nldcsc-elastic-rules 0.0.8__py3-none-any.whl

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/windows/defense_evasion_execution_suspicious_explorer_winword.toml

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+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2020/09/03"
+integration = ["endpoint", "windows", "m365_defender", "crowdstrike", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/09/11"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Identifies an instance of a Windows trusted program that is known to be vulnerable to DLL Search Order Hijacking
+starting after being renamed or from a non-standard path. This is uncommon behavior and may indicate an attempt to evade
+defenses via side loading a malicious DLL within the memory space of one of those processes.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = [
+    "winlogbeat-*",
+    "logs-endpoint.events.process-*",
+    "logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*",
+    "endgame-*",
+    "logs-m365_defender.event-*",
+    "logs-crowdstrike.fdr*",
+    "logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*",
+]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Potential DLL Side-Loading via Trusted Microsoft Programs"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating Potential DLL Side-Loading via Trusted Microsoft Programs
+
+DLL side-loading exploits the DLL search order to load malicious code into trusted Microsoft programs, which are often whitelisted by security tools. Adversaries rename or relocate these programs to execute unauthorized DLLs, evading detection. The detection rule identifies unusual execution paths or renamed instances of these programs, signaling potential misuse and enabling timely threat response.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Review the process details to confirm the original file name and the path from which the process was executed. Check if the process.pe.original_file_name matches any of the specified trusted programs like "WinWord.exe", "EXPLORER.EXE", "w3wp.exe", or "DISM.EXE".
+- Investigate the process execution path to determine if it deviates from the standard paths listed in the query, such as "?:\\Windows\\explorer.exe" or "?:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Office\\root\\Office*\\WINWORD.EXE".
+- Examine the process creation history and parent process to identify any unusual or suspicious parent-child relationships that might indicate malicious activity.
+- Check for any recent file modifications or creations in the directory from which the process was executed, which could suggest the presence of a malicious DLL.
+- Correlate the event with other security logs or alerts from data sources like Elastic Endgame, Elastic Defend, Sysmon, or Microsoft Defender for Endpoint to gather additional context and identify potential patterns of malicious behavior.
+- Assess the risk and impact of the event by considering the risk score and severity level provided, and determine if immediate containment or further investigation is necessary.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Legitimate software updates or installations may temporarily execute trusted Microsoft programs from non-standard paths. Users can create exceptions for known update processes to prevent false alerts.
+- Custom enterprise applications might use renamed instances of trusted Microsoft programs for legitimate purposes. Identify and whitelist these specific applications to avoid unnecessary alerts.
+- Virtual environments or sandboxed applications may execute trusted programs from unusual paths as part of their normal operation. Review and exclude these environments if they are known and trusted.
+- Security or IT administrative tools might mimic trusted Microsoft programs for monitoring or management tasks. Verify these tools and add them to an exception list if they are part of standard operations.
+- Development or testing environments often involve renamed or relocated executables for debugging purposes. Ensure these environments are recognized and excluded from the detection rule to reduce false positives.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Isolate the affected system from the network to prevent further spread of the potential threat and unauthorized access.
+- Terminate the suspicious process identified by the detection rule to stop any ongoing malicious activity.
+- Conduct a forensic analysis of the affected system to identify any malicious DLLs or additional compromised files, and remove them.
+- Restore the affected system from a known good backup to ensure all malicious changes are reverted.
+- Update and patch all software on the affected system, focusing on the trusted Microsoft programs identified in the alert, to mitigate vulnerabilities exploited by DLL side-loading.
+- Monitor the network for any signs of lateral movement or additional compromised systems, using the indicators of compromise identified during the investigation.
+- Escalate the incident to the security operations center (SOC) or incident response team for further analysis and to determine if additional systems or data have been affected."""
