nldcsc-elastic-rules 0.0.8__py3-none-any.whl

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/persistence_grub_makeconfig.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2025/01/16"
+integration = ["endpoint", "crowdstrike", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/03/20"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+This rule detects the generation of a new GRUB configuration file using built-in Linux commands. The GRUB configuration
+file is used to configure the GRUB bootloader, which is responsible for loading the Linux kernel and initramfs image
+during the boot process. Attackers may use these built-in utilities to generate a new GRUB configuration file that
+includes malicious kernel parameters or boot options, which can be leveraged to maintain persistence on the system.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = [
+    "logs-endpoint.events.process*",
+    "endgame-*",
+    "logs-crowdstrike.fdr*",
+    "logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*",
+]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "GRUB Configuration Generation through Built-in Utilities"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating GRUB Configuration Generation through Built-in Utilities
+
+GRUB, the Grand Unified Bootloader, is crucial for loading the Linux kernel during system startup. It uses configuration files to determine boot parameters. Adversaries may exploit utilities like `grub-mkconfig` to alter these files, embedding malicious parameters for persistence. The detection rule identifies suspicious executions of these utilities, especially when initiated by atypical parent processes, signaling potential misuse.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Review the process execution details to identify the parent process of the suspicious GRUB configuration utility execution. Check if the parent process is unusual or unexpected based on the query's exclusion list.
+- Examine the command-line arguments used in the execution of the GRUB configuration utility to identify any potentially malicious kernel parameters or boot options.
+- Investigate the user account associated with the process execution to determine if it has the necessary privileges and if the activity aligns with the user's typical behavior.
+- Check the system's recent changes or updates, especially those related to bootloader configurations, to identify any unauthorized modifications.
+- Analyze system logs for any other suspicious activities or anomalies around the time of the GRUB configuration utility execution to gather additional context.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Routine system updates or maintenance tasks may trigger the rule when legitimate processes like package managers (e.g., pacman, dnf, yum) or system utilities (e.g., sudo) execute GRUB configuration commands. Users can mitigate this by adding these processes to the exception list in the rule configuration.
+- Automated scripts or cron jobs that regularly update GRUB configurations for legitimate reasons might be flagged. To handle this, identify these scripts and add their parent process names or paths to the exclusion criteria.
+- Custom administrative scripts that manage bootloader settings could also cause false positives. Review these scripts and, if verified as safe, include their parent process details in the rule's exceptions.
+- Some Linux distributions may have specific utilities or services that interact with GRUB as part of their normal operation. Investigate these utilities and consider excluding them if they are confirmed to be benign and necessary for system functionality.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Immediately isolate the affected system from the network to prevent further malicious activity or lateral movement.
+- Terminate any suspicious processes related to `grub-mkconfig`, `grub2-mkconfig`, or `update-grub` that were initiated by atypical parent processes.
+- Review and restore the GRUB configuration file from a known good backup to ensure no malicious parameters are present.
+- Conduct a thorough examination of the system for additional signs of compromise, focusing on persistence mechanisms and unauthorized changes to boot parameters.
+- Escalate the incident to the security operations team for further analysis and to determine if additional systems are affected.
+- Implement monitoring for future unauthorized executions of GRUB configuration utilities, ensuring alerts are generated for similar suspicious activities.
+- Review and update access controls and permissions to restrict the execution of GRUB configuration utilities to authorized personnel only."""
