nldcsc-elastic-rules 0.0.8__py3-none-any.whl

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/privilege_escalation_kworker_uid_elevation.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2023/10/26"
+integration = ["endpoint"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/02/04"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Monitors for the elevation of regular user permissions to root permissions through the kworker process. kworker, or
+kernel worker, processes are part of the kernel's workqueue mechanism. They are responsible for executing work that has
+been scheduled to be done in kernel space, which might include tasks like handling interrupts, background activities,
+and other kernel-related tasks. Attackers may attempt to evade detection by masquerading as a kernel worker process, and
+hijack the execution flow by hooking certain functions/syscalls through a rootkit in order to provide easy access to
+root via a special modified command.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["endgame-*", "logs-endpoint.events.process*"]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Suspicious Kworker UID Elevation"
+risk_score = 47
+rule_id = "7dfaaa17-425c-4fe7-bd36-83705fde7c2b"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows
+the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+#### Prerequisite Requirements:
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click Add integrations.
+- In the query bar, search for Elastic Defend and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click Add Elastic Defend.
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either Traditional Endpoints or Cloud Workloads.
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
+- We suggest to select "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in New agent policy name. If other agent policies already exist, you can click the Existing hosts tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
+- Click Save and Continue.
+- To complete the integration, select Add Elastic Agent to your hosts and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
+"""
+severity = "medium"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Linux",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Privilege Escalation",
+    "Tactic: Defense Evasion",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+
+query = '''
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "session_id_change" and process.name : "kworker*" and
+user.id == "0"
+'''
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating Suspicious Kworker UID Elevation
+
+Kworker processes are integral to Linux, handling tasks like interrupts and background activities within the kernel. Adversaries may exploit these processes by disguising malicious activities as legitimate kernel operations, often using rootkits to hijack execution flow and gain root access. The detection rule identifies anomalies by monitoring for kworker processes that unexpectedly change session IDs and elevate privileges to root, signaling potential misuse.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Review the process details for the kworker process with a session ID change and user ID of 0 to confirm the legitimacy of the process and its parent process.
+- Check the system logs around the time of the session ID change event for any unusual activities or errors that might indicate tampering or exploitation attempts.
+- Investigate any recent changes to the system, such as new software installations or updates, that could have introduced vulnerabilities or unauthorized modifications.
+- Analyze the system for signs of rootkit presence, such as hidden files or processes, by using rootkit detection tools or manual inspection techniques.
+- Correlate the event with other security alerts or anomalies in the network to determine if this is part of a broader attack campaign or isolated incident.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Regular system updates or maintenance activities may trigger session ID changes in kworker processes. Users can monitor scheduled maintenance windows and exclude these time frames from triggering alerts.
+- Custom kernel modules or legitimate software that interacts with kernel processes might cause kworker to change session IDs. Identify and whitelist these known modules or software to prevent false positives.
+- Automated scripts or tools that require elevated privileges for legitimate tasks could inadvertently cause kworker processes to appear suspicious. Review and document these scripts, then create exceptions for their expected behavior.
+- Certain system configurations or optimizations might lead to benign kworker session ID changes. Conduct a baseline analysis of normal system behavior and adjust the detection rule to accommodate these patterns without compromising security.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Immediately isolate the affected system from the network to prevent further unauthorized access or lateral movement by the attacker.
+- Terminate the suspicious kworker process identified in the alert to stop any ongoing malicious activity.
+- Conduct a thorough review of system logs and process trees to identify any additional compromised processes or indicators of rootkit installation.
+- Restore the system from a known good backup if rootkit presence is confirmed, as rootkits can deeply embed themselves into the system.
+- Change all credentials and keys that may have been exposed or used on the compromised system to prevent unauthorized access using stolen credentials.
+- Implement enhanced monitoring and logging for kworker processes and session ID changes to detect similar activities in the future.
+- Escalate the incident to the security operations center (SOC) or incident response team for further investigation and to assess the potential impact on other systems."""
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1574"
+name = "Hijack Execution Flow"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1574.013"
+name = "KernelCallbackTable"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/013/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0004"
+name = "Privilege Escalation"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1014"
+name = "Rootkit"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0005"
+name = "Defense Evasion"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/privilege_escalation_ld_preload_shared_object_modif.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2021/01/27"
+integration = ["endpoint"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/01/27"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Identifies modification of the dynamic linker preload shared object (ld.so.preload). Adversaries may execute malicious
+payloads by hijacking the dynamic linker used to load libraries.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["auditbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.*", "endgame-*"]
+language = "kuery"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Modification of Dynamic Linker Preload Shared Object"
+references = [
+    "https://www.anomali.com/blog/rocke-evolves-its-arsenal-with-a-new-malware-family-written-in-golang",
+]
+risk_score = 47
+rule_id = "717f82c2-7741-4f9b-85b8-d06aeb853f4f"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
+- Elastic Defend
+- Auditbeat
+
+### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+#### Prerequisite Requirements:
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
+
+### Auditbeat Setup
+Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit the activities of users and processes on your systems. For example, you can use Auditbeat to collect and centralize audit events from the Linux Audit Framework. You can also use Auditbeat to detect changes to critical files, like binaries and configuration files, and identify potential security policy violations.