+risk_score = 47
+rule_id = "1160dcdb-0a0a-4a79-91d8-9b84616edebd"
+severity = "medium"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Windows",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Defense Evasion",
+    "Tactic: Execution",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Data Source: Sysmon",
+    "Data Source: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+    "Data Source: Crowdstrike",
+    "Data Source: SentinelOne",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+
+query = '''
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+  (
+    process.name : ("WinWord.exe", "EXPLORER.EXE", "w3wp.exe", "DISM.EXE") or
+    ?process.pe.original_file_name : ("WinWord.exe", "EXPLORER.EXE", "w3wp.exe", "DISM.EXE")
+  ) and
+  not process.executable : (
+          "\\\\?\\Volume{????????-????-????-????-????????????}\\Windows\\System32\\inetsrv\\w3wp.exe",
+          "?:\\PROGRA~?\\MICROS~?\\Office??\\winword.exe",
+          "?:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Office\\*\\winword.exe",
+          "?:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Office ??\\*\\winword.exe",
+          "?:\\Program Files\\WindowsApps\\Microsoft.Office.Desktop.*\\Office??\\winword.exe",
+          "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\Microsoft Office\\*\\winword.exe",
+          "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\Windows Kits\\*Assessment and Deployment Kit\\Deployment Tools\\amd64\\DISM\\dism.exe",
+          "?:\\Windows\\explorer.exe",
+          "?:\\Windows\\System32\\Dism.exe",
+          "?:\\Windows\\System32\\inetsrv\\w3wp.exe",
+          "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\Dism.exe",
+          "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\explorer.exe",
+          "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\inetsrv\\w3wp.exe"
+  ) and
+  /* Crowdstrike specific exclusion as it uses NT Object paths */
+  not
+  (
+    data_stream.dataset == "crowdstrike.fdr" and
+    process.executable : (
+        "\\Device\\HarddiskVolume*\\Program Files\\Microsoft Office\\*\\winword.exe",
+        "\\Device\\HarddiskVolume*\\Program Files\\Microsoft Office ??\\*\\winword.exe",
+        "\\Device\\HarddiskVolume*\\Program Files\\WindowsApps\\Microsoft.Office.Desktop.*\\Office??\\winword.exe",
+        "\\Device\\HarddiskVolume*\\Program Files (x86)\\Microsoft Office\\*\\winword.exe",
+        "\\Device\\HarddiskVolume*\\Program Files (x86)\\Windows Kits\\10\\Assessment and Deployment Kit\\Deployment Tools\\amd64\\DISM\\dism.exe",
+        "\\Device\\HarddiskVolume*\\Windows\\explorer.exe",
+        "\\Device\\HarddiskVolume*\\Windows\\System32\\Dism.exe",
+        "\\Device\\HarddiskVolume*\\Windows\\System32\\inetsrv\\w3wp.exe",
+        "\\Device\\HarddiskVolume*\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\Dism.exe",
+        "\\Device\\HarddiskVolume*\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\explorer.exe",
+        "\\Device\\HarddiskVolume*\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\inetsrv\\w3wp.exe"
+    )
+  )
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1036"
+name = "Masquerading"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1574"
+name = "Hijack Execution Flow"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1574.001"
+name = "DLL"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0005"
+name = "Defense Evasion"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/windows/defense_evasion_execution_windefend_unusual_path.toml

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+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2021/07/07"
+integration = ["endpoint", "windows", "m365_defender", "crowdstrike"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/09/11"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic", "Dennis Perto"]
+description = """
+Identifies suspicious execution of the Microsoft Antimalware Service Executable (MsMpEng.exe) from non-standard paths or
+renamed instances. This may indicate an attempt to evade defenses through DLL side-loading or by masquerading as the
+antimalware process.
+"""
+false_positives = ["Microsoft Antimalware Service Executable installed on non default installation path."]
