nldcsc-elastic-rules 0.0.8__py3-none-any.whl

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/windows/persistence_run_key_and_startup_broad.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2020/11/18"
+integration = ["endpoint"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/09/18"
+
+[transform]
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache"
+query = "SELECT * FROM dns_cache"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve All Services"
+query = "SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts"
+query = """
+SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE
+NOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR
+user_account == null)
+"""
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link"
+query = """
+SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,
+services.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =
+authenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'
+"""
+
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Identifies run key or startup key registry modifications. In order to survive reboots and other system interrupts,
+attackers will modify run keys within the registry or leverage startup folder items as a form of persistence.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["logs-endpoint.events.registry-*"]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Startup or Run Key Registry Modification"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+### Investigating Startup or Run Key Registry Modification
+
+Adversaries may achieve persistence by referencing a program with a registry run key. Adding an entry to the run keys in the registry will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will executed under the context of the user and will have the account's permissions. This rule looks for this behavior by monitoring a range of registry run keys.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the [Osquery Markdown Plugin](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/invest-guide-run-osquery.html) introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+#### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Validate if the activity is not related to planned patches, updates, network administrator activity, or legitimate software installations.
+- Assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences across hosts.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze the process executable using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - $osquery_0
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - $osquery_1
+      - $osquery_2
+      - $osquery_3
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+- Investigate potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (for example, 4624) to the target host after the registry modification.
+
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- There is a high possibility of benign legitimate programs being added to registry run keys. This activity could be based on new software installations, patches, or any kind of network administrator related activity. Before undertaking further investigation, verify that this activity is not benign.
+
+### Related rules
+
+- Suspicious Startup Shell Folder Modification - c8b150f0-0164-475b-a75e-74b47800a9ff
+- Persistent Scripts in the Startup Directory - f7c4dc5a-a58d-491d-9f14-9b66507121c0
+- Startup Folder Persistence via Unsigned Process - 2fba96c0-ade5-4bce-b92f-a5df2509da3f
+- Startup Persistence by a Suspicious Process - 440e2db4-bc7f-4c96-a068-65b78da59bde
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+"""
+references = ["https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/elastic-security-uncovers-blister-malware-campaign"]
+risk_score = 21
+rule_id = "97fc44d3-8dae-4019-ae83-298c3015600f"
+severity = "low"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Windows",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Persistence",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+]
+timeline_id = "3e47ef71-ebfc-4520-975c-cb27fc090799"
+timeline_title = "Comprehensive Registry Timeline"
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+
+query = '''
+registry where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "change" and 
+ registry.data.strings != null and registry.hive : ("HKEY_USERS", "HKLM") and
+ registry.path : (
+     /* Machine Hive */
+     "HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\*",
+     "HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce\\*",
+     "HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnceEx\\*",
+     "HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run\\*",
+     "HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\Shell\\*",
+     /* Users Hive */
+     "HKEY_USERS\\*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\*",
+     "HKEY_USERS\\*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce\\*",
+     "HKEY_USERS\\*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnceEx\\*",
+     "HKEY_USERS\\*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run\\*",
+     "HKEY_USERS\\*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\Shell\\*"
+     ) and
+  /* add common legitimate changes without being too restrictive as this is one of the most abused AESPs */
+  not registry.data.strings : "ctfmon.exe /n" and
+  not (registry.value : "Application Restart #*" and process.name : "csrss.exe") and
+  not user.id : ("S-1-5-18", "S-1-5-19", "S-1-5-20") and
+  not registry.data.strings : ("*:\\Program Files\\*",
+                               "*:\\Program Files (x86)\\*",
+                               "*:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\*",
+                               "* --processStart *",
+                               "* --process-start-args *",
+                               "ms-teamsupdate.exe -UninstallT20",
+                               " ",
+                               "grpconv -o", "* /burn.runonce*", "* /startup",
+                               "?:\\WINDOWS\\SysWOW64\\Macromed\\Flash\\FlashUtil32_*_Plugin.exe -update plugin") and
+  not process.executable : ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\msiexec.exe",
