nldcsc-elastic-rules 0.0.8__py3-none-any.whl

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/persistence_dynamic_linker_backup.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2022/07/12"
+integration = ["endpoint", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/03/20"
+
+[transform]
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve File Listing Information"
+query = """
+SELECT * FROM file WHERE ( path = '/etc/ld.so.preload' OR path = '/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2' OR path =
+'/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2' OR path = '/usr/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2' OR path =
+'/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2' )
+"""
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Additional File Listing Information"
+query = """
+SELECT f.path, u.username AS file_owner, g.groupname AS group_owner, datetime(f.atime, 'unixepoch') AS
+file_last_access_time, datetime(f.mtime, 'unixepoch') AS file_last_modified_time, datetime(f.ctime, 'unixepoch') AS
+file_last_status_change_time, datetime(f.btime, 'unixepoch') AS file_created_time, f.size AS size_bytes FROM file f LEFT
+JOIN users u ON f.uid = u.uid LEFT JOIN groups g ON f.gid = g.gid WHERE ( path = '/etc/ld.so.preload' OR path =
+'/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2' OR path = '/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2' OR path =
+'/usr/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2' OR path = '/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2' )
+"""
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Running Processes by User"
+query = "SELECT pid, username, name FROM processes p JOIN users u ON u.uid = p.uid ORDER BY username"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Listening Ports"
+query = "SELECT pid, address, port, socket, protocol, path FROM listening_ports"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Open Sockets"
+query = "SELECT pid, family, remote_address, remote_port, socket, state FROM process_open_sockets"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Information for a Specific User"
+query = "SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = {{user.name}}"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Investigate the Account Authentication Status"
+query = "SELECT * FROM logged_in_users WHERE user = {{user.name}}"
+
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Detects the copying of the Linux dynamic loader binary and subsequent file creation for the purpose of creating a backup
+copy. This technique was seen recently being utilized by Linux malware prior to patching the dynamic loader in order to
+inject and preload a malicious shared object file. This activity should never occur and if it does then it should be
+considered highly suspicious or malicious.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["logs-endpoint.events.file*", "logs-endpoint.events.process*", "logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*"]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Dynamic Linker Copy"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+### Investigating Dynamic Linker Copy
+
+The Linux dynamic linker is responsible for loading shared libraries required by executables at runtime. It is a critical component of the Linux operating system and should not be tampered with. 
+
+Adversaries may attempt to copy the dynamic linker binary and create a backup copy before patching it to inject and preload malicious shared object files. This technique has been observed in recent Linux malware attacks and is considered highly suspicious or malicious.
+
+The detection rule 'Dynamic Linker Copy' is designed to identify such abuse by monitoring for processes with names "cp" or "rsync" that involve copying the dynamic linker binary ("/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2") and modifying the "/etc/ld.so.preload" file. Additionally, the rule checks for the creation of new files with the "so" extension on Linux systems. By detecting these activities within a short time span (1 minute), the rule aims to alert security analysts to potential malicious behavior.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the [Osquery Markdown Plugin](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/invest-guide-run-osquery.html) introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+> This investigation guide uses [placeholder fields](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/osquery-placeholder-fields.html) to dynamically pass alert data into Osquery queries. Placeholder fields were introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.7.0. If you're using Elastic Stack version 8.6.0 or earlier, you'll need to manually adjust this investigation guide's queries to ensure they properly run.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Investigate the dynamic linker that was copied or altered.
+  - $osquery_0
+  - $osquery_1
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence and whether they are located in expected locations.
+  - $osquery_2
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Validate the activity is not related to planned patches, updates, network administrator activity, or legitimate software installations.
+- Investigate whether the altered scripts call other malicious scripts elsewhere on the file system. 
+  - If scripts or executables were dropped, retrieve the files and determine if they are malicious:
+    - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+      - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+        - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+          - Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
+          - Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
+        - File access, modification, and creation activities.
+- Investigate abnormal behaviors by the subject process/user such as network connections, file modifications, and any other spawned child processes.
+  - Investigate listening ports and open sockets to look for potential command and control traffic or data exfiltration.
+    - $osquery_3
+    - $osquery_4
+  - Identify the user account that performed the action, analyze it, and check whether it should perform this kind of action.
+    - $osquery_5
+- Investigate whether the user is currently logged in and active.
+    - $osquery_6
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
+- Any activity that triggered the alert and is not inherently malicious must be monitored by the security team.
+- The security team should address any potential benign true positive (B-TP), as this configuration can put the user and the domain at risk.
+- Try to understand the context of the execution by thinking about the user, machine, or business purpose. A small number of endpoints, such as servers with unique software, might appear unusual but satisfy a specific business need.
