nldcsc-elastic-rules 0.0.8__py3-none-any.whl

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/persistence_network_manager_dispatcher_persistence.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2025/01/16"
+integration = ["endpoint", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/03/20"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+This rule detects the creation of a NetworkManager dispatcher script on a Linux system. NetworkManager dispatcher
+scripts are shell scripts that NetworkManager executes when network interfaces change state. Attackers can abuse
+NetworkManager dispatcher scripts to maintain persistence on a system by executing malicious code whenever a network
+event occurs.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["logs-endpoint.events.file*", "logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*", "endgame-*"]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "NetworkManager Dispatcher Script Creation"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating NetworkManager Dispatcher Script Creation
+
+NetworkManager dispatcher scripts are executed on Linux systems when network interfaces change state, allowing for automated responses to network events. Adversaries can exploit this by creating scripts that execute malicious code, ensuring persistence and evasion. The detection rule identifies unauthorized script creation by monitoring file creation events in the dispatcher directory, excluding known legitimate processes and file types, thus highlighting potential abuse.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Review the file creation event details to identify the specific script created in the /etc/NetworkManager/dispatcher.d/ directory, noting the file path and name.
+- Examine the process that created the script by checking the process.executable field to determine if it is an unexpected or suspicious process not listed in the known legitimate processes.
+- Investigate the contents of the newly created script to identify any potentially malicious code or commands that could indicate an attempt to maintain persistence or execute unauthorized actions.
+- Check the system's recent network events and changes to see if the script has been triggered and executed, which could provide further context on its intended use.
+- Correlate the event with other security alerts or logs from the same host to identify any related suspicious activities or patterns that could indicate a broader attack or compromise.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Package management tools like dpkg, rpm, and yum may trigger false positives when they create or modify dispatcher scripts during software installations or updates. To handle these, ensure that the process executables for these tools are included in the exclusion list within the detection rule.
+- Automated system management tools such as Puppet, Chef, and Ansible can also cause false positives when they deploy or update configurations. Verify that the executables for these tools are part of the exclusion criteria to prevent unnecessary alerts.
+- Temporary files created by text editors like Vim may be mistakenly flagged. These files typically have extensions like swp or swpx. Ensure these extensions are included in the exclusion list to avoid false positives.
+- Custom scripts or applications that are known to create or modify dispatcher scripts for legitimate purposes should be reviewed. If deemed safe, add their process executables to the exclusion list to prevent them from being flagged.
+- Consider monitoring the frequency and context of script creation events. If certain scripts are frequently created by known processes, evaluate the need to adjust the rule to reduce noise while maintaining security efficacy.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Immediately isolate the affected system from the network to prevent further execution of potentially malicious scripts and limit the attacker's ability to maintain persistence.
+- Review and remove any unauthorized scripts found in the /etc/NetworkManager/dispatcher.d/ directory to eliminate the immediate threat.
+- Conduct a thorough examination of the system for additional signs of compromise, such as unexpected processes or network connections, to identify any further malicious activity.
+- Restore any affected systems from a known good backup to ensure the removal of any persistent threats that may have been established.
+- Implement stricter access controls and monitoring on the /etc/NetworkManager/dispatcher.d/ directory to prevent unauthorized script creation in the future.
+- Escalate the incident to the security operations team for further investigation and to determine if the threat is part of a larger attack campaign.
+- Update and enhance endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions to improve detection capabilities for similar threats, leveraging the MITRE ATT&CK framework for guidance on persistence and execution techniques."""
