nldcsc-elastic-rules 0.0.8__py3-none-any.whl

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/windows/defense_evasion_posh_assembly_load.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,224 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2021/10/15"
+integration = ["windows"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/07/02"
+
+[transform]
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache"
+query = "SELECT * FROM dns_cache"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve All Services"
+query = "SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts"
+query = """
+SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE
+NOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR
+user_account == null)
+"""
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link"
+query = """
+SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,
+services.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =
+authenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'
+"""
+
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Detects the use of Reflection.Assembly to load PEs and DLLs in memory in PowerShell scripts. Attackers use this method
+to load executables and DLLs without writing to the disk, bypassing security solutions.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-windows.powershell*"]
+language = "kuery"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Suspicious .NET Reflection via PowerShell"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+### Investigating Suspicious .NET Reflection via PowerShell
+
+PowerShell is one of the main tools system administrators use for automation, report routines, and other tasks. This makes it available for use in various environments, and creates an attractive way for attackers to execute code.
+
+Attackers can use .NET reflection to load PEs and DLLs in memory. These payloads are commonly embedded in the script, which can circumvent file-based security protections.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the [Osquery Markdown Plugin](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/invest-guide-run-osquery.html) introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+#### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Examine the script content that triggered the detection; look for suspicious DLL imports, collection or exfiltration capabilities, suspicious functions, encoded or compressed data, and other potentially malicious characteristics.
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Examine file or network events from the involved PowerShell process for suspicious behavior.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Evaluate whether the user needs to use PowerShell to complete tasks.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze the script using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - $osquery_0
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - $osquery_1
+      - $osquery_2
+      - $osquery_3
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+- Investigate potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (for example, 4624) to the target host after the registry modification.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately outside engineering or IT business units. As long as the analyst did not identify malware or suspicious activity related to the user or host, this alert can be dismissed.
+
+### Related rules
+
+- PowerShell PSReflect Script - 56f2e9b5-4803-4e44-a0a4-a52dc79d57fe
+- Potential Process Injection via PowerShell - 2e29e96a-b67c-455a-afe4-de6183431d0d
+- PowerShell Suspicious Payload Encoded and Compressed - 81fe9dc6-a2d7-4192-a2d8-eed98afc766a
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Restrict PowerShell usage outside of IT and engineering business units using GPOs, AppLocker, Intune, or similar software.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+"""
+references = ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.reflection.assembly.load"]
+risk_score = 47
+rule_id = "e26f042e-c590-4e82-8e05-41e81bd822ad"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+The 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy must be enabled.
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+
+```
+Computer Configuration >
+Administrative Templates >
+Windows PowerShell >
+Turn on PowerShell Script Block Logging (Enable)
+```
+
+Steps to implement the logging policy via registry:
+
+```
+reg add "hklm\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\PowerShell\\ScriptBlockLogging" /v EnableScriptBlockLogging /t REG_DWORD /d 1
+```
+"""
+severity = "medium"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Windows",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Defense Evasion",
+    "Tactic: Execution",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+    "Data Source: PowerShell Logs",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "query"
+
+query = '''
+event.category:process and host.os.type:windows and
+  powershell.file.script_block_text : (
+    "[System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load" or
+    "[Reflection.Assembly]::Load" or
+    "Assembly.Load("
+  ) and
+  not powershell.file.script_block_text : (
+        ("CommonWorkflowParameters" or "RelatedLinksHelpInfo") and
+        "HelpDisplayStrings"
+  ) and
+  not (powershell.file.script_block_text :
+        ("Get-SolutionFiles" or "Get-VisualStudio" or "Select-MSBuildPath") and
+        file.name : "PathFunctions.ps1"
+  ) and
+  not powershell.file.script_block_text : (
+        "Microsoft.PowerShell.Workflow.ServiceCore" and "ExtractPluginProperties([string]$pluginDir"
+  ) and 
+  
