visaljs 0.0.1 → 0.0.3

package/runtime/third_party/boringssl/crypto/fipsmodule/bcm_interface.h

@@ -0,0 +1,953 @@
+// Copyright 2024 The BoringSSL Authors
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_HEADER_CRYPTO_FIPSMODULE_BCM_INTERFACE_H
+#define OPENSSL_HEADER_CRYPTO_FIPSMODULE_BCM_INTERFACE_H
+
+#include <openssl/aes.h>
+#include <openssl/mldsa.h>
+#include <openssl/mlkem.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+#include <openssl/sha2.h>
+
+
+// This header will eventually become the interface between BCM and the
+// rest of libcrypto. More cleanly separating the two is still a work in
+// progress (see https://crbug.com/boringssl/722) so, at the moment, we
+// consider this no different from any other header in BCM.
+//
+// Over time, calls from libcrypto to BCM will all move to this header
+// and the separation will become more meaningful.
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
+
+// Enumerated types for return values from bcm functions, both infallible
+// and fallible functions. Two success values are used to correspond to the
+// FIPS service indicator. For the moment, the official service indicator
+// remains the counter, not these values. Once we fully transition to
+// these return values from bcm we will change that.
+enum class bcm_infallible_t {
+  approved,
+  not_approved,
+};
+
+enum class bcm_status_t {
+  approved,
+  not_approved,
+  failure,
+};
+typedef enum bcm_status_t bcm_status;
+typedef enum bcm_infallible_t bcm_infallible;
+
+inline int bcm_success(bcm_status status) {
+  return status == bcm_status::approved || status == bcm_status::not_approved;
+}
+
+inline bcm_status_t bcm_as_approved_status(int result) {
+  return result ? bcm_status::approved : bcm_status::failure;
+}
+
+inline bcm_status_t bcm_as_not_approved_status(int result) {
+  return result ? bcm_status::not_approved : bcm_status::failure;
+}
+
+// Random number generator.
+
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS)
+
+// We overread from /dev/urandom or RDRAND by a factor of 10 and XOR to whiten.
+// TODO(bbe): disentangle this value which is used to calculate the size of the
+// stack buffer in RAND_need entropy based on a calculation.
+#define BORINGSSL_FIPS_OVERREAD 10
+
+#endif  // BORINGSSL_FIPS
+
+// BCM_rand_bytes is the same as the public `RAND_bytes` function, other
+// than returning a bcm_infallible status indicator.
+bcm_infallible BCM_rand_bytes(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len);
+
+// BCM_rand_bytes_hwrng attempts to fill `out` with `len` bytes of entropy from
+// the CPU hardware random number generator if one is present.
+// bcm_status_approved is returned on success, and a failure status is
+// returned otherwise.
+bcm_status BCM_rand_bytes_hwrng(uint8_t *out, size_t len);
+
+// BCM_rand_bytes_with_additional_data samples from the RNG after mixing 32
+// bytes from `user_additional_data` in.
+bcm_infallible BCM_rand_bytes_with_additional_data(
+    uint8_t *out, size_t out_len, const uint8_t user_additional_data[32]);
+
+
+// SHA-1
+
+// BCM_sha1_init initialises `sha`.
+bcm_infallible BCM_sha1_init(SHA_CTX *sha);
+
+// SHA1_transform is a low-level function that performs a single, SHA-1
+// block transformation using the state from `sha` and `SHA_CBLOCK` bytes from
+// `block`.
+bcm_infallible BCM_sha1_transform(SHA_CTX *c, const uint8_t data[SHA_CBLOCK]);
+
+// BCM_sha1_update adds `len` bytes from `data` to `sha`.
+bcm_infallible BCM_sha1_update(SHA_CTX *c, const void *data, size_t len);
+
+// BCM_sha1_final adds the final padding to `sha` and writes the resulting
+// digest to `out`, which must have at least `SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH` bytes of space.
+bcm_infallible BCM_sha1_final(uint8_t out[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA_CTX *c);
+
+
+// BCM_fips_186_2_prf derives `out_len` bytes from `xkey` using the PRF
+// defined in FIPS 186-2, Appendix 3.1, with change notice 1 applied. The b
+// parameter is 160 and seed, XKEY, is also 160 bits. The optional XSEED user
+// input is all zeros.
+//
+// The PRF generates a sequence of 320-bit numbers. Each number is encoded as a
+// 40-byte string in big-endian and then concatenated to form `out`. If
+// `out_len` is not a multiple of 40, the result is truncated. This matches the
+// construction used in Section 7 of RFC 4186 and Section 7 of RFC 4187.
+//
+// This PRF is based on SHA-1, a weak hash function, and should not be used
+// in new protocols. It is provided for compatibility with some legacy EAP
+// methods.
+bcm_infallible BCM_fips_186_2_prf(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len,
+                                  const uint8_t xkey[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]);
+
+
+// SHA-224
+
+// BCM_sha224_unit initialises `sha`.
+bcm_infallible BCM_sha224_init(SHA256_CTX *sha);
+
+// BCM_sha224_update adds `len` bytes from `data` to `sha`.
+bcm_infallible BCM_sha224_update(SHA256_CTX *sha, const void *data, size_t len);
+
+// BCM_sha224_final adds the final padding to `sha` and writes the resulting
+// digest to `out`, which must have at least `SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH` bytes of
+// space. It aborts on programmer error.
