nldcsc-elastic-rules 0.0.8__py3-none-any.whl

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/privilege_escalation_potential_suid_sgid_proxy_execution.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2025/10/30"
+integration = ["endpoint"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/11/11"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Detects potential privilege escalation via SUID/SGID proxy execution on Linux systems. Attackers may exploit binaries with the
+SUID/SGID bit set to execute commands with elevated privileges. This rule identifies instances where a process is executed with
+root privileges (user ID 0 or group ID 0) while the real user or group ID is non-root, indicating potential misuse of SUID/SGID
+binaries. 
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["logs-endpoint.events.process*"]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Potential Privilege Escalation via SUID/SGID Proxy Execution"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating Potential Privilege Escalation via SUID/SGID Proxy Execution
+
+This rule surfaces executions of well-known SUID/SGID helpers on Linux that run with root privileges while the launching user remains non‑root, signaling an attempt to proxy elevated rights. It matters because a non‑privileged process invoking pkexec can spawn /bin/sh as root via environment manipulation, turning a low-privilege foothold into full system control.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Determine if the invocation is interactive and expected (e.g., admin using su/sudo) by correlating with a TTY/SSH session, recent successful authentication logs, and sudo/polkit policy outcomes in journald.
+- For pkexec events, inspect the environment for exploit indicators (e.g., unset argv or suspicious GCONV_PATH, PATH, LD_PRELOAD, LC_* values) and look for attacker-created files in /tmp or the user's home that match gconv or loader artifacts.
+- Review the child/descendant process tree of the SUID/SGID helper to see if it spawned a root shell or arbitrary interpreter, and pivot to concurrent network connections or file writes by those children.
+- Validate whether the executable’s SUID/SGID file on disk has been tampered with by checking its hash, permissions, ownership, and recent mtime against package manager metadata and known-good baselines.
+- If the binary is mount/umount/fusermount or newuidmap/newgidmap, correlate with container or FUSE activity to confirm a legitimate workflow and inspect mounts or namespace changes for risky options (e.g., suid, exec) or unusual target directories.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- An authorized pkexec or polkit-agent-helper invocation by a user to perform a permitted administrative task may run as root while the real user is non‑root, often with a single‑argument parent, and should align with an interactive prompt and expected policy.
+- Normal unprivileged workflows using fusermount3 or newuidmap/newgidmap legitimately leverage SUID/SGID helpers, typically launched by a simple shell with one argument, and should correlate with expected mount or user‑namespace activity.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Immediately isolate the host, kill the offending SUID/SGID child processes (e.g., pkexec spawning /bin/sh), and temporarily remove the setuid/setgid bit from the abused binary (chmod u-s /usr/bin/pkexec or chmod g-s /usr/bin/newgrp) to halt further elevation.
+- Reinstall and verify integrity of abused packages and SUID helpers (e.g., polkit to replace /usr/bin/pkexec, dbus-daemon-launch-helper, fusermount3) and delete attacker artifacts such as gconv modules or LD_PRELOAD payloads from /tmp, /var/tmp, and user homes.
+- Undo attacker changes by restoring /etc/sudoers, /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow, and polkit rules under /usr/share/polkit-1 or /etc/polkit-1, unmount suspicious FUSE or bind mounts created by fusermount3/mount, and rotate credentials and keys.
+- Escalate to incident command if you observe a SUID helper launching an interactive root shell (/bin/sh -p or bash -p), root-owned droppers in /tmp or /usr/local/bin, or similar events on more than one host or account.
+- Permanently reduce the SUID/SGID attack surface by auditing and removing setuid bits from rarely used binaries (e.g., chfn, chsh, newgrp, ssh-keysign), restricting pkexec via polkit rules to specific callers, and mounting /tmp, /var/tmp, and home directories with nosuid,nodev,noexec.
+- Strengthen monitoring and policy by enabling AppArmor/SELinux confinement for pkexec and mount helpers, adding auditd rules for exec of setuid binaries and writes to /tmp by root, and enforcing least-privilege sudoers by removing broad NOPASSWD entries and requiring MFA for privileged tasks.