+risk_score = 21
+rule_id = "86aa8579-1526-4dff-97cd-3635eb0e0545"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+#### Prerequisite Requirements:
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
+"""
+severity = "low"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Linux",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Persistence",
+    "Tactic: Execution",
+    "Tactic: Defense Evasion",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Data Source: SentinelOne",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+
+query = '''
+file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "creation" and file.path like~ "/etc/NetworkManager/dispatcher.d/*" and not (
+  process.executable in (
+    "/bin/dpkg", "/usr/bin/dpkg", "/bin/dockerd", "/usr/bin/dockerd", "/usr/sbin/dockerd", "/bin/microdnf",
+    "/usr/bin/microdnf", "/bin/rpm", "/usr/bin/rpm", "/bin/snapd", "/usr/bin/snapd", "/bin/yum", "/usr/bin/yum",
+    "/bin/dnf", "/usr/bin/dnf", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/bin/dnf-automatic", "/usr/bin/dnf-automatic",
+    "/bin/pacman", "/usr/bin/pacman", "/usr/bin/dpkg-divert", "/bin/dpkg-divert", "/sbin/apk", "/usr/sbin/apk",
+    "/usr/local/sbin/apk", "/usr/bin/apt", "/usr/sbin/pacman", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/puppet",
+    "/bin/puppet", "/opt/puppetlabs/puppet/bin/puppet", "/usr/bin/chef-client", "/bin/chef-client",
+    "/bin/autossl_check", "/usr/bin/autossl_check", "/proc/self/exe", "/dev/fd/*",  "/usr/bin/pamac-daemon",
+    "/bin/pamac-daemon", "/usr/lib/snapd/snapd", "/usr/local/bin/dockerd", "/usr/bin/crio", "/usr/sbin/crond",
+    "/opt/puppetlabs/puppet/bin/ruby", "/usr/libexec/platform-python", "/kaniko/kaniko-executor",
+    "/usr/local/bin/dockerd", "/usr/bin/podman", "/bin/install", "/proc/self/exe", "/usr/lib/systemd/systemd",
+    "/usr/sbin/sshd", "/usr/bin/gitlab-runner", "/opt/gitlab/embedded/bin/ruby", "/usr/sbin/gdm", "/usr/bin/install",
+    "/usr/local/manageengine/uems_agent/bin/dcregister", "/usr/local/bin/pacman"
+  ) or
+  process.executable like~ (
+    "/nix/store/*", "/var/lib/dpkg/*", "/tmp/vmis.*", "/snap/*", "/dev/fd/*", "/usr/lib/virtualbox/*"
+  ) or
+  file.extension in ("swp", "swpx", "swx", "dpkg-remove") or
+  (process.name == "sed" and file.name : "sed*")
+)
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1543"
+name = "Create or Modify System Process"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1574"
+name = "Hijack Execution Flow"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0003"
+name = "Persistence"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1059"
+name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1059.004"
+name = "Unix Shell"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0002"
+name = "Execution"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0005"
+name = "Defense Evasion"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/persistence_nodejs_pre_or_post_install_script_execution.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2025/09/18"
+integration = ["endpoint", "crowdstrike"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/10/17"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+This rule detects the execution of Node.js pre or post-install scripts. These scripts are executed
+by the Node.js package manager (npm) during the installation of packages. Adversaries may abuse
+this technique to execute arbitrary commands on the system and establish persistence. This activity
+was observed in the wild as part of the Shai-Hulud worm.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["logs-endpoint.events.process*", "logs-crowdstrike.fdr*"]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Node.js Pre or Post-Install Script Execution"
+references = ["https://www.elastic.co/blog/shai-hulud-worm-npm-supply-chain-compromise"]
+risk_score = 47
+rule_id = "0871a5d8-6b5f-4a12-a568-fd7bc05bd8db"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+#### Prerequisite Requirements:
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
+"""
+severity = "medium"
+tags = [
+  "Domain: Endpoint",
+  "OS: Linux",
+  "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+  "Tactic: Persistence",
+  "Tactic: Execution",
+  "Tactic: Defense Evasion",
+  "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+  "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+  "Data Source: Crowdstrike",
+]
+type = "eql"
+query = '''
+sequence by host.id with maxspan=10s
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "ProcessRollup2") and process.name == "node" and process.args == "install"] by process.entity_id
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "ProcessRollup2") and process.parent.name == "node"] by process.parent.entity_id
+'''
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1543"
+name = "Create or Modify System Process"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1574"
+name = "Hijack Execution Flow"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/"
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0003"
+name = "Persistence"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1059"
+name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1059.004"
+name = "Unix Shell"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/"
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0002"
+name = "Execution"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0005"
+name = "Defense Evasion"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/persistence_openssl_passwd_hash_generation.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2025/01/16"
+integration = ["endpoint", "auditd_manager", "crowdstrike", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/03/20"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+This rule detects the usage of the `openssl` binary to generate password hashes on Linux systems. The `openssl` command
+is a cryptographic utility that can be used to generate password hashes. Attackers may use `openssl` to generate
+password hashes for new user accounts or to change the password of existing accounts, which can be leveraged to maintain
+persistence on a Linux system.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = [
+    "logs-endpoint.events.process*",
+    "endgame-*",
+    "auditbeat-*",
+    "logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*",
+    "logs-crowdstrike.fdr*",
+    "logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*",
+]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "OpenSSL Password Hash Generation"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating OpenSSL Password Hash Generation
+
+OpenSSL is a robust cryptographic toolkit used for secure communications and data protection, including generating password hashes. Adversaries may exploit OpenSSL to create hashes for unauthorized user accounts or modify existing ones, aiding in persistent access to Linux systems. The detection rule identifies suspicious OpenSSL executions by monitoring specific process actions and arguments, flagging potential misuse for further investigation.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Review the process execution details to confirm the presence of the "openssl" command with the "passwd" argument, as this indicates an attempt to generate a password hash.
+- Identify the user account associated with the process execution to determine if the action was performed by a legitimate user or a potential adversary.
+- Check the system logs and user activity around the time of the alert to identify any suspicious behavior or unauthorized access attempts.
