visaljs 0.0.1 → 0.0.3

package/runtime/third_party/boringssl/ssl/tls_record.cc

@@ -0,0 +1,524 @@
+// Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+
+#include "../crypto/internal.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
+
+// kMaxEmptyRecords is the number of consecutive, empty records that will be
+// processed. Without this limit an attacker could send empty records at a
+// faster rate than we can process and cause record processing to loop
+// forever.
+static const uint8_t kMaxEmptyRecords = 32;
+
+// kMaxEarlyDataSkipped is the maximum number of rejected early data bytes that
+// will be skipped. Without this limit an attacker could send records at a
+// faster rate than we can process and cause trial decryption to loop forever.
+// This value should be slightly above kMaxEarlyDataAccepted, which is measured
+// in plaintext.
+static const size_t kMaxEarlyDataSkipped = 16384;
+
+// kMaxWarningAlerts is the number of consecutive warning alerts that will be
+// processed.
+static const uint8_t kMaxWarningAlerts = 4;
+
+// ssl_needs_record_splitting returns one if `ssl`'s current outgoing cipher
+// state needs record-splitting and zero otherwise.
+bool ssl_needs_record_splitting(const SSLImpl *ssl) {
+  return !CRYPTO_fuzzer_mode_enabled() &&
+         !ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->is_null_cipher() &&
+         ssl_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_1_VERSION &&
+         (ssl->mode & SSL_MODE_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) != 0 &&
+         SSL_CIPHER_is_block_cipher(ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->cipher());
+}
+
+size_t ssl_record_prefix_len(const SSLImpl *ssl) {
+  assert(!SSL_is_dtls(ssl));
+  return SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx->ExplicitNonceLen();
+}
+
+static ssl_open_record_t skip_early_data(SSLImpl *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                         size_t consumed) {
+  ssl->s3->early_data_skipped += consumed;
+  if (ssl->s3->early_data_skipped < consumed) {
+    ssl->s3->early_data_skipped = kMaxEarlyDataSkipped + 1;
+  }
+
+  if (ssl->s3->early_data_skipped > kMaxEarlyDataSkipped) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_TOO_MUCH_SKIPPED_EARLY_DATA);
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+    return ssl_open_record_error;
+  }
+
+  return ssl_open_record_discard;
+}
+
+static uint16_t tls_record_version(const SSLImpl *ssl) {
+  if (ssl->s3->version == 0) {
+    // Before the version is determined, outgoing records use TLS 1.0 for
+    // historical compatibility requirements.
+    return TLS1_VERSION;
+  }
+
+  // TLS 1.3 freezes the record version at TLS 1.2. Previous ones use the
+  // version itself.
+  return ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION ? TLS1_2_VERSION
+                                                     : ssl->s3->version;
+}
+
+ssl_open_record_t tls_open_record(SSLImpl *ssl, uint8_t *out_type,
+                                  Span<uint8_t> *out, size_t *out_consumed,
+                                  uint8_t *out_alert, Span<uint8_t> in) {
+  *out_consumed = 0;
+  if (ssl->s3->read_shutdown == ssl_shutdown_close_notify) {
+    return ssl_open_record_close_notify;
+  }
+
+  // If there is an unprocessed handshake message or we are already buffering
+  // too much, stop before decrypting another handshake record.
+  if (!tls_can_accept_handshake_data(ssl, out_alert)) {
+    return ssl_open_record_error;
+  }
+
+  CBS cbs = CBS(in);
+
+  // Decode the record header.
+  uint8_t type;
+  uint16_t version, ciphertext_len;
+  if (!CBS_get_u8(&cbs, &type) ||      //
+      !CBS_get_u16(&cbs, &version) ||  //
+      !CBS_get_u16(&cbs, &ciphertext_len)) {
+    *out_consumed = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+    return ssl_open_record_partial;
+  }
+
+  bool version_ok;
+  if (ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx->is_null_cipher()) {
+    // Only check the first byte. Enforcing beyond that can prevent decoding
+    // version negotiation failure alerts.
