nldcsc-elastic-rules 0.0.8__py3-none-any.whl

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/lateral_movement_telnet_network_activity_internal.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2020/04/23"
+integration = ["endpoint", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/03/20"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Telnet provides a command line interface for communication with a remote device or server. This rule identifies Telnet
+network connections to non-publicly routable IP addresses.
+"""
+false_positives = [
+    """
+    Telnet can be used for both benign or malicious purposes. Telnet is included by default in some Linux distributions,
+    so its presence is not inherently suspicious. The use of Telnet to manage devices remotely has declined in recent
+    years in favor of more secure protocols such as SSH. Telnet usage by non-automated tools or frameworks may be
+    suspicious.
+    """,
+]
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["logs-endpoint.events.network*", "logs-endpoint.events.process*", "logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*"]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Connection to Internal Network via Telnet"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating Connection to Internal Network via Telnet
+
+Telnet is a protocol offering a command-line interface for remote device management, often used in network environments. Adversaries may exploit Telnet to move laterally within a network, accessing non-public IPs to execute commands or exfiltrate data. The detection rule identifies Telnet connections to internal IP ranges, flagging potential unauthorized access attempts, thus aiding in early threat detection and response.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Review the process details to confirm the Telnet connection initiation by examining the process.entity_id and process.name fields to ensure the process is indeed Telnet.
+- Analyze the destination IP address to determine if it falls within the specified non-public IP ranges, indicating an internal network connection attempt.
+- Check the event.type field to verify that the Telnet process event is of type "start", confirming the initiation of a connection.
+- Investigate the source host by reviewing host.os.type and other relevant host details to understand the context and legitimacy of the connection attempt.
+- Correlate the Telnet activity with any other suspicious network or process activities on the same host to identify potential lateral movement or data exfiltration attempts.
+- Consult historical logs and alerts to determine if there have been previous similar Telnet connection attempts from the same source, which might indicate a pattern or ongoing threat.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Routine administrative tasks using Telnet within internal networks can trigger false positives. To manage this, create exceptions for known IP addresses or specific user accounts that regularly perform these tasks.
+- Automated scripts or monitoring tools that use Telnet for legitimate purposes may be flagged. Identify these scripts and whitelist their associated processes or IP addresses to prevent unnecessary alerts.
+- Internal testing environments often simulate network activities, including Telnet connections. Exclude IP ranges associated with these environments to reduce false positives.
+- Legacy systems that rely on Telnet for communication might generate alerts. Document these systems and apply exceptions based on their IP addresses or hostnames to avoid repeated false positives.
+- Regularly review and update the list of excluded IPs and processes to ensure that only legitimate activities are exempted, maintaining the effectiveness of the detection rule.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Immediately isolate the affected host from the network to prevent further lateral movement or data exfiltration.
+- Terminate any active Telnet sessions on the affected host to stop unauthorized access.
+- Conduct a thorough review of the affected host's system logs and Telnet session logs to identify any unauthorized commands executed or data accessed.
+- Change all credentials that may have been exposed or used during the unauthorized Telnet sessions to prevent further unauthorized access.
+- Apply security patches and updates to the affected host and any other systems that may be vulnerable to similar exploitation.
+- Implement network segmentation to limit Telnet access to only necessary systems and ensure that Telnet is disabled on systems where it is not required.
+- Escalate the incident to the security operations center (SOC) or incident response team for further investigation and to determine if additional systems have been compromised."""
+references = ["https://www.iana.org/assignments/iana-ipv4-special-registry/iana-ipv4-special-registry.xhtml"]
+risk_score = 47
+rule_id = "1b21abcc-4d9f-4b08-a7f5-316f5f94b973"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
+- Elastic Defend
+- Auditbeat
+
+### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+#### Prerequisite Requirements:
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
+
+### Auditbeat Setup
+Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit the activities of users and processes on your systems. For example, you can use Auditbeat to collect and centralize audit events from the Linux Audit Framework. You can also use Auditbeat to detect changes to critical files, like binaries and configuration files, and identify potential security policy violations.
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Auditbeat on a Linux System:
+- Elastic provides repositories available for APT and YUM-based distributions. Note that we provide binary packages, but no source packages.
+- To install the APT and YUM repositories follow the setup instructions in this [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setup-repositories.html).
+- To run Auditbeat on Docker follow the setup instructions in the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-docker.html).
+- To run Auditbeat on Kubernetes follow the setup instructions in the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-kubernetes.html).
+- For complete “Setup and Run Auditbeat” information refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html).