+bcm_infallible BCM_sha224_final(uint8_t out[SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH],
+                                SHA256_CTX *sha);
+
+
+// SHA-256
+
+// BCM_sha256_init initialises `sha`.
+bcm_infallible BCM_sha256_init(SHA256_CTX *sha);
+
+// BCM_sha256_update adds `len` bytes from `data` to `sha`.
+bcm_infallible BCM_sha256_update(SHA256_CTX *sha, const void *data, size_t len);
+
+// BCM_sha256_final adds the final padding to `sha` and writes the resulting
+// digest to `out`, which must have at least `SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH` bytes of
+// space. It aborts on programmer error.
+bcm_infallible BCM_sha256_final(uint8_t out[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH],
+                                SHA256_CTX *sha);
+
+// BCM_sha256_transform is a low-level function that performs a single, SHA-256
+// block transformation using the state from `sha` and `SHA256_CBLOCK` bytes
+// from `block`.
+bcm_infallible BCM_sha256_transform(SHA256_CTX *sha,
+                                    const uint8_t block[SHA256_CBLOCK]);
+
+// BCM_sha256_transform_blocks is a low-level function that takes `num_blocks` *
+// `SHA256_CBLOCK` bytes of data and performs SHA-256 transforms on it to update
+// `state`.
+bcm_infallible BCM_sha256_transform_blocks(uint32_t state[8],
+                                           const uint8_t *data,
+                                           size_t num_blocks);
+
+
+// SHA-384.
+
+// BCM_sha384_init initialises `sha`.
+bcm_infallible BCM_sha384_init(SHA512_CTX *sha);
+
+// BCM_sha384_update adds `len` bytes from `data` to `sha`.
+bcm_infallible BCM_sha384_update(SHA512_CTX *sha, const void *data, size_t len);
+
+// BCM_sha384_final adds the final padding to `sha` and writes the resulting
+// digest to `out`, which must have at least `SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH` bytes of
+// space. It may abort on programmer error.
+bcm_infallible BCM_sha384_final(uint8_t out[SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH],
+                                SHA512_CTX *sha);
+
+
+// SHA-512.
+
+// BCM_sha512_init initialises `sha`.
+bcm_infallible BCM_sha512_init(SHA512_CTX *sha);
+
+// BCM_sha512_update adds `len` bytes from `data` to `sha`.
+bcm_infallible BCM_sha512_update(SHA512_CTX *sha, const void *data, size_t len);
+
+// BCM_sha512_final adds the final padding to `sha` and writes the resulting
+// digest to `out`, which must have at least `SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH` bytes of
+// space.
+bcm_infallible BCM_sha512_final(uint8_t out[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH],
+                                SHA512_CTX *sha);
+
+// BCM_sha512_transform is a low-level function that performs a single, SHA-512
+// block transformation using the state from `sha` and `SHA512_CBLOCK` bytes
+// from `block`.
+bcm_infallible BCM_sha512_transform(SHA512_CTX *sha,
+                                    const uint8_t block[SHA512_CBLOCK]);
+
+
+// SHA-512-256
+//
+// See https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf section 5.3.6
+
+// BCM_sha512_256_init initialises `sha`.
+bcm_infallible BCM_sha512_256_init(SHA512_CTX *sha);
+
+// BCM_sha512_256_update adds `len` bytes from `data` to `sha`.
+bcm_infallible BCM_sha512_256_update(SHA512_CTX *sha, const void *data,
+                                     size_t len);
+
+// BCM_sha512_256_final adds the final padding to `sha` and writes the resulting
+// digest to `out`, which must have at least `SHA512_256_DIGEST_LENGTH` bytes of
+// space. It may abort on programmer error.
+bcm_infallible BCM_sha512_256_final(uint8_t out[SHA512_256_DIGEST_LENGTH],
+                                    SHA512_CTX *sha);
+
+
+// ML-DSA
+//
+// Where not commented, these functions have the same signature as the
+// corresponding public function.
+
+// BCM_MLDSA_SIGNATURE_RANDOMIZER_BYTES is the number of bytes of uniformly
+// random entropy necessary to generate a signature in randomized mode.
+#define BCM_MLDSA_SIGNATURE_RANDOMIZER_BYTES 32
+
+// BCM_MLDSA65_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES is the number of bytes in an encoded ML-DSA-65
+// private key.
+#define BCM_MLDSA65_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES 4032
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa65_generate_key(
+    uint8_t out_encoded_public_key[MLDSA65_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
+    uint8_t out_seed[MLDSA_SEED_BYTES], MLDSA65_private_key *out_private_key);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa65_private_key_from_seed(
+    MLDSA65_private_key *out_private_key, const uint8_t seed[MLDSA_SEED_BYTES]);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa65_public_from_private(
+    MLDSA65_public_key *out_public_key, const MLDSA65_private_key *private_key);
+
+// BCM_mldsa65_public_of_private returns the public half of `private_key`.