+- Investigate any recent changes to user accounts on the system, focusing on new account creations or password modifications that coincide with the alert.
+- Correlate the alert with other security events or alerts from the same host to identify patterns or additional indicators of compromise.
+- Assess the risk and impact of the detected activity by considering the context of the system and its role within the organization, as well as any potential data exposure or system access implications.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Routine administrative tasks may trigger the rule when system administrators use OpenSSL to generate password hashes for legitimate user account management. To handle this, create exceptions for specific administrator accounts or processes that are known to perform these tasks regularly.
+- Automated scripts for user account provisioning or maintenance that utilize OpenSSL for password hashing can also cause false positives. Identify these scripts and exclude their execution paths or associated user accounts from the rule.
+- Security tools or compliance checks that periodically verify password strength or integrity using OpenSSL might be flagged. Review these tools and whitelist their operations to prevent unnecessary alerts.
+- Development environments where OpenSSL is used for testing password hashing functions can generate alerts. Exclude these environments or specific test accounts from monitoring to reduce noise.
+- Scheduled tasks or cron jobs that involve OpenSSL for password management purposes should be identified and excluded if they are part of regular system operations.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Immediately isolate the affected system from the network to prevent further unauthorized access or lateral movement by the adversary.
+- Terminate any suspicious OpenSSL processes identified by the detection rule to halt ongoing unauthorized password hash generation.
+- Conduct a thorough review of user accounts on the affected system to identify any unauthorized accounts or changes to existing accounts, and revert any unauthorized modifications.
+- Change passwords for all user accounts on the affected system, especially those with elevated privileges, to ensure that any compromised credentials are no longer valid.
+- Implement additional monitoring on the affected system to detect any further unauthorized use of OpenSSL or similar tools, focusing on process execution and command-line arguments.
+- Escalate the incident to the security operations team for a comprehensive investigation to determine the root cause and scope of the breach, and to assess potential impacts on other systems.
+- Review and update access controls and authentication mechanisms to enhance security and prevent similar incidents in the future, ensuring that only authorized users can perform sensitive operations."""
+risk_score = 21
+rule_id = "f4b857b3-faef-430d-b420-90be48647f00"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+#### Prerequisite Requirements:
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
+"""
+severity = "low"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Linux",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Persistence",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Data Source: Auditd Manager",
+    "Data Source: Crowdstrike",
+    "Data Source: SentinelOne",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+
+query = '''
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and
+event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "start", "ProcessRollup2", "executed") and process.name == "openssl"
+and process.args == "passwd"
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1136"
+name = "Create Account"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1136.001"
+name = "Local Account"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/001/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0003"
+name = "Persistence"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
+

nldcsc_elastic_rules/rules/linux/persistence_pluggable_authentication_module_creation.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2024/03/06"
+integration = ["endpoint"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/01/15"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+This rule monitors for the creation or modification of Pluggable Authentication Module (PAM) shared object files or
+configuration files. Attackers may create or modify these files to maintain persistence on a compromised system, or
+harvest account credentials.
+"""
+false_positives = [
+    "Trusted system module updates or allowed Pluggable Authentication Module (PAM) daemon configuration changes.",
+]
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["logs-endpoint.events.file*"]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Creation or Modification of Pluggable Authentication Module or Configuration"
+references = [
+    "https://github.com/zephrax/linux-pam-backdoor",
+    "https://github.com/eurialo/pambd",
+    "http://0x90909090.blogspot.com/2016/06/creating-backdoor-in-pam-in-5-line-of.html",
+    "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/19/i/skidmap-linux-malware-uses-rootkit-capabilities-to-hide-cryptocurrency-mining-payload.html",
+]
+risk_score = 47
+rule_id = "f48ecc44-7d02-437d-9562-b838d2c41987"
+severity = "medium"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Linux",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Credential Access",
+    "Tactic: Persistence",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+query = '''
+file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("rename", "creation") and
+process.executable != null and (
+  (file.path like~ (
+    "/lib/security/*", "/lib64/security/*", "/usr/lib/security/*", "/usr/lib64/security/*",
+    "/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/security/*", "/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/security/*"
+  ) and file.extension == "so") or
+  (file.path like~ "/etc/pam.d/*" and file.extension == null) or
