nldcsc-elastic-rules 0.0.8__py3-none-any.whl

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/persistence_kde_autostart_modification.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,246 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2021/01/06"
+integration = ["endpoint", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/03/20"
+
+[transform]
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve File Listing Information"
+query = """
+SELECT * FROM file WHERE ( path LIKE '/home/%/.config/autostart/%.sh' OR path LIKE '/home/%/.config/autostart/%.desktop'
+OR path LIKE '/root/.config/autostart/%.sh' OR path LIKE '/root/.config/autostart/%.desktop' OR path LIKE
+'/home/%/.kde/Autostart/%.sh' OR path LIKE '/home/%/.kde/Autostart/%.desktop' OR path LIKE '/root/.kde/Autostart/%.sh'
+OR path LIKE '/root/.kde/Autostart/%.desktop' OR path LIKE '/home/%/.kde4/Autostart/%.sh' OR path LIKE
+'/home/%/.kde4/Autostart/%.desktop' OR path LIKE '/root/.kde4/Autostart/%.sh' OR path LIKE
+'/root/.kde4/Autostart/%.desktop' OR path LIKE '/home/%/.kde/share/autostart/%.sh' OR path LIKE
+'/home/%/.kde/share/autostart/%.desktop' OR path LIKE '/root/.kde/share/autostart/%.sh' OR path LIKE
+'/root/.kde/share/autostart/%.desktop' OR path LIKE '/home/%/.kde4/share/autostart/%.sh' OR path LIKE
+'/home/%/.kde4/share/autostart/%.desktop' OR path LIKE '/root/.kde4/share/autostart/%.sh' OR path LIKE
+'/root/.kde4/share/autostart/%.desktop' OR path LIKE '/home/%/.local/share/autostart/%.sh' OR path LIKE
+'/home/%/.local/share/autostart/%.desktop' OR path LIKE '/root/.local/share/autostart/%.sh' OR path LIKE
+'/root/.local/share/autostart/%.desktop' OR path LIKE '/home/%/.config/autostart-scripts/%.sh' OR path LIKE
+'/home/%/.config/autostart-scripts/%.desktop' OR path LIKE '/root/.config/autostart-scripts/%.sh' OR path LIKE
+'/root/.config/autostart-scripts/%.desktop' OR path LIKE '/etc/xdg/autostart/%.sh' OR path LIKE
+'/etc/xdg/autostart/%.desktop' OR path LIKE '/usr/share/autostart/%.sh' OR path LIKE '/usr/share/autostart/%.desktop' )
+"""
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Additional File Listing Information"
+query = """
+SELECT f.path, u.username AS file_owner, g.groupname AS group_owner, datetime(f.atime, 'unixepoch') AS
+file_last_access_time, datetime(f.mtime, 'unixepoch') AS file_last_modified_time, datetime(f.ctime, 'unixepoch') AS
+file_last_status_change_time, datetime(f.btime, 'unixepoch') AS file_created_time, f.size AS size_bytes FROM file f LEFT
+JOIN users u ON f.uid = u.uid LEFT JOIN groups g ON f.gid = g.gid WHERE ( path LIKE '/home/%/.config/autostart/%.sh' OR
+path LIKE '/home/%/.config/autostart/%.desktop' OR path LIKE '/root/.config/autostart/%.sh' OR path LIKE
+'/root/.config/autostart/%.desktop' OR path LIKE '/home/%/.kde/Autostart/%.sh' OR path LIKE
+'/home/%/.kde/Autostart/%.desktop' OR path LIKE '/root/.kde/Autostart/%.sh' OR path LIKE
+'/root/.kde/Autostart/%.desktop' OR path LIKE '/home/%/.kde4/Autostart/%.sh' OR path LIKE
+'/home/%/.kde4/Autostart/%.desktop' OR path LIKE '/root/.kde4/Autostart/%.sh' OR path LIKE
+'/root/.kde4/Autostart/%.desktop' OR path LIKE '/home/%/.kde/share/autostart/%.sh' OR path LIKE
+'/home/%/.kde/share/autostart/%.desktop' OR path LIKE '/root/.kde/share/autostart/%.sh' OR path LIKE
+'/root/.kde/share/autostart/%.desktop' OR path LIKE '/home/%/.kde4/share/autostart/%.sh' OR path LIKE
+'/home/%/.kde4/share/autostart/%.desktop' OR path LIKE '/root/.kde4/share/autostart/%.sh' OR path LIKE
+'/root/.kde4/share/autostart/%.desktop' OR path LIKE '/home/%/.local/share/autostart/%.sh' OR path LIKE
+'/home/%/.local/share/autostart/%.desktop' OR path LIKE '/root/.local/share/autostart/%.sh' OR path LIKE
+'/root/.local/share/autostart/%.desktop' OR path LIKE '/home/%/.config/autostart-scripts/%.sh' OR path LIKE
+'/home/%/.config/autostart-scripts/%.desktop' OR path LIKE '/root/.config/autostart-scripts/%.sh' OR path LIKE
+'/root/.config/autostart-scripts/%.desktop' OR path LIKE '/etc/xdg/autostart/%.sh' OR path LIKE
+'/etc/xdg/autostart/%.desktop' OR path LIKE '/usr/share/autostart/%.sh' OR path LIKE '/usr/share/autostart/%.desktop' )
+"""
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Running Processes by User"
+query = "SELECT pid, username, name FROM processes p JOIN users u ON u.uid = p.uid ORDER BY username"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Crontab Information"
+query = "SELECT * FROM crontab"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Listening Ports"
+query = "SELECT pid, address, port, socket, protocol, path FROM listening_ports"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Open Sockets"
