nldcsc-elastic-rules 0.0.8__py3-none-any.whl

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/command_and_control_linux_chisel_server_activity.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2023/08/23"
+integration = ["endpoint"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/02/04"
+
+[transform]
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Listening Ports"
+query = "SELECT pid, address, port, socket, protocol, path FROM listening_ports"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Open Sockets"
+query = "SELECT pid, family, remote_address, remote_port, socket, state FROM process_open_sockets"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Information for a Specific User"
+query = "SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = {{user.name}}"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Investigate the Account Authentication Status"
+query = "SELECT * FROM logged_in_users WHERE user = {{user.name}}"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Running Processes by User"
+query = "SELECT pid, username, name FROM processes p JOIN users u ON u.uid = p.uid ORDER BY username"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Process Info"
+query = "SELECT name, cmdline, parent, path, uid FROM processes"
+
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+This rule monitors for common command line flags leveraged by the Chisel server utility followed by a received
+connection within a timespan of 1 minute. Chisel is a command-line utility used for creating and managing TCP and UDP
+tunnels, enabling port forwarding and secure communication between machines. Attackers can abuse the Chisel utility to
+establish covert communication channels, bypass network restrictions, and carry out malicious activities by creating
+tunnels that allow unauthorized access to internal systems.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["logs-endpoint.events.network*", "logs-endpoint.events.process*"]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Potential Protocol Tunneling via Chisel Server"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+### Investigating Potential Protocol Tunneling via Chisel Server
+
+Attackers can leverage `chisel` to clandestinely tunnel network communications and evade security measures, potentially gaining unauthorized access to sensitive systems.
+
+This rule looks for a sequence of command line arguments that are consistent with `chisel` server tunneling behavior, followed by a network event by an uncommon process. 
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the [Osquery Markdown Plugin](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/invest-guide-run-osquery.html) introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+> This investigation guide uses [placeholder fields](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/osquery-placeholder-fields.html) to dynamically pass alert data into Osquery queries. Placeholder fields were introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.7.0. If you're using Elastic Stack version 8.6.0 or earlier, you'll need to manually adjust this investigation guide's queries to ensure they properly run.
+
+#### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Identify any signs of suspicious network activity or anomalies that may indicate protocol tunneling. This could include unexpected traffic patterns or unusual network behavior.
+  - Investigate listening ports and open sockets to look for potential protocol tunneling, reverse shells, or data exfiltration.
+    - $osquery_0
+    - $osquery_1
+- Identify the user account that performed the action, analyze it, and check whether it should perform this kind of action.
+  - $osquery_2
+- Investigate whether the user is currently logged in and active.
+  - $osquery_3
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence and whether they are located in expected locations.
+  - $osquery_4
+  - $osquery_5
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+  - If scripts or executables were dropped, retrieve the files and determine if they are malicious:
+    - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+      - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+        - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+          - Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
+          - Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
+        - File access, modification, and creation activities.
+
+### Related rules
+
+- Potential Protocol Tunneling via Chisel Client - 3f12325a-4cc6-410b-8d4c-9fbbeb744cfd
+- Potential Linux Tunneling and/or Port Forwarding - 6ee947e9-de7e-4281-a55d-09289bdf947e
+- Potential Protocol Tunneling via EarthWorm - 9f1c4ca3-44b5-481d-ba42-32dc215a2769
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- If this activity is related to new benign software installation activity, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of user and command line conditions.
+- If this activity is related to a system administrator or developer who uses port tunneling for benign purposes, consider adding exceptions for specific user accounts or hosts. 
+- Try to understand the context of the execution by thinking about the user, machine, or business purpose. A small number of endpoints, such as servers with unique software, might appear unusual but satisfy a specific business need.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors, such as reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers, that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+"""
+references = [
+    "https://blog.bitsadmin.com/living-off-the-foreign-land-windows-as-offensive-platform",
+    "https://book.hacktricks.xyz/generic-methodologies-and-resources/tunneling-and-port-forwarding",
+]
+risk_score = 47
+rule_id = "ac8805f6-1e08-406c-962e-3937057fa86f"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+#### Prerequisite Requirements:
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
+"""
+severity = "medium"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Linux",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Command and Control",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+type = "eql"
+
+query = '''
+sequence by host.id, process.entity_id with maxspan=1m
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and 
+   process.args == "server" and process.args in ("--port", "-p", "--reverse", "--backend", "--socks5") and 
+   process.args_count >= 3 and process.parent.name in ("bash", "dash", "ash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish")]
+  [network where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "connection_accepted" and 
+   destination.ip != null and destination.ip != "127.0.0.1" and destination.ip != "::1" and 
+   not process.name : (
+     "python*", "php*", "perl", "ruby", "lua*", "openssl", "nc", "netcat", "ncat", "telnet", "awk", "java", "telnet",
+     "ftp", "socat", "curl", "wget", "dpkg", "docker", "dockerd", "yum", "apt", "rpm", "dnf", "ssh", "sshd", "hugo")]
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1572"
+name = "Protocol Tunneling"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0011"
+name = "Command and Control"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/"
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/command_and_control_linux_kworker_netcon.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2023/10/18"
+integration = ["endpoint"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/01/24"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+This rule monitors for network connections from a kworker process. kworker, or kernel worker, processes are part of the
+kernel's workqueue mechanism. They are responsible for executing work that has been scheduled to be done in kernel
+space, which might include tasks like handling interrupts, background activities, and other kernel-related tasks.
