nldcsc-elastic-rules 0.0.8__py3-none-any.whl

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/execution_shell_via_lolbin_interpreter_linux.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2023/07/04"
+integration = ["endpoint"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/02/04"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+This detection rule detects the creation of a shell through a suspicious process chain. Any reverse shells spawned by
+the specified utilities that are initialized from a single process followed by a network connection attempt will be
+captured through this rule. Attackers may spawn reverse shells to establish persistence onto a target system.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["logs-endpoint.events.network*", "logs-endpoint.events.process*"]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Potential Reverse Shell via Suspicious Child Process"
+references = [
+    "https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/blob/master/Methodology%20and%20Resources/Reverse%20Shell%20Cheatsheet.md",
+]
+risk_score = 47
+rule_id = "76e4d92b-61c1-4a95-ab61-5fd94179a1ee"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+#### Prerequisite Requirements:
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
+"""
+severity = "medium"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Linux",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Execution",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+type = "eql"
+
+query = '''
+sequence by host.id, process.entity_id with maxspan=1s
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "fork") and (
+    (process.name : "python*" and process.args : "-c" and process.args : (
+     "*import*pty*spawn*", "*import*subprocess*call*"
+    )) or
+    (process.name : "perl*" and process.args : "-e" and process.args : "*socket*" and process.args : (
+     "*exec*", "*system*"
+    )) or
+    (process.name : "ruby*" and process.args : ("-e", "-rsocket") and process.args : (
+     "*TCPSocket.new*", "*TCPSocket.open*"
+     )) or
+    (process.name : "lua*" and process.args : "-e" and process.args : "*socket.tcp*" and process.args : (
+     "*io.popen*", "*os.execute*"
+    )) or
+    (process.name : "php*" and process.args : "-r" and process.args : "*fsockopen*" and process.args : "*/bin/*sh*") or
+    (process.name : ("awk", "gawk", "mawk", "nawk") and process.args : "*/inet/tcp/*") or
+    (process.name : "openssl" and process.args : "-connect") or
+    (process.name : ("nc", "ncat", "netcat") and process.args == "-e" and process.args_count >= 3 and
+     not process.args == "-z") or
+    (process.name : "telnet" and process.args_count >= 3)
+  ) and process.parent.name : (
+    "bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish", "python*", "php*", "perl", "ruby", "lua*",
+    "openssl", "nc", "netcat", "ncat", "telnet", "awk")]
+  [network where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("connection_attempted", "connection_accepted") and
+    process.name : ("python*", "php*", "perl", "ruby", "lua*", "openssl", "nc", "netcat", "ncat", "telnet", "awk") and
+    destination.ip != null and not cidrmatch(destination.ip, "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "224.0.0.0/4", "::1")]
+'''
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating Potential Reverse Shell via Suspicious Child Process
+
+Reverse shells are a common technique used by attackers to gain remote access to a compromised system. They exploit scripting languages and utilities like Python, Perl, and Netcat to execute commands remotely. The detection rule identifies suspicious process chains and network activities, such as unexpected shell spawns and outbound connections, to flag potential reverse shell attempts, leveraging process and network event analysis to detect anomalies.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Review the process chain to identify the parent process and determine if it is expected behavior for the system. Check the process.parent.name field for any unusual or unauthorized parent processes.
+- Analyze the process arguments captured in the alert, such as process.args, to understand the command being executed and assess if it aligns with known reverse shell patterns.
+- Investigate the network connection details, focusing on the destination.ip field, to determine if the connection is to a known malicious IP or an unexpected external address.
+- Check the process.name field to identify the specific utility used (e.g., python, perl, nc) and verify if its usage is legitimate or if it indicates a potential compromise.
+- Correlate the alert with other security events or logs from the same host.id to identify any additional suspicious activities or patterns that may indicate a broader attack.
+- Consult threat intelligence sources to gather information on any identified IP addresses or domains involved in the network connection to assess their reputation and potential threat level.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Development and testing environments may frequently execute scripts using languages like Python, Perl, or Ruby, which can trigger the rule. To manage this, consider excluding specific host IDs or process names associated with known development activities.
+- Automated scripts or cron jobs that utilize network connections for legitimate purposes, such as data backups or updates, might be flagged. Identify these processes and add them to an exception list based on their parent process names or specific arguments.
+- System administrators might use tools like Netcat or OpenSSL for troubleshooting or monitoring network connections. If these activities are routine and verified, exclude them by specifying the administrator's user ID or the specific command patterns used.