+                            "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\msiexec.exe",
+                            "D:\\*",
+                            "\\Device\\Mup*",
+                            "C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\reg.exe",
+                            "C:\\Windows\\System32\\changepk.exe",
+                            "C:\\Windows\\System32\\netsh.exe",
+                            "C:\\$WINDOWS.~BT\\Sources\\SetupPlatform.exe",
+                            "C:\\$WINDOWS.~BT\\Sources\\SetupHost.exe",
+                            "C:\\Program Files\\Cisco Spark\\CiscoCollabHost.exe",
+                            "C:\\Sistemas\\Programas MP\\CCleaner\\CCleaner64.exe",
+                            "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\FastTrack Software\\Admin By Request\\AdminByRequest.exe",
+                            "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Exclaimer Ltd\\Cloud Signature Update Agent\\Exclaimer.CloudSignatureAgent.exe",
+                            "C:\\ProgramData\\Lenovo\\Vantage\\AddinData\\LenovoBatteryGaugeAddin\\x64\\QSHelper.exe",
+                            "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Microsoft\\Edge\\Application\\*\\Installer\\setup.exe",
+                            "C:\\ProgramData\\bomgar-scc-*\\bomgar-scc.exe",
+                            "C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\Macromed\\Flash\\FlashUtil*_pepper.exe",
+                            "C:\\Windows\\System32\\spool\\drivers\\x64\\3\\*.EXE",
+                            "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Common Files\\Adobe\\ARM\\*\\AdobeARM.exe")
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1547"
+name = "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1547.001"
+name = "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0003"
+name = "Persistence"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/windows/persistence_runtime_run_key_startup_susp_procs.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2020/11/19"
+integration = ["endpoint", "windows"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/03/20"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Identifies execution of suspicious persistent programs (scripts, rundll32, etc.) by looking at process lineage and
+command line usage.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.process-*", "logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*", "endgame-*"]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Execution of Persistent Suspicious Program"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating Execution of Persistent Suspicious Program
+
+Persistent programs, like scripts or rundll32, are often used by adversaries to maintain access to a system. These programs can be executed at startup, leveraging process lineage and command line arguments to evade detection. The detection rule identifies suspicious executions by monitoring the sequence of processes initiated after user logon, focusing on known malicious executables and unusual file paths, thus highlighting potential abuse of persistence mechanisms.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Review the process lineage to confirm the sequence of userinit.exe, explorer.exe, and the suspicious child process. Verify if the child process was indeed launched shortly after user logon.
+- Examine the command line arguments of the suspicious process to identify any unusual or malicious patterns, especially those involving known suspicious paths like C:\\Users\\*, C:\\ProgramData\\*, or C:\\Windows\\Temp\\*.
+- Check the original file name of the suspicious process against known malicious executables such as cscript.exe, wscript.exe, or PowerShell.EXE to determine if it matches any of these.
+- Investigate the parent process explorer.exe to ensure it was not compromised or manipulated to launch the suspicious child process.
+- Analyze the user account associated with the suspicious process to determine if it has been involved in any other suspicious activities or if it has elevated privileges that could be exploited.
+- Review recent system changes or installations that might have introduced the suspicious executable or altered startup configurations.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Legitimate administrative scripts or tools may trigger alerts if they are executed from common directories like C:\\Users or C:\\ProgramData. To manage this, create exceptions for known administrative scripts that are regularly used in your environment.
+- Software updates or installations might use processes like PowerShell or RUNDLL32, leading to false positives. Identify and exclude these processes when they are part of a verified update or installation routine.
+- Custom scripts or automation tasks that run at startup could be flagged. Document these tasks and exclude them from the rule if they are part of normal operations.
+- Security or monitoring tools that use similar execution patterns may be mistakenly identified. Verify these tools and add them to an exclusion list to prevent unnecessary alerts.
+- User-initiated actions that mimic suspicious behavior, such as running scripts from the command line, can cause false positives. Educate users on safe practices and adjust the rule to exclude known benign user actions.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Isolate the affected host from the network to prevent further spread or communication with potential command and control servers.
+- Terminate any suspicious processes identified in the alert, such as those executed by cscript.exe, wscript.exe, PowerShell.EXE, MSHTA.EXE, RUNDLL32.EXE, REGSVR32.EXE, RegAsm.exe, MSBuild.exe, or InstallUtil.exe.
+- Remove any unauthorized or suspicious startup entries or scheduled tasks that may have been created to ensure persistence.
+- Conduct a thorough scan of the system using updated antivirus or endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools to identify and remove any additional malicious files or remnants.
+- Review and restore any modified system configurations or registry settings to their default or secure state.