+"""
+severity = "medium"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Linux",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Lateral Movement",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Data Source: SentinelOne",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+type = "eql"
+
+query = '''
+sequence by process.entity_id
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and process.name == "telnet" and event.type == "start"]
+  [network where host.os.type == "linux" and process.name == "telnet" and cidrmatch(
+     destination.ip, "10.0.0.0/8", "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "172.16.0.0/12", "192.0.0.0/24", "192.0.0.0/29",
+     "192.0.0.8/32", "192.0.0.9/32", "192.0.0.10/32", "192.0.0.170/32", "192.0.0.171/32", "192.0.2.0/24",
+     "192.31.196.0/24", "192.52.193.0/24", "192.168.0.0/16", "192.88.99.0/24", "224.0.0.0/4", "100.64.0.0/10",
+     "192.175.48.0/24", "198.18.0.0/15", "198.51.100.0/24", "203.0.113.0/24", "240.0.0.0/4", "::1", "FE80::/10",
+     "FF00::/8"
+    )
+  ]
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1021"
+name = "Remote Services"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0008"
+name = "Lateral Movement"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/"
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/lateral_movement_unusual_remote_file_creation.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2025/02/20"
+integration = ["endpoint"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/09/29"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+This rule leverages the new_terms rule type to detect file creation via a commonly used file
+transfer service while excluding typical remote file creation activity. This behavior is
+often linked to lateral movement, potentially indicating an attacker attempting to move
+within a network.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["logs-endpoint.events.file*", "auditbeat-*"]
+language = "kuery"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Unusual Remote File Creation"
+note = """ ## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating Unusual Remote File Creation
+
+Remote file creation tools like SCP, FTP, and SFTP are essential for transferring files across networks, often used in legitimate administrative tasks. However, adversaries can exploit these services to move laterally within a network, creating files in unauthorized locations. The detection rule identifies suspicious file creation activities by monitoring specific processes and excluding typical paths, thus highlighting potential lateral movement attempts by attackers.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Review the alert details to identify the specific process name (e.g., scp, ftp, sftp) involved in the file creation event.
+- Examine the file path where the file was created to determine if it is an unusual or unauthorized location, considering the exclusion of typical paths like /dev/ptmx, /run/*, or /var/run/*.
+- Check the user account associated with the process to verify if it is a legitimate user or if there are signs of compromised credentials.
+- Investigate the source and destination IP addresses involved in the file transfer to identify any suspicious or unexpected network connections.
+- Analyze recent activity on the host to identify any other unusual or unauthorized actions that may indicate lateral movement or further compromise.
+- Correlate this event with other alerts or logs to determine if it is part of a broader attack pattern or campaign within the network.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Administrative file transfers: Legitimate administrative tasks often involve transferring files using SCP, FTP, or SFTP. To manage this, create exceptions for known administrative accounts or specific IP addresses that regularly perform these tasks.
+- Automated backup processes: Scheduled backups may use tools like rsync or sftp-server to create files remotely. Identify and exclude these processes by specifying the paths or scripts involved in the backup operations.
+- System updates and patches: Some system updates might involve remote file creation in non-standard directories. Monitor update schedules and exclude these activities by correlating them with known update events.
+- Development and testing environments: Developers may use remote file transfer services to deploy or test applications. Establish a baseline of typical development activities and exclude these from alerts by defining specific user accounts or project directories.
+- Third-party integrations: Some third-party applications might require remote file creation as part of their functionality. Document these integrations and exclude their associated processes or file paths from triggering alerts.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Isolate the affected host immediately to prevent further lateral movement within the network. This can be done by removing the host from the network or applying network segmentation controls.
+- Terminate any suspicious processes identified in the alert, such as scp, ftp, sftp, vsftpd, sftp-server, or sync, to stop unauthorized file transfers.
+- Conduct a thorough review of the file paths and files created to determine if any sensitive data has been compromised or if any malicious files have been introduced.
+- Restore any unauthorized or malicious file changes from known good backups to ensure system integrity.
+- Update and patch the affected systems to close any vulnerabilities that may have been exploited by the attacker.
+- Implement stricter access controls and authentication mechanisms for remote file transfer services to prevent unauthorized use.
+- Escalate the incident to the security operations center (SOC) or incident response team for further investigation and to determine if additional systems have been compromised.