+const MLDSA65_public_key *BCM_mldsa65_public_of_private(
+    const MLDSA65_private_key *private_key);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status
+BCM_mldsa65_check_key_fips(MLDSA65_private_key *private_key);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa65_generate_key_fips(
+    uint8_t out_encoded_public_key[MLDSA65_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
+    uint8_t out_seed[MLDSA_SEED_BYTES], MLDSA65_private_key *out_private_key);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa65_private_key_from_seed_fips(
+    MLDSA65_private_key *out_private_key, const uint8_t seed[MLDSA_SEED_BYTES]);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status
+BCM_mldsa65_sign(uint8_t out_encoded_signature[MLDSA65_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
+                 const MLDSA65_private_key *private_key, const uint8_t *msg,
+                 size_t msg_len, const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa65_verify(
+    const MLDSA65_public_key *public_key,
+    const uint8_t signature[MLDSA65_SIGNATURE_BYTES], const uint8_t *msg,
+    size_t msg_len, const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT void BCM_mldsa65_prehash_init(
+    MLDSA65_prehash *out_prehash_ctx, const MLDSA65_public_key *public_key,
+    const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT void BCM_mldsa65_prehash_update(
+    MLDSA65_prehash *inout_prehash_ctx, const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT void BCM_mldsa65_prehash_finalize(
+    uint8_t out_msg_rep[MLDSA_MU_BYTES], MLDSA65_prehash *inout_prehash_ctx);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa65_sign_message_representative(
+    uint8_t out_encoded_signature[MLDSA65_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
+    const MLDSA65_private_key *private_key,
+    const uint8_t msg_rep[MLDSA_MU_BYTES]);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa65_verify_message_representative(
+    const MLDSA65_public_key *public_key,
+    const uint8_t signature[MLDSA65_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
+    const uint8_t msg_rep[MLDSA_MU_BYTES]);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status
+BCM_mldsa65_marshal_public_key(CBB *out, const MLDSA65_public_key *public_key);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status
+BCM_mldsa65_parse_public_key(MLDSA65_public_key *public_key, CBS *in);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status
+BCM_mldsa65_parse_private_key(MLDSA65_private_key *private_key, CBS *in);
+
+// BCM_mldsa65_generate_key_external_entropy generates a public/private key pair
+// using the given seed, writes the encoded public key to
+// `out_encoded_public_key` and sets `out_private_key` to the private key.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa65_generate_key_external_entropy(
+    uint8_t out_encoded_public_key[MLDSA65_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
+    MLDSA65_private_key *out_private_key,
+    const uint8_t entropy[MLDSA_SEED_BYTES]);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa65_generate_key_external_entropy_fips(
+    uint8_t out_encoded_public_key[MLDSA65_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
+    MLDSA65_private_key *out_private_key,
+    const uint8_t entropy[MLDSA_SEED_BYTES]);
+
+// BCM_mldsa5_sign_internal signs `msg` using `private_key` and writes the
+// signature to `out_encoded_signature`. The `context_prefix` and `context` are
+// prefixed to the message, in that order, before signing. The `randomizer`
+// value can be set to zero bytes in order to make a deterministic signature, or
+// else filled with entropy for the usual `MLDSA_sign` behavior.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa65_sign_internal(
+    uint8_t out_encoded_signature[MLDSA65_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
+    const MLDSA65_private_key *private_key, const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len,
+    const uint8_t *context_prefix, size_t context_prefix_len,
+    const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len,
+    const uint8_t randomizer[BCM_MLDSA_SIGNATURE_RANDOMIZER_BYTES]);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa65_sign_mu_internal(
+    uint8_t out_encoded_signature[MLDSA65_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
+    const MLDSA65_private_key *private_key,
+    const uint8_t msg_rep[MLDSA_MU_BYTES],
+    const uint8_t randomizer[BCM_MLDSA_SIGNATURE_RANDOMIZER_BYTES]);
+
+// BCM_mldsa5_verify_internal verifies that `encoded_signature` is a valid
+// signature of `msg` by `public_key`. The `context_prefix` and `context` are
+// prefixed to the message before verification, in that order.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa65_verify_internal(
+    const MLDSA65_public_key *public_key,
+    const uint8_t encoded_signature[MLDSA65_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
+    const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len, const uint8_t *context_prefix,
+    size_t context_prefix_len, const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len);
+
+// BCM_mldsa65_marshal_private_key serializes `private_key` to `out` in the
+// NIST format for ML-DSA-65 private keys.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa65_marshal_private_key(
+    CBB *out, const MLDSA65_private_key *private_key);
+
+// BCM_mldsa65_public_keys_equal returns one if `a` and `b` are equal and zero
+// otherwise.
+int BCM_mldsa65_public_keys_equal(const MLDSA65_public_key *a,
+                                  const MLDSA65_public_key *b);
+
+
+// BCM_MLDSA87_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES is the number of bytes in an encoded ML-DSA-87
+// private key.
+#define BCM_MLDSA87_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES 4896
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa87_generate_key(
+    uint8_t out_encoded_public_key[MLDSA87_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
+    uint8_t out_seed[MLDSA_SEED_BYTES], MLDSA87_private_key *out_private_key);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa87_private_key_from_seed(
+    MLDSA87_private_key *out_private_key, const uint8_t seed[MLDSA_SEED_BYTES]);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa87_public_from_private(
+    MLDSA87_public_key *out_public_key, const MLDSA87_private_key *private_key);
+
+// BCM_mldsa87_public_of_private returns the public half of `private_key`.