+Attackers may attempt to evade detection by masquerading as a kernel worker process.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["logs-endpoint.events.*"]
+language = "kuery"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Network Activity Detected via Kworker"
+risk_score = 21
+rule_id = "25d917c4-aa3c-4111-974c-286c0312ff95"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows
+the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+#### Prerequisite Requirements:
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
+- We suggest to select "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
+"""
+severity = "low"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Linux",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Command and Control",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "new_terms"
+
+query = '''
+host.os.type:linux and event.category:network and event.action:(connection_attempted or connection_accepted) and
+process.name:kworker* and not destination.ip:(
+  10.0.0.0/8 or
+  127.0.0.0/8 or
+  169.254.0.0/16 or
+  172.16.0.0/12 or
+  192.168.0.0/16 or
+  224.0.0.0/4 or
+  "::1" or
+  "FE80::/10" or
+  "FF00::/8" or
+  "0.0.0.0"
+) and not destination.port:("2049" or "111" or "892" or "597")
+'''
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating Network Activity Detected via Kworker
+
+Kworker processes are integral to Linux systems, handling kernel tasks like interrupts and background activities. Adversaries may exploit these processes to mask malicious network activities, evading detection by blending in with legitimate kernel operations. The detection rule identifies suspicious network connections initiated by kworker processes, excluding trusted IP ranges and ports, to uncover potential command and control activities.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Review the alert details to confirm the kworker process is indeed initiating network connections, focusing on the process.name field.
+- Examine the destination IP address and port to determine if the connection is to an untrusted or suspicious external network, as the rule excludes trusted IP ranges and ports.
+- Check historical data for any previous alerts or network activity involving the same kworker process to identify patterns or repeated behavior.
+- Investigate the source host for any signs of compromise or unusual activity, such as unauthorized access attempts or unexpected process executions.
+- Correlate the network activity with other security events or logs from the same timeframe to identify potential indicators of compromise or related malicious activities.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Network monitoring tools or legitimate applications may occasionally use kworker processes for routine checks or updates, leading to false positives. Users can create exceptions for these specific applications by identifying their typical IP ranges and ports.
+- Internal network scanning or monitoring activities might trigger alerts. To mitigate this, users should exclude known internal IP ranges and ports used by these activities from the detection rule.
+- Automated backup or synchronization services that operate in the background could be mistaken for suspicious activity. Users should identify these services and adjust the rule to exclude their associated network traffic.
+- Some system updates or maintenance tasks might temporarily use kworker processes for network communication. Users can whitelist the IP addresses and ports associated with these tasks to prevent false alerts.
+- If a specific kworker process consistently triggers alerts without any malicious intent, users should investigate the process's behavior and, if deemed safe, add it to an exception list to avoid future false positives.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Isolate the affected system from the network to prevent further malicious activity and potential lateral movement by the attacker.
+- Terminate any suspicious kworker processes identified as initiating unauthorized network connections to halt ongoing malicious activities.
+- Conduct a thorough forensic analysis of the affected system to identify any additional indicators of compromise, such as unauthorized files or processes, and remove them.
+- Update and patch the affected system to the latest security standards to close any vulnerabilities that may have been exploited.
+- Monitor network traffic for any further suspicious activity originating from other systems, indicating potential spread or persistence of the threat.
+- Escalate the incident to the security operations center (SOC) or incident response team for further investigation and to determine if additional systems are compromised.
+- Implement enhanced monitoring and logging for kworker processes and network activities to improve detection of similar threats in the future."""
