nldcsc-elastic-rules 0.0.8__py3-none-any.whl

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/command_and_control_linux_suspicious_proxychains_activity.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2023/08/23"
+integration = ["endpoint", "auditd_manager", "crowdstrike", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/03/20"
+
+[transform]
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Listening Ports"
+query = "SELECT pid, address, port, socket, protocol, path FROM listening_ports"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Open Sockets"
+query = "SELECT pid, family, remote_address, remote_port, socket, state FROM process_open_sockets"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Information for a Specific User"
+query = "SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = {{user.name}}"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Investigate the Account Authentication Status"
+query = "SELECT * FROM logged_in_users WHERE user = {{user.name}}"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Running Processes by User"
+query = "SELECT pid, username, name FROM processes p JOIN users u ON u.uid = p.uid ORDER BY username"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Process Info"
+query = "SELECT name, cmdline, parent, path, uid FROM processes"
+
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+This rule monitors for the execution of suspicious linux tools through ProxyChains. ProxyChains is a command-line tool
+that enables the routing of network connections through intermediary proxies, enhancing anonymity and enabling access to
+restricted resources. Attackers can exploit the ProxyChains utility to hide their true source IP address, evade
+detection, and perform malicious activities through a chain of proxy servers, potentially masking their identity and
+intentions.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = [
+    "auditbeat-*",
+    "endgame-*",
+    "logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*",
+    "logs-crowdstrike.fdr*",
+    "logs-endpoint.events.process*",
+    "logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*",
+]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Suspicious Utility Launched via ProxyChains"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+### Investigating Suspicious Utility Launched via ProxyChains
+
+Attackers can leverage `proxychains` to obfuscate their origin and bypass network defenses by routing their malicious traffic through multiple intermediary servers.
+
+This rule looks for a list of suspicious processes spawned through `proxychains` by analyzing process command line arguments. 
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the [Osquery Markdown Plugin](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/invest-guide-run-osquery.html) introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+> This investigation guide uses [placeholder fields](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/osquery-placeholder-fields.html) to dynamically pass alert data into Osquery queries. Placeholder fields were introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.7.0. If you're using Elastic Stack version 8.6.0 or earlier, you'll need to manually adjust this investigation guide's queries to ensure they properly run.
+
+#### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Identify any signs of suspicious network activity or anomalies that may indicate network obfuscation. This could include unexpected traffic patterns or unusual network behavior.
+  - Investigate listening ports and open sockets to look for potential protocol tunneling, reverse shells, or data exfiltration.
+    - $osquery_0
+    - $osquery_1
+- Identify the user account that performed the action, analyze it, and check whether it should perform this kind of action.
+  - $osquery_2
+- Investigate whether the user is currently logged in and active.
+  - $osquery_3
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence and whether they are located in expected locations.
+  - $osquery_4
+  - $osquery_5
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+  - If scripts or executables were dropped, retrieve the files and determine if they are malicious:
+    - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+      - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+        - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+          - Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
+          - Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
+        - File access, modification, and creation activities.
+
+### Related rules
+
+- ProxyChains Activity - 4b868f1f-15ff-4ba3-8c11-d5a7a6356d37
+- Potential Protocol Tunneling via Chisel Client - 3f12325a-4cc6-410b-8d4c-9fbbeb744cfd
+- Potential Protocol Tunneling via Chisel Server - ac8805f6-1e08-406c-962e-3937057fa86f
+- Potential Linux Tunneling and/or Port Forwarding - 6ee947e9-de7e-4281-a55d-09289bdf947e
+- Potential Protocol Tunneling via EarthWorm - 9f1c4ca3-44b5-481d-ba42-32dc215a2769
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- If this activity is related to new benign software installation activity, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of user and command line conditions.
+- If this activity is related to a system administrator or developer who uses this utility for benign purposes, consider adding exceptions for specific user accounts or hosts. 