+const MLDSA87_public_key *BCM_mldsa87_public_of_private(
+    const MLDSA87_private_key *private_key);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status
+BCM_mldsa87_check_key_fips(MLDSA87_private_key *private_key);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa87_generate_key_fips(
+    uint8_t out_encoded_public_key[MLDSA87_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
+    uint8_t out_seed[MLDSA_SEED_BYTES], MLDSA87_private_key *out_private_key);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa87_private_key_from_seed_fips(
+    MLDSA87_private_key *out_private_key, const uint8_t seed[MLDSA_SEED_BYTES]);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status
+BCM_mldsa87_sign(uint8_t out_encoded_signature[MLDSA87_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
+                 const MLDSA87_private_key *private_key, const uint8_t *msg,
+                 size_t msg_len, const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status
+BCM_mldsa87_verify(const MLDSA87_public_key *public_key,
+                   const uint8_t *signature, const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len,
+                   const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT void BCM_mldsa87_prehash_init(
+    MLDSA87_prehash *out_prehash_ctx, const MLDSA87_public_key *public_key,
+    const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT void BCM_mldsa87_prehash_update(
+    MLDSA87_prehash *inout_prehash_ctx, const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT void BCM_mldsa87_prehash_finalize(
+    uint8_t out_msg_rep[MLDSA_MU_BYTES], MLDSA87_prehash *inout_prehash_ctx);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa87_sign_message_representative(
+    uint8_t out_encoded_signature[MLDSA87_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
+    const MLDSA87_private_key *private_key,
+    const uint8_t msg_rep[MLDSA_MU_BYTES]);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa87_verify_message_representative(
+    const MLDSA87_public_key *public_key,
+    const uint8_t signature[MLDSA87_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
+    const uint8_t msg_rep[MLDSA_MU_BYTES]);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status
+BCM_mldsa87_marshal_public_key(CBB *out, const MLDSA87_public_key *public_key);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status
+BCM_mldsa87_parse_public_key(MLDSA87_public_key *public_key, CBS *in);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status
+BCM_mldsa87_parse_private_key(MLDSA87_private_key *private_key, CBS *in);
+
+// BCM_mldsa87_generate_key_external_entropy generates a public/private key pair
+// using the given seed, writes the encoded public key to
+// `out_encoded_public_key` and sets `out_private_key` to the private key.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa87_generate_key_external_entropy(
+    uint8_t out_encoded_public_key[MLDSA87_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
+    MLDSA87_private_key *out_private_key,
+    const uint8_t entropy[MLDSA_SEED_BYTES]);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa87_generate_key_external_entropy_fips(
+    uint8_t out_encoded_public_key[MLDSA87_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
+    MLDSA87_private_key *out_private_key,
+    const uint8_t entropy[MLDSA_SEED_BYTES]);
+
+// BCM_mldsa87_sign_internal signs `msg` using `private_key` and writes the
+// signature to `out_encoded_signature`. The `context_prefix` and `context` are
+// prefixed to the message, in that order, before signing. The `randomizer`
+// value can be set to zero bytes in order to make a deterministic signature, or
+// else filled with entropy for the usual `MLDSA_sign` behavior.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa87_sign_internal(
+    uint8_t out_encoded_signature[MLDSA87_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
+    const MLDSA87_private_key *private_key, const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len,
+    const uint8_t *context_prefix, size_t context_prefix_len,
+    const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len,
+    const uint8_t randomizer[BCM_MLDSA_SIGNATURE_RANDOMIZER_BYTES]);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa87_sign_mu_internal(
+    uint8_t out_encoded_signature[MLDSA87_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
+    const MLDSA87_private_key *private_key,
+    const uint8_t msg_rep[MLDSA_MU_BYTES],
+    const uint8_t randomizer[BCM_MLDSA_SIGNATURE_RANDOMIZER_BYTES]);
+
+// BCM_mldsa87_verify_internal verifies that `encoded_signature` is a valid
+// signature of `msg` by `public_key`. The `context_prefix` and `context` are
+// prefixed to the message before verification, in that order.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa87_verify_internal(
+    const MLDSA87_public_key *public_key,
+    const uint8_t encoded_signature[MLDSA87_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
+    const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len, const uint8_t *context_prefix,
+    size_t context_prefix_len, const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len);
+
+// BCM_mldsa87_marshal_private_key serializes `private_key` to `out` in the
+// NIST format for ML-DSA-87 private keys.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa87_marshal_private_key(
+    CBB *out, const MLDSA87_private_key *private_key);
+
+// BCM_mldsa87_public_keys_equal returns one if `a` and `b` are equal and zero
+// otherwise.
+int BCM_mldsa87_public_keys_equal(const MLDSA87_public_key *a,
+                                  const MLDSA87_public_key *b);
+
+// BCM_MLDSA44_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES is the number of bytes in an encoded ML-DSA-44
+// private key.
+#define BCM_MLDSA44_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES 2560
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa44_generate_key(
+    uint8_t out_encoded_public_key[MLDSA44_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
+    uint8_t out_seed[MLDSA_SEED_BYTES], MLDSA44_private_key *out_private_key);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa44_private_key_from_seed(
+    MLDSA44_private_key *out_private_key, const uint8_t seed[MLDSA_SEED_BYTES]);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa44_public_from_private(
+    MLDSA44_public_key *out_public_key, const MLDSA44_private_key *private_key);
+
+// BCM_mldsa44_public_of_private returns the public half of `private_key`.