+    version_ok = (version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR;
+  } else {
+    version_ok = version == tls_record_version(ssl);
+  }
+
+  if (!version_ok) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+    return ssl_open_record_error;
+  }
+
+  // Check the ciphertext length.
+  if (ciphertext_len > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+    return ssl_open_record_error;
+  }
+
+  // Extract the body.
+  CBS body;
+  if (!CBS_get_bytes(&cbs, &body, ciphertext_len)) {
+    *out_consumed = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + (size_t)ciphertext_len;
+    return ssl_open_record_partial;
+  }
+
+  auto header = in.first(SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
+  ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 0 /* read */, SSL3_RT_HEADER, header);
+
+  *out_consumed = in.size() - CBS_len(&cbs);
+
+  // In TLS 1.3, during the handshake, skip ChangeCipherSpec records.
+  static const uint8_t kChangeCipherSpec[] = {SSL3_MT_CCS};
+  if (ssl_has_final_version(ssl) &&
+      ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION && SSL_in_init(ssl) &&
+      type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC &&
+      Span<const uint8_t>(body) == kChangeCipherSpec) {
+    ssl->s3->empty_record_count++;
+    if (ssl->s3->empty_record_count > kMaxEmptyRecords) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS);
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+      return ssl_open_record_error;
+    }
+    return ssl_open_record_discard;
+  }
+
+  // Skip early data received when expecting a second ClientHello if we rejected
+  // 0RTT.
+  if (ssl->s3->skip_early_data &&                  //
+      ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx->is_null_cipher() &&  //
+      type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
+    return skip_early_data(ssl, out_alert, *out_consumed);
+  }
+
+  // Ensure the sequence number update does not overflow.
+  if (ssl->s3->read_sequence + 1 == 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    return ssl_open_record_error;
+  }
+
+  // Decrypt the body in-place.
+  if (!ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx->Open(
+          out, type, version, ssl->s3->read_sequence, header,
+          Span(const_cast<uint8_t *>(CBS_data(&body)), CBS_len(&body)))) {
+    if (ssl->s3->skip_early_data && !ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx->is_null_cipher()) {
+      ERR_clear_error();
+      return skip_early_data(ssl, out_alert, *out_consumed);
+    }
+
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
+    return ssl_open_record_error;
+  }
+
+  ssl->s3->skip_early_data = false;
+  ssl->s3->read_sequence++;
+
+  // TLS 1.3 hides the record type inside the encrypted data.
+  bool has_padding = !ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx->is_null_cipher() &&
+                     ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION;
+
+  // If there is padding, the plaintext limit includes the padding, but includes
+  // extra room for the inner content type.
+  size_t plaintext_limit =
+      has_padding ? SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH + 1 : SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
+  if (out->size() > plaintext_limit) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+    return ssl_open_record_error;
+  }
+
+  if (has_padding) {
+    // The outer record type is always application_data.
+    if (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_OUTER_RECORD_TYPE);
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+      return ssl_open_record_error;
+    }
+
+    do {
+      if (out->empty()) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
+        *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+        return ssl_open_record_error;
+      }
+      type = out->back();
+      *out = out->subspan(0, out->size() - 1);
+    } while (type == 0);
+  }
+
+  // Limit the number of consecutive empty records.
+  if (out->empty()) {
+    ssl->s3->empty_record_count++;
+    if (ssl->s3->empty_record_count > kMaxEmptyRecords) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS);
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+      return ssl_open_record_error;
+    }
+    // Apart from the limit, empty records are returned up to the caller. This
+    // allows the caller to reject records of the wrong type.
+  }
+
+  if (type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
+    return ssl_process_alert(ssl, out_alert, *out);
+  }
+
+  // Handshake messages may not interleave with any other record type.
+  if (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&  //
+      tls_has_unprocessed_handshake_data(ssl)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+    return ssl_open_record_error;
+  }
+
+  // Only when at least one byte is returned, clear the counters for empty
+  // records and warnings.