+risk_score = 21
+rule_id = "aabdad51-51fb-4a66-9d82-3873e42accb8"
+setup = """## Setup
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+#### Prerequisite Requirements:
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
+"""
+severity = "low"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Linux",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Persistence",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Data Source: Crowdstrike",
+    "Data Source: SentinelOne",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+
+query = '''
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and
+event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "start", "ProcessRollup2") and
+process.parent.executable != null and process.name in ("grub-mkconfig", "grub2-mkconfig", "update-grub") and not (
+  process.parent.name in ("run-parts", "sudo", "update-grub", "pacman", "dockerd", "dnf", "rpm", "yum") or
+  process.parent.executable like~ (
+    "/var/lib/dpkg/info/*", "/usr/lib/bootloader/grub2-efi/config", "/tmp/newroot/*", "/usr/lib/kernel/install.d/*"
+  )
+)
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1542"
+name = "Pre-OS Boot"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1543"
+name = "Create or Modify System Process"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1574"
+name = "Hijack Execution Flow"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0003"
+name = "Persistence"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/persistence_init_d_file_creation.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2023/03/21"
+integration = ["endpoint", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/03/20"
+
+[transform]
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve File Information"
+query = "SELECT * FROM file WHERE path = {{file.path}}"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve File Listing Information"
+query = "SELECT * FROM file WHERE path LIKE '/etc/init.d/%'"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Additional File Listing Information"
+query = """
+SELECT f.path, u.username AS file_owner, g.groupname AS group_owner, datetime(f.atime, 'unixepoch') AS
+file_last_access_time, datetime(f.mtime, 'unixepoch') AS file_last_modified_time, datetime(f.ctime, 'unixepoch') AS
+file_last_status_change_time, datetime(f.btime, 'unixepoch') AS file_created_time, f.size AS size_bytes FROM file f LEFT
+JOIN users u ON f.uid = u.uid LEFT JOIN groups g ON f.gid = g.gid WHERE path LIKE '/etc/init.d/%'
+"""
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Running Processes by User"
+query = "SELECT pid, username, name FROM processes p JOIN users u ON u.uid = p.uid ORDER BY username"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Crontab Information"
+query = "SELECT * FROM crontab"
+
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Files that are placed in the /etc/init.d/ directory in Unix can be used to start custom applications, services, scripts
+or commands during start-up. Init.d has been mostly replaced in favor of Systemd. However, the "systemd-sysv-generator"
+can convert init.d files to service unit files that run at boot. Adversaries may add or alter files located in the
+/etc/init.d/ directory to execute malicious code upon boot in order to gain persistence on the system.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["endgame-*", "logs-endpoint.events.file*", "logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*"]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "System V Init Script Created"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+### Investigating System V Init Script Created
+
+The `/etc/init.d` directory is used in Linux systems to store the initialization scripts for various services and daemons that are executed during system startup and shutdown.
+
+Attackers can abuse files within the `/etc/init.d/` directory to run scripts, commands or malicious software every time a system is rebooted by converting an executable file into a service file through the `systemd-sysv-generator`. After conversion, a unit file is created within the `/run/systemd/generator.late/` directory.
+
+This rule looks for the creation of new files within the `/etc/init.d/` directory. Executable files in these directories will automatically run at boot with root privileges.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the [Osquery Markdown Plugin](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/invest-guide-run-osquery.html) introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+> This investigation guide uses [placeholder fields](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/osquery-placeholder-fields.html) to dynamically pass alert data into Osquery queries. Placeholder fields were introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.7.0. If you're using Elastic Stack version 8.6.0 or earlier, you'll need to manually adjust this investigation guide's queries to ensure they properly run.
+#### Possible Investigation Steps
+
+- Investigate the file that was created or modified.
+  - $osquery_0
+- Investigate whether any other files in the `/etc/init.d/` or `/run/systemd/generator.late/` directories have been altered.
+  - $osquery_1
+  - $osquery_2
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence and whether they are located in expected locations.
+  - $osquery_3
+- Investigate syslog through the `sudo cat /var/log/syslog | grep 'LSB'` command to find traces of the LSB header of the script (if present). If syslog is being ingested into Elasticsearch, the same can be accomplished through Kibana.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Validate whether this activity is related to planned patches, updates, network administrator activity, or legitimate software installations.
+- Investigate whether the altered scripts call other malicious scripts elsewhere on the file system. 
+  - If scripts or executables were dropped, retrieve the files and determine if they are malicious:
+    - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+      - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+        - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+          - Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
+          - Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
+        - File access, modification, and creation activities.
+        - Cron jobs, services and other persistence mechanisms.
+            - $osquery_4
+
+### False Positive Analysis
+
+- If this activity is related to new benign software installation activity, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of user and command line conditions.
+- If this activity is related to a system administrator who uses init.d for administrative purposes, consider adding exceptions for this specific administrator user account. 
+- Try to understand the context of the execution by thinking about the user, machine, or business purpose. A small number of endpoints, such as servers with unique software, might appear unusual but satisfy a specific business need.