+"""
+risk_score = 21
+rule_id = "ed3fedc3-dd10-45a5-a485-34a8b48cea46"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
+- Elastic Defend
+- Auditbeat
+
+### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+#### Prerequisite Requirements:
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
+
+### Auditbeat Setup
+Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit the activities of users and processes on your systems. For example, you can use Auditbeat to collect and centralize audit events from the Linux Audit Framework. You can also use Auditbeat to detect changes to critical files, like binaries and configuration files, and identify potential security policy violations.
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Auditbeat on a Linux System:
+- Elastic provides repositories available for APT and YUM-based distributions. Note that we provide binary packages, but no source packages.
+- To install the APT and YUM repositories follow the setup instructions in this [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setup-repositories.html).
+- To run Auditbeat on Docker follow the setup instructions in the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-docker.html).
+- To run Auditbeat on Kubernetes follow the setup instructions in the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-kubernetes.html).
+- For complete “Setup and Run Auditbeat” information refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html).
+"""
+severity = "low"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Linux",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Lateral Movement",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "new_terms"
+query = '''
+event.category:file and host.os.type:linux and event.action:creation and
+process.name:(scp or ftp or sftp or vsftpd or sftp-server or sync) and
+not (
+  file.path:(
+    /dev/ptmx or /run/* or /var/run/* or /home/*/.ansible/*AnsiballZ_*.py or /home/*/.ansible/tmp/ansible-tmp* or
+    /root/.ansible/*AnsiballZ_*.py or /tmp/ansible-chief/ansible-tmp*AnsiballZ_*.py or
+    /tmp/newroot/home/*/.ansible/tmp/ansible-tmp*AnsiballZ_*.py or /tmp/.ansible/tmp/ansible-tmp*AnsiballZ_*.py or
+    /tmp/ansible-tmp-*/AnsiballZ_*.py or /tmp/.ansible/ansible-tmp-*AnsiballZ_*.py
+  ) or
+  file.extension:(filepart or yaml or new or rpm or deb)
+)
+'''
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1021"
+name = "Remote Services"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1021.004"
+name = "SSH"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004/"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1570"
+name = "Lateral Tool Transfer"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570/"
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0008"
+name = "Lateral Movement"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/"
+
+[rule.new_terms]
+field = "new_terms_fields"
+value = ["process.executable", "host.id"]
+
+[[rule.new_terms.history_window_start]]
+field = "history_window_start"
+value = "now-10d"

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/persistence_apt_package_manager_execution.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2024/02/01"
+integration = ["endpoint", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel", "crowdstrike"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/10/17"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Detects suspicious process events executed by the APT package manager, potentially indicating persistence through an APT
+backdoor. In Linux, APT (Advanced Package Tool) is a command-line utility used for handling packages on Debian-based
+systems, providing functions for installing, updating, upgrading, and removing software along with managing package
+repositories. Attackers can backdoor APT to gain persistence by injecting malicious code into scripts that APT runs,
+thereby ensuring continued unauthorized access or control each time APT is used for package management.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["logs-endpoint.events.process*", "logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*", "logs-crowdstrike.fdr*"]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Suspicious APT Package Manager Execution"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating Suspicious APT Package Manager Execution
+
+The APT package manager is a vital tool for managing software on Debian-based Linux systems, handling tasks like installation and updates. Adversaries may exploit APT by embedding malicious scripts to maintain persistence and control. The detection rule identifies unusual shell or script executions initiated by APT, signaling potential backdoor activities, thus aiding in early threat detection and response.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Review the process execution details to identify the specific shell or script that was executed with APT as the parent process. Pay attention to the process names and arguments, such as "bash", "dash", "sh", etc., and the presence of the "-c" argument.
+- Examine the command-line arguments and scripts executed by the suspicious process to determine if they contain any malicious or unexpected commands.
+- Check the parent process details, specifically the APT process, to understand the context in which the shell or script was executed. This includes reviewing any recent package installations or updates that might have triggered the execution.
+- Investigate the user account under which the suspicious process was executed to assess if it has been compromised or if it has elevated privileges that could be exploited.
+- Correlate the event with other security logs or alerts from the same host to identify any additional indicators of compromise or related suspicious activities.
+- Review the system's package management logs to identify any recent changes or anomalies in package installations or updates that could be linked to the suspicious execution.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Legitimate administrative scripts executed by system administrators using APT may trigger the rule. To handle this, identify and document routine administrative tasks and create exceptions for these specific scripts or commands.
+- Automated system maintenance scripts that use APT for updates or installations can be mistaken for suspicious activity. Review and whitelist these scripts by their specific command patterns or script names.