+  if (!out->empty()) {
+    ssl->s3->empty_record_count = 0;
+    ssl->s3->warning_alert_count = 0;
+  }
+
+  *out_type = type;
+  return ssl_open_record_success;
+}
+
+static bool do_seal_record(SSLImpl *ssl, uint8_t *out_prefix, uint8_t *out,
+                           uint8_t *out_suffix, uint8_t type, const uint8_t *in,
+                           const size_t in_len) {
+  SSLAEADContext *aead = ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx.get();
+  uint8_t *extra_in = nullptr;
+  size_t extra_in_len = 0;
+  if (!aead->is_null_cipher() && ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    // TLS 1.3 hides the actual record type inside the encrypted data.
+    extra_in = &type;
+    extra_in_len = 1;
+  }
+
+  size_t suffix_len, ciphertext_len;
+  if (!aead->SuffixLen(&suffix_len, in_len, extra_in_len) ||
+      !aead->CiphertextLen(&ciphertext_len, in_len, extra_in_len)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  assert(in == out || !buffers_alias(in, in_len, out, in_len));
+  assert(!buffers_alias(in, in_len, out_prefix, ssl_record_prefix_len(ssl)));
+  assert(!buffers_alias(in, in_len, out_suffix, suffix_len));
+
+  if (extra_in_len) {
+    out_prefix[0] = SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA;
+  } else {
+    out_prefix[0] = type;
+  }
+
+  uint16_t record_version = tls_record_version(ssl);
+  out_prefix[1] = record_version >> 8;
+  out_prefix[2] = record_version & 0xff;
+  out_prefix[3] = ciphertext_len >> 8;
+  out_prefix[4] = ciphertext_len & 0xff;
+  Span<const uint8_t> header = Span(out_prefix, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
+
+  // Ensure the sequence number update does not overflow.
+  if (ssl->s3->write_sequence + 1 == 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (!aead->SealScatter(out_prefix + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, out, out_suffix,
+                         out_prefix[0], record_version, ssl->s3->write_sequence,
+                         header, in, in_len, extra_in, extra_in_len)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  ssl->s3->write_sequence++;
+  ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 1 /* write */, SSL3_RT_HEADER, header);
+  return true;
+}
+
+static size_t tls_seal_scatter_prefix_len(const SSLImpl *ssl, uint8_t type,
+                                          size_t in_len) {
+  size_t ret = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+  if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && in_len > 1 &&
+      ssl_needs_record_splitting(ssl)) {
+    // In the case of record splitting, the 1-byte record (of the 1/n-1 split)
+    // will be placed in the prefix, as will four of the five bytes of the
+    // record header for the main record. The final byte will replace the first
+    // byte of the plaintext that was used in the small record.
+    ret += ssl_cipher_get_record_split_len(ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->cipher());
+    ret += SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - 1;
+  } else {
+    ret += ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->ExplicitNonceLen();
+  }
+  return ret;
+}
+
+static bool tls_seal_scatter_suffix_len(const SSLImpl *ssl,
+                                        size_t *out_suffix_len, uint8_t type,
+                                        size_t in_len) {
+  size_t extra_in_len = 0;
+  if (!ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->is_null_cipher() &&
+      ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    // TLS 1.3 adds an extra byte for encrypted record type.
+    extra_in_len = 1;
+  }
+  // clang-format off
+  if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
+      in_len > 1 &&
+      ssl_needs_record_splitting(ssl)) {
+    // With record splitting enabled, the first byte gets sealed into a separate
+    // record which is written into the prefix.
+    in_len -= 1;
+  }
+  // clang-format on
+  return ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->SuffixLen(out_suffix_len, in_len,
+                                            extra_in_len);
+}
+
+// tls_seal_scatter_record seals a new record of type `type` and body `in` and
+// splits it between `out_prefix`, `out`, and `out_suffix`. Exactly
+// `tls_seal_scatter_prefix_len` bytes are written to `out_prefix`, `in_len`
+// bytes to `out`, and `tls_seal_scatter_suffix_len` bytes to `out_suffix`. It
+// returns one on success and zero on error. If enabled,
+// `tls_seal_scatter_record` implements TLS 1.0 CBC 1/n-1 record splitting and
+// may write two records concatenated.