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Auditbeat on a Linux System:
+- Elastic provides repositories available for APT and YUM-based distributions. Note that we provide binary packages, but no source packages.
+- To install the APT and YUM repositories follow the setup instructions in this [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setup-repositories.html).
+- To run Auditbeat on Docker follow the setup instructions in the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-docker.html).
+- To run Auditbeat on Kubernetes follow the setup instructions in the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-kubernetes.html).
+- For complete “Setup and Run Auditbeat” information refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html).
+"""
+severity = "medium"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Linux",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Privilege Escalation",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "new_terms"
+
+query = '''
+host.os.type:linux and event.category:file and event.action:(file_rename_event or rename or renamed or updated) and
+not event.type:deletion and file.path:/etc/ld.so.preload and
+process.name:(* and not (oneagentinstallaction or passwd or wine))
+'''
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating Modification of Dynamic Linker Preload Shared Object
+
+The dynamic linker preload mechanism in Linux, via `/etc/ld.so.preload`, allows preloading of shared libraries, influencing how executables load dependencies. Adversaries exploit this by inserting malicious libraries, hijacking execution flow for privilege escalation. The detection rule monitors changes to this file, excluding benign processes, to identify unauthorized modifications indicative of such abuse.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Review the alert details to confirm the file path involved is /etc/ld.so.preload and verify the event action is one of the specified actions: updated, renamed, or file_rename_event.
+- Identify the process responsible for the modification by examining the process.name field, ensuring it is not one of the excluded processes (wine or oneagentinstallaction).
+- Investigate the process that triggered the alert by gathering additional context such as process ID, command line arguments, and parent process to understand its origin and purpose.
+- Check the modification timestamp and correlate it with other system events or logs to identify any suspicious activity or patterns around the time of the modification.
+- Analyze the contents of /etc/ld.so.preload to determine if any unauthorized or suspicious libraries have been added, and assess their potential impact on the system.
+- Review user accounts and permissions associated with the process to determine if there has been any unauthorized access or privilege escalation attempt.
+- If malicious activity is confirmed, isolate the affected system and follow incident response procedures to mitigate the threat and prevent further exploitation.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Legitimate software installations or updates may modify /etc/ld.so.preload. To handle this, monitor the process names associated with these activities and consider adding them to the exclusion list if they are verified as benign.
+- System management tools like configuration management software might update /etc/ld.so.preload as part of routine operations. Identify these tools and exclude their process names from the detection rule to prevent false alerts.
+- Custom scripts or administrative tasks executed by trusted users could inadvertently trigger the rule. Review these scripts and, if necessary, exclude their process names or user accounts from the detection criteria.
+- Security agents or monitoring tools that interact with system files might cause false positives. Verify these tools' activities and exclude their process names if they are known to be safe and necessary for system operations.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Immediately isolate the affected system from the network to prevent further exploitation or lateral movement by the adversary.
+- Terminate any suspicious processes that are not part of the baseline or known benign applications, especially those related to the modification of `/etc/ld.so.preload`.
+- Restore the `/etc/ld.so.preload` file from a known good backup to ensure no malicious libraries are preloaded.
+- Conduct a thorough review of recent system changes and installed packages to identify any unauthorized software or modifications that may have facilitated the attack.
+- Escalate the incident to the security operations team for a deeper forensic analysis to determine the scope of the compromise and identify any additional affected systems.
+- Implement additional monitoring on the affected system and similar environments to detect any further attempts to modify the dynamic linker preload file.
+- Review and enhance access controls and permissions on critical system files like `/etc/ld.so.preload` to prevent unauthorized modifications in the future."""