+query = "SELECT pid, family, remote_address, remote_port, socket, state FROM process_open_sockets"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Retrieve Information for a Specific User"
+query = "SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = {{user.name}}"
+
+[[transform.osquery]]
+label = "Osquery - Investigate the Account Authentication Status"
+query = "SELECT * FROM logged_in_users WHERE user = {{user.name}}"
+
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Identifies the creation or modification of a K Desktop Environment (KDE) AutoStart script or desktop file that will
+execute upon each user logon. Adversaries may abuse this method for persistence.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["auditbeat-*", "endgame-*", "logs-endpoint.events.file*", "logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*"]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Persistence via KDE AutoStart Script or Desktop File Modification"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+### Investigating Persistence via KDE AutoStart Script or Desktop File Modification
+
+K Desktop Environment (KDE) is a popular graphical desktop environment for Linux systems. It supports AutoStart scripts and desktop files that execute automatically upon user logon.
+
+Adversaries may exploit this feature to maintain persistence on a compromised system by creating or modifying these files.
+
+The detection rule 'Persistence via KDE AutoStart Script or Desktop File Modification' is designed to identify such activities by monitoring file events on Linux systems. It specifically targets the creation or modification of files with extensions ".sh" or ".desktop" in various AutoStart directories. By detecting these events, the rule helps security analysts identify potential abuse of KDE AutoStart functionality by malicious actors.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the [Osquery Markdown Plugin](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/invest-guide-run-osquery.html) introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+> This investigation guide uses [placeholder fields](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/osquery-placeholder-fields.html) to dynamically pass alert data into Osquery queries. Placeholder fields were introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.7.0. If you're using Elastic Stack version 8.6.0 or earlier, you'll need to manually adjust this investigation guide's queries to ensure they properly run.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Investigate the file that was created or modified.
+  - $osquery_0
+  - $osquery_1
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence and whether they are located in expected locations.
+  - $osquery_2
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Validate the activity is not related to planned patches, updates, network administrator activity, or legitimate software installations.
+- Investigate whether the altered scripts call other malicious scripts elsewhere on the file system. 
+  - If scripts or executables were dropped, retrieve the files and determine if they are malicious:
+    - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+      - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+        - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+          - Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
+          - Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
+        - File access, modification, and creation activities.
+        - Cron jobs, services and other persistence mechanisms.
+            - $osquery_3
+- Investigate abnormal behaviors by the subject process/user such as network connections, file modifications, and any other spawned child processes.
+  - Investigate listening ports and open sockets to look for potential command and control traffic or data exfiltration.
+    - $osquery_4
+    - $osquery_5
+  - Identify the user account that performed the action, analyze it, and check whether it should perform this kind of action.
+    - $osquery_6
+- Investigate whether the user is currently logged in and active.
+    - $osquery_7
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- If this activity is related to new benign software installation activity, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of user and command line conditions.
+- If this activity is related to a system administrator who uses cron jobs for administrative purposes, consider adding exceptions for this specific administrator user account. 
+- Try to understand the context of the execution by thinking about the user, machine, or business purpose. A small number of endpoints, such as servers with unique software, might appear unusual but satisfy a specific business need.