+"""
+references = [
+    "https://dfir.ch/posts/today_i_learned_binfmt_misc/",
+    "https://gtfobins.github.io/#+suid",
+    "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/primer-on-persistence-mechanisms",
+]
+risk_score = 21
+rule_id = "341c6e18-9ef1-437e-bf18-b513f3ae2130"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+#### Prerequisite Requirements:
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
+"""
+severity = "low"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Linux",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Privilege Escalation",
+    "Tactic: Persistence",
+    "Tactic: Defense Evasion",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+query = '''
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and (
+  (process.user.id == "0" and process.real_user.id != "0") or
+  (process.group.id == "0" and process.real_group.id != "0")
+) and process.args in (
+  "/bin/su", "/usr/bin/su",
+  "/usr/bin/sudo",
+  "/bin/mount", "/usr/bin/mount",
+  "/bin/umount", "/usr/bin/umount",
+  "/usr/bin/fusermount3",
+  "/bin/passwd", "/usr/bin/passwd",
+  "/bin/chfn", "/usr/bin/chfn",
+  "/bin/chsh", "/usr/bin/chsh",
+  "/bin/gpasswd", "/usr/bin/gpasswd",
+  "/bin/newgrp", "/usr/bin/newgrp",
+  "/sbin/unix_chkpwd", "/usr/sbin/unix_chkpwd",
+  "/usr/bin/newuidmap", "/usr/bin/newgidmap",
+  "/usr/lib/dbus-1.0/dbus-daemon-launch-helper", "/usr/libexec/dbus-daemon-launch-helper",
+  "/usr/lib/openssh/ssh-keysign", "/usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keysign",
+  "/usr/bin/pkexec", "/usr/libexec/pkexec", "/usr/lib/polkit-1/pkexec",
+  "/usr/lib/polkit-1/polkit-agent-helper-1", "/usr/libexec/polkit-agent-helper-1",
+  "/usr/lib/snapd/snap-confine"
+) and process.parent.args_count == 1 
+'''
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1068"
+name = "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1548"
+name = "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1548.001"
+name = "Setuid and Setgid"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/001/"
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0004"
+name = "Privilege Escalation"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0003"
+name = "Persistence"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+name = "Defense Evasion"
+id = "TA0005"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1218"
+name = "System Binary Proxy Execution"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/"

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/privilege_escalation_potential_wildcard_shell_spawn.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2023/07/28"
+integration = ["endpoint", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel", "crowdstrike"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/10/17"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+This rule monitors for the execution of a set of linux binaries, that are potentially vulnerable to wildcard injection,
+with suspicious command line flags followed by a shell spawn event. Linux wildcard injection is a type of security
+vulnerability where attackers manipulate commands or input containing wildcards (e.g., *, ?, []) to execute unintended
+operations or access sensitive data by tricking the system into interpreting the wildcard characters in unexpected ways.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["logs-endpoint.events.process*", "logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*", "logs-crowdstrike.fdr*"]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Potential Shell via Wildcard Injection Detected"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating Potential Shell via Wildcard Injection Detected
+
+Wildcard injection exploits vulnerabilities in Linux command-line utilities by manipulating wildcard characters to execute unauthorized commands. Adversaries leverage this to escalate privileges or execute arbitrary code. The detection rule identifies suspicious use of vulnerable binaries like `tar`, `rsync`, and `zip` followed by shell execution, indicating potential exploitation attempts.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Review the process details to identify the specific command executed, focusing on the process name and arguments, especially those involving `tar`, `rsync`, or `zip` with suspicious flags like `--checkpoint=*`, `-e*`, or `--unzip-command`.
+- Examine the parent process information to determine if a shell process (e.g., `bash`, `sh`, `zsh`) was spawned, indicating potential exploitation.
+- Check the process execution path to ensure it does not match the exclusion pattern `/tmp/newroot/*`, which might indicate a benign operation.