+from = "now-9m"
+index = [
+    "winlogbeat-*",
+    "logs-endpoint.events.process-*",
+    "logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*",
+    "endgame-*",
+    "logs-m365_defender.event-*",
+    "logs-crowdstrike.fdr*",
+]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Suspicious Microsoft Antimalware Service Execution"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating Suspicious Microsoft Antimalware Service Execution
+
+The Microsoft Antimalware Service Executable, a core component of Windows Defender, is crucial for real-time protection against malware. Adversaries exploit its trust by renaming it or executing it from non-standard paths to load malicious DLLs, bypassing security measures. The detection rule identifies such anomalies by monitoring process names and paths, flagging deviations from expected behavior to uncover potential threats.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Review the process details to confirm if the process name is MsMpEng.exe but is executing from a non-standard path. Check the process.executable field to identify the exact path and verify if it deviates from the expected directories.
+- Investigate the parent process of the suspicious MsMpEng.exe instance to determine how it was initiated. This can provide insights into whether the process was started by a legitimate application or a potentially malicious one.
+- Examine the system for any recent file modifications or creations in the directory where the suspicious MsMpEng.exe is located. This can help identify if a malicious DLL was recently placed in the same directory.
+- Check for any network connections or communications initiated by the suspicious MsMpEng.exe process. This can help determine if the process is attempting to communicate with external servers, which may indicate malicious activity.
+- Look for any other processes or activities on the host that may indicate compromise, such as unusual user account activity or other processes running from unexpected locations. This can help assess the broader impact of the potential threat.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Legitimate software updates or installations may temporarily rename or relocate the Microsoft Antimalware Service Executable. Users should verify if any software updates or installations occurred around the time of the alert and consider excluding these paths if they are known and trusted.
+- Custom security or IT management tools might execute the executable from non-standard paths for monitoring or testing purposes. Confirm with IT or security teams if such tools are in use and add these paths to the exclusion list if they are verified as safe.
+- Virtualization or sandbox environments may replicate the executable in different locations for testing or analysis. Check if the environment is part of a controlled setup and exclude these paths if they are part of legitimate operations.
+- Backup or recovery processes might involve copying the executable to alternate locations. Ensure these processes are legitimate and consider excluding these paths if they are part of routine operations.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Immediately isolate the affected system from the network to prevent further spread of the potential threat.
+- Terminate any suspicious processes identified by the detection rule, specifically those involving MsMpEng.exe running from non-standard paths.
+- Conduct a thorough scan of the affected system using an updated antivirus or endpoint detection and response (EDR) tool to identify and remove any malicious DLLs or other malware.
+- Review and restore any altered or deleted system files from a known good backup to ensure system integrity.
+- Investigate the source of the DLL side-loading attempt to determine if it was part of a broader attack campaign, and gather forensic evidence for further analysis.
+- Escalate the incident to the security operations center (SOC) or incident response team for a deeper investigation and to assess the need for further containment measures.
+- Implement additional monitoring and alerting for similar anomalies in process execution paths to enhance detection capabilities and prevent recurrence."""