+
+### Response and Remediation
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+"""
+references = [
+    "https://userbase.kde.org/System_Settings/Autostart",
+    "https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2020/09/german-made-finspy-spyware-found-in-egypt-and-mac-and-linux-versions-revealed/",
+    "https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/operation-electrorat-attacker-creates-fake-companies-to-drain-your-crypto-wallets/",
+    "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/primer-on-persistence-mechanisms",
+]
+risk_score = 47
+rule_id = "e3e904b3-0a8e-4e68-86a8-977a163e21d3"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
+- Elastic Defend
+- Auditbeat
+
+### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+#### Prerequisite Requirements:
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
+
+### Auditbeat Setup
+Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit the activities of users and processes on your systems. For example, you can use Auditbeat to collect and centralize audit events from the Linux Audit Framework. You can also use Auditbeat to detect changes to critical files, like binaries and configuration files, and identify potential security policy violations.
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Auditbeat on a Linux System:
+- Elastic provides repositories available for APT and YUM-based distributions. Note that we provide binary packages, but no source packages.
+- To install the APT and YUM repositories follow the setup instructions in this [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setup-repositories.html).
+- To run Auditbeat on Docker follow the setup instructions in the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-docker.html).
+- To run Auditbeat on Kubernetes follow the setup instructions in the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-kubernetes.html).
+- For complete “Setup and Run Auditbeat” information refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html).
+
+#### Custom Ingest Pipeline
+For versions <8.2, you need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate `event.ingested` with @timestamp for non-elastic-agent indexes, like auditbeats/filebeat/winlogbeat etc. For more details to add a custom ingest pipeline refer to the [guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html).
+"""
+severity = "medium"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Linux",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Persistence",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Data Source: SentinelOne",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+
+query = '''
+file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type != "deletion" and
+  file.extension in ("sh", "desktop") and
+  file.path :
+    (
+      "/home/*/.config/autostart/*", "/root/.config/autostart/*",
+      "/home/*/.kde/Autostart/*", "/root/.kde/Autostart/*",
+      "/home/*/.kde4/Autostart/*", "/root/.kde4/Autostart/*",
+      "/home/*/.kde/share/autostart/*", "/root/.kde/share/autostart/*",
+      "/home/*/.kde4/share/autostart/*", "/root/.kde4/share/autostart/*",
+      "/home/*/.local/share/autostart/*", "/root/.local/share/autostart/*",
+      "/home/*/.config/autostart-scripts/*", "/root/.config/autostart-scripts/*",
+      "/etc/xdg/autostart/*", "/usr/share/autostart/*"
+    ) and
+    not process.name in (
+      "yum", "dpkg", "install", "dnf", "teams", "yum-cron", "dnf-automatic", "docker", "dockerd", "rpm", "pacman",
+      "podman", "nautilus", "remmina", "cinnamon-settings.py", "executor", "xfce4-clipman", "jetbrains-toolbox",
+      "ansible-admin", "apk"
+    )
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1547"
+name = "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0003"
+name = "Persistence"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/persistence_kernel_driver_load.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2023/10/26"
+integration = ["auditd_manager"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/01/15"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Detects the loading of a Linux kernel module through system calls. Threat actors may leverage Linux kernel modules to
+load a rootkit on a system providing them with complete control and the ability to hide from security products. As other
+rules monitor for the addition of Linux kernel modules through system utilities or .ko files, this rule covers the gap
+that evasive rootkits leverage by monitoring for kernel module additions on the lowest level through auditd_manager.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["auditbeat-*", "logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*"]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Kernel Driver Load"
+risk_score = 21
+rule_id = "3e12a439-d002-4944-bc42-171c0dcb9b96"
+setup = """## Setup
+This rule requires the use of the `auditd_manager` integration. `Auditd_manager` is a tool designed to simplify and enhance the management of the audit subsystem in Linux systems. It provides a user-friendly interface and automation capabilities for configuring and monitoring system auditing through the auditd daemon. With `auditd_manager`, administrators can easily define audit rules, track system events, and generate comprehensive audit reports, improving overall security and compliance in the system. The following steps should be executed in order to install and deploy `auditd_manager` on a Linux system.