+const MLDSA44_public_key *BCM_mldsa44_public_of_private(
+    const MLDSA44_private_key *private_key);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status
+BCM_mldsa44_check_key_fips(MLDSA44_private_key *private_key);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa44_generate_key_fips(
+    uint8_t out_encoded_public_key[MLDSA44_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
+    uint8_t out_seed[MLDSA_SEED_BYTES], MLDSA44_private_key *out_private_key);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa44_private_key_from_seed_fips(
+    MLDSA44_private_key *out_private_key, const uint8_t seed[MLDSA_SEED_BYTES]);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status
+BCM_mldsa44_sign(uint8_t out_encoded_signature[MLDSA44_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
+                 const MLDSA44_private_key *private_key, const uint8_t *msg,
+                 size_t msg_len, const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status
+BCM_mldsa44_verify(const MLDSA44_public_key *public_key,
+                   const uint8_t *signature, const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len,
+                   const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT void BCM_mldsa44_prehash_init(
+    MLDSA44_prehash *out_prehash_ctx, const MLDSA44_public_key *public_key,
+    const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT void BCM_mldsa44_prehash_update(
+    MLDSA44_prehash *inout_prehash_ctx, const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT void BCM_mldsa44_prehash_finalize(
+    uint8_t out_msg_rep[MLDSA_MU_BYTES], MLDSA44_prehash *inout_prehash_ctx);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa44_sign_message_representative(
+    uint8_t out_encoded_signature[MLDSA44_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
+    const MLDSA44_private_key *private_key,
+    const uint8_t msg_rep[MLDSA_MU_BYTES]);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa44_verify_message_representative(
+    const MLDSA44_public_key *public_key,
+    const uint8_t signature[MLDSA44_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
+    const uint8_t msg_rep[MLDSA_MU_BYTES]);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status
+BCM_mldsa44_marshal_public_key(CBB *out, const MLDSA44_public_key *public_key);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status
+BCM_mldsa44_parse_public_key(MLDSA44_public_key *public_key, CBS *in);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status
+BCM_mldsa44_parse_private_key(MLDSA44_private_key *private_key, CBS *in);
+
+// BCM_mldsa44_generate_key_external_entropy generates a public/private key pair
+// using the given seed, writes the encoded public key to
+// `out_encoded_public_key` and sets `out_private_key` to the private key.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa44_generate_key_external_entropy(
+    uint8_t out_encoded_public_key[MLDSA44_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
+    MLDSA44_private_key *out_private_key,
+    const uint8_t entropy[MLDSA_SEED_BYTES]);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa44_generate_key_external_entropy_fips(
+    uint8_t out_encoded_public_key[MLDSA44_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
+    MLDSA44_private_key *out_private_key,
+    const uint8_t entropy[MLDSA_SEED_BYTES]);
+
+// BCM_mldsa44_sign_internal signs `msg` using `private_key` and writes the
+// signature to `out_encoded_signature`. The `context_prefix` and `context` are
+// prefixed to the message, in that order, before signing. The `randomizer`
+// value can be set to zero bytes in order to make a deterministic signature, or
+// else filled with entropy for the usual `MLDSA_sign` behavior.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa44_sign_internal(
+    uint8_t out_encoded_signature[MLDSA44_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
+    const MLDSA44_private_key *private_key, const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len,
+    const uint8_t *context_prefix, size_t context_prefix_len,
+    const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len,
+    const uint8_t randomizer[BCM_MLDSA_SIGNATURE_RANDOMIZER_BYTES]);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa44_sign_mu_internal(
+    uint8_t out_encoded_signature[MLDSA44_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
+    const MLDSA44_private_key *private_key,
+    const uint8_t msg_rep[MLDSA_MU_BYTES],
+    const uint8_t randomizer[BCM_MLDSA_SIGNATURE_RANDOMIZER_BYTES]);
+
+// BCM_mldsa44_verify_internal verifies that `encoded_signature` is a valid
+// signature of `msg` by `public_key`. The `context_prefix` and `context` are
+// prefixed to the message before verification, in that order.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa44_verify_internal(
+    const MLDSA44_public_key *public_key,
+    const uint8_t encoded_signature[MLDSA44_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
+    const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len, const uint8_t *context_prefix,
+    size_t context_prefix_len, const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len);
+
+// BCM_mldsa44_marshal_private_key serializes `private_key` to `out` in the
+// NIST format for ML-DSA-44 private keys.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa44_marshal_private_key(
+    CBB *out, const MLDSA44_private_key *private_key);
+
+// BCM_mldsa44_public_keys_equal returns one if `a` and `b` are equal and zero
+// otherwise.
+int BCM_mldsa44_public_keys_equal(const MLDSA44_public_key *a,
+                                  const MLDSA44_public_key *b);
+
+
+// ML-KEM
+//
+// Where not commented, these functions have the same signature as the
+// corresponding public function.
+
+// BCM_MLKEM_ENCAP_ENTROPY is the number of bytes of uniformly random entropy
+// necessary to encapsulate a secret. The entropy will be leaked to the
+// decapsulating party.