+  not powershell.file.script_block_text : ("reflection.assembly]::Load('System." or "LoadWithPartialName('Microsoft." or "::Load(\"Microsoft." or "Microsoft.Build.Utilities.Core.dll") and 
+  
+  not user.id : "S-1-5-18"
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.filters]]
+[rule.filters.meta]
+negate = true
+[rule.filters.query.wildcard."file.path"]
+case_insensitive = true
+value = """
+C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Monitoring Agent\\Agent\\Health Service State\\Monitoring Host Temporary
+Files*\\AvailabilityGroupMonitoring.ps1
+"""
+
+[[rule.filters]]
+[rule.filters.meta]
+negate = true
+[rule.filters.query.wildcard."file.path"]
+case_insensitive = true
+value = "?:\\\\ProgramData\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection\\\\DataCollection\\\\*"
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1055"
+name = "Process Injection"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1055.001"
+name = "Dynamic-link Library Injection"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001/"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1055.002"
+name = "Portable Executable Injection"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/002/"
+
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1620"
+name = "Reflective Code Loading"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1620/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0005"
+name = "Defense Evasion"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1059"
+name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1059.001"
+name = "PowerShell"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0002"
+name = "Execution"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/windows/defense_evasion_posh_compressed.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2021/10/19"
+integration = ["windows"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/03/20"
+
+[transform]
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache"
+query = "SELECT * FROM dns_cache"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve All Services"
+query = "SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts"
+query = """
+SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE
+NOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR
+user_account == null)
+"""
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link"
+query = """
+SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,
+services.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =
+authenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'
+"""
+
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Identifies the use of .NET functionality for decompression and base64 decoding combined in PowerShell scripts, which
+malware and security tools heavily use to deobfuscate payloads and load them directly in memory to bypass defenses.
+"""
+false_positives = ["Legitimate PowerShell Scripts which makes use of compression and encoding."]
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-windows.powershell*"]
+language = "kuery"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "PowerShell Suspicious Payload Encoded and Compressed"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+### Investigating PowerShell Suspicious Payload Encoded and Compressed
+
+PowerShell is one of the main tools system administrators use for automation, report routines, and other tasks. This makes it available for use in various environments, and creates an attractive way for attackers to execute code.
+
+Attackers can embed compressed and encoded payloads in scripts to load directly into the memory without touching the disk. This strategy can circumvent string and file-based security protections.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the [Osquery Markdown Plugin](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/invest-guide-run-osquery.html) introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+#### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Examine the script content that triggered the detection; look for suspicious DLL imports, collection or exfiltration capabilities, suspicious functions, encoded or compressed data, and other potentially malicious characteristics.
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Examine file or network events from the involved PowerShell process for suspicious behavior.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Evaluate whether the user needs to use PowerShell to complete tasks.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze the script using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - $osquery_0
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - $osquery_1
+      - $osquery_2
+      - $osquery_3
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+- Investigate potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (for example, 4624) to the target host after the registry modification.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately outside engineering or IT business units. As long as the analyst did not identify malware or suspicious activity related to the user or host, this alert can be dismissed.
+
+### Related rules
+
+- PowerShell PSReflect Script - 56f2e9b5-4803-4e44-a0a4-a52dc79d57fe
+- Potential Process Injection via PowerShell - 2e29e96a-b67c-455a-afe4-de6183431d0d
+- Suspicious .NET Reflection via PowerShell - e26f042e-c590-4e82-8e05-41e81bd822ad
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Restrict PowerShell usage outside of IT and engineering business units using GPOs, AppLocker, Intune, or similar software.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+"""
+risk_score = 73
+rule_id = "81fe9dc6-a2d7-4192-a2d8-eed98afc766a"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+The 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy must be enabled.