+- Investigate the host's recent activity logs to identify any other suspicious or related events that might indicate a broader attack or compromise.
+- Correlate the alert with any other security events or alerts from the same host to assess if this is part of a larger attack pattern or campaign.
+- Assess the user account associated with the process execution to determine if it has the necessary privileges and if the activity aligns with expected behavior for that account.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Legitimate use of tar, rsync, or zip with wildcard-related flags in automated scripts or backup processes can trigger false positives. Review the context of these processes and consider excluding specific scripts or directories from monitoring if they are verified as safe.
+- System administrators or maintenance scripts may use shell commands following tar, rsync, or zip for legitimate purposes. Identify these routine operations and create exceptions for known safe parent processes or specific command patterns.
+- Development environments or testing scenarios might involve intentional use of wildcard characters for testing purposes. Exclude these environments from the rule or adjust the rule to ignore specific user accounts or process paths associated with development activities.
+- Scheduled tasks or cron jobs that involve the use of these binaries with wildcard flags can be mistaken for malicious activity. Verify the legitimacy of these tasks and exclude them based on their schedule or specific command line arguments.
+- Security tools or monitoring solutions that simulate attacks for testing or validation purposes might trigger this rule. Ensure these tools are recognized and excluded from monitoring to prevent unnecessary alerts.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Immediately isolate the affected host from the network to prevent further unauthorized access or lateral movement.
+- Terminate any suspicious processes identified in the alert, particularly those involving the execution of shell commands following the use of `tar`, `rsync`, or `zip`.
+- Conduct a thorough review of the affected system's logs to identify any additional indicators of compromise or unauthorized access attempts.
+- Restore the affected system from a known good backup if any unauthorized changes or malicious activities are confirmed.
+- Apply security patches and updates to the affected system to address any vulnerabilities that may have been exploited.
+- Implement file integrity monitoring on critical systems to detect unauthorized changes to system binaries or configuration files.
+- Escalate the incident to the security operations team for further investigation and to assess the potential impact on other systems within the network."""
+references = ["https://www.exploit-db.com/papers/33930"]
+risk_score = 47
+rule_id = "0b803267-74c5-444d-ae29-32b5db2d562a"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+#### Prerequisite Requirements:
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
+"""
+severity = "medium"
+tags = [
+  "Domain: Endpoint",
+  "OS: Linux",
+  "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+  "Tactic: Privilege Escalation",
+  "Tactic: Execution",
+  "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+  "Data Source: SentinelOne",
+  "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+  "Data Source: Crowdstrike",
+]
+type = "eql"
+
+query = '''
+sequence by host.id with maxspan=1s
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "start", "ProcessRollup2") and (
+    (process.name == "tar" and process.args : "--checkpoint=*" and process.args : "--checkpoint-action=*") or
+    (process.name == "rsync" and process.args : "-e*") or
+    (process.name == "zip" and process.args == "--unzip-command")
+   ) and not process.executable : "/tmp/newroot/*"
+  ]  by process.entity_id
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "start", "ProcessRollup2") and
+     process.parent.name : ("tar", "rsync", "zip") and
+     process.name : ("bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish")
+  ] by process.parent.entity_id
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1068"
+name = "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0004"
+name = "Privilege Escalation"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1059"
+name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0002"
+name = "Execution"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/privilege_escalation_sda_disk_mount_non_root.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2023/08/30"
+integration = ["endpoint"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/02/04"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+This rule monitors for the usage of the built-in Linux DebugFS utility to access a disk device without root permissions.