+references = [
+    "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/07/04/independence-day-revil-uses-supply-chain-exploit-to-attack-hundreds-of-businesses/",
+]
+risk_score = 73
+rule_id = "053a0387-f3b5-4ba5-8245-8002cca2bd08"
+severity = "high"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Windows",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Defense Evasion",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
+    "Tactic: Execution",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Data Source: Sysmon",
+    "Data Source: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint",
+    "Data Source: Crowdstrike",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+
+query = '''
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+(
+  (process.pe.original_file_name == "MsMpEng.exe" and not process.name : "MsMpEng.exe") or
+  (
+    process.name : "MsMpEng.exe" and
+    not process.executable : (
+            "?:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\*.exe",
+            "?:\\Program Files\\Windows Defender\\*.exe",
+            "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\Windows Defender\\*.exe",
+            "?:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Security Client\\*.exe",
+            "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\Microsoft Security Client\\*.exe",
+
+            /* Crowdstrike specific exclusion as it uses NT Object paths */
+            "\\Device\\HarddiskVolume*\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\*.exe",
+            "\\Device\\HarddiskVolume*\\Program Files\\Windows Defender\\*.exe",
+            "\\Device\\HarddiskVolume*\\Program Files (x86)\\Windows Defender\\*.exe",
+            "\\Device\\HarddiskVolume*\\Program Files\\Microsoft Security Client\\*.exe",
+            "\\Device\\HarddiskVolume*\\Program Files (x86)\\Microsoft Security Client\\*.exe"
+    )
+  )
+)
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1574"
+name = "Hijack Execution Flow"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1574.001"
+name = "DLL"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0005"
+name = "Defense Evasion"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/windows/defense_evasion_file_creation_mult_extension.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2021/01/19"
+integration = ["endpoint", "windows", "m365_defender", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel", "crowdstrike"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/08/26"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Masquerading can allow an adversary to evade defenses and better blend in with the environment. One way it occurs is
+when the name or location of a file is manipulated as a means of tricking a user into executing what they think is a
+benign file type but is actually executable code.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = [
+    "winlogbeat-*",
+    "logs-endpoint.events.file-*",
+    "logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*",
+    "endgame-*",
+    "logs-m365_defender.event-*",
+    "logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*",
+    "logs-crowdstrike.fdr*",
+]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Executable File Creation with Multiple Extensions"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating Executable File Creation with Multiple Extensions
+
+In Windows environments, adversaries may exploit file extensions to disguise malicious executables as benign files, such as documents or images, by appending multiple extensions. This tactic, known as masquerading, aims to deceive users and evade security measures. The detection rule identifies suspicious file creations by monitoring for executables with misleading extensions, excluding known legitimate processes, thus highlighting potential threats.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Review the file creation event details to identify the full file path and name, focusing on the extensions used to determine if they match the suspicious pattern outlined in the query.
+- Investigate the process that created the file by examining the process.executable field to determine if it is a known legitimate process or potentially malicious.
+- Check the file's origin by analyzing the user account and network activity associated with the file creation event to identify any unusual or unauthorized access patterns.
+- Utilize threat intelligence sources to assess if the file hash or any related indicators of compromise (IOCs) are known to be associated with malicious activity.
+- Examine the file's metadata and properties to verify its authenticity and check for any signs of tampering or unusual characteristics.
+- Conduct a behavioral analysis of the file in a controlled environment to observe any malicious actions or network communications it may attempt.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Legitimate software installations may create executables with multiple extensions during setup processes. Users can exclude these by adding exceptions for known installer paths, such as "C:\\Users\\*\\QGIS_SCCM\\Files\\QGIS-OSGeo4W-*-Setup-x86_64.exe".
+- System updates or patches might temporarily create files with multiple extensions. Monitor and verify these activities, and if confirmed as legitimate, add exceptions for the specific update processes.
+- Development environments or script-based applications may generate files with multiple extensions for testing purposes. Identify these environments and exclude their specific file paths or processes to prevent false positives.
+- Security tools or administrative scripts might use multiple extensions for legitimate purposes. Review and whitelist these tools by their executable paths or process names to avoid unnecessary alerts.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Isolate the affected system from the network to prevent further spread of the potential threat and to contain any malicious activity.
+- Terminate any suspicious processes associated with the masquerading executable files to halt any ongoing malicious actions.
+- Quarantine the identified files with multiple extensions to prevent execution and further analysis.
+- Conduct a thorough scan of the affected system using updated antivirus or endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools to identify and remove any additional threats.
+- Review and restore any altered system configurations or files to their original state to ensure system integrity.
+- Escalate the incident to the security operations center (SOC) or incident response team for further investigation and to determine if additional systems are affected.
+- Implement enhanced monitoring and logging for similar file creation activities to improve detection and response capabilities for future incidents."""