+static bool tls_seal_scatter_record(SSLImpl *ssl, uint8_t *out_prefix,
+                                    uint8_t *out, uint8_t *out_suffix,
+                                    uint8_t type, const uint8_t *in,
+                                    size_t in_len) {
+  if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && in_len > 1 &&
+      ssl_needs_record_splitting(ssl)) {
+    assert(ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->ExplicitNonceLen() == 0);
+    const size_t prefix_len = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
+    // Write the 1-byte fragment into `out_prefix`.
+    uint8_t *split_body = out_prefix + prefix_len;
+    uint8_t *split_suffix = split_body + 1;
+
+    if (!do_seal_record(ssl, out_prefix, split_body, split_suffix, type, in,
+                        1)) {
+      return false;
+    }
+
+    size_t split_record_suffix_len;
+    if (!ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->SuffixLen(&split_record_suffix_len, 1, 0)) {
+      assert(false);
+      return false;
+    }
+    const size_t split_record_len = prefix_len + 1 + split_record_suffix_len;
+    assert(SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + ssl_cipher_get_record_split_len(
+                                       ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->cipher()) ==
+           split_record_len);
+
+    // Write the n-1-byte fragment. The header gets split between `out_prefix`
+    // (header[:-1]) and `out` (header[-1:]).
+    uint8_t tmp_prefix[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH];
+    if (!do_seal_record(ssl, tmp_prefix, out + 1, out_suffix, type, in + 1,
+                        in_len - 1)) {
+      return false;
+    }
+    assert(tls_seal_scatter_prefix_len(ssl, type, in_len) ==
+           split_record_len + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - 1);
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(out_prefix + split_record_len, tmp_prefix,
+                   SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - 1);
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(out, tmp_prefix + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - 1, 1);
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  return do_seal_record(ssl, out_prefix, out, out_suffix, type, in, in_len);
+}
+
+bool tls_seal_record(SSLImpl *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
+                     size_t max_out_len, uint8_t type, const uint8_t *in,
+                     size_t in_len) {
+  if (buffers_alias(in, in_len, out, max_out_len)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_OUTPUT_ALIASES_INPUT);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  const size_t prefix_len = tls_seal_scatter_prefix_len(ssl, type, in_len);
+  size_t suffix_len;
+  if (!tls_seal_scatter_suffix_len(ssl, &suffix_len, type, in_len)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  if (in_len + prefix_len < in_len ||
+      prefix_len + in_len + suffix_len < prefix_len + in_len) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
+    return false;
+  }
+  if (max_out_len < in_len + prefix_len + suffix_len) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  uint8_t *prefix = out;
+  uint8_t *body = out + prefix_len;
+  uint8_t *suffix = body + in_len;
+  if (!tls_seal_scatter_record(ssl, prefix, body, suffix, type, in, in_len)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  *out_len = prefix_len + in_len + suffix_len;
+  return true;
+}
+
+enum ssl_open_record_t ssl_process_alert(SSLImpl *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                         Span<const uint8_t> in) {
+  // Alerts records may not contain fragmented or multiple alerts.
+  if (in.size() != 2) {
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_ALERT);
+    return ssl_open_record_error;
+  }
+
+  ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 0 /* read */, SSL3_RT_ALERT, in);
+
+  const uint8_t alert_level = in[0];
+  const uint8_t alert_descr = in[1];
+
+  uint16_t alert = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
+  ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, alert);
+
+  if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
+    if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
+      ssl->s3->read_shutdown = ssl_shutdown_close_notify;
+      return ssl_open_record_close_notify;
+    }
+
+    // Warning alerts do not exist in TLS 1.3, but RFC 8446 section 6.1
+    // continues to define user_canceled as a signal to cancel the handshake,
+    // without specifying how to handle it. JDK11 misuses it to signal
+    // full-duplex connection close after the handshake. As a workaround, skip
+    // user_canceled as in TLS 1.2. This matches NSS and OpenSSL.