+
+```
+Kibana -->
+Management -->
+Integrations -->
+Auditd Manager -->
+Add Auditd Manager
+```
+
+`Auditd_manager` subscribes to the kernel and receives events as they occur without any additional configuration. However, if more advanced configuration is required to detect specific behavior, audit rules can be added to the integration in either the "audit rules" configuration box or the "auditd rule files" box by specifying a file to read the audit rules from.
+
+For this detection rule to trigger, the following additional audit rules are required to be added to the integration:
+```
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S finit_module -S init_module -S delete_module -F auid!=-1 -k modules
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S finit_module -S init_module -S delete_module -F auid!=-1 -k modules
+```
+
+Add the newly installed `auditd manager` to an agent policy, and deploy the agent on a Linux system from which auditd log files are desirable.
+"""
+severity = "low"
+tags = [
+    "Data Source: Auditd Manager",
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Linux",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Persistence",
+    "Tactic: Defense Evasion",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+
+query = '''
+driver where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "loaded-kernel-module" and
+auditd.data.syscall in ("init_module", "finit_module")
+'''
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating Kernel Driver Load
+
+Kernel modules extend the functionality of the Linux kernel, allowing dynamic loading of drivers and other components. Adversaries exploit this by loading malicious modules, or rootkits, to gain stealthy control over systems. The 'Kernel Driver Load' detection rule leverages auditd to monitor system calls like `init_module`, identifying unauthorized module loads indicative of potential rootkit activity, thus enhancing threat detection and system integrity.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Review the alert details to identify the specific host where the kernel module was loaded, focusing on the host.os.type field to confirm it is a Linux system.
+- Examine the event.action field to verify that the action was indeed "loaded-kernel-module" and check the auditd.data.syscall field for the specific system call used, either "init_module" or "finit_module".
+- Investigate the timeline of events on the affected host around the time of the alert to identify any suspicious activities or changes, such as new user accounts, unexpected network connections, or file modifications.
+- Check the system logs and audit logs on the affected host for any additional context or anomalies that coincide with the module load event.
+- Identify the source and legitimacy of the loaded kernel module by examining the module's file path, signature, and associated metadata, if available.
+- Assess the potential impact and scope of the incident by determining if similar alerts have been triggered on other hosts within the environment, indicating a broader campaign or attack.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Legitimate kernel module updates or installations can trigger alerts. Regularly scheduled updates or installations by trusted administrators should be documented and excluded from monitoring to reduce noise.
+- System utilities that load kernel modules as part of their normal operation may cause false positives. Identify these utilities and create exceptions for their expected behavior.
+- Automated configuration management tools that deploy or update kernel modules can generate alerts. Ensure these tools are recognized and their activities are whitelisted.
+- Development environments where kernel modules are frequently compiled and tested may lead to frequent alerts. Exclude specific development hosts or processes from monitoring to avoid unnecessary alerts.
+- Security software that loads kernel modules for protection purposes might be flagged. Verify and exclude these modules if they are from trusted vendors.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Isolate the affected system from the network immediately to prevent further malicious activity and lateral movement.
+- Verify the legitimacy of the loaded kernel module by checking its source and integrity. If the module is unauthorized or suspicious, unload it using appropriate system commands.
+- Conduct a thorough scan of the system using updated antivirus or anti-malware tools to identify and remove any additional malicious components or rootkits.
+- Review and analyze system logs, especially those related to auditd, to identify any unauthorized access or changes made by the adversary. This can help in understanding the scope of the compromise.
+- Restore the system from a known good backup if the integrity of the system is in question and if the malicious activity cannot be fully remediated.
+- Implement stricter access controls and monitoring on kernel module loading activities to prevent unauthorized actions in the future. This may include restricting module loading to trusted users or processes.
+- Escalate the incident to the security operations center (SOC) or incident response team for further investigation and to determine if additional systems are affected."""
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1547"
+name = "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1547.006"
+name = "Kernel Modules and Extensions"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/006/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0003"
+name = "Persistence"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1014"
+name = "Rootkit"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0005"
+name = "Defense Evasion"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/persistence_kernel_driver_load_by_non_root.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2024/01/10"
+integration = ["auditd_manager"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/01/15"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Detects the loading of a Linux kernel module by a non-root user through system calls. Threat actors may leverage Linux
+kernel modules to load a rootkit on a system providing them with complete control and the ability to hide from security
+products. As other rules monitor for the addition of Linux kernel modules through system utilities or .ko files, this
+rule covers the gap that evasive rootkits leverage by monitoring for kernel module additions on the lowest level through
+auditd_manager.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*"]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Kernel Driver Load by non-root User"
+risk_score = 47
+rule_id = "ba81c182-4287-489d-af4d-8ae834b06040"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Auditd Manager.