+- Security tools or monitoring solutions that simulate attack scenarios for testing purposes can also trigger this rule. Ensure these tools are recognized and excluded by their process names or associated network activities.
+- Custom scripts that use shell commands to interact with remote systems for maintenance tasks may appear suspicious. Review these scripts and exclude them by their unique process arguments or parent process names.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Immediately isolate the affected host from the network to prevent further unauthorized access or data exfiltration.
+- Terminate any suspicious processes identified by the detection rule, particularly those involving scripting languages or utilities like Python, Perl, or Netcat.
+- Conduct a forensic analysis of the affected system to identify any additional indicators of compromise, such as unauthorized user accounts or modified system files.
+- Review and reset credentials for any accounts that may have been accessed or compromised during the incident.
+- Apply security patches and updates to the affected system to address any vulnerabilities that may have been exploited.
+- Monitor network traffic for any signs of further suspicious activity, focusing on outbound connections from the affected host.
+- Escalate the incident to the security operations center (SOC) or relevant security team for further investigation and to ensure comprehensive remediation efforts."""
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1059"
+name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1059.004"
+name = "Unix Shell"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0002"
+name = "Execution"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1071"
+name = "Application Layer Protocol"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0011"
+name = "Command and Control"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/"
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/execution_shell_via_meterpreter_linux.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2023/08/10"
+integration = ["auditd_manager"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/01/15"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+This detection rule identifies a sample of suspicious Linux system file reads used for system fingerprinting, leveraged
+by the Metasploit Meterpreter shell to gather information about the target that it is executing its shell on. Detecting
+this pattern is indicative of a successful meterpreter shell connection.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["auditbeat-*", "logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*"]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Potential Meterpreter Reverse Shell"
+references = [
+    "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/primer-on-persistence-mechanisms",
+    "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/linux-detection-engineering-with-auditd",
+]
+risk_score = 47
+rule_id = "5c895b4f-9133-4e68-9e23-59902175355c"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
+- Auditbeat
+- Auditd Manager
+
+### Auditbeat Setup
+Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit the activities of users and processes on your systems. For example, you can use Auditbeat to collect and centralize audit events from the Linux Audit Framework. You can also use Auditbeat to detect changes to critical files, like binaries and configuration files, and identify potential security policy violations.
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Auditbeat on a Linux System:
+- Elastic provides repositories available for APT and YUM-based distributions. Note that we provide binary packages, but no source packages.
+- To install the APT and YUM repositories follow the setup instructions in this [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setup-repositories.html).
+- To run Auditbeat on Docker follow the setup instructions in the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-docker.html).
+- To run Auditbeat on Kubernetes follow the setup instructions in the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-kubernetes.html).
+- For complete “Setup and Run Auditbeat” information refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html).
+
+### Auditd Manager Integration Setup
+The Auditd Manager Integration receives audit events from the Linux Audit Framework which is a part of the Linux kernel.
+Auditd Manager provides a user-friendly interface and automation capabilities for configuring and monitoring system auditing through the auditd daemon. With `auditd_manager`, administrators can easily define audit rules, track system events, and generate comprehensive audit reports, improving overall security and compliance in the system.
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Agent System integration "auditd_manager" on a Linux System:
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click “Add integrations”.
+- In the query bar, search for “Auditd Manager” and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click “Add Auditd Manager”.
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Review optional and advanced settings accordingly.
+- Add the newly installed “auditd manager” to an existing or a new agent policy, and deploy the agent on a Linux system from which auditd log files are desirable.
+- Click “Save and Continue”.
+- For more details on the integration refer to the [helper guide](https://docs.elastic.co/integrations/auditd_manager).
+
+#### Rule Specific Setup Note
+Auditd Manager subscribes to the kernel and receives events as they occur without any additional configuration.
+However, if more advanced configuration is required to detect specific behavior, audit rules can be added to the integration in either the "audit rules" configuration box or the "auditd rule files" box by specifying a file to read the audit rules from.