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1574"
+name = "Hijack Execution Flow"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1574.006"
+name = "Dynamic Linker Hijacking"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/006/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0004"
+name = "Privilege Escalation"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"
+
+[rule.new_terms]
+field = "new_terms_fields"
+value = ["host.id", "user.id", "process.executable"]
+[[rule.new_terms.history_window_start]]
+field = "history_window_start"
+value = "now-10d"
+
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/privilege_escalation_linux_suspicious_symbolic_link.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2023/07/27"
+integration = ["endpoint"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/02/04"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Identifies the creation of a symbolic link to a suspicious file or location. A symbolic link is a reference to a file or
+directory that acts as a pointer or shortcut, allowing users to access the target file or directory from a different
+location in the file system. An attacker can potentially leverage symbolic links for privilege escalation by tricking a
+privileged process into following the symbolic link to a sensitive file, giving the attacker access to data or
+capabilities they would not normally have.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["logs-endpoint.events.process*"]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Suspicious Symbolic Link Created"
+risk_score = 21
+rule_id = "8a024633-c444-45c0-a4fe-78128d8c1ab6"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+#### Prerequisite Requirements:
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
+"""
+severity = "low"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Linux",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Privilege Escalation",
+    "Tactic: Credential Access",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+query = '''
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
+process.name == "ln" and process.args in ("-s", "-sf") and
+  (
+    /* suspicious files */
+    (process.args in ("/etc/shadow", "/etc/shadow-", "/etc/shadow~", "/etc/gshadow", "/etc/gshadow-") or
+    (process.working_directory == "/etc" and process.args in ("shadow", "shadow-", "shadow~", "gshadow", "gshadow-"))) or
+
+    /* suspicious bins */
+    (process.args in ("/bin/bash", "/bin/dash", "/bin/sh", "/bin/tcsh", "/bin/csh", "/bin/zsh", "/bin/ksh", "/bin/fish") or
+    (process.working_directory == "/bin" and process.args : ("bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish"))) or
+    (process.args in ("/usr/bin/bash", "/usr/bin/dash", "/usr/bin/sh", "/usr/bin/tcsh", "/usr/bin/csh", "/usr/bin/zsh", "/usr/bin/ksh", "/usr/bin/fish") or
+    (process.working_directory == "/usr/bin" and process.args in ("bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish"))) or
+
+    /* suspicious locations */
+    (process.args : ("/etc/cron.d/*", "/etc/cron.daily/*", "/etc/cron.hourly/*", "/etc/cron.weekly/*", "/etc/cron.monthly/*")) or
+    (process.args : ("/home/*/.ssh/*", "/root/.ssh/*","/etc/sudoers.d/*", "/dev/shm/*"))
+  ) and
+  process.parent.name in ("bash", "dash", "ash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish") and
+  not user.Ext.real.id == "0" and not group.Ext.real.id == "0"
+'''
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating Suspicious Symbolic Link Created
+
+Symbolic links in Linux are shortcuts that point to files or directories, facilitating easy access. Adversaries may exploit these links to redirect privileged processes to sensitive files, potentially escalating privileges or accessing restricted data. The detection rule identifies suspicious link creation by monitoring the execution of the 'ln' command with specific arguments and targets, especially when initiated by non-root users, indicating potential misuse.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Review the process details to confirm the execution of the 'ln' command with suspicious arguments such as "-s" or "-sf" and verify the target files or directories listed in the query, like "/etc/shadow" or "/bin/bash".
+- Check the user and group IDs associated with the process to ensure they are not root (ID "0"), as the rule specifically targets non-root users.
+- Investigate the parent process name to determine if it is one of the shell processes listed in the query, such as "bash" or "zsh", which might indicate a user-initiated action.
+- Examine the working directory and arguments to identify if the symbolic link creation is targeting sensitive locations like "/etc/cron.d/*" or "/home/*/.ssh/*".
+- Analyze the user's recent activity and command history to understand the context and intent behind the symbolic link creation.
+- Correlate this event with other security alerts or logs to identify any patterns or additional suspicious activities involving the same user or system.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Non-root users creating symbolic links for legitimate administrative tasks may trigger the rule. To manage this, identify and whitelist specific users or groups who regularly perform these tasks without malicious intent.
+- Automated scripts or applications that use symbolic links for configuration management or software deployment might be flagged. Review these processes and exclude them by specifying the script or application names in the detection rule.
+- Development environments where symbolic links are used to manage dependencies or version control can cause false positives. Exclude directories or processes associated with these environments to prevent unnecessary alerts.
+- Backup or synchronization tools that create symbolic links as part of their operation may be mistakenly identified. Identify these tools and add exceptions for their typical execution patterns.
+- System maintenance activities that involve symbolic link creation, such as linking to shared libraries or binaries, should be reviewed and excluded if they are part of routine operations.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Immediately isolate the affected system from the network to prevent further unauthorized access or potential lateral movement by the attacker.
+- Terminate any suspicious processes related to the 'ln' command that are identified in the alert to stop any ongoing malicious activity.
+- Conduct a thorough review of the symbolic links created, especially those pointing to sensitive files or directories, and remove any unauthorized or suspicious links.
+- Reset credentials and review access permissions for any accounts that may have been compromised or used in the attack, focusing on those with elevated privileges.
