicate tampering or unauthorized modifications.
+- Correlate the alert with other security events or logs from the same host to identify any patterns or additional indicators of compromise that might suggest a broader attack or persistence mechanism.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Legitimate system maintenance scripts may trigger this rule if they are executed by systemd during boot. Users can create exceptions for known maintenance scripts by identifying their specific command lines and excluding them from the detection rule.
+- Custom user scripts that are intentionally set to run at boot for automation purposes might be flagged. To handle this, users should document these scripts and adjust the rule to exclude their specific process names or command lines.
+- Some Linux distributions may use shell scripts for legitimate boot-time operations. Users should verify the distribution's default boot scripts and exclude them if they are known to be safe and necessary for system operation.
+- System updates or package installations that modify boot processes could cause false positives. Users should monitor for these events and temporarily adjust the rule to prevent unnecessary alerts during known update windows.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Immediately isolate the affected system from the network to prevent further unauthorized access or lateral movement.
+- Terminate any suspicious shell processes identified as being executed by systemd during boot to halt potential malicious activity.
+- Conduct a thorough review of systemd service files and configurations to identify and remove any unauthorized or malicious entries.
+- Restore any modified system files or configurations from a known good backup to ensure system integrity.
+- Escalate the incident to the security operations team for further investigation and to determine if additional systems are affected.
+- Implement enhanced monitoring on the affected system and similar environments to detect any recurrence of the threat.
+- Review and update access controls and permissions to limit the ability of unauthorized users to modify systemd configurations or execute shell commands during boot."""
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1543"
+name = "Create or Modify System Process"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1543.002"
+name = "Systemd Service"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002/"
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0003"
+name = "Persistence"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1543"
+name = "Create or Modify System Process"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1543.002"
+name = "Systemd Service"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002/"
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0004"
+name = "Privilege Escalation"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/persistence_tainted_kernel_module_load.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2023/10/23"
+integration = ["system"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/01/15"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+This rule monitors the syslog log file for messages related to instances of a tainted kernel module load. Rootkits often
+leverage kernel modules as their main defense evasion technique. Detecting tainted kernel module loads is crucial for
+ensuring system security and integrity, as malicious or unauthorized modules can compromise the kernel and lead to
+system vulnerabilities or unauthorized access.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["logs-system.syslog-*"]
+language = "kuery"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Tainted Kernel Module Load"
+risk_score = 21
+rule_id = "05cad2fb-200c-407f-b472-02ea8c9e5e4a"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
+- Filebeat
+
+### Filebeat Setup
+Filebeat is a lightweight shipper for forwarding and centralizing log data. Installed as an agent on your servers, Filebeat monitors the log files or locations that you specify, collects log events, and forwards them either to Elasticsearch or Logstash for indexing.
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Filebeat for the Linux System:
+- Elastic provides repositories available for APT and YUM-based distributions. Note that we provide binary packages, but no source packages.
+- To install the APT and YUM repositories follow the setup instructions in this [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/setup-repositories.html).
+- To run Filebeat on Docker follow the setup instructions in the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/running-on-docker.html).
+- To run Filebeat on Kubernetes follow the setup instructions in the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/running-on-kubernetes.html).
+- For quick start information for Filebeat refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/8.11/filebeat-installation-configuration.html).
+- For complete Setup and Run Filebeat information refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html).
+
+#### Rule Specific Setup Note
+- This rule requires the Filebeat System Module to be enabled.
+- The system module collects and parses logs created by the system logging service of common Unix/Linux based distributions.
+- To run the system module of Filebeat on Linux follow the setup instructions in the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/filebeat-module-system.html).