+
+### Auditd Manager Integration Setup
+The Auditd Manager Integration receives audit events from the Linux Audit Framework which is a part of the Linux kernel.
+Auditd Manager provides a user-friendly interface and automation capabilities for configuring and monitoring system auditing through the auditd daemon. With `auditd_manager`, administrators can easily define audit rules, track system events, and generate comprehensive audit reports, improving overall security and compliance in the system.
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Agent System integration "auditd_manager" on a Linux System:
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click “Add integrations”.
+- In the query bar, search for “Auditd Manager” and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click “Add Auditd Manager”.
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Review optional and advanced settings accordingly.
+- Add the newly installed “auditd manager” to an existing or a new agent policy, and deploy the agent on a Linux system from which auditd log files are desirable.
+- Click “Save and Continue”.
+- For more details on the integration refer to the [helper guide](https://docs.elastic.co/integrations/auditd_manager).
+
+#### Rule Specific Setup Note
+Auditd Manager subscribes to the kernel and receives events as they occur without any additional configuration.
+However, if more advanced configuration is required to detect specific behavior, audit rules can be added to the integration in either the "audit rules" configuration box or the "auditd rule files" box by specifying a file to read the audit rules from.
+- For this detection rule the following additional audit rules are required to be added to the integration:
+  -- "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S finit_module -S init_module -S delete_module -F auid!=-1 -k modules"
+  -- "-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S finit_module -S init_module -S delete_module -F auid!=-1 -k modules"
+"""
+severity = "medium"
+tags = [
+    "Data Source: Auditd Manager",
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Linux",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Persistence",
+    "Tactic: Defense Evasion",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+
+query = '''
+driver where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "loaded-kernel-module" and
+auditd.data.syscall in ("init_module", "finit_module") and user.id != "0"
+'''
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating Kernel Driver Load by non-root User
+
+Kernel modules extend the functionality of the Linux kernel, allowing dynamic loading of drivers or features. Typically, only root users can load these modules due to their potential to alter system behavior. Adversaries may exploit this by loading malicious modules, such as rootkits, to gain control and evade detection. The detection rule identifies non-root users attempting to load modules, signaling potential unauthorized activity.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Review the alert details to identify the non-root user (user.id) involved in the kernel module loading attempt.
+- Check the system logs and audit logs for any additional context around the time of the event, focusing on the specific system calls (init_module, finit_module) used.
+- Investigate the source and legitimacy of the kernel module being loaded by examining the module's file path and associated metadata.
+- Assess the user's recent activity and permissions to determine if there are any signs of privilege escalation or unauthorized access.
+- Correlate this event with other security alerts or anomalies on the same host to identify potential patterns of malicious behavior.
+- Verify the integrity and security posture of the affected system by running a comprehensive malware and rootkit scan.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Legitimate software or system utilities may occasionally load kernel modules as part of their normal operation. Identify these applications and verify their behavior to ensure they are not malicious.
+- Development environments or testing scenarios might involve non-root users loading kernel modules for legitimate purposes. Consider creating exceptions for these specific users or processes after thorough validation.
+- Some system management tools or scripts executed by non-root users might trigger this rule. Review these tools and, if deemed safe, add them to an exception list to prevent unnecessary alerts.
+- In environments where non-root users are granted specific permissions to load kernel modules, ensure these permissions are documented and monitored. Adjust the rule to exclude these known and authorized activities.
+- Regularly review and update the list of exceptions to ensure that only verified and non-threatening behaviors are excluded, maintaining the integrity of the detection rule.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Immediately isolate the affected system from the network to prevent further unauthorized access or potential lateral movement by the adversary.
+- Terminate any suspicious processes associated with the non-root user attempting to load the kernel module to halt any ongoing malicious activity.
+- Conduct a thorough review of the loaded kernel modules on the affected system to identify and remove any unauthorized or malicious modules.
+- Reset credentials and review permissions for the non-root user involved in the alert to prevent further unauthorized actions.
+- Escalate the incident to the security operations team for a deeper forensic analysis to determine the scope of the compromise and identify any additional affected systems.