+- Restore any altered or compromised files from a known good backup to ensure system integrity and prevent further exploitation.
+- Implement additional monitoring and logging for symbolic link creation and other related activities to detect similar threats in the future.
+- Escalate the incident to the security operations team for further investigation and to assess the need for broader organizational response measures."""
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1548"
+name = "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/"
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0004"
+name = "Privilege Escalation"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1003"
+name = "OS Credential Dumping"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1003.008"
+name = "/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/008/"
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0006"
+name = "Credential Access"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/privilege_escalation_linux_uid_int_max_bug.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2023/07/27"
+integration = ["endpoint", "crowdstrike"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/02/04"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+This rule monitors for the execution of the systemd-run command by a user with a UID that is larger than the maximum
+allowed UID size (INT_MAX). Some older Linux versions were affected by a bug which allows user accounts with a UID
+greater than INT_MAX to escalate privileges by spawning a shell through systemd-run.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["endgame-*", "logs-crowdstrike.fdr*", "logs-endpoint.events.process*"]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Potential Privilege Escalation via UID INT_MAX Bug Detected"
+references = [
+    "https://twitter.com/paragonsec/status/1071152249529884674",
+    "https://github.com/mirchr/security-research/blob/master/vulnerabilities/CVE-2018-19788.sh",
+    "https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/polkit/polkit/-/issues/74",
+]
+risk_score = 47
+rule_id = "d55436a8-719c-445f-92c4-c113ff2f9ba5"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+#### Prerequisite Requirements:
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
+"""
+severity = "medium"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Linux",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Privilege Escalation",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
+    "Data Source: Crowdstrike",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+
+query = '''
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and
+  event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "ProcessRollup2") and
+  process.name == "systemd-run" and process.args == "-t" and process.args_count >= 3 and user.id >= "1000000000"
+'''
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating Potential Privilege Escalation via UID INT_MAX Bug Detected
+
+In certain Linux environments, systemd-run is a utility that allows users to create and start a transient service or scope unit. A bug in older Linux versions permits users with a UID exceeding INT_MAX to exploit this utility for privilege escalation, potentially gaining unauthorized access. The detection rule identifies suspicious executions of systemd-run by monitoring for processes initiated by users with unusually high UIDs, signaling potential exploitation attempts.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Review the alert details to confirm the presence of a user with a UID greater than INT_MAX, as indicated by the user.id field in the query.
+- Examine the process execution context, including the process.args and process.args_count fields, to verify the use of systemd-run with the specified arguments, which may indicate an exploitation attempt.
+- Check the system logs for any other suspicious activities or anomalies around the time of the alert, focusing on processes initiated by the same user or related to systemd-run.
+- Investigate the history and purpose of the user account with the high UID to determine if it was intentionally created or if it appears to be an anomaly.
+- Assess the affected system's Linux version to determine if it is one of the older versions known to be vulnerable to this bug, and consider updating or patching if necessary.
+- Look for any additional indicators of compromise or privilege escalation attempts on the system, such as unauthorized access to sensitive files or changes in user permissions.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- High UID service accounts: Some legitimate service accounts may have UIDs exceeding INT_MAX for specific operational purposes. Review these accounts and, if verified as non-threatening, add them to an exception list to prevent unnecessary alerts.
+- Custom scripts or automation tools: Organizations may use scripts or tools that invoke systemd-run with high UID accounts for legitimate tasks. Identify these scripts and whitelist their execution paths or specific user IDs to reduce false positives.
+- Testing environments: In testing or development environments, users might intentionally create accounts with high UIDs to test system behavior. Ensure these environments are isolated and consider excluding them from monitoring to avoid false alerts.
+- Legacy systems: Older systems might have configurations that inadvertently trigger this rule. Conduct a thorough review of these systems and apply exceptions where the behavior is deemed safe and necessary for operational continuity.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Immediately isolate the affected system from the network to prevent further unauthorized access or lateral movement.
+- Terminate any suspicious processes initiated by users with UIDs exceeding INT_MAX, especially those involving systemd-run, to halt potential privilege escalation.
+- Conduct a thorough review of user accounts on the affected system to identify and disable any accounts with UIDs greater than INT_MAX.
+- Apply available patches or updates to the Linux operating system to address the specific bug related to UID handling in systemd-run.
+- Review and adjust user account creation policies to ensure no new accounts are created with UIDs exceeding the standard range.
+- Monitor for any further attempts to exploit this vulnerability by setting up alerts for similar suspicious activities, focusing on high UID values and systemd-run usage.
+- Report the incident to the appropriate internal security team or external authorities if necessary, providing details of the exploit and actions taken."""
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1068"
+name = "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0004"
+name = "Privilege Escalation"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"
+