+- Custom software deployment processes that involve APT and shell scripts might be flagged. Analyze these processes and exclude them by defining clear criteria for legitimate deployment activities.
+- Security tools or monitoring solutions that interact with APT for scanning or auditing purposes may cause false positives. Verify these tools' operations and exclude their known benign processes from triggering the rule.
+- Development environments where developers frequently use APT and shell scripts for testing and building software can lead to alerts. Establish a baseline of normal development activities and exclude these from the detection rule.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Isolate the affected host immediately to prevent further unauthorized access or lateral movement within the network.
+- Terminate any suspicious processes identified in the alert, particularly those initiated by the APT package manager that match the query criteria.
+- Conduct a thorough review of the APT configuration files and scripts to identify and remove any injected malicious code or unauthorized modifications.
+- Restore the affected system from a known good backup if malicious modifications are extensive or if the integrity of the system cannot be assured.
+- Update all system packages and apply security patches to mitigate vulnerabilities that may have been exploited by the adversary.
+- Monitor the affected host and network for any signs of re-infection or further suspicious activity, focusing on the execution of shell scripts and unauthorized network connections.
+- Escalate the incident to the security operations team for further investigation and to determine if additional systems have been compromised."""
+references = ["https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/sequel-on-persistence-mechanisms"]
+risk_score = 47
+rule_id = "ad959eeb-2b7b-4722-ba08-a45f6622f005"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+#### Prerequisite Requirements:
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
+"""
+severity = "medium"
+tags = [
+  "Domain: Endpoint",
+  "OS: Linux",
+  "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+  "Tactic: Persistence",
+  "Tactic: Execution",
+  "Tactic: Defense Evasion",
+  "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+  "Data Source: SentinelOne",
+  "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+  "Data Source: Crowdstrike",
+]
+type = "eql"
+
+query = '''
+sequence by host.id with maxspan=5s
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "start", "ProcessRollup2") and
+   process.parent.name == "apt" and process.args == "-c" and process.name in (
+     "bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish"
+   ) and not process.executable == "/usr/lib/venv-salt-minion/bin/python.original"
+  ] by process.entity_id
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "start", "ProcessRollup2") and process.name : (
+     "bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish", "python*", "php*",
+     "perl", "ruby", "lua*", "openssl", "nc", "netcat", "ncat", "telnet", "awk"
+   )
+  ] by process.parent.entity_id
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1543"
+name = "Create or Modify System Process"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1546"
+name = "Event Triggered Execution"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1546.016"
+name = "Installer Packages"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/016/"
+
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1574"
+name = "Hijack Execution Flow"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0003"
+name = "Persistence"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1059"
+name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1059.004"
+name = "Unix Shell"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0002"
+name = "Execution"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0005"
+name = "Defense Evasion"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/persistence_apt_package_manager_file_creation.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2024/06/03"
+integration = ["endpoint"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/01/24"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Detects file creation events in the configuration directory for the APT package manager. In Linux, APT (Advanced Package
+Tool) is a command-line utility used for handling packages on (by default) Debian-based systems, providing functions for
+installing, updating, upgrading, and removing software along with managing package repositories. Attackers can backdoor
+APT to gain persistence by injecting malicious code into scripts that APT runs, thereby ensuring continued unauthorized
+access or control each time APT is used for package management.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["logs-endpoint.events.file*"]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "APT Package Manager Configuration File Creation"
+references = [
+    "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/152668/APT-Package-Manager-Persistence.html",
+    "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/sequel-on-persistence-mechanisms",
+]
+risk_score = 47
+rule_id = "7c2e1297-7664-42bc-af11-6d5d35220b6b"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+#### Prerequisite Requirements:
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
+"""
+severity = "medium"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Linux",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Persistence",
+    "Tactic: Defense Evasion",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+
+query = '''
+file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("rename", "creation") and
+file.path : "/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/*" and not (
+  process.executable in (
+    "/bin/dpkg", "/usr/bin/dpkg", "/bin/dockerd", "/usr/bin/dockerd", "/usr/sbin/dockerd", "/bin/microdnf",