+- Implement enhanced monitoring and logging for kernel module loading activities across all systems to detect similar threats in the future.
+- Review and update security policies to ensure that only authorized users have the necessary permissions to load kernel modules, reducing the risk of unauthorized access."""
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1547"
+name = "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1547.006"
+name = "Kernel Modules and Extensions"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/006/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0003"
+name = "Persistence"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1014"
+name = "Rootkit"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0005"
+name = "Defense Evasion"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/persistence_kernel_object_file_creation.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2024/12/19"
+integration = ["endpoint"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/01/24"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+This rule detects the creation of a Linux kernel object file (.ko) on a system. Threat actors may leverage Linux kernel
+object files to load a rootkit or other type of malware on a system providing them with complete control and the ability
+to hide from security products.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["logs-endpoint.events.file-*"]
+language = "kuery"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Kernel Object File Creation"
+risk_score = 21
+rule_id = "1965eab8-d17f-4b21-8c48-ad5ff133695d"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+#### Prerequisite Requirements:
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
+"""
+severity = "low"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Linux",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Persistence",
+    "Tactic: Defense Evasion",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "new_terms"
+query = '''
+event.category:file and host.os.type:linux and event.type:creation and file.extension:ko and not (
+  file.path:/var/tmp/mkinitramfs_* or process.executable:/snap/* or process.name:cpio
+) and not file.path:/tmp/mkinitramfs*
+'''
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating Kernel Object File Creation
+
+Kernel object files (.ko) are loadable modules that extend the functionality of the Linux kernel, often used for adding drivers or system features. Adversaries exploit this by loading malicious modules, such as rootkits, to gain control and evade detection. The detection rule identifies suspicious .ko file creation, excluding benign paths, to flag potential threats while minimizing false positives.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Review the file path of the created .ko file to determine if it is located in a suspicious or unusual directory that is not excluded by the rule, such as /var/tmp or /usr/local.
+- Examine the process that created the .ko file by checking the process.executable and process.name fields to identify if it is a known legitimate process or potentially malicious.
+- Investigate the parent process of the process that created the .ko file to understand the context of how the file was created and if it was initiated by a legitimate user action or a script.
+- Check for any recent system changes or anomalies around the time of the .ko file creation, such as new user accounts, changes in system configurations, or other suspicious file activities.
+- Look for any associated network activity from the host around the time of the .ko file creation to identify potential command and control communications or data exfiltration attempts.
+- Correlate the alert with other security events or logs from the same host to identify any patterns or additional indicators of compromise that may suggest a broader attack campaign.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Kernel updates and system maintenance activities can generate .ko files in legitimate scenarios. Users should monitor for these activities and consider excluding paths related to official update processes.
+- Custom kernel module development by developers or system administrators may trigger this rule. Establish a process to whitelist known development environments or specific user accounts involved in module creation.
+- Automated system recovery tools, such as those using mkinitramfs, may create .ko files. Ensure these paths are excluded as indicated in the rule to prevent unnecessary alerts.
+- Snap package installations might involve .ko file creation. Exclude the /snap/ directory to avoid false positives from legitimate package installations.
+- Backup and restoration processes using tools like cpio can lead to .ko file creation. Verify these processes and exclude them if they are part of routine system operations.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Isolate the affected system from the network to prevent further spread or communication with potential command and control servers.
+- Terminate any suspicious processes associated with the creation of the .ko file, especially those not originating from known benign paths.
+- Remove the suspicious .ko file from the system to prevent it from being loaded into the kernel.
+- Conduct a thorough scan of the system using updated antivirus or endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools to identify and remove any additional malicious components.
+- Review system logs and audit trails to identify any unauthorized access or changes made around the time of the .ko file creation.
+- Escalate the incident to the security operations center (SOC) or incident response team for further investigation and to determine if the threat is part of a larger attack campaign.
+- Implement additional monitoring and alerting for similar activities, ensuring that any future attempts to create or load unauthorized .ko files are promptly detected and addressed."""
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1547"
+name = "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1547.006"
+name = "Kernel Modules and Extensions"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/006/"
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0003"
+name = "Persistence"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1014"
+name = "Rootkit"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014/"
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0005"
+name = "Defense Evasion"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
+
+[rule.new_terms]
+field = "new_terms_fields"
+value = ["process.name", "file.name"]
+
+[[rule.new_terms.history_window_start]]
+field = "history_window_start"
+value = "now-10d"