+"""
+severity = "low"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Linux",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Persistence",
+    "Tactic: Defense Evasion",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "query"
+
+query = '''
+host.os.type:linux and event.dataset:"system.syslog" and process.name:kernel and
+message:"module verification failed: signature and/or required key missing - tainting kernel"
+'''
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating Tainted Kernel Module Load
+
+Kernel modules extend the functionality of the Linux kernel, allowing dynamic loading of code. While beneficial, they can be exploited by adversaries to introduce malicious code, bypassing security measures. Attackers may load unsigned or improperly signed modules, leading to a "tainted" kernel state. The detection rule identifies such events by monitoring syslog for specific error messages, signaling potential unauthorized module loads, thus aiding in early threat detection and system integrity maintenance.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Review the syslog entries around the time of the alert to gather additional context and identify any other suspicious activities or related events.
+- Investigate the specific kernel module mentioned in the syslog message to determine its origin, legitimacy, and whether it is expected on the system.
+- Check the system for any recent changes or installations that could have introduced the unsigned or improperly signed module, including software updates or new applications.
+- Analyze the system for signs of compromise, such as unexpected network connections, unusual process activity, or unauthorized user accounts, which may indicate a broader security incident.
+- Consult with system administrators or relevant personnel to verify if the module load was authorized or part of a legitimate operation, and document any findings or justifications provided.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Custom kernel modules: Organizations often use custom or proprietary kernel modules that may not be signed. These can trigger false positives. To manage this, maintain a list of known, trusted custom modules and create exceptions for them in the monitoring system.
+- Outdated or unsupported hardware drivers: Some older hardware drivers may not have signed modules, leading to false positives. Regularly update drivers and, if necessary, exclude specific drivers that are known to be safe but unsigned.
+- Development and testing environments: In environments where kernel module development occurs, unsigned modules may be loaded frequently. Implement separate monitoring rules or exceptions for these environments to avoid unnecessary alerts.
+- Vendor-provided modules: Certain vendors may provide modules that are not signed. Verify the legitimacy of these modules with the vendor and consider excluding them if they are confirmed to be safe.
+- Temporary testing modules: During troubleshooting or testing, temporary modules might be loaded without proper signing. Ensure these are removed after testing and consider temporary exceptions during the testing phase.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Immediately isolate the affected system from the network to prevent potential lateral movement by the attacker.
+- Verify the integrity of the kernel and loaded modules by comparing them against known good versions or using a trusted baseline.
+- Unload the suspicious kernel module if possible, and replace it with a verified, signed version to restore system integrity.
+- Conduct a thorough forensic analysis of the affected system to identify any additional signs of compromise or persistence mechanisms.
+- Escalate the incident to the security operations center (SOC) or incident response team for further investigation and to determine if other systems are affected.
+- Implement enhanced monitoring and logging for kernel module loads and other critical system activities to detect similar threats in the future.
+- Review and update system and network access controls to ensure only authorized personnel can load kernel modules, reducing the risk of unauthorized changes."""
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1547"
+name = "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1547.006"
+name = "Kernel Modules and Extensions"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/006/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0003"
+name = "Persistence"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1014"
+name = "Rootkit"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0005"
+name = "Defense Evasion"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/persistence_tainted_kernel_module_out_of_tree_load.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2023/10/26"
+integration = ["system"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/01/15"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+This rule monitors the syslog log file for messages related to instances of a out-of-tree kernel module load, indicating
+the taining of the kernel. Rootkits often leverage kernel modules as their main defense evasion technique. Detecting
+tainted kernel module loads is crucial for ensuring system security and integrity, as malicious or unauthorized modules
+can compromise the kernel and lead to system vulnerabilities or unauthorized access.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["logs-system.syslog-*"]
+language = "kuery"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Tainted Out-Of-Tree Kernel Module Load"
+risk_score = 21
+rule_id = "51a09737-80f7-4551-a3be-dac8ef5d181a"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
+- Filebeat
+
+### Filebeat Setup
+Filebeat is a lightweight shipper for forwarding and centralizing log data. Installed as an agent on your servers, Filebeat monitors the log files or locations that you specify, collects log events, and forwards them either to Elasticsearch or Logstash for indexing.