+Linux users that are part of the "disk" group have sufficient privileges to access all data inside of the machine
+through DebugFS. Attackers may leverage DebugFS in conjunction with "disk" permissions to read sensitive files owned by
+root, such as the shadow file, root ssh private keys or other sensitive files that may allow them to further escalate
+privileges.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["logs-endpoint.events.process*"]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Potential Suspicious DebugFS Root Device Access"
+references = [
+    "https://book.hacktricks.xyz/linux-hardening/privilege-escalation/interesting-groups-linux-pe#disk-group",
+]
+risk_score = 21
+rule_id = "2605aa59-29ac-4662-afad-8d86257c7c91"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+#### Prerequisite Requirements:
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
+"""
+severity = "low"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Linux",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Privilege Escalation",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+
+query = '''
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
+process.name == "debugfs" and process.args : "/dev/sd*" and not process.args == "-R" and
+not user.Ext.real.id == "0" and not group.Ext.real.id == "0"
+'''
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating Potential Suspicious DebugFS Root Device Access
+
+DebugFS is a Linux utility that provides a low-level interface to access and manipulate file systems, typically used for debugging purposes. It can be exploited by adversaries with "disk" group privileges to access sensitive files without root permissions, potentially leading to privilege escalation. The detection rule identifies non-root users executing DebugFS on disk devices, flagging potential unauthorized access attempts.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Review the process execution details to identify the non-root user and group involved in the DebugFS execution by examining the user.Ext.real.id and group.Ext.real.id fields.
+- Check the command-line arguments (process.args) to determine which specific disk device was accessed and assess if the access was legitimate or necessary for the user's role.
+- Investigate the user's recent activity and login history to identify any unusual patterns or unauthorized access attempts that might indicate malicious intent.
+- Verify the user's group memberships, particularly focusing on the "disk" group, to understand if the user should have such privileges and if any recent changes were made to their group assignments.
+- Examine system logs and other security alerts around the time of the DebugFS execution to identify any correlated suspicious activities or potential indicators of compromise.
+- Assess the system for any unauthorized changes or access to sensitive files, such as the shadow file or root SSH keys, which could indicate privilege escalation attempts.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Non-root system administrators or maintenance scripts may use DebugFS for legitimate disk diagnostics or recovery tasks. To handle this, identify and whitelist specific users or scripts that are known to perform these tasks regularly.
+- Automated backup or monitoring tools might invoke DebugFS as part of their operations. Review and exclude these tools by adding their process identifiers or user accounts to an exception list.
+- Developers or testers with disk group privileges might use DebugFS during development or testing phases. Establish a policy to document and approve such activities, and exclude these users from triggering alerts.
+- Educational or training environments where DebugFS is used for learning purposes can generate false positives. Create exceptions for these environments by specifying the associated user accounts or groups.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Immediately isolate the affected system from the network to prevent further unauthorized access or data exfiltration.
+- Revoke "disk" group privileges from non-essential users to limit access to disk devices and prevent misuse of DebugFS.
+- Conduct a thorough review of user accounts and group memberships to ensure only authorized personnel have "disk" group privileges.
+- Check for unauthorized access to sensitive files such as the shadow file or root SSH private keys and reset credentials if necessary.
+- Monitor for any additional suspicious activity on the affected system and related systems, focusing on privilege escalation attempts.
+- Escalate the incident to the security operations team for further investigation and to determine if additional systems are compromised.
+- Implement enhanced logging and monitoring for DebugFS usage and access to disk devices to detect similar threats in the future."""