+#define BCM_MLKEM_ENCAP_ENTROPY 32
+
+// BCM_MLKEM768_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES is the length of the data produced by
+// `BCM_mlkem768_marshal_private_key`.
+#define BCM_MLKEM768_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES 2400
+
+// BCM_MLKEM1024_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES is the length of the data produced by
+// `BCM_mlkem1024_marshal_private_key`.
+#define BCM_MLKEM1024_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES 3168
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_infallible BCM_mlkem768_generate_key(
+    uint8_t out_encoded_public_key[MLKEM768_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
+    uint8_t optional_out_seed[MLKEM_SEED_BYTES],
+    MLKEM768_private_key *out_private_key);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status
+BCM_mlkem768_private_key_from_seed(MLKEM768_private_key *out_private_key,
+                                   const uint8_t *seed, size_t seed_len);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mlkem768_generate_key_fips(
+    uint8_t out_encoded_public_key[MLKEM768_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
+    uint8_t optional_out_seed[MLKEM_SEED_BYTES],
+    MLKEM768_private_key *out_private_key);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status
+BCM_mlkem768_check_fips(const MLKEM768_private_key *private_key);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_infallible
+BCM_mlkem768_public_from_private(MLKEM768_public_key *out_public_key,
+                                 const MLKEM768_private_key *private_key);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT const MLKEM768_public_key *BCM_mlkem768_public_of_private(
+    const MLKEM768_private_key *private_key);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_infallible
+BCM_mlkem768_encap(uint8_t out_ciphertext[MLKEM768_CIPHERTEXT_BYTES],
+                   uint8_t out_shared_secret[MLKEM_SHARED_SECRET_BYTES],
+                   const MLKEM768_public_key *public_key);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status
+BCM_mlkem768_decap(uint8_t out_shared_secret[MLKEM_SHARED_SECRET_BYTES],
+                   const uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_len,
+                   const MLKEM768_private_key *private_key);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mlkem768_marshal_public_key(
+    CBB *out, const MLKEM768_public_key *public_key);
+
+// BCM_mlkem768_public_keys_equal returns one if `a` and `b` are equal and zero
+// otherwise.
+int BCM_mlkem768_public_keys_equal(const MLKEM768_public_key *a,
+                                   const MLKEM768_public_key *b);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status
+BCM_mlkem768_parse_public_key(MLKEM768_public_key *out_public_key, CBS *in);
+
+// BCM_mlkem768_parse_private_key parses a private key, in NIST's format for
+// private keys, from `in` and writes the result to `out_private_key`. It
+// returns one on success or zero on parse error or if there are trailing bytes
+// in `in`. This format is verbose and should be avoided. Private keys should be
+// stored as seeds and parsed using `BCM_mlkem768_private_key_from_seed`.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status
+BCM_mlkem768_parse_private_key(MLKEM768_private_key *out_private_key, CBS *in);
+
+// BCM_mlkem768_generate_key_external_seed is a deterministic function to create
+// a pair of ML-KEM-768 keys, using the supplied seed. The seed needs to be
+// uniformly random. This function should only be used for tests; regular
+// callers should use the non-deterministic `BCM_mlkem768_generate_key`
+// directly.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_infallible BCM_mlkem768_generate_key_external_seed(
+    uint8_t out_encoded_public_key[MLKEM768_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
+    MLKEM768_private_key *out_private_key,
+    const uint8_t seed[MLKEM_SEED_BYTES]);
+
+// BCM_mlkem768_encap_external_entropy behaves like `MLKEM768_encap`, but uses
+// `MLKEM_ENCAP_ENTROPY` bytes of `entropy` for randomization. The decapsulating
+// side will be able to recover `entropy` in full. This function should only be
+// used for tests, regular callers should use the non-deterministic
+// `BCM_mlkem768_encap` directly.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_infallible BCM_mlkem768_encap_external_entropy(
+    uint8_t out_ciphertext[MLKEM768_CIPHERTEXT_BYTES],
+    uint8_t out_shared_secret[MLKEM_SHARED_SECRET_BYTES],
+    const MLKEM768_public_key *public_key,
+    const uint8_t entropy[BCM_MLKEM_ENCAP_ENTROPY]);
+
+// BCM_mlkem768_marshal_private_key serializes `private_key` to `out` in the
+// NIST format for ML-KEM-768 private keys. (Note that one can also save just
+// the seed value produced by `BCM_mlkem768_generate_key`, which is
+// significantly smaller.)