+  (file.path like~ "/etc/security/pam_*" or file.path == "/etc/pam.conf")
+) and not (
+  process.executable in (
+    "/bin/dpkg", "/usr/bin/dpkg", "/bin/dockerd", "/usr/bin/dockerd", "/usr/sbin/dockerd", "/bin/microdnf",
+    "/usr/bin/microdnf", "/bin/rpm", "/usr/bin/rpm", "/bin/snapd", "/usr/bin/snapd", "/bin/yum", "/usr/bin/yum",
+    "/bin/dnf", "/usr/bin/dnf", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/bin/dnf-automatic", "/usr/bin/dnf-automatic",
+    "/bin/pacman", "/usr/bin/pacman", "/usr/bin/dpkg-divert", "/bin/dpkg-divert", "/sbin/apk", "/usr/sbin/apk",
+    "/usr/local/sbin/apk", "/usr/bin/apt", "/usr/sbin/pacman", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/puppet",
+    "/bin/puppet", "/opt/puppetlabs/puppet/bin/puppet", "/usr/bin/chef-client", "/bin/chef-client",
+    "/bin/autossl_check", "/usr/bin/autossl_check", "/proc/self/exe", "/dev/fd/*",  "/usr/bin/pamac-daemon",
+    "/bin/pamac-daemon", "/usr/lib/snapd/snapd", "/usr/local/bin/dockerd", "/usr/sbin/pam-auth-update",
+    "/usr/lib/systemd/systemd", "/usr/libexec/packagekitd", "/usr/bin/bsdtar", "/sbin/pam-auth-update"
+  ) or
+  file.path like (
+    "/tmp/snap.rootfs_*/pam_*.so", "/tmp/newroot/lib/*/pam_*.so", "/tmp/newroot/usr/lib64/security/pam_*.so"
+  ) or
+  file.extension in ("swp", "swpx", "swx", "dpkg-remove") or
+  file.Ext.original.extension == "dpkg-new" or
+  process.executable like (
+    "/nix/store/*", "/var/lib/dpkg/*", "/snap/*", "/dev/fd/*", "/usr/lib/virtualbox/*"
+  ) or
+  (process.name == "sed" and file.name like~ "sed*") or
+  (process.name == "perl" and file.name like~ "e2scrub_all.tmp*")
+)
+'''
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating Creation or Modification of Pluggable Authentication Module or Configuration
+
+Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM) are integral to Linux systems, managing authentication tasks. Adversaries may exploit PAM by creating or altering its modules or configurations to gain persistence or capture credentials. The detection rule identifies suspicious activities by monitoring file operations in PAM directories, excluding legitimate processes, thus highlighting potential unauthorized modifications.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Review the file path and extension to determine if the modified or created file is a PAM shared object or configuration file, focusing on paths like "/lib/security/*", "/etc/pam.d/*", and "/etc/security/pam_*".
+- Identify the process executable responsible for the file operation and verify if it is listed as an excluded legitimate process, such as "/bin/dpkg" or "/usr/bin/yum". If not, investigate the process further.
+- Check the process execution history and command line arguments to understand the context of the file operation and assess if it aligns with typical system administration tasks.
+- Investigate the user account associated with the process to determine if it has legitimate access and permissions to modify PAM files, and check for any signs of compromise or misuse.
+- Examine recent system logs and security alerts for any related suspicious activities or anomalies that might indicate a broader attack or compromise.
+- If the file operation is deemed suspicious, consider restoring the original PAM configuration from a known good backup and monitor the system for any further unauthorized changes.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Package management operations: Legitimate package managers like dpkg, rpm, and yum may trigger the rule during software updates or installations. To handle this, exclude these processes by adding them to the exception list in the rule configuration.
+- System updates and maintenance: Processes such as pam-auth-update and systemd may modify PAM configurations during routine system updates. Exclude these processes to prevent false positives.
+- Temporary files: Files with extensions like swp, swpx, and swx are often temporary and not indicative of malicious activity. Exclude these extensions to reduce noise.
+- Development environments: Paths like /nix/store/* and /snap/* may be used in development or containerized environments. Consider excluding these paths if they are part of a known and secure setup.
+- Automated scripts: Scripts using tools like sed or perl may create temporary files that match the rule's criteria. Exclude these specific patterns if they are part of regular, non-malicious operations.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Immediately isolate the affected system from the network to prevent further unauthorized access or lateral movement by the adversary.
+- Review the specific PAM module or configuration file that was created or modified to understand the changes made and assess the potential impact on system security.
+- Restore the affected PAM files from a known good backup to ensure the integrity of the authentication process and remove any malicious modifications.
+- Conduct a thorough scan of the system using updated antivirus and anti-malware tools to identify and remove any additional malicious software that may have been introduced.
+- Monitor the system and network for any signs of continued unauthorized access or suspicious activity, focusing on the indicators of compromise related to PAM manipulation.
+- Escalate the incident to the security operations center (SOC) or incident response team for further investigation and to determine if other systems may be affected.
+- Implement additional monitoring and alerting for PAM-related activities to enhance detection capabilities and prevent similar threats in the future."""
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1543"
+name = "Create or Modify System Process"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/"
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0003"
+name = "Persistence"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1556"
+name = "Modify Authentication Process"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/"
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0006"
+name = "Credential Access"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"