+
+### Related Rules
+
+- Suspicious File Creation in /etc for Persistence - 1c84dd64-7e6c-4bad-ac73-a5014ee37042
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Delete the maliciously created service/init.d files or restore it to the original configuration.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+"""
+references = [
+    "https://www.intezer.com/blog/malware-analysis/hiddenwasp-malware-targeting-linux-systems/",
+    "https://pberba.github.io/security/2022/02/06/linux-threat-hunting-for-persistence-initialization-scripts-and-shell-configuration/#8-boot-or-logon-initialization-scripts-rc-scripts",
+    "https://www.cyberciti.biz/faq/how-to-enable-rc-local-shell-script-on-systemd-while-booting-linux-system/",
+    "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/sequel-on-persistence-mechanisms",
+]
+risk_score = 21
+rule_id = "474fd20e-14cc-49c5-8160-d9ab4ba16c8b"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+#### Prerequisite Requirements:
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
+"""
+severity = "low"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Linux",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Persistence",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Data Source: SentinelOne",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+
+query = '''
+file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("creation", "file_create_event", "rename", "file_rename_event")
+and file.path : "/etc/init.d/*" and not (
+  process.executable in (
+    "/bin/dpkg", "/usr/bin/dpkg", "/bin/dockerd", "/usr/bin/dockerd", "/usr/sbin/dockerd", "/bin/microdnf",
+    "/usr/bin/microdnf", "/bin/rpm", "/usr/bin/rpm", "/bin/snapd", "/usr/bin/snapd", "/bin/yum", "/usr/bin/yum",
+    "/bin/dnf", "/usr/bin/dnf", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/bin/dnf-automatic", "/usr/bin/dnf-automatic",
+    "/bin/pacman", "/usr/bin/pacman", "/usr/bin/dpkg-divert", "/bin/dpkg-divert", "/sbin/apk", "/usr/sbin/apk",
+    "/usr/local/sbin/apk", "/usr/bin/apt", "/usr/sbin/pacman", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/puppet",
+    "/bin/puppet", "/opt/puppetlabs/puppet/bin/puppet", "/usr/bin/chef-client", "/bin/chef-client",
+    "/bin/autossl_check", "/usr/bin/autossl_check", "/proc/self/exe", "/dev/fd/*",  "/usr/bin/pamac-daemon",
+    "/bin/pamac-daemon", "/usr/lib/snapd/snapd", "/usr/local/bin/dockerd"
+  ) or
+  file.extension in ("swp", "swpx", "swx", "dpkg-remove", "dpkg-new") or
+  file.path like ("/etc/init.d/*beat*", "/etc/init.d/elastic-agent*") or
+  process.executable like ("/nix/store/*", "/var/lib/dpkg/*", "/snap/*", "/dev/fd/*", "/usr/lib/virtualbox/*", "/opt/puppetlabs/puppet/bin/ruby") or
+  process.name in ("docker-init", "jumpcloud-agent", "crio") or
+  process.executable == null or
+  process.name in ("executor", "univention-config-registry", "install", "dockerd-entrypoint.sh", "platform-python*", "ssm-agent-worker") or
+  (process.name == "ln" and file.path : "/etc/init.d/rc*.d/*") or
+  (process.name == "sed" and file.name : "sed*") or
+  (process.name == "perl" and file.name : "e2scrub_all.tmp*") 
+)
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1037"
+name = "Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0003"
+name = "Persistence"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/persistence_insmod_kernel_module_load.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2022/07/11"
+integration = ["endpoint", "auditd_manager", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/03/20"
+
+[transform]
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve all Kernel Modules"
+query = "SELECT * FROM kernel_modules"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Running Processes by User"
+query = "SELECT pid, username, name FROM processes p JOIN users u ON u.uid = p.uid ORDER BY username"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Listening Ports"
+query = "SELECT pid, address, port, socket, protocol, path FROM listening_ports"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Open Sockets"
+query = "SELECT pid, family, remote_address, remote_port, socket, state FROM process_open_sockets"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Information for a Specific User"
+query = "SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = {{user.name}}"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Investigate the Account Authentication Status"
+query = "SELECT * FROM logged_in_users WHERE user = {{user.name}}"
+
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Detects the use of the insmod binary to load a Linux kernel object file. Threat actors can use this binary, given they
+have root privileges, to load a rootkit on a system providing them with complete control and the ability to hide from
+security products. Manually loading a kernel module in this manner should not be at all common and can indicate
+suspcious or malicious behavior.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = [
+    "auditbeat-*",
+    "endgame-*",
+    "logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*",
+    "logs-endpoint.events.process*",
+    "logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*",
+]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Kernel Module Load via insmod"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+### Investigating Kernel module load via insmod
+
+The insmod binary is a Linux utility that allows users with root privileges to load kernel modules, which are object files that extend the functionality of the kernel. 