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+
+```
+Computer Configuration >
+Administrative Templates >
+Windows PowerShell >
+Turn on PowerShell Script Block Logging (Enable)
+```
+
+Steps to implement the logging policy via registry:
+
+```
+reg add "hklm\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\PowerShell\\ScriptBlockLogging" /v EnableScriptBlockLogging /t REG_DWORD /d 1
+```
+"""
+severity = "high"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Windows",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Defense Evasion",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+    "Data Source: PowerShell Logs",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "query"
+
+query = '''
+event.category:process and host.os.type:windows and
+  powershell.file.script_block_text : (
+    (
+      "System.IO.Compression.DeflateStream" or
+      "System.IO.Compression.GzipStream" or
+      "IO.Compression.DeflateStream" or
+      "IO.Compression.GzipStream"
+    ) and
+    FromBase64String
+  ) and
+  not user.id : "S-1-5-18"
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.filters]]
+
+[rule.filters.meta]
+negate = true
+[rule.filters.query.wildcard."file.path"]
+case_insensitive = true
+value = "?:\\\\ProgramData\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection\\\\Downloads\\\\*"
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1027"
+name = "Obfuscated Files or Information"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1140"
+name = "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0005"
+name = "Defense Evasion"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1059"
+name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1059.001"
+name = "PowerShell"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0002"
+name = "Execution"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/windows/defense_evasion_posh_defender_tampering.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2024/09/11"
+integration = ["windows"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/09/15"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Identifies PowerShell scripts containing cmdlets and parameters that attackers can abuse to disable Windows Defender
+features. Attackers can tamper with antivirus to reduce the risk of detection when executing their payloads.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-windows.powershell*"]
+language = "kuery"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "PowerShell Script with Windows Defender Tampering Capabilities"
+note = """ ## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating PowerShell Script with Windows Defender Tampering Capabilities
+
+PowerShell is a powerful scripting language used for task automation and configuration management in Windows environments. Adversaries exploit PowerShell to disable Windows Defender features, reducing detection risks. The detection rule identifies scripts attempting to modify Defender settings, such as disabling real-time monitoring, by analyzing script block text for specific cmdlets and parameters, while excluding legitimate processes and users.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Examine the script content that triggered the detection; look for suspicious DLL imports, collection or exfiltration capabilities, suspicious functions, encoded or compressed data, and other potentially malicious characteristics.
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Examine the script's execution context, such as the user account, privileges, the role of the system on which it was executed, and any relevant timestamps.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Evaluate whether the user needs to use PowerShell to complete tasks.
+- Investigate the origin of the PowerShell script, including its source, download method, and any associated URLs or IP addresses.
+- Use the Get-MpPreference cmdlet to check defender settings for the host. Revert them to the desired state if needed.
+- Check for Files written and executed after the settings were changed.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Legitimate administrative scripts may trigger the rule if they use Set-MpPreference cmdlets for valid configuration changes. To handle this, review the script's purpose and source, and consider adding exceptions for trusted scripts or users.
+- Automated system management tools might use similar cmdlets for routine maintenance. Identify these tools and exclude their processes or directories from the rule to prevent unnecessary alerts.
+- Security software updates or installations could temporarily disable certain Defender features. Monitor these activities and whitelist known update processes to avoid false positives.
+- PowerShell scripts executed by system administrators for troubleshooting may appear suspicious. Verify the user ID and script content, and exclude known administrator accounts from the rule if they frequently perform such tasks.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+  - If malicious activity is confirmed, perform a broader investigation to identify the scope of the compromise and determine the appropriate remediation steps.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Reimage the host operating system or restore the compromised files to clean versions.
+- Restrict PowerShell usage outside of IT and engineering business units using GPOs, AppLocker, Intune, or similar software.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+"""
+risk_score = 21
+rule_id = "c124dc1b-cef2-4d01-8d74-ff6b0d5096b6"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+The 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy must be enabled.