+
+### Related Rules
+
+- Modification of Dynamic Linker Preload Shared Object Inside A Container - 342f834b-21a6-41bf-878c-87d116eba3ee
+- Modification of Dynamic Linker Preload Shared Object - 717f82c2-7741-4f9b-85b8-d06aeb853f4f
+- Shared Object Created or Changed by Previously Unknown Process - aebaa51f-2a91-4f6a-850b-b601db2293f4
+
+### Response and Remediation
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+"""
+references = ["https://www.intezer.com/blog/incident-response/orbit-new-undetected-linux-threat/"]
+risk_score = 73
+rule_id = "df6f62d9-caab-4b88-affa-044f4395a1e0"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+#### Prerequisite Requirements:
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
+"""
+severity = "high"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Linux",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Persistence",
+    "Threat: Orbit",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Data Source: SentinelOne",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+type = "eql"
+
+query = '''
+sequence by process.entity_id with maxspan=1m
+[process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and process.name in ("cp", "rsync") and
+   process.args in (
+     "/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2", "/etc/ld.so.preload", "/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2",
+     "/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2", "/usr/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2"
+    )]
+[file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "creation" and file.extension == "so"]
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1574"
+name = "Hijack Execution Flow"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1574.006"
+name = "Dynamic Linker Hijacking"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/006/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0003"
+name = "Persistence"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/persistence_extract_initramfs_via_cpio.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2025/01/16"
+integration = ["endpoint", "auditd_manager", "crowdstrike", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/09/29"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+This rule detects the extraction of an initramfs image using the "cpio" command on Linux systems. The "cpio" command is
+used to create or extract cpio archives. Attackers may extract the initramfs image to modify the contents or add
+malicious files, which can be leveraged to maintain persistence on the system.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = [
+    "logs-endpoint.events.process*",
+    "endgame-*",
+    "auditbeat-*",
+    "logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*",
+    "logs-crowdstrike.fdr*",
+    "logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*",
+]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Initramfs Extraction via CPIO"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating Initramfs Extraction via CPIO
+
+Initramfs is a temporary filesystem used during the Linux boot process, containing essential drivers and scripts. Attackers may exploit the `cpio` command to extract and modify initramfs, embedding malicious files to ensure persistence. The detection rule identifies suspicious `cpio` usage by monitoring process execution patterns, excluding legitimate parent processes, to flag potential threats.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Review the process execution details to confirm the presence of the cpio command with arguments "-H" or "--format" and "newc" to ensure the alert is not a false positive.
+- Investigate the parent process of the cpio command to determine if it is an unexpected or unauthorized process, as legitimate processes like mkinitramfs or dracut should be excluded.
+- Check the execution path of the parent process to verify if it matches any known legitimate paths such as "/usr/share/initramfs-tools/*" or "/nix/store/*".
+- Analyze the timeline of events around the cpio execution to identify any preceding or subsequent suspicious activities that might indicate a broader attack or persistence mechanism.
+- Examine the system for any unauthorized modifications or additions to the initramfs image that could indicate tampering or the presence of malicious files.
+- Correlate the alert with other security data sources like Elastic Endgame, Elastic Defend, or Crowdstrike to gather additional context and assess the scope of the potential threat.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Legitimate system updates or maintenance activities may trigger the rule when tools like mkinitramfs or dracut are used. To handle this, ensure these processes are excluded by verifying that the parent process is mkinitramfs or dracut.
+- Custom scripts or automation tools that manage initramfs might use cpio in a non-malicious context. Review these scripts and add their parent process names or paths to the exclusion list if they are verified as safe.
+- Systems using non-standard initramfs management tools located in directories like /usr/share/initramfs-tools or /nix/store may cause false positives. Confirm these tools' legitimacy and update the exclusion paths accordingly.
+- Development or testing environments where initramfs is frequently modified for legitimate reasons can generate alerts. Consider creating environment-specific exceptions to reduce noise while maintaining security in production systems.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Isolate the affected system from the network to prevent further unauthorized access or spread of potential malware.
+- Terminate any suspicious processes related to the `cpio` command that do not have legitimate parent processes, such as `mkinitramfs` or `dracut`.
+- Conduct a thorough review of the extracted initramfs contents to identify and remove any unauthorized or malicious files.
+- Restore the initramfs from a known good backup to ensure system integrity and remove any potential persistence mechanisms.
+- Monitor the system for any further suspicious activity, particularly related to the `cpio` command, to ensure the threat has been fully mitigated.
+- Escalate the incident to the security operations team for further analysis and to determine if additional systems may be affected.
+- Update security policies and procedures to include specific checks for unauthorized `cpio` usage and enhance detection capabilities for similar threats."""