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mlkem768_marshal_private_key(
+    CBB *out, const MLKEM768_private_key *private_key);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_infallible BCM_mlkem1024_generate_key(
+    uint8_t out_encoded_public_key[MLKEM1024_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
+    uint8_t optional_out_seed[MLKEM_SEED_BYTES],
+    MLKEM1024_private_key *out_private_key);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mlkem1024_generate_key_fips(
+    uint8_t out_encoded_public_key[MLKEM1024_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
+    uint8_t optional_out_seed[MLKEM_SEED_BYTES],
+    MLKEM1024_private_key *out_private_key);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status
+BCM_mlkem1024_check_fips(const MLKEM1024_private_key *private_key);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status
+BCM_mlkem1024_private_key_from_seed(MLKEM1024_private_key *out_private_key,
+                                    const uint8_t *seed, size_t seed_len);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_infallible
+BCM_mlkem1024_public_from_private(MLKEM1024_public_key *out_public_key,
+                                  const MLKEM1024_private_key *private_key);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT const MLKEM1024_public_key *BCM_mlkem1024_public_of_private(
+    const MLKEM1024_private_key *private_key);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_infallible
+BCM_mlkem1024_encap(uint8_t out_ciphertext[MLKEM1024_CIPHERTEXT_BYTES],
+                    uint8_t out_shared_secret[MLKEM_SHARED_SECRET_BYTES],
+                    const MLKEM1024_public_key *public_key);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status
+BCM_mlkem1024_decap(uint8_t out_shared_secret[MLKEM_SHARED_SECRET_BYTES],
+                    const uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_len,
+                    const MLKEM1024_private_key *private_key);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mlkem1024_marshal_public_key(
+    CBB *out, const MLKEM1024_public_key *public_key);
+
+// BCM_mlkem1024_public_keys_equal returns one if `a` and `b` are equal and zero
+// otherwise.
+int BCM_mlkem1024_public_keys_equal(const MLKEM1024_public_key *a,
+                                    const MLKEM1024_public_key *b);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status
+BCM_mlkem1024_parse_public_key(MLKEM1024_public_key *out_public_key, CBS *in);
+
+// BCM_mlkem1024_parse_private_key parses a private key, in NIST's format for
+// private keys, from `in` and writes the result to `out_private_key`. It
+// returns one on success or zero on parse error or if there are trailing bytes
+// in `in`. This format is verbose and should be avoided. Private keys should be
+// stored as seeds and parsed using `BCM_mlkem1024_private_key_from_seed`.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mlkem1024_parse_private_key(
+    MLKEM1024_private_key *out_private_key, CBS *in);
+
+// BCM_mlkem1024_generate_key_external_seed is a deterministic function to
+// create a pair of ML-KEM-1024 keys, using the supplied seed. The seed needs to
+// be uniformly random. This function should only be used for tests, regular
+// callers should use the non-deterministic `BCM_mlkem1024_generate_key`
+// directly.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_infallible BCM_mlkem1024_generate_key_external_seed(
+    uint8_t out_encoded_public_key[MLKEM1024_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
+    MLKEM1024_private_key *out_private_key,
+    const uint8_t seed[MLKEM_SEED_BYTES]);
+
+// BCM_mlkem1024_encap_external_entropy behaves like `MLKEM1024_encap`, but uses
+// `MLKEM_ENCAP_ENTROPY` bytes of `entropy` for randomization. The
+// decapsulating side will be able to recover `entropy` in full. This function
+// should only be used for tests, regular callers should use the
+// non-deterministic `BCM_mlkem1024_encap` directly.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_infallible BCM_mlkem1024_encap_external_entropy(
+    uint8_t out_ciphertext[MLKEM1024_CIPHERTEXT_BYTES],
+    uint8_t out_shared_secret[MLKEM_SHARED_SECRET_BYTES],
+    const MLKEM1024_public_key *public_key,
+    const uint8_t entropy[BCM_MLKEM_ENCAP_ENTROPY]);
+
+// BCM_mlkem1024_marshal_private_key serializes `private_key` to `out` in the
+// NIST format for ML-KEM-1024 private keys. (Note that one can also save just
+// the seed value produced by `BCM_mlkem1024_generate_key`, which is
+// significantly smaller.)
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mlkem1024_marshal_private_key(
+    CBB *out, const MLKEM1024_private_key *private_key);
+
+
+// SLH-DSA
+
+// Output length of the hash function.
+#define BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_N 16
+#define BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_N 32
+
+// The number of bytes at the beginning of M', the augmented message, before the
+// context.
+#define BCM_SLHDSA_M_PRIME_HEADER_LEN 2
+
+// SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES is the number of bytes in an
+// SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s public key.
+#define BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES 32
+#define BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES 64
+
+// BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES is the number of bytes in an
+// SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s private key.
+#define BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES 64
+#define BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES 128
+
+// BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_SIGNATURE_BYTES is the number of bytes in an
+// SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s signature.