+- Escalate the incident to the security operations center (SOC) or incident response team for further analysis and to determine if additional systems are affected.
+- Implement enhanced monitoring and logging for the affected host and similar systems to detect any recurrence or related suspicious activities."""
+risk_score = 47
+rule_id = "e7125cea-9fe1-42a5-9a05-b0792cf86f5a"
+severity = "medium"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Windows",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Persistence",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Data Source: Sysmon",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+type = "eql"
+
+query = '''
+/* userinit followed by explorer followed by early child process of explorer (unlikely to be launched interactively) within 1m */
+sequence by host.id, user.name with maxspan=1m
+  [process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and process.name : "userinit.exe" and process.parent.name : "winlogon.exe"]
+  [process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and process.name : "explorer.exe"]
+  [process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and process.parent.name : "explorer.exe" and
+   /* add suspicious programs here */
+   process.pe.original_file_name in ("cscript.exe",
+                                     "wscript.exe",
+                                     "PowerShell.EXE",
+                                     "MSHTA.EXE",
+                                     "RUNDLL32.EXE",
+                                     "REGSVR32.EXE",
+                                     "RegAsm.exe",
+                                     "MSBuild.exe",
+                                     "InstallUtil.exe") and
+    /* add potential suspicious paths here */
+    process.args : ("C:\\Users\\*", "C:\\ProgramData\\*", "C:\\Windows\\Temp\\*", "C:\\Windows\\Tasks\\*", "C:\\PerfLogs\\*", "C:\\Intel\\*")
+   ]
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1547"
+name = "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1547.001"
+name = "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0003"
+name = "Persistence"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/windows/persistence_scheduled_task_creation_winlog.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2022/08/29"
+integration = ["system", "windows"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/11/14"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Indicates the creation of a scheduled task using Windows event logs. Adversaries can use these to establish persistence,
+move laterally, and/or escalate privileges.
+"""
+false_positives = ["Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software."]
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["logs-system.security*", "logs-windows.forwarded*", "winlogbeat-*"]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "A scheduled task was created"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating A scheduled task was created
+
+Scheduled tasks in Windows automate routine tasks, enhancing efficiency. However, adversaries exploit this feature to maintain persistence, move laterally, or escalate privileges by creating malicious tasks. The detection rule identifies suspicious task creation by filtering out benign tasks and those initiated by system accounts, focusing on potential threats. This approach helps security analysts pinpoint unauthorized task creation indicative of malicious activity.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Review the user account associated with the task creation to determine if it is a known and authorized user, ensuring it is not a system account by checking that the username does not end with a dollar sign.
+- Examine the task name and path in the event data to identify if it matches any known benign tasks or if it appears suspicious or unfamiliar.
+- Investigate the origin of the task creation by checking the source IP address or hostname, if available, to determine if it aligns with expected network activity.
+- Check the task's scheduled actions and triggers to understand what the task is designed to execute and when, looking for any potentially harmful or unexpected actions.
+- Correlate the task creation event with other security events or logs around the same time to identify any related suspicious activities or anomalies.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Scheduled tasks created by system accounts or computer accounts are often benign. These can be excluded by filtering out user names ending with a dollar sign, which typically represent system accounts.
+- Tasks associated with common software updates or maintenance, such as those from Hewlett-Packard or Microsoft Visual Studio, are generally non-threatening. These can be excluded by specifying their full task names in the exclusion list.
+- OneDrive update tasks are frequently triggered and are usually safe. Exclude these by using patterns that match their task names, such as those starting with "OneDrive Standalone Update Task".
+- Regularly review and update the exclusion list to include any new benign tasks that are identified over time, ensuring that the rule remains effective without generating unnecessary alerts.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Immediately isolate the affected system from the network to prevent potential lateral movement by the adversary.
+- Terminate any suspicious scheduled tasks identified by the alert to halt any ongoing malicious activity.
+- Conduct a thorough review of the system's scheduled tasks to identify and remove any other unauthorized or suspicious tasks.
+- Restore the system from a known good backup if any malicious activity has been confirmed and has potentially compromised system integrity.
+- Update and patch the system to the latest security standards to close any vulnerabilities that may have been exploited.
+- Monitor the system and network for any signs of re-infection or further unauthorized scheduled task creation.
+- Escalate the incident to the security operations center (SOC) or incident response team for further investigation and to determine if additional systems are affected."""