+- Try to understand the context of the execution by thinking about the user, machine, or business purpose. A small number of endpoints, such as servers with unique software, might appear unusual but satisfy a specific business need.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors, such as reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers, that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+"""
+references = ["https://blog.bitsadmin.com/living-off-the-foreign-land-windows-as-offensive-platform"]
+risk_score = 21
+rule_id = "6ace94ba-f02c-4d55-9f53-87d99b6f9af4"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+#### Prerequisite Requirements:
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
+"""
+severity = "low"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Linux",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Command and Control",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
+    "Data Source: Auditd Manager",
+    "Data Source: Crowdstrike",
+    "Data Source: SentinelOne",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+
+query = '''
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "start", "ProcessRollup2", "executed", "process_started")
+ and process.name == "proxychains" and process.args : (
+  "ssh", "sshd", "sshuttle", "socat", "iodine", "iodined", "dnscat", "hans", "hans-ubuntu", "ptunnel-ng",
+  "ssf", "3proxy", "ngrok", "gost", "pivotnacci", "chisel*", "nmap", "ping", "python*", "php*", "perl", "ruby",
+  "lua*", "openssl", "nc", "netcat", "ncat", "telnet", "awk", "java", "telnet", "ftp", "curl", "wget"
+)
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1572"
+name = "Protocol Tunneling"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0011"
+name = "Command and Control"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/"
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/command_and_control_linux_tunneling_and_port_forwarding.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2023/08/23"
+integration = ["endpoint", "crowdstrike", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/06/30"
+
+[transform]
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Listening Ports"
+query = "SELECT pid, address, port, socket, protocol, path FROM listening_ports"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Open Sockets"
+query = "SELECT pid, family, remote_address, remote_port, socket, state FROM process_open_sockets"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Information for a Specific User"
+query = "SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = {{user.name}}"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Investigate the Account Authentication Status"
+query = "SELECT * FROM logged_in_users WHERE user = {{user.name}}"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Running Processes by User"
+query = "SELECT pid, username, name FROM processes p JOIN users u ON u.uid = p.uid ORDER BY username"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Process Info"
+query = "SELECT name, cmdline, parent, path, uid FROM processes"
+
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+This rule monitors for a set of Linux utilities that can be used for tunneling and port forwarding. Attackers can
+leverage tunneling and port forwarding techniques to bypass network defenses, establish hidden communication channels,
+and gain unauthorized access to internal resources, facilitating data exfiltration, lateral movement, and remote
+control.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = [
+    "endgame-*",
+    "logs-crowdstrike.fdr*",
+    "logs-endpoint.events.process*",
+    "logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*",
+]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Potential Linux Tunneling and/or Port Forwarding"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+### Investigating Potential Linux Tunneling and/or Port Forwarding
+
+Attackers can leverage many utilities to clandestinely tunnel network communications and evade security measures, potentially gaining unauthorized access to sensitive systems.
+
+This rule looks for several utilities that are capable of setting up tunnel network communications by analyzing process names or command line arguments. 
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the [Osquery Markdown Plugin](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/invest-guide-run-osquery.html) introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+> This investigation guide uses [placeholder fields](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/osquery-placeholder-fields.html) to dynamically pass alert data into Osquery queries. Placeholder fields were introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.7.0. If you're using Elastic Stack version 8.6.0 or earlier, you'll need to manually adjust this investigation guide's queries to ensure they properly run.
+
+#### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Identify any signs of suspicious network activity or anomalies that may indicate protocol tunneling. This could include unexpected traffic patterns or unusual network behavior.
+  - Investigate listening ports and open sockets to look for potential protocol tunneling, reverse shells, or data exfiltration.
+    - $osquery_0
+    - $osquery_1
+- Identify the user account that performed the action, analyze it, and check whether it should perform this kind of action.
+  - $osquery_2
+- Investigate whether the user is currently logged in and active.
+  - $osquery_3
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence and whether they are located in expected locations.
+  - $osquery_4
+  - $osquery_5
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+  - If scripts or executables were dropped, retrieve the files and determine if they are malicious:
+    - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+      - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+        - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+          - Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
+          - Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
+        - File access, modification, and creation activities.
+
+### Related rules
+
+- Potential Protocol Tunneling via Chisel Client - 3f12325a-4cc6-410b-8d4c-9fbbeb744cfd
+- Potential Protocol Tunneling via Chisel Server - ac8805f6-1e08-406c-962e-3937057fa86f
+- Potential Protocol Tunneling via EarthWorm - 9f1c4ca3-44b5-481d-ba42-32dc215a2769
+- Suspicious Utility Launched via ProxyChains - 6ace94ba-f02c-4d55-9f53-87d99b6f9af4
+- ProxyChains Activity - 4b868f1f-15ff-4ba3-8c11-d5a7a6356d37
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- If this activity is related to new benign software installation activity, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of user and command line conditions.
+- If this activity is related to a system administrator or developer who uses port tunneling/forwarding for benign purposes, consider adding exceptions for specific user accounts or hosts. 
+- Try to understand the context of the execution by thinking about the user, machine, or business purpose. A small number of endpoints, such as servers with unique software, might appear unusual but satisfy a specific business need.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors, such as reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers, that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+"""
+references = [
+    "https://blog.bitsadmin.com/living-off-the-foreign-land-windows-as-offensive-platform",
+    "https://book.hacktricks.xyz/generic-methodologies-and-resources/tunneling-and-port-forwarding",
+]
+risk_score = 47
+rule_id = "6ee947e9-de7e-4281-a55d-09289bdf947e"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+#### Prerequisite Requirements:
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
+"""
+severity = "medium"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Linux",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Command and Control",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
+    "Data Source: Crowdstrike",
+    "Data Source: SentinelOne",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+
+query = '''
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "start", "ProcessRollup2") and (
+  (
+    // gost & pivotnacci - spawned without process.parent.name
+    (process.name == "gost" and process.args : ("-L*", "-C*", "-R*")) or (process.name == "pivotnacci")) or (
+    // ssh
+    (process.name == "ssh" and (process.args in ("-R", "-L", "-D", "-w") and process.args_count >= 4 and 
+     not process.args : "chmod")) or
+    // sshuttle
+    (process.name == "sshuttle" and process.args in ("-r", "--remote", "-l", "--listen") and process.args_count >= 4) or
+    // socat
+    (process.name == "socat" and process.args : ("TCP4-LISTEN:*", "SOCKS*") and process.args_count >= 3) or
+    // chisel
+    (process.name : "chisel*" and process.args in ("client", "server")) or
+    // iodine(d), dnscat, hans, ptunnel-ng, ssf, 3proxy & ngrok 
+    (process.name in ("iodine", "iodined", "dnscat", "hans", "hans-ubuntu", "ptunnel-ng", "ssf", "3proxy", "ngrok"))
+  ) and process.parent.name in ("bash", "dash", "ash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish")
+)
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1572"
+name = "Protocol Tunneling"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0011"
+name = "Command and Control"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/"
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/command_and_control_linux_tunneling_via_ssh_option.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2025/04/25"
+integration = ["endpoint", "crowdstrike", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/07/07"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+This rule detects the use of SSH options that may indicate tunneling or port forwarding on Linux systems. This behavior
+is commonly associated with malicious activity, such as establishing a port forward, proxy or an encrypted tunnel to
+exfiltrate data. 