+- For this detection rule the following additional audit rules are required to be added to the integration:
+  -w /proc/net/ -p r -k audit_proc
+  -w /etc/machine-id -p wa -k machineid
+  -w /etc/passwd -p wa -k passwd
+"""
+severity = "medium"
+tags = [
+    "Data Source: Auditd Manager",
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Linux",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Execution",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+
+query = '''
+sample by host.id, process.pid, user.id
+  [file where host.os.type == "linux" and auditd.data.syscall == "open" and auditd.data.a2 == "1b6" and file.path == "/etc/machine-id"]
+  [file where host.os.type == "linux" and auditd.data.syscall == "open" and auditd.data.a2 == "1b6" and file.path == "/etc/passwd"]
+  [file where host.os.type == "linux" and auditd.data.syscall == "open" and auditd.data.a2 == "1b6" and file.path == "/proc/net/route"]
+  [file where host.os.type == "linux" and auditd.data.syscall == "open" and auditd.data.a2 == "1b6" and file.path == "/proc/net/ipv6_route"]
+  [file where host.os.type == "linux" and auditd.data.syscall == "open" and auditd.data.a2 == "1b6" and file.path == "/proc/net/if_inet6"]
+'''
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating Potential Meterpreter Reverse Shell
+
+Meterpreter is a sophisticated payload within the Metasploit framework, enabling attackers to execute commands and scripts on compromised systems. Adversaries exploit it to perform system reconnaissance and data exfiltration. The detection rule identifies suspicious file access patterns typical of Meterpreter's system fingerprinting activities, such as reading key system files, indicating a potential reverse shell connection.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Review the process associated with the alert by examining the process ID (process.pid) and user ID (user.id) to determine if the process is legitimate or potentially malicious.
+- Check the host ID (host.id) to identify the specific system where the suspicious activity was detected and assess if it is a high-value target or has been previously compromised.
+- Investigate the command history and running processes on the affected host to identify any unusual or unauthorized activities that may indicate a Meterpreter session.
+- Analyze network connections from the host to detect any suspicious outbound connections that could suggest a reverse shell communication.
+- Examine the file access patterns, particularly the access to files like /etc/machine-id, /etc/passwd, /proc/net/route, /proc/net/ipv6_route, and /proc/net/if_inet6, to understand the context and purpose of these reads and whether they align with normal system operations.
+- Correlate the alert with other security events or logs from the same timeframe to identify any additional indicators of compromise or related malicious activities.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- System administration scripts or tools that perform regular checks on system files like /etc/machine-id or /etc/passwd may trigger this rule. To manage this, identify and whitelist these legitimate processes by their process ID or user ID.
+- Backup or monitoring software that accesses network configuration files such as /proc/net/route or /proc/net/ipv6_route can cause false positives. Exclude these applications by adding exceptions for their specific file access patterns.
+- Security tools that perform network diagnostics or inventory checks might read files like /proc/net/if_inet6. Review these tools and exclude their known benign activities from triggering the rule.
+- Custom scripts used for system health checks or inventory management that access the flagged files should be reviewed. If deemed safe, add them to an exception list based on their host ID or user ID.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Isolate the affected system from the network immediately to prevent further data exfiltration or lateral movement by the attacker.
+- Terminate any suspicious processes identified by the detection rule, particularly those associated with the process IDs flagged in the alert.
+- Conduct a thorough review of the affected system's logs and file access history to identify any additional unauthorized access or data exfiltration attempts.
+- Change all credentials and keys that may have been exposed or compromised on the affected system, especially those related to user accounts identified in the alert.
+- Restore the affected system from a known good backup to ensure any malicious changes are removed, and verify the integrity of the restored system.
+- Implement network segmentation to limit the potential impact of future attacks and enhance monitoring of critical systems for similar suspicious activities.
+- Escalate the incident to the security operations center (SOC) or incident response team for further investigation and to determine if additional systems are affected."""