+references = ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4698"]
+risk_score = 21
+rule_id = "92a6faf5-78ec-4e25-bea1-73bacc9b59d9"
+severity = "low"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Windows",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Persistence",
+    "Data Source: Windows Security Event Logs",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+
+query = '''
+iam where host.os.type == "windows" and event.action == "scheduled-task-created" and
+
+ /* excluding tasks created by the computer account */
+ not user.name : "*$" and
+
+ /* TaskContent is not parsed, exclude by full taskname noisy ones */
+ not winlog.event_data.TaskName : (
+              "\\CreateExplorerShellUnelevatedTask",
+              "\\Hewlett-Packard\\HPDeviceCheck",
+              "\\Hewlett-Packard\\HP Support Assistant\\WarrantyChecker",
+              "\\Hewlett-Packard\\HP Support Assistant\\WarrantyChecker_backup",
+              "\\Hewlett-Packard\\HP Web Products Detection",
+              "\\Microsoft\\VisualStudio\\Updates\\BackgroundDownload",
+              "\\OneDrive Standalone Update Task-S-1-5-21*",
+              "\\OneDrive Standalone Update Task-S-1-12-1-*"
+ )
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1053"
+name = "Scheduled Task/Job"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1053.005"
+name = "Scheduled Task"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0003"
+name = "Persistence"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/windows/persistence_scheduled_task_updated.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2022/08/29"
+integration = ["system", "windows"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/11/14"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Identifies first-time modifications to scheduled tasks by user accounts, excluding system activity and machine accounts.
+"""
+false_positives = ["Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software."]
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["logs-system.security*", "logs-windows.forwarded*", "winlogbeat-*"]
+language = "kuery"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Unusual Scheduled Task Update"
+note = """ ## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating Unusual Scheduled Task Update
+
+Scheduled tasks in Windows environments automate routine tasks, but adversaries can exploit them for persistence by modifying tasks to execute malicious code. The detection rule identifies first-time task modifications by non-system users, flagging potential unauthorized changes. By excluding known system accounts, it focuses on suspicious user activity, aiding in early threat detection.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Review the event logs for event code 4702 to identify the specific scheduled task that was modified and the user account responsible for the change.
+- Investigate the user account involved in the modification to determine if it is a legitimate user or potentially compromised. Check for any recent unusual activity associated with this account.
+- Examine the details of the modified scheduled task, including the command or script it is set to execute, to assess if it is potentially malicious or unauthorized.
+- Cross-reference the scheduled task's modification time with other security events or logs to identify any correlated suspicious activities or anomalies.
+- Check the history of the scheduled task to determine if this is the first modification or if there have been previous changes that might indicate a pattern of unauthorized access.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Scheduled task modifications by IT administrators performing routine maintenance can trigger alerts. To manage this, create exceptions for known administrator accounts that regularly update tasks.
+- Software updates or installations by trusted applications may modify scheduled tasks. Identify these applications and exclude their associated user accounts or processes from the rule.
+- Automated scripts or management tools that modify tasks as part of their normal operation can be mistaken for suspicious activity. Document these tools and exclude their activity from detection.
+- Temporary user accounts used for specific projects or tasks might modify scheduled tasks. If these accounts are verified and trusted, consider excluding them from the rule during their active period.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Immediately isolate the affected system from the network to prevent further unauthorized scheduled task modifications or potential lateral movement by the adversary.
+- Terminate any suspicious processes associated with the modified scheduled task to halt any ongoing malicious activity.
+- Review the modified scheduled task details, including the command or script being executed, and remove or disable any malicious components identified.
+- Reset the credentials of the user account involved in the modification to prevent further unauthorized access, and investigate for any signs of credential compromise.
+- Conduct a thorough scan of the affected system using updated antivirus or endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools to identify and remove any additional malware or persistence mechanisms.
+- Escalate the incident to the security operations center (SOC) or incident response team for further investigation and to determine if the threat has spread to other systems.
+- Implement additional monitoring and alerting for scheduled task modifications across the environment to enhance detection of similar threats in the future.