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = [
+    "endgame-*",
+    "logs-crowdstrike.fdr*",
+    "logs-endpoint.events.process*",
+    "logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*",
+]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Potential Linux Tunneling and/or Port Forwarding via SSH Option"
+note = """ ## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating Potential Linux Tunneling and/or Port Forwarding via SSH Option
+
+SSH is a secure protocol used for encrypted communication over networks, often employed for remote administration. Adversaries exploit SSH options like port forwarding to create tunnels, facilitating covert data exfiltration or unauthorized access. The detection rule identifies suspicious SSH commands indicative of tunneling by monitoring specific SSH options, helping to flag potential misuse for further investigation.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Review the process command line details to identify the specific SSH options used, such as ProxyCommand, LocalForward, RemoteForward, DynamicForward, Tunnel, GatewayPorts, ExitOnForwardFailure, or ProxyJump, to understand the nature of the potential tunneling or port forwarding.
+- Examine the user account associated with the SSH process to determine if the activity aligns with their typical behavior or if it appears suspicious.
+- Check the source and destination IP addresses involved in the SSH connection to identify any unusual or unauthorized endpoints that may indicate malicious activity.
+- Investigate the timing and frequency of the SSH connections to assess whether they coincide with known business operations or if they suggest unauthorized access patterns.
+- Correlate the event with other security logs or alerts from the same host or network segment to identify any additional indicators of compromise or related suspicious activities.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Legitimate administrative tasks using SSH options like ProxyCommand or LocalForward can trigger the rule. To manage this, create exceptions for known administrative scripts or users frequently using these options for valid purposes.
+- Automated backup or synchronization processes that use SSH tunneling for secure data transfer may be flagged. Identify these processes and exclude them by specifying the associated process names or user accounts.
+- Development or testing environments where developers use SSH tunneling for accessing remote services might cause alerts. Implement exceptions for specific IP addresses or user groups associated with these environments.
+- Monitoring or logging tools that utilize SSH for secure data collection can be mistaken for malicious activity. Whitelist these tools by their process names or command-line patterns to prevent false positives.
+- Internal network services that rely on SSH port forwarding for legitimate communication should be reviewed and excluded based on their known behavior and usage patterns.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Immediately isolate the affected Linux system from the network to prevent further unauthorized access or data exfiltration.
+- Terminate any suspicious SSH sessions identified by the detection rule to halt potential tunneling or port forwarding activities.
+- Conduct a thorough review of SSH configuration files and logs on the affected system to identify unauthorized changes or access patterns.
+- Reset credentials for any accounts that were used in the suspicious SSH activity to prevent further unauthorized access.
+- Implement network segmentation to limit SSH access to only necessary systems and services, reducing the risk of lateral movement.
+- Escalate the incident to the security operations team for further investigation and to determine if additional systems are compromised.
+- Enhance monitoring and logging of SSH activities across the network to detect similar threats in the future, ensuring alerts are promptly reviewed and acted upon.
+"""
+references = [
+    "https://blog.bitsadmin.com/living-off-the-foreign-land-windows-as-offensive-platform",
+    "https://book.hacktricks.xyz/generic-methodologies-and-resources/tunneling-and-port-forwarding",
+]
+risk_score = 21
+rule_id = "ef395dff-be12-4a6e-8919-d87d627c2174"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+#### Prerequisite Requirements:
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
+"""
+severity = "low"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Linux",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Command and Control",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
+    "Data Source: Crowdstrike",
+    "Data Source: SentinelOne",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+query = '''
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "start", "ProcessRollup2") and
+process.name in ("ssh", "sshd") and process.args == "-o" and
+process.command_line like~ (
+  "*ProxyCommand*", "*LocalForward*", "*RemoteForward*", "*DynamicForward*", "*Tunnel*", "*GatewayPorts*",
+  "*ExitOnForwardFailure*", "*ProxyCommand*", "*ProxyJump*"
+)
+'''
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1572"
+name = "Protocol Tunneling"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572/"
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0011"
+name = "Command and Control"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/"