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0011"
+name = "Command and Control"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/"
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1014"
+name = "Rootkit"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014/"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1036"
+name = "Masquerading"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/"
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0005"
+name = "Defense Evasion"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1041"
+name = "Exfiltration Over C2 Channel"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041/"
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0010"
+name = "Exfiltration"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010/"
+
+[rule.new_terms]
+field = "new_terms_fields"
+value = ["process.name", "host.id"]
+
+[[rule.new_terms.history_window_start]]
+field = "history_window_start"
+value = "now-14d"

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/command_and_control_linux_proxychains_activity.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2023/08/23"
+integration = ["endpoint", "auditd_manager", "crowdstrike", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/03/20"
+
+[transform]
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Listening Ports"
+query = "SELECT pid, address, port, socket, protocol, path FROM listening_ports"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Open Sockets"
+query = "SELECT pid, family, remote_address, remote_port, socket, state FROM process_open_sockets"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Information for a Specific User"
+query = "SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = {{user.name}}"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Investigate the Account Authentication Status"
+query = "SELECT * FROM logged_in_users WHERE user = {{user.name}}"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Running Processes by User"
+query = "SELECT pid, username, name FROM processes p JOIN users u ON u.uid = p.uid ORDER BY username"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Process Info"
+query = "SELECT name, cmdline, parent, path, uid FROM processes"
+
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+This rule monitors for the execution of the ProxyChains utility. ProxyChains is a command-line tool that enables the
+routing of network connections through intermediary proxies, enhancing anonymity and enabling access to restricted
+resources. Attackers can exploit the ProxyChains utility to hide their true source IP address, evade detection, and
+perform malicious activities through a chain of proxy servers, potentially masking their identity and intentions.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = [
+    "auditbeat-*",
+    "endgame-*",
+    "logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*",
+    "logs-crowdstrike.fdr*",
+    "logs-endpoint.events.process*",
+    "logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*",
+]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "ProxyChains Activity"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+### Investigating ProxyChains Activity
+
+Attackers can leverage `proxychains` to obfuscate their origin and bypass network defenses by routing their malicious traffic through multiple intermediary servers.
+
+This rule looks for processes spawned through `proxychains` by analyzing `proxychains` process execution.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the [Osquery Markdown Plugin](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/invest-guide-run-osquery.html) introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+> This investigation guide uses [placeholder fields](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/osquery-placeholder-fields.html) to dynamically pass alert data into Osquery queries. Placeholder fields were introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.7.0. If you're using Elastic Stack version 8.6.0 or earlier, you'll need to manually adjust this investigation guide's queries to ensure they properly run.
+
+#### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Identify any signs of suspicious network activity or anomalies that may indicate network obfuscation. This could include unexpected traffic patterns or unusual network behavior.
+  - Investigate listening ports and open sockets to look for potential protocol tunneling, reverse shells, or data exfiltration.
+    - $osquery_0
+    - $osquery_1
+- Identify the user account that performed the action, analyze it, and check whether it should perform this kind of action.
+  - $osquery_2
+- Investigate whether the user is currently logged in and active.
+  - $osquery_3
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence and whether they are located in expected locations.
+  - $osquery_4
+  - $osquery_5
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+  - If scripts or executables were dropped, retrieve the files and determine if they are malicious:
+    - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+      - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+        - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+          - Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
+          - Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
+        - File access, modification, and creation activities.
+
+### Related rules
+
+- Suspicious Utility Launched via ProxyChains - 6ace94ba-f02c-4d55-9f53-87d99b6f9af4
+- Potential Protocol Tunneling via Chisel Client - 3f12325a-4cc6-410b-8d4c-9fbbeb744cfd
+- Potential Protocol Tunneling via Chisel Server - ac8805f6-1e08-406c-962e-3937057fa86f
+- Potential Linux Tunneling and/or Port Forwarding - 6ee947e9-de7e-4281-a55d-09289bdf947e
+- Potential Protocol Tunneling via EarthWorm - 9f1c4ca3-44b5-481d-ba42-32dc215a2769
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- If this activity is related to new benign software installation activity, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of user and command line conditions.
+- If this activity is related to a system administrator or developer who uses this utility for benign purposes, consider adding exceptions for specific user accounts or hosts. 