+"""
+references = ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4698"]
+risk_score = 21
+rule_id = "a02cb68e-7c93-48d1-93b2-2c39023308eb"
+severity = "low"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Windows",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Persistence",
+    "Data Source: Windows Security Event Logs",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "new_terms"
+
+query = '''
+event.category: "iam" and host.os.type:"windows" and event.code: "4702" and
+  not winlog.event_data.SubjectUserSid: ("S-1-5-18" or "S-1-5-19" or "S-1-5-20") and
+  not user.name : *$
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1053"
+name = "Scheduled Task/Job"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1053.005"
+name = "Scheduled Task"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0003"
+name = "Persistence"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
+
+[rule.new_terms]
+field = "new_terms_fields"
+value = ["host.id", "winlog.event_data.TaskName"]
+
+[[rule.new_terms.history_window_start]]
+field = "history_window_start"
+value = "now-14d"

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/windows/persistence_sdprop_exclusion_dsheuristics.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2022/02/24"
+integration = ["system", "windows"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/11/14"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Identifies a modification on the dsHeuristics attribute on the bit that holds the configuration of groups excluded from
+the SDProp process. The SDProp compares the permissions on protected objects with those defined on the AdminSDHolder
+object. If the permissions on any of the protected accounts and groups do not match, the permissions on the protected
+accounts and groups are reset to match those of the domain's AdminSDHolder object, meaning that groups excluded will
+remain unchanged. Attackers can abuse this misconfiguration to maintain long-term access to privileged accounts in these
+groups.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["logs-system.security*", "logs-windows.forwarded*", "winlogbeat-*"]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "AdminSDHolder SDProp Exclusion Added"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+### Investigating AdminSDHolder SDProp Exclusion Added
+
+The SDProp process compares the permissions on protected objects with those defined on the AdminSDHolder object. If the permissions on any of the protected accounts and groups do not match, it resets the permissions on the protected accounts and groups to match those defined in the domain AdminSDHolder object.
+
+The dSHeuristics is a Unicode string attribute, in which each character in the string represents a heuristic that is used to determine the behavior of Active Directory.
+
+Administrators can use the dSHeuristics attribute to exclude privilege groups from the SDProp process by setting the 16th bit (dwAdminSDExMask) of the string to a certain value, which represents the group(s):
+
+- For example, to exclude the Account Operators group, an administrator would modify the string, so the 16th character is set to 1 (i.e., 0000000001000001).
+
+The usage of this exclusion can leave the accounts unprotected and facilitate the misconfiguration of privileges for the excluded groups, enabling attackers to add accounts to these groups to maintain long-term persistence with high privileges.
+
+This rule matches changes of the dsHeuristics object where the 16th bit is set to a value other than zero.
+
+#### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Contact the account and system owners and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Check the value assigned to the 16th bit of the string on the `winlog.event_data.AttributeValue` field:
+    - Account Operators eq 1
+    - Server Operators eq 2
+    - Print Operators eq 4
+    - Backup Operators eq 8
+    The field value can range from 0 to f (15). If more than one group is specified, the values will be summed together; for example, Backup Operators and Print Operators will set the `c` value on the bit.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- While this modification can be done legitimately, it is not a best practice. Any potential benign true positive (B-TP) should be mapped and reviewed by the security team for alternatives as this weakens the security of the privileged group.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- The change can be reverted by setting the dwAdminSDExMask (16th bit) to 0 in dSHeuristics.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+"""
+references = [
+    "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/uploads/guide-ad.html#dsheuristics_bad",
+    "https://petri.com/active-directory-security-understanding-adminsdholder-object",
+]
+risk_score = 73
+rule_id = "61d29caf-6c15-4d1e-9ccb-7ad12ccc0bc7"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+The 'Audit Directory Service Changes' logging policy must be configured for (Success).
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+
+```
+Computer Configuration >
+Policies >
+Windows Settings >
+Security Settings >
+Advanced Audit Policies Configuration >
+Audit Policies >
+DS Access >
+Audit Directory Service Changes (Success)
+```
+"""
+severity = "high"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Windows",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Persistence",
+    "Data Source: Active Directory",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+    "Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring",
+    "Data Source: Windows Security Event Logs",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+
+query = '''
+any where host.os.type == "windows" and event.code == "5136" and
+  winlog.event_data.AttributeLDAPDisplayName : "dSHeuristics" and
+  length(winlog.event_data.AttributeValue) > 15 and
+  winlog.event_data.AttributeValue regex~ "[0-9]{15}([1-9a-f]).*"
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1078"
+name = "Valid Accounts"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1078.002"
+name = "Domain Accounts"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002/"
+
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1098"
+name = "Account Manipulation"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0003"
+name = "Persistence"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
+