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1078"
+name = "Valid Accounts"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1078.003"
+name = "Local Accounts"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/003/"
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0004"
+name = "Privilege Escalation"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/privilege_escalation_shadow_file_read.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2022/09/01"
+integration = ["endpoint"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/01/15"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Identifies access to the /etc/shadow file via the commandline using standard system utilities. After elevating
+privileges to root, threat actors may attempt to read or dump this file in order to gain valid credentials. They may
+utilize these to move laterally undetected and access additional resources.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["logs-endpoint.events.*", "endgame-*"]
+language = "kuery"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Potential Shadow File Read via Command Line Utilities"
+references = ["https://www.cyberciti.biz/faq/unix-linux-password-cracking-john-the-ripper/"]
+risk_score = 47
+rule_id = "9a3a3689-8ed1-4cdb-83fb-9506db54c61f"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+#### Prerequisite Requirements:
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
+"""
+severity = "medium"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Linux",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Privilege Escalation",
+    "Tactic: Credential Access",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "new_terms"
+query = '''
+host.os.type : "linux" and event.category : "process" and event.action : ("exec" or "exec_event") and
+(process.args : "/etc/shadow" or (process.working_directory: "/etc" and process.args: "shadow")) and not (
+  (process.executable : ("/bin/chown" or "/usr/bin/chown") and process.args : "root:shadow") or
+  (process.executable : ("/bin/chmod" or "/usr/bin/chmod") and process.args : "640") or
+  process.executable:(/vz/* or /var/lib/docker/* or /run/containerd/* or /tmp/.criu* or /tmp/newroot/*) or
+  process.parent.name:(gen_passwd_sets or scc_* or wazuh-modulesd)
+)
+'''
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating Potential Shadow File Read via Command Line Utilities
+
+In Linux environments, the `/etc/shadow` file stores hashed passwords, making it a prime target for attackers seeking credential access. Adversaries with elevated privileges may exploit command-line utilities to read this file, aiming to extract credentials for lateral movement. The detection rule identifies suspicious access attempts by monitoring process activities related to the file, excluding legitimate operations, thus highlighting potential unauthorized access attempts.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Review the process details to identify the executable and arguments used, focusing on the process.args field to confirm access attempts to /etc/shadow.
+- Check the process.parent.name field to determine the parent process and assess if it is associated with known legitimate activities or suspicious behavior.
+- Investigate the user context under which the process was executed to verify if the user had legitimate reasons to access the /etc/shadow file.
+- Examine the host's recent activity logs for any privilege escalation events that might have preceded the access attempt, indicating potential unauthorized privilege elevation.
+- Correlate the event with other alerts or logs from the same host to identify patterns or sequences of actions that suggest lateral movement or further credential access attempts.
+- Assess the environment for any recent changes or deployments that might explain the access attempt, such as updates or configuration changes involving user management.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- System maintenance tasks may trigger alerts when legitimate processes like chown or chmod access the /etc/shadow file. To handle these, consider excluding these specific processes when they are executed by trusted system administrators during scheduled maintenance.
+- Containerized environments might generate false positives if processes within containers access the /etc/shadow file. Exclude paths such as /var/lib/docker/* or /run/containerd/* to reduce noise from container operations.
+- Security tools like wazuh-modulesd or custom scripts (e.g., gen_passwd_sets) that legitimately interact with the /etc/shadow file for monitoring or compliance checks can be excluded by adding them to the process.parent.name exclusion list.
+- Automated scripts or cron jobs that perform routine checks or updates on system files, including /etc/shadow, should be reviewed and, if deemed safe, excluded from triggering alerts by specifying their process names or paths in the exclusion criteria.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Immediately isolate the affected system from the network to prevent further unauthorized access or lateral movement.
+- Terminate any suspicious processes identified in the alert that are attempting to access the /etc/shadow file.
+- Conduct a thorough review of user accounts and privileges on the affected system to identify any unauthorized privilege escalations or account creations.
+- Change all passwords for accounts on the affected system, especially those with elevated privileges, to mitigate the risk of credential compromise.
+- Review and update access controls and permissions for sensitive files like /etc/shadow to ensure they are restricted to only necessary users and processes.
+- Monitor for any further attempts to access the /etc/shadow file across the network, using enhanced logging and alerting mechanisms to detect similar threats.
+- Escalate the incident to the security operations team for further investigation and to determine if additional systems have been compromised."""
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1068"
+name = "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/"
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0004"
+name = "Privilege Escalation"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1003"
+name = "OS Credential Dumping"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1003.008"
+name = "/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/008/"
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0006"
+name = "Credential Access"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"
+
+[rule.new_terms]
+field = "new_terms_fields"
+value = ["process.executable"]
+
+[[rule.new_terms.history_window_start]]
+field = "history_window_start"
+value = "now-10d"