+- Try to understand the context of the execution by thinking about the user, machine, or business purpose. A small number of endpoints, such as servers with unique software, might appear unusual but satisfy a specific business need.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors, such as reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers, that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+"""
+references = ["https://blog.bitsadmin.com/living-off-the-foreign-land-windows-as-offensive-platform"]
+risk_score = 21
+rule_id = "4b868f1f-15ff-4ba3-8c11-d5a7a6356d37"
+severity = "low"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Linux",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Command and Control",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
+    "Data Source: Auditd Manager",
+    "Data Source: Crowdstrike",
+    "Data Source: SentinelOne",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+
+query = '''
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "start", "ProcessRollup2", "executed", "process_started")
+ and process.name == "proxychains"
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1572"
+name = "Protocol Tunneling"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0011"
+name = "Command and Control"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/"
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/command_and_control_linux_ssh_x11_forwarding.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2023/08/23"
+integration = ["endpoint", "crowdstrike", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/03/20"
+
+[transform]
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Listening Ports"
+query = "SELECT pid, address, port, socket, protocol, path FROM listening_ports"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Open Sockets"
+query = "SELECT pid, family, remote_address, remote_port, socket, state FROM process_open_sockets"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Information for a Specific User"
+query = "SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = {{user.name}}"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Investigate the Account Authentication Status"
+query = "SELECT * FROM logged_in_users WHERE user = {{user.name}}"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Running Processes by User"
+query = "SELECT pid, username, name FROM processes p JOIN users u ON u.uid = p.uid ORDER BY username"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Process Info"
+query = "SELECT name, cmdline, parent, path, uid FROM processes"
+
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+This rule monitors for X11 forwarding via SSH. X11 forwarding is a feature that allows users to run graphical
+applications on a remote server and display the application's graphical user interface on their local machine. Attackers
+can abuse X11 forwarding for tunneling their GUI-based tools, pivot through compromised systems, and create covert
+communication channels, enabling lateral movement and facilitating remote control of systems within a network.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = [
+    "endgame-*",
+    "logs-crowdstrike.fdr*",
+    "logs-endpoint.events.process*",
+    "logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*",
+]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Linux SSH X11 Forwarding"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+### Investigating Linux SSH X11 Forwarding
+
+Attackers can leverage SSH X11 forwarding to capture a user's graphical desktop session and potentially execute unauthorized GUI applications remotely.
+
+This rule looks for the execution of SSH in conjunction with command line arguments that are capable of setting up X11 forwarding.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the [Osquery Markdown Plugin](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/invest-guide-run-osquery.html) introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+> This investigation guide uses [placeholder fields](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/osquery-placeholder-fields.html) to dynamically pass alert data into Osquery queries. Placeholder fields were introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.7.0. If you're using Elastic Stack version 8.6.0 or earlier, you'll need to manually adjust this investigation guide's queries to ensure they properly run.
+
+#### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Identify any signs of suspicious network activity or anomalies that may indicate network forwarding activity. This could include unexpected traffic patterns or unusual network behavior.
+  - Investigate listening ports and open sockets to look for potential protocol tunneling, reverse shells, or data exfiltration.
+    - $osquery_0
+    - $osquery_1
+- Identify the user account that performed the action, analyze it, and check whether it should perform this kind of action.
+  - $osquery_2
+- Investigate whether the user is currently logged in and active.
+  - $osquery_3
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence and whether they are located in expected locations.
+  - $osquery_4
+  - $osquery_5
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+  - If scripts or executables were dropped, retrieve the files and determine if they are malicious:
+    - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+      - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+        - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+          - Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
+          - Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
+        - File access, modification, and creation activities.
+
+### Related rules
+
+- Potential Linux Tunneling and/or Port Forwarding - 6ee947e9-de7e-4281-a55d-09289bdf947e
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- If this activity is related to new benign software installation activity, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of user and command line conditions.
+- If this activity is related to a system administrator or developer who uses port tunneling/forwarding for benign purposes, consider adding exceptions for specific user accounts or hosts.
+- Try to understand the context of the execution by thinking about the user, machine, or business purpose. A small number of endpoints, such as servers with unique software, might appear unusual but satisfy a specific business need.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors, such as reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers, that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+"""
+references = ["https://book.hacktricks.xyz/generic-methodologies-and-resources/tunneling-and-port-forwarding"]
+risk_score = 21
+rule_id = "29f0cf93-d17c-4b12-b4f3-a433800539fa"
+severity = "low"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Linux",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Command and Control",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
+    "Data Source: Crowdstrike",
+    "Data Source: SentinelOne",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+
+query = '''
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "start", "ProcessRollup2") and
+process.name in ("ssh", "sshd") and process.args in ("-X", "-Y") and process.args_count >= 3 and
+process.parent.name in ("bash", "dash", "ash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish")
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1572"
+name = "Protocol Tunneling"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0011"
+name = "Command and Control"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/"
+