+risk_score = 21
+rule_id = "17b3fcd1-90fb-4f5d-858c-dc1d998fa368"
+setup = """## Setup
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+#### Prerequisite Requirements:
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
+"""
+severity = "low"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Linux",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Persistence",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Data Source: Auditd Manager",
+    "Data Source: Crowdstrike",
+    "Data Source: SentinelOne",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+query = '''
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and
+event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "start", "ProcessRollup2", "executed") and
+process.name == "cpio" and process.args in ("-H", "--format") and process.args == "newc" and
+not (
+  process.parent.name in ("mkinitramfs", "dracut") or
+  ?process.parent.executable like~ ("/usr/share/initramfs-tools/*", "/nix/store/*") or
+  ?process.parent.args in (
+    "/bin/dracut", "/usr/share/initramfs-tools/hooks/amd64_microcode", "/usr/bin/dracut", "/usr/sbin/mkinitramfs",
+    "/usr/sbin/dracut", "/usr/bin/update-microcode-initrd"
+  ) or
+  process.args like ("/var/tmp/mkinitramfs_*", "/tmp/tmp.*/mkinitramfs_*") or
+  ?process.working_directory like (
+    "/var/tmp/mkinitramfs-*", "/tmp/microcode-initrd_*", "/var/tmp/mkinitramfs-*", "/var/tmp/dracut.*",
+    "/var/tmp/mkinitramfs_*"
+  )
+)
+'''
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1542"
+name = "Pre-OS Boot"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1543"
+name = "Create or Modify System Process"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1574"
+name = "Hijack Execution Flow"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/"
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0003"
+name = "Persistence"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/persistence_git_hook_execution.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2024/07/15"
+integration = ["endpoint", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel", "crowdstrike"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/10/17"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+This rule detects the execution of a potentially malicious process from a Git hook. Git hooks are scripts that Git
+executes before or after events such as: commit, push, and receive. An attacker can abuse Git hooks to execute arbitrary
+commands on the system and establish persistence.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["logs-endpoint.events.process*", "logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*", "logs-crowdstrike.fdr*"]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Git Hook Command Execution"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating Git Hook Command Execution
+
+Git hooks are scripts that automate tasks by executing before or after Git events like commits or pushes. While useful for developers, adversaries can exploit them to run malicious commands, gaining persistence or evading defenses. The detection rule identifies suspicious processes initiated by Git hooks, focusing on shell executions, to flag potential abuse on Linux systems.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Review the alert details to identify the specific Git hook script path and the suspicious process name that was executed, as indicated by the process.args and process.name fields.
+- Examine the process tree to understand the parent-child relationship, focusing on the process.parent.name and process.entity_id fields, to determine how the suspicious process was initiated.
+- Check the Git repository's history and recent changes to the .git/hooks directory to identify any unauthorized modifications or additions to the hook scripts.
+- Investigate the user account associated with the process execution to determine if the activity aligns with their typical behavior or if it indicates potential compromise.
+- Analyze the command-line arguments and environment variables of the suspicious process to gather more context on the nature of the executed command.
+- Correlate this event with other security alerts or logs from the same host.id to identify any patterns or additional indicators of compromise.
+- If possible, isolate the affected system and conduct a deeper forensic analysis to uncover any further malicious activity or persistence mechanisms.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Developers using Git hooks for legitimate automation tasks may trigger this rule. To manage this, identify and document common scripts used in your development environment and create exceptions for these known benign processes.
+- Continuous integration and deployment (CI/CD) systems often utilize Git hooks to automate workflows. Review the processes initiated by these systems and exclude them from detection if they are verified as non-malicious.
+- Custom scripts executed via Git hooks for project-specific tasks can also cause false positives. Collaborate with development teams to catalog these scripts and adjust the detection rule to exclude them.
+- Frequent updates or changes in Git repositories might lead to repeated triggering of the rule. Monitor these activities and, if consistent and verified as safe, consider adding them to an allowlist to reduce noise.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Immediately isolate the affected system from the network to prevent further malicious activity and lateral movement.
+- Terminate any suspicious processes identified as being executed from Git hooks, especially those involving shell executions.
+- Conduct a thorough review of the .git/hooks directory on the affected system to identify and remove any unauthorized or malicious scripts.
+- Restore any modified or deleted files from a known good backup to ensure system integrity.
+- Implement monitoring for any future modifications to the .git/hooks directory to detect unauthorized changes promptly.
+- Escalate the incident to the security operations team for further investigation and to determine if additional systems are affected.
+- Review and update access controls and permissions for Git repositories to limit the ability to modify hooks to trusted users only."""
+references = [
+    "https://swisskyrepo.github.io/InternalAllTheThings/redteam/persistence/linux-persistence/#backdooring-git",
+    "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/sequel-on-persistence-mechanisms",
+]
+risk_score = 47
+rule_id = "dc61f382-dc0c-4cc0-a845-069f2a071704"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+#### Prerequisite Requirements:
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
+"""
+severity = "medium"
+tags = [
+  "Domain: Endpoint",
+  "OS: Linux",
+  "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+  "Tactic: Persistence",
+  "Tactic: Execution",
+  "Tactic: Defense Evasion",
+  "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+  "Data Source: SentinelOne",
+  "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+  "Data Source: Crowdstrike",
+]
+type = "eql"
+
+query = '''
+sequence by host.id with maxspan=3s
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "start", "ProcessRollup2") and
+   process.parent.name == "git" and process.args : ".git/hooks/*" and
+   process.name in ("bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish")
+  ] by process.entity_id
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "start", "ProcessRollup2") and
+   process.parent.name in ("bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish")] by process.parent.entity_id
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1543"
+name = "Create or Modify System Process"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1574"
+name = "Hijack Execution Flow"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0003"
+name = "Persistence"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1059"
+name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1059.004"
+name = "Unix Shell"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0002"
+name = "Execution"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0005"
+name = "Defense Evasion"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
+