+#define BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_SIGNATURE_BYTES 7856
+#define BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_SIGNATURE_BYTES 49856
+
+// BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_generate_key_from_seed generates an SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s
+// key pair from a 48-byte seed and writes the result to `out_public_key` and
+// `out_secret_key`.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_infallible BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_generate_key_from_seed(
+    uint8_t out_public_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
+    uint8_t out_secret_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES],
+    const uint8_t seed[3 * BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_N]);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_infallible BCM_slhdsa_shake_256f_generate_key_from_seed(
+    uint8_t out_public_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
+    uint8_t out_secret_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES],
+    const uint8_t seed[3 * BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_N]);
+
+// BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_generate_key_from_seed_fips does the same thing as
+// `BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_generate_key_from_seed` but implements the required
+// second check before generating a key by testing for nullptr arguments.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_generate_key_from_seed_fips(
+    uint8_t out_public_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
+    uint8_t out_secret_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES],
+    const uint8_t seed[3 * BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_N]);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_slhdsa_shake_256f_generate_key_from_seed_fips(
+    uint8_t out_public_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
+    uint8_t out_secret_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES],
+    const uint8_t seed[3 * BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_N]);
+
+// BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_sign_internal acts like `SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_sign` but
+// accepts an explicit entropy input, which can be PK.seed (bytes 32..48 of
+// the private key) to generate deterministic signatures. It also takes the
+// input message in three parts so that the "internal" version of the signing
+// function, from section 9.2, can be implemented. The `header` argument may be
+// NULL to omit it.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_infallible BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_sign_internal(
+    uint8_t out_signature[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
+    const uint8_t secret_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES],
+    const uint8_t header[BCM_SLHDSA_M_PRIME_HEADER_LEN], const uint8_t *context,
+    size_t context_len, const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len,
+    const uint8_t entropy[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_N]);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_infallible BCM_slhdsa_shake_256f_sign_internal(
+    uint8_t out_signature[BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
+    const uint8_t secret_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES],
+    const uint8_t header[BCM_SLHDSA_M_PRIME_HEADER_LEN], const uint8_t *context,
+    size_t context_len, const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len,
+    const uint8_t entropy[BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_N]);
+
+// BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_verify_internal acts like `SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_verify` but
+// takes the input message in three parts so that the "internal" version of the
+// verification function, from section 9.3, can be implemented. The `header`
+// argument may be NULL to omit it.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_verify_internal(
+    const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_len,
+    const uint8_t public_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
+    const uint8_t header[BCM_SLHDSA_M_PRIME_HEADER_LEN], const uint8_t *context,
+    size_t context_len, const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_slhdsa_shake_256f_verify_internal(
+    const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_len,
+    const uint8_t public_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
+    const uint8_t header[BCM_SLHDSA_M_PRIME_HEADER_LEN], const uint8_t *context,
+    size_t context_len, const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_infallible BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_generate_key(
+    uint8_t out_public_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
+    uint8_t out_private_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES]);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_infallible BCM_slhdsa_shake_256f_generate_key(
+    uint8_t out_public_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
+    uint8_t out_private_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES]);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_generate_key_fips(
+    uint8_t out_public_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
+    uint8_t out_private_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES]);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_slhdsa_shake_256f_generate_key_fips(
+    uint8_t out_public_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
+    uint8_t out_private_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES]);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_infallible BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_public_from_private(
+    uint8_t out_public_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
+    const uint8_t private_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES]);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_infallible BCM_slhdsa_shake_256f_public_from_private(
+    uint8_t out_public_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
+    const uint8_t private_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES]);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_sign(
+    uint8_t out_signature[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
+    const uint8_t private_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES],
+    const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len, const uint8_t *context,
+    size_t context_len);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_slhdsa_shake_256f_sign(
+    uint8_t out_signature[BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
+    const uint8_t private_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES],
+    const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len, const uint8_t *context,
+    size_t context_len);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_verify(
+    const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_len,
+    const uint8_t public_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
+    const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len, const uint8_t *context,
+    size_t context_len);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_slhdsa_shake_256f_verify(
+    const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_len,
+    const uint8_t public_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
+    const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len, const uint8_t *context,
+    size_t context_len);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_prehash_sign(
+    uint8_t out_signature[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
+    const uint8_t private_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES],
+    const uint8_t *hashed_msg, size_t hashed_msg_len, int hash_nid,
+    const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_slhdsa_shake_256f_prehash_sign(
+    uint8_t out_signature[BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
+    const uint8_t private_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES],
+    const uint8_t *hashed_msg, size_t hashed_msg_len, int hash_nid,
+    const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_prehash_verify(
+    const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_len,
+    const uint8_t public_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
+    const uint8_t *hashed_msg, size_t hashed_msg_len, int hash_nid,
+    const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len);
+
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_slhdsa_shake_256f_prehash_verify(
+    const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_len,
+    const uint8_t public_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
+    const uint8_t *hashed_msg, size_t hashed_msg_len, int hash_nid,
+    const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len);
+
+
+// AES
+
+// BCM_aes_encrypt encrypts a single block from `in` to `out` with `key`. The
+// `in` and `out` pointers may overlap.
+bcm_infallible BCM_aes_encrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out,
+                               const AES_KEY *key);
+// BCM_aes_decrypt decrypts a single block from `in` to `out` with `key`. The
+// `in` and `out` pointers may overlap.
+bcm_infallible BCM_aes_decrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out,
+                               const AES_KEY *key);
+
+// BCM_aes_set_encrypt_key configures `aeskey` to encrypt with the `bits`-bit
+// key, `key`. `key` must point to `bits`/8 bytes. It will return failure if
+// `bits` is an invalid AES key size.
+bcm_status BCM_aes_set_encrypt_key(const uint8_t *key, unsigned bits,
+                                   AES_KEY *aeskey);
+
+// BCM_aes_set_decrypt_key configures `aeskey` to decrypt with the `bits`-bit
+// key, `key`. `key` must point to `bits`/8 bytes. It will return failure if
+// `bits` is an invalid AES key size.
+bcm_status BCM_aes_set_decrypt_key(const uint8_t *key, unsigned bits,
+                                   AES_KEY *aeskey);
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_END
+
+
+#endif  // OPENSSL_HEADER_CRYPTO_FIPSMODULE_BCM_INTERFACE_H