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1059"
+name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1059.004"
+name = "Unix Shell"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0002"
+name = "Execution"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1071"
+name = "Application Layer Protocol"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0011"
+name = "Command and Control"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/"
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/execution_shell_via_suspicious_binary.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2023/07/05"
+integration = ["endpoint"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/02/04"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+This detection rule detects the creation of a shell through a chain consisting of the execution of a suspicious binary
+(located in a commonly abused location or executed manually) followed by a network event and ending with a shell being
+spawned. Stageless reverse tcp shells display this behaviour. Attackers may spawn reverse shells to establish
+persistence onto a target system.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["logs-endpoint.events.network*", "logs-endpoint.events.process*"]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Potential Reverse Shell via Suspicious Binary"
+references = [
+    "https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/blob/master/Methodology%20and%20Resources/Reverse%20Shell%20Cheatsheet.md",
+]
+risk_score = 47
+rule_id = "fa3a59dc-33c3-43bf-80a9-e8437a922c7f"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+#### Prerequisite Requirements:
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
+"""
+severity = "medium"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Linux",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Execution",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+type = "eql"
+
+query = '''
+sequence by host.id, process.entity_id with maxspan=1s
+[ process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
+  process.executable : (
+  "./*", "/tmp/*", "/var/tmp/*", "/var/www/*", "/dev/shm/*", "/etc/init.d/*", "/etc/rc*.d/*",
+  "/etc/crontab", "/etc/cron.*", "/etc/update-motd.d/*", "/usr/lib/update-notifier/*",
+  "/boot/*", "/srv/*", "/run/*", "/root/*", "/etc/rc.local"
+   ) and
+  process.parent.name : ("bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish") and not
+  process.name : ("curl", "wget", "ping", "apt", "dpkg", "yum", "rpm", "dnf", "dockerd") ]
+[ network where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("connection_attempted", "connection_accepted") and
+  process.executable : (
+  "./*", "/tmp/*", "/var/tmp/*", "/var/www/*", "/dev/shm/*", "/etc/init.d/*", "/etc/rc*.d/*",
+  "/etc/crontab", "/etc/cron.*", "/etc/update-motd.d/*", "/usr/lib/update-notifier/*",
+  "/boot/*", "/srv/*", "/run/*", "/root/*", "/etc/rc.local"
+   ) and destination.ip != null and destination.ip != "127.0.0.1" and destination.ip != "::1" ]
+[ process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
+  process.name : ("bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish") and
+  process.parent.name : ("bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish") ]
+'''
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating Potential Reverse Shell via Suspicious Binary
+
+Reverse shells are a common technique used by attackers to gain persistent access to a compromised system. They exploit legitimate shell environments to execute commands remotely. Adversaries often deploy binaries in unusual directories to evade detection. The detection rule identifies suspicious binaries executed in these locations, followed by network activity and shell spawning, indicating potential reverse shell activity. This approach helps in identifying unauthorized access attempts on Linux systems.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Review the process execution details to identify the suspicious binary's path and name, focusing on the directories specified in the query such as /tmp, /var/tmp, and /dev/shm.
+- Examine the parent process of the suspicious binary to determine if it was spawned by a legitimate shell process like bash or sh, as indicated in the query.
+- Analyze the network activity associated with the suspicious binary, paying attention to the destination IP address to identify any external connections that are not local (i.e., not 127.0.0.1 or ::1).
+- Check the process tree to see if a new shell was spawned following the network activity, which could indicate a reverse shell attempt.
+- Investigate the user account under which the suspicious process was executed to assess if it aligns with expected behavior or if it might be compromised.
+- Correlate the event timestamps to understand the sequence of actions and verify if they align with typical reverse shell behavior patterns.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Legitimate administrative scripts or binaries may be executed from directories like /tmp or /var/tmp during maintenance tasks. To handle this, create exceptions for known scripts or binaries used by trusted administrators.
+- Automated deployment tools might temporarily use directories such as /dev/shm or /run for staging files. Identify these tools and exclude their processes from triggering the rule.
+- Custom monitoring or backup scripts could initiate network connections from non-standard directories. Review these scripts and whitelist their activities if they are verified as safe.
+- Development or testing environments might involve executing binaries from unusual locations. Ensure these environments are well-documented and exclude their processes from the detection rule.
+- Some legitimate applications may spawn shells as part of their normal operation. Identify these applications and add them to an exception list to prevent false alerts.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Isolate the affected system from the network immediately to prevent further unauthorized access or data exfiltration.
+- Terminate any suspicious processes identified by the detection rule, especially those originating from unusual directories or involving shell spawning.
+- Conduct a thorough review of the system's scheduled tasks, startup scripts, and cron jobs to identify and remove any unauthorized entries that may have been added by the attacker.
+- Analyze network logs to identify any external IP addresses involved in the suspicious network activity and block these IPs at the firewall to prevent further connections.
+- Restore the affected system from a known good backup to ensure that any malicious changes are reverted.
+- Update and patch the system to the latest security standards to close any vulnerabilities that may have been exploited.
+- Escalate the incident to the security operations team for further investigation and to assess the potential impact on other systems within the network."""