+risk_score = 47
+rule_id = "8b2b3a62-a598-4293-bc14-3d5fa22bb98f"
+severity = "medium"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Windows",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Defense Evasion",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Data Source: Sysmon",
+    "Data Source: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint",
+    "Data Source: SentinelOne",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+    "Data Source: Crowdstrike",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+
+query = '''
+file where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "creation" and file.extension : "exe" and
+  file.name regex~ """.*\.(vbs|vbe|bat|js|cmd|wsh|ps1|pdf|docx?|xlsx?|pptx?|txt|rtf|gif|jpg|png|bmp|hta|txt|img|iso)\.exe""" and
+  not (
+      process.executable : (
+          "?:\\Windows\\System32\\msiexec.exe",
+          "\\Device\\HarddiskVolume*\\Windows\\System32\\msiexec.exe",
+          "*\\Users\\*\\QGIS_SCCM\\Files\\QGIS-OSGeo4W-*-Setup-x86_64.exe"
+      ) and
+      file.path : ("?:\\Program Files\\QGIS *\\apps\\grass\\*.exe", "\\Device\\HarddiskVolume*\\Program Files\\QGIS *\\apps\\grass\\*.exe")
+  ) and 
+  not process.executable : 
+                             ("C:\\Program Files\\dotnet\\dotnet.exe", 
+                              "C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Visual Studio\\*.exe",
+                              "\\Device\\HarddiskVolume*\\Program Files\\dotnet\\dotnet.exe", 
+                              "\\Device\\HarddiskVolume*\\Program Files\\Microsoft Visual Studio\\*.exe")
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1036"
+name = "Masquerading"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1036.007"
+name = "Double File Extension"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/007/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0005"
+name = "Defense Evasion"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1204"
+name = "User Execution"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1204.002"
+name = "Malicious File"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0002"
+name = "Execution"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/windows/defense_evasion_from_unusual_directory.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2020/10/30"
+integration = ["endpoint", "windows", "system", "m365_defender", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/05/05"
+
+[transform]
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache"
+query = "SELECT * FROM dns_cache"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve All Services"
+query = "SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts"
+query = """
+SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE
+NOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR
+user_account == null)
+"""
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link"
+query = """
+SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,
+services.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =
+authenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'
+"""
+
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Identifies process execution from suspicious default Windows directories. This is sometimes done by adversaries to hide
+malware in trusted paths.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = [
+    "endgame-*",
+    "logs-endpoint.events.process-*",
+    "logs-m365_defender.event-*",
+    "logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*",
+    "logs-system.security*",
+    "logs-windows.forwarded*",
+    "logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*",
+    "winlogbeat-*",
+]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Process Execution from an Unusual Directory"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+### Investigating Process Execution from an Unusual Directory
+
+This rule identifies processes that are executed from suspicious default Windows directories. Adversaries may abuse this technique by planting malware in trusted paths, making it difficult for security analysts to discern if their activities are malicious or take advantage of exceptions that may apply to these paths.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the [Osquery Markdown Plugin](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/invest-guide-run-osquery.html) introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes, examining their executable files for prevalence, location, and valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate any abnormal behavior by the subject process, such as network connections, registry or file modifications, and any spawned child processes.
+- Examine arguments and working directory to determine the program's source or the nature of the tasks it is performing.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Inspect the host for suspicious or abnormal behavior in the alert timeframe.
+- Assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences across hosts.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze the process executable using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - $osquery_0
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - $osquery_1
+      - $osquery_2
+      - $osquery_3
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- If this activity is expected and noisy in your environment, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of executable and signature conditions.