+
+Threat actors can abuse this utility to load rootkits, granting them full control over the system and the ability to evade security products.
+
+The detection rule 'Kernel module load via insmod' is designed to identify instances where the insmod binary is used to load a kernel object file (with a .ko extension) on a Linux system. This activity is uncommon and may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the [Osquery Markdown Plugin](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/invest-guide-run-osquery.html) introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+> This investigation guide uses [placeholder fields](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/osquery-placeholder-fields.html) to dynamically pass alert data into Osquery queries. Placeholder fields were introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.7.0. If you're using Elastic Stack version 8.6.0 or earlier, you'll need to manually adjust this investigation guide's queries to ensure they properly run.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Investigate the kernel object file that was loaded via insmod.
+  - $osquery_1
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence and whether they are located in expected locations.
+  - $osquery_2
+- Investigate the kernel ring buffer for any warnings or messages, such as tainted or out-of-tree kernel module loads through `dmesg`.
+- Investigate syslog for any unusual segfaults or other messages. Rootkits may be installed on targets with different architecture as expected, and could potentially cause segmentation faults. 
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Validate the activity is not related to planned patches, updates, network administrator activity, or legitimate software installations.
+- Investigate whether the altered scripts call other malicious scripts elsewhere on the file system. 
+  - If scripts or executables were dropped, retrieve the files and determine if they are malicious:
+    - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+      - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+        - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+          - Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
+          - Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
+        - File access, modification, and creation activities.
+- Investigate abnormal behaviors by the subject process/user such as network connections, file modifications, and any other spawned child processes.
+  - Investigate listening ports and open sockets to look for potential command and control traffic or data exfiltration.
+    - $osquery_3
+    - $osquery_4
+  - Identify the user account that performed the action, analyze it, and check whether it should perform this kind of action.
+    - $osquery_5
+- Investigate whether the user is currently logged in and active.
+    - $osquery_6
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- If this activity is related to new benign software installation activity, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of user and command line conditions.
+- If this activity is related to a system administrator who uses cron jobs for administrative purposes, consider adding exceptions for this specific administrator user account. 
+- Try to understand the context of the execution by thinking about the user, machine, or business purpose. A small number of endpoints, such as servers with unique software, might appear unusual but satisfy a specific business need.
+
+### Related Rules
+
+- Kernel Driver Load - 3e12a439-d002-4944-bc42-171c0dcb9b96
+- Tainted Out-Of-Tree Kernel Module Load - 51a09737-80f7-4551-a3be-dac8ef5d181a
+- Tainted Kernel Module Load - 05cad2fb-200c-407f-b472-02ea8c9e5e4a
+- Attempt to Clear Kernel Ring Buffer - 2724808c-ba5d-48b2-86d2-0002103df753
+- Enumeration of Kernel Modules via Proc - 80084fa9-8677-4453-8680-b891d3c0c778
+- Suspicious Modprobe File Event - 40ddbcc8-6561-44d9-afc8-eefdbfe0cccd
+- Kernel Module Removal - cd66a5af-e34b-4bb0-8931-57d0a043f2ef
+- Enumeration of Kernel Modules - 2d8043ed-5bda-4caf-801c-c1feb7410504
+
+### Response and Remediation
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+"""
+references = [
+    "https://decoded.avast.io/davidalvarez/linux-threat-hunting-syslogk-a-kernel-rootkit-found-under-development-in-the-wild/",
+]
+risk_score = 47
+rule_id = "2339f03c-f53f-40fa-834b-40c5983fc41f"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+#### Prerequisite Requirements:
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
+"""
+severity = "medium"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Linux",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Persistence",
+    "Threat: Rootkit",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Data Source: Auditd Manager",
+    "Data Source: SentinelOne",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+
+query = '''
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and process.name == "insmod" and process.args : "*.ko" and
+not process.parent.executable like (
+  "/opt/ds_agent/*", "/usr/sbin/veeamsnap-loader", "/opt/TrendMicro/vls_agent/*", "/opt/intel/oneapi/*",
+  "/opt/commvault/Base/linux_drv", "/bin/falcoctl"
+)
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1547"
+name = "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1547.006"
+name = "Kernel Modules and Extensions"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/006/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0003"
+name = "Persistence"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
+