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1059"
+name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1059.004"
+name = "Unix Shell"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0002"
+name = "Execution"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1071"
+name = "Application Layer Protocol"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0011"
+name = "Command and Control"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/"
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/execution_shell_via_tcp_cli_utility_linux.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2023/07/04"
+integration = ["endpoint"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/02/04"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+This detection rule identifies suspicious network traffic patterns associated with TCP reverse shell activity. This
+activity consists of a parent-child relationship where a network event is followed by the creation of a shell process.
+An attacker may establish a Linux TCP reverse shell to gain remote access to a target system.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["logs-endpoint.events.network*", "logs-endpoint.events.process*"]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Potential Reverse Shell"
+references = [
+    "https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/blob/master/Methodology%20and%20Resources/Reverse%20Shell%20Cheatsheet.md",
+]
+risk_score = 47
+rule_id = "48b3d2e3-f4e8-41e6-95e6-9b2091228db3"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+#### Prerequisite Requirements:
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
+"""
+severity = "medium"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Linux",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Execution",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+type = "eql"
+
+query = '''
+sequence by host.id with maxspan=5s
+  [network where event.type == "start" and host.os.type == "linux" and
+     event.action in ("connection_attempted", "connection_accepted") and
+     process.name : ("bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish", "socat") and destination.ip != null and
+     not cidrmatch(destination.ip, "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "224.0.0.0/4", "::1")] by process.entity_id
+  [process where event.type == "start" and host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("exec", "fork") and
+     process.name in ("bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish") and (
+       (process.args : ("-i", "-l")) or (process.parent.name == "socat" and process.parent.args : "*exec*")
+   )] by process.parent.entity_id
+'''
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating Potential Reverse Shell
+
+Reverse shells are tools that adversaries use to gain remote access to a system by initiating a connection from the target back to the attacker. This detection rule identifies such activity by monitoring for network events followed by shell process creation on Linux systems. It flags suspicious patterns, such as shell processes with interactive flags or spawned by tools like socat, indicating potential unauthorized access attempts.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Review the network event details to identify the source and destination IP addresses involved in the connection attempt or acceptance. Pay special attention to any external IP addresses that are not part of the internal network ranges.
+- Examine the process tree to understand the parent-child relationship, focusing on the shell process creation following the network event. Verify if the shell process was spawned by a known tool like socat.
+- Check the process arguments for interactive flags such as "-i" or "-l" to determine if the shell was intended to be interactive, which could indicate malicious intent.
+- Investigate the user account associated with the process to determine if it is a legitimate user or if there are signs of compromise, such as unusual login times or locations.
+- Correlate the event with other security logs or alerts to identify any additional suspicious activities or patterns that might indicate a broader attack campaign.
+- Assess the risk and impact of the potential reverse shell by determining if any sensitive data or critical systems could have been accessed or compromised.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Legitimate administrative tasks using interactive shells may trigger this rule. System administrators often use shells with interactive flags for maintenance. To mitigate, create exceptions for known administrator accounts or specific IP addresses.
+- Automated scripts or cron jobs that use shell commands with interactive flags can be mistaken for reverse shells. Review and whitelist these scripts by process name or parent process ID to prevent false alerts.
+- Tools like socat are used in legitimate network troubleshooting and testing. If socat is frequently used in your environment, consider excluding specific command patterns or user accounts associated with its legitimate use.
+- Development environments may spawn shell processes as part of testing or deployment workflows. Identify and exclude these environments by host ID or process name to reduce noise.
+- Internal network connections that match the rule's criteria but are part of normal operations can be excluded by specifying internal IP ranges or known service accounts.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Immediately isolate the affected host from the network to prevent further unauthorized access or data exfiltration.
+- Terminate any suspicious shell processes identified by the detection rule, especially those initiated by socat or with interactive flags.
+- Conduct a forensic analysis of the affected system to identify any additional indicators of compromise, such as unauthorized user accounts or modified files.
+- Review and secure network configurations to ensure that only authorized IP addresses can initiate connections to critical systems.
+- Update and patch the affected system and any related software to close vulnerabilities that may have been exploited.
+- Implement enhanced monitoring and logging on the affected host and network to detect any further attempts at reverse shell activity.
+- Escalate the incident to the security operations center (SOC) or incident response team for further investigation and to determine if broader organizational impacts exist."""
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1059"
+name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1059.004"
+name = "Unix Shell"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0002"
+name = "Execution"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1071"
+name = "Application Layer Protocol"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0011"
+name = "Command and Control"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/"
+