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Filebeat for the Linux System:
+- Elastic provides repositories available for APT and YUM-based distributions. Note that we provide binary packages, but no source packages.
+- To install the APT and YUM repositories follow the setup instructions in this [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/setup-repositories.html).
+- To run Filebeat on Docker follow the setup instructions in the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/running-on-docker.html).
+- To run Filebeat on Kubernetes follow the setup instructions in the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/running-on-kubernetes.html).
+- For quick start information for Filebeat refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/8.11/filebeat-installation-configuration.html).
+- For complete Setup and Run Filebeat information refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html).
+
+#### Rule Specific Setup Note
+- This rule requires the Filebeat System Module to be enabled.
+- The system module collects and parses logs created by the system logging service of common Unix/Linux based distributions.
+- To run the system module of Filebeat on Linux follow the setup instructions in the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/filebeat-module-system.html).
+"""
+severity = "low"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Linux",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Persistence",
+    "Tactic: Defense Evasion",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "query"
+
+query = '''
+host.os.type:linux and event.dataset:"system.syslog" and process.name:kernel and
+message:"loading out-of-tree module taints kernel."
+'''
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating Tainted Out-Of-Tree Kernel Module Load
+
+Kernel modules extend the functionality of the Linux kernel without rebooting the system. While beneficial, out-of-tree modules, not included in the official kernel source, can taint the kernel, posing security risks. Adversaries exploit this by loading malicious modules to evade detection and maintain persistence. The detection rule monitors syslog for specific messages indicating such module loads, helping identify potential threats early.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Review the syslog entries around the time of the alert to gather additional context about the module load event, focusing on messages with "loading out-of-tree module taints kernel."
+- Identify the specific out-of-tree kernel module that was loaded by examining the syslog message details and cross-reference with known legitimate modules.
+- Check the system for any recent changes or installations that might have introduced the out-of-tree module, such as software updates or new applications.
+- Investigate the source and integrity of the module by verifying its origin and comparing its hash against known good or malicious hashes.
+- Assess the system for any signs of compromise or unauthorized access, focusing on persistence mechanisms and defense evasion tactics, as indicated by the MITRE ATT&CK framework references.
+- Consult with system administrators or relevant stakeholders to determine if the module load was authorized or expected as part of normal operations.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Legitimate third-party drivers or hardware support modules may trigger alerts when loaded as out-of-tree modules. Users should verify the source and purpose of these modules to ensure they are not malicious.
+- Custom-built modules for specific applications or hardware optimizations can also cause false positives. Users can create exceptions for these modules by adding them to an allowlist if they are verified as safe and necessary for system operations.
+- Development and testing environments often load experimental or custom modules that are not part of the official kernel. In such cases, users should document these modules and exclude them from alerts to avoid unnecessary noise.
+- Regularly updated or patched modules from trusted vendors might not be immediately recognized as safe. Users should maintain a list of trusted vendors and update their exception lists accordingly to prevent false positives.
+- Some security tools or monitoring solutions may use out-of-tree modules for enhanced functionality. Users should ensure these tools are from reputable sources and exclude their modules from detection rules if they are confirmed to be secure.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Immediately isolate the affected system from the network to prevent potential lateral movement by the adversary.
+- Identify and unload the suspicious out-of-tree kernel module using the `rmmod` command to remove it from the kernel.
+- Conduct a thorough review of the system's kernel module load history and verify the legitimacy of all loaded modules.
+- Perform a comprehensive malware scan on the affected system to detect and remove any additional malicious software.
+- Restore the system from a known good backup if the integrity of the system cannot be assured after module removal.
+- Implement stricter access controls and monitoring for kernel module loading to prevent unauthorized module loads in the future.
+- Escalate the incident to the security operations team for further investigation and to assess the need for broader organizational response measures."""
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1547"
+name = "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1547.006"
+name = "Kernel Modules and Extensions"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/006/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0003"
+name = "Persistence"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1014"
+name = "Rootkit"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0005"
+name = "Defense Evasion"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
+