+    "/usr/bin/microdnf", "/bin/rpm", "/usr/bin/rpm", "/bin/snapd", "/usr/bin/snapd", "/bin/yum", "/usr/bin/yum",
+    "/bin/dnf", "/usr/bin/dnf", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/bin/dnf-automatic", "/usr/bin/dnf-automatic",
+    "/bin/pacman", "/usr/bin/pacman", "/usr/bin/dpkg-divert", "/bin/dpkg-divert", "/sbin/apk", "/usr/sbin/apk",
+    "/usr/local/sbin/apk", "/usr/bin/apt", "/usr/sbin/pacman", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/puppet",
+    "/bin/puppet", "/opt/puppetlabs/puppet/bin/puppet", "/usr/bin/chef-client", "/bin/chef-client",
+    "/bin/autossl_check", "/usr/bin/autossl_check", "/proc/self/exe", "/dev/fd/*",  "/usr/bin/pamac-daemon",
+    "/bin/pamac-daemon", "/usr/lib/snapd/snapd", "/usr/local/bin/dockerd", "/usr/libexec/netplan/generate",
+    "/usr/local/bin/apt-get", "/usr/bin/apt-get"
+  ) or
+  file.path :("/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/*.tmp*") or
+  file.extension in ("swp", "swpx", "swx", "dpkg-remove") or
+  file.Ext.original.extension == "dpkg-new" or
+  process.executable : (
+    "/nix/store/*", "/var/lib/dpkg/*", "/tmp/vmis.*", "/snap/*", "/dev/fd/*", "/usr/lib/*", "/usr/libexec/*",
+    "/etc/kernel/*"
+  ) or
+  process.executable == null or
+  process.name in ("pveupdate", "perl", "executor", "crio", "docker-init", "dockerd", "pvedaemon") or
+  (process.name == "sed" and file.name : "sed*") or
+  (process.name == "perl" and file.name : "e2scrub_all.tmp*")
+)
+'''
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating APT Package Manager Configuration File Creation
+
+APT is a crucial tool for managing software on Debian-based Linux systems, handling tasks like installation and updates. Adversaries may exploit APT by inserting malicious scripts into its configuration files, ensuring persistent access. The detection rule monitors for unauthorized file creation or renaming in APT's configuration directory, excluding legitimate processes, to identify potential tampering.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Review the file creation or renaming event details, focusing on the file path to confirm it is within the APT configuration directory (/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/).
+- Identify the process responsible for the file creation or renaming by examining the process.executable field, ensuring it is not one of the legitimate processes listed in the query.
+- Investigate the origin and purpose of the newly created or renamed file by checking its contents for any suspicious or unauthorized scripts or configurations.
+- Correlate the event with recent system activity to determine if there are any other related alerts or anomalies, such as unusual user logins or network connections, that could indicate a broader attack.
+- Check the file's metadata, such as timestamps and ownership, to identify any discrepancies or signs of tampering that could suggest malicious activity.
+- If the process responsible for the event is unknown or suspicious, conduct a deeper analysis of the process, including its parent process, command-line arguments, and any associated network activity.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Legitimate package management operations by system tools like dpkg or apt-get can trigger alerts. To manage this, ensure these processes are included in the exclusion list within the detection rule.
+- Temporary files created during package updates or installations, such as those with extensions like swp or dpkg-new, may cause false positives. Exclude these file extensions from triggering alerts.
+- Automated system maintenance scripts or tools like puppet or chef-client might modify APT configuration files as part of their normal operations. Add these processes to the exclusion list to prevent unnecessary alerts.
+- Custom scripts or administrative tasks that involve renaming or creating files in the APT configuration directory should be reviewed. If deemed safe, add these specific scripts or processes to the exclusion criteria.
+- Processes running from directories like /nix/store or /var/lib/dpkg may be part of legitimate system operations. Consider excluding these paths if they are verified as non-threatening.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Immediately isolate the affected system from the network to prevent further unauthorized access or potential lateral movement by the adversary.
+- Conduct a thorough review of the newly created or renamed files in the /etc/apt/apt.conf.d/ directory to identify any malicious scripts or unauthorized changes.
+- Remove any identified malicious files or scripts from the APT configuration directory to eliminate the persistence mechanism.
+- Restore any legitimate configuration files from a known good backup to ensure the integrity of the APT configuration.
+- Perform a comprehensive scan of the system using updated antivirus or endpoint detection tools to identify and remove any additional malware or unauthorized changes.
+- Escalate the incident to the security operations center (SOC) or incident response team for further investigation and to determine if additional systems are affected.
+- Implement enhanced monitoring and logging for the APT configuration directory and related processes to detect similar threats in the future."""
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1543"
+name = "Create or Modify System Process"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1546"
+name = "Event Triggered Execution"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1546.016"
+name = "Installer Packages"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/016/"
+
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1574"
+name = "Hijack Execution Flow"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0003"
+name = "Persistence"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0005"
+name = "Defense Evasion"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
+