+
+### Related Rules
+
+- Unusual Windows Path Activity - 445a342e-03fb-42d0-8656-0367eb2dead5
+- Execution from Unusual Directory - Command Line - cff92c41-2225-4763-b4ce-6f71e5bda5e6
+
+### Response and Remediation
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+"""
+references = [
+    "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/invisible-miners-unveiling-ghostengine",
+    "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/siestagraph-new-implant-uncovered-in-asean-member-foreign-ministry",
+]
+risk_score = 47
+rule_id = "ebfe1448-7fac-4d59-acea-181bd89b1f7f"
+severity = "medium"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Windows",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Defense Evasion",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Data Source: Windows Security Event Logs",
+    "Data Source: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint",
+    "Data Source: Sysmon",
+    "Data Source: SentinelOne",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+
+query = '''
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+  /* add suspicious execution paths here */
+  process.executable : (
+    "?:\\PerfLogs\\*.exe", "?:\\Users\\Public\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\Tasks\\*.exe",
+    "?:\\Intel\\*.exe", "?:\\AMD\\Temp\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\AppReadiness\\*.exe",
+    "?:\\Windows\\ServiceState\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\security\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\IdentityCRL\\*.exe",
+    "?:\\Windows\\Branding\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\csc\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\DigitalLocker\\*.exe",
+    "?:\\Windows\\en-US\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\wlansvc\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\Prefetch\\*.exe",
+    "?:\\Windows\\Fonts\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\diagnostics\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\TAPI\\*.exe",
+    "?:\\Windows\\INF\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\System32\\Speech\\*.exe", "?:\\windows\\tracing\\*.exe",
+    "?:\\windows\\IME\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\Performance\\*.exe", "?:\\windows\\intel\\*.exe",
+    "?:\\windows\\ms\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\dot3svc\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\panther\\*.exe",
+    "?:\\Windows\\RemotePackages\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\OCR\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\appcompat\\*.exe",
+    "?:\\Windows\\apppatch\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\addins\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\Setup\\*.exe",
+    "?:\\Windows\\Help\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\SKB\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\Vss\\*.exe",
+    "?:\\Windows\\Web\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\servicing\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\CbsTemp\\*.exe",
+    "?:\\Windows\\Logs\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\WaaS\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\ShellExperiences\\*.exe",
+    "?:\\Windows\\ShellComponents\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\PLA\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\Migration\\*.exe",
+    "?:\\Windows\\debug\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\Cursors\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\Containers\\*.exe",
+    "?:\\Windows\\Boot\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\bcastdvr\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\assembly\\*.exe",
+    "?:\\Windows\\TextInput\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\security\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\schemas\\*.exe",
+    "?:\\Windows\\SchCache\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\Resources\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\rescache\\*.exe",
+    "?:\\Windows\\Provisioning\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\PrintDialog\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\PolicyDefinitions\\*.exe",
+    "?:\\Windows\\media\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\Globalization\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\L2Schemas\\*.exe",
+    "?:\\Windows\\LiveKernelReports\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\ModemLogs\\*.exe",
+    "?:\\Windows\\ImmersiveControlPanel\\*.exe"
+  ) and
+  
+  not process.name : (
+    "SpeechUXWiz.exe", "SystemSettings.exe", "TrustedInstaller.exe",
+    "PrintDialog.exe", "MpSigStub.exe", "LMS.exe", "mpam-*.exe"
+  ) and
+  not process.executable :
+            ("?:\\Intel\\Wireless\\WUSetupLauncher.exe",
+             "?:\\Intel\\Wireless\\Setup.exe",
+             "?:\\Intel\\Move Mouse.exe",
+             "?:\\windows\\Panther\\DiagTrackRunner.exe",
+             "?:\\Windows\\servicing\\GC64\\tzupd.exe",
+             "?:\\Users\\Public\\res\\RemoteLite.exe",
+             "?:\\Users\\Public\\IBM\\ClientSolutions\\*.exe",
+             "?:\\Users\\Public\\Documents\\syspin.exe",
+             "?:\\Users\\Public\\res\\FileWatcher.exe")
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1036"
+name = "Masquerading"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1036.005"
+name = "Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0005"
+name = "Defense Evasion"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
+