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+
+```
+Computer Configuration >
+Administrative Templates >
+Windows PowerShell >
+Turn on PowerShell Script Block Logging (Enable)
+```
+
+Steps to implement the logging policy via registry:
+
+```
+reg add "hklm\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\PowerShell\\ScriptBlockLogging" /v EnableScriptBlockLogging /t REG_DWORD /d 1
+```
+"""
+severity = "low"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Windows",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Defense Evasion",
+    "Data Source: PowerShell Logs",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "query"
+
+query = '''
+event.category: "process" and host.os.type:windows and
+(
+  powershell.file.script_block_text: "Set-MpPreference" and
+  powershell.file.script_block_text: (
+    DisableArchiveScanning or DisableBehaviorMonitoring or
+    DisableIntrusionPreventionSystem or DisableIOAVProtection or
+    DisableRemovableDriveScanning or DisableBlockAtFirstSeen or
+    DisableScanningMappedNetworkDrivesForFullScan or
+    DisableScanningNetworkFiles or DisableScriptScanning or
+    DisableRealtimeMonitoring or LowThreatDefaultAction or
+    ModerateThreatDefaultAction or HighThreatDefaultAction
+  )
+) and
+not powershell.file.script_block_text : (
+  ("cmdletization" and "cdxml-Help.xml") or
+  ("function Set-MpPreference" and "Microsoft.PowerShell.Cmdletization.GeneratedTypes.MpPreference.SubmitSamplesConsentType")
+) and
+not file.directory : "C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection\SenseCM" and
+not user.id : "S-1-5-18"
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1562"
+name = "Impair Defenses"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1562.001"
+name = "Disable or Modify Tools"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0005"
+name = "Defense Evasion"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1059"
+name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1059.001"
+name = "PowerShell"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0002"
+name = "Execution"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/windows/defense_evasion_posh_encryption.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2023/01/23"
+integration = ["windows"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/03/20"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Identifies the use of Cmdlets and methods related to encryption/decryption of files in PowerShell scripts, which malware
+and offensive security tools can abuse to encrypt data or decrypt payloads to bypass security solutions.
+"""
+false_positives = ["Legitimate PowerShell Scripts which makes use of encryption."]
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-windows.powershell*"]
+language = "kuery"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "PowerShell Script with Encryption/Decryption Capabilities"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+### Investigating PowerShell Script with Encryption/Decryption Capabilities
+
+PowerShell is one of the main tools system administrators use for automation, report routines, and other tasks, making it available for use in various environments, creating an attractive way for attackers to execute code.
+
+PowerShell offers encryption and decryption functionalities that attackers can abuse for various purposes, such as concealing payloads, C2 communications, and encrypting data as part of ransomware operations.
+
+#### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Examine the script content that triggered the detection; look for suspicious DLL imports, collection or exfiltration capabilities, suspicious functions, encoded or compressed data, and other potentially malicious characteristics.
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Examine file or network events from the involved PowerShell process for suspicious behavior.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Evaluate whether the user needs to use PowerShell to complete tasks.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- This is a dual-use mechanism, meaning its usage is not inherently malicious. Analysts can dismiss the alert if the script doesn't contain malicious functions or potential for abuse, no other suspicious activity was identified, and there are justifications for the execution.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Restrict PowerShell usage outside of IT and engineering business units using GPOs, AppLocker, Intune, or similar software.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+"""
+risk_score = 47
+rule_id = "1d9aeb0b-9549-46f6-a32d-05e2a001b7fd"
+severity = "medium"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Windows",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Defense Evasion",
+    "Data Source: PowerShell Logs",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "query"
+
+query = '''
+event.category:process and host.os.type:windows and
+  powershell.file.script_block_text : (
+    (
+      "Cryptography.AESManaged" or
+      "Cryptography.RijndaelManaged" or
+      "Cryptography.SHA1Managed" or
+      "Cryptography.SHA256Managed" or
+      "Cryptography.SHA384Managed" or
+      "Cryptography.SHA512Managed" or
+      "Cryptography.SymmetricAlgorithm" or
+      "PasswordDeriveBytes" or
+      "Rfc2898DeriveBytes"
+    ) and
+    (
+      CipherMode and PaddingMode
+    ) and
+    (
+      ".CreateEncryptor" or
+      ".CreateDecryptor"
+    )
+  ) and
+  not user.id : "S-1-5-18" and
+  not (
+    file.name : "Bootstrap.Octopus.FunctionAppenderContext.ps1" and
+    powershell.file.script_block_text : ("function Decrypt-Variables" or "github.com/OctopusDeploy")
+  )
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1027"
+name = "Obfuscated Files or Information"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1140"
+name = "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0005"
+name = "Defense Evasion"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
+