+    if (ssl_has_final_version(ssl) &&
+        ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION &&
+        alert_descr != SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED) {
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_ALERT);
+      return ssl_open_record_error;
+    }
+
+    ssl->s3->warning_alert_count++;
+    if (ssl->s3->warning_alert_count > kMaxWarningAlerts) {
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARNING_ALERTS);
+      return ssl_open_record_error;
+    }
+    return ssl_open_record_discard;
+  }
+
+  if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
+    ERR_add_error_dataf("SSL alert number %d", alert_descr);
+    *out_alert = 0;  // No alert to send back to the peer.
+    return ssl_open_record_error;
+  }
+
+  *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+  OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
+  return ssl_open_record_error;
+}
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_END
+
+using namespace bssl;
+
+size_t SSL_max_seal_overhead(const SSL *ssl) {
+  const auto *ssl_impl = FromOpaque(ssl);
+  if (SSL_is_dtls(ssl_impl)) {
+    // TODO(crbug.com/381113363): Use the 0-RTT epoch if writing 0-RTT.
+    return dtls_max_seal_overhead(ssl_impl, ssl_impl->d1->write_epoch.epoch());
+  }
+
+  size_t ret = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+  ret += ssl_impl->s3->aead_write_ctx->MaxOverhead();
+  // TLS 1.3 needs an extra byte for the encrypted record type.
+  if (!ssl_impl->s3->aead_write_ctx->is_null_cipher() &&
+      ssl_protocol_version(ssl_impl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    ret += 1;
+  }
+  if (ssl_needs_record_splitting(ssl_impl)) {
+    ret *= 2;
+  }
+  return ret;
+}

package/runtime/third_party/boringssl/third_party/fiat/asm/fiat_curve25519_adx_mul.S

@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
+#include <openssl/asm_base.h>
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && defined(OPENSSL_X86_64) && \
+    (defined(__APPLE__) || defined(__ELF__))
+
+.intel_syntax noprefix
+.text
+#if defined(__APPLE__)
+.private_extern _fiat_curve25519_adx_mul
+.global _fiat_curve25519_adx_mul
+_fiat_curve25519_adx_mul:
+#else
+.type fiat_curve25519_adx_mul, @function
+.hidden fiat_curve25519_adx_mul
+.global fiat_curve25519_adx_mul
+fiat_curve25519_adx_mul:
+#endif
+
+.cfi_startproc
+_CET_ENDBR
+push rbp
+.cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8
+.cfi_offset rbp, -16
+mov rbp, rsp
+
+mov rax, rdx
+mov rdx, [ rsi + 0x18 ]
+mulx r11, r10, [ rax + 0x8 ]
+mov rdx, [ rax + 0x0 ]
+mov [ rsp - 0x58 ], r15
+.cfi_offset r15, -16-0x58
+mulx r8, rcx, [ rsi + 0x18 ]
+mov rdx, [ rsi + 0x8 ]
+mov [ rsp - 0x80 ], rbx
+.cfi_offset rbx, -16-0x80
+mulx rbx, r9, [ rax + 0x18 ]
+mov rdx, [ rsi + 0x8 ]
+mov [ rsp - 0x70 ], r12
+.cfi_offset r12, -16-0x70
+mulx r15, r12, [ rax + 0x8 ]
+mov rdx, [ rsi + 0x0 ]
+mov [ rsp - 0x68 ], r13
+.cfi_offset r13, -16-0x68
+mov [ rsp - 0x60 ], r14
+.cfi_offset r14, -16-0x60
+mulx r14, r13, [ rax + 0x0 ]
+mov rdx, [ rax + 0x10 ]
+mov [ rsp - 0x18 ], r15
+mov [ rsp - 0x50 ], rdi
+mulx rdi, r15, [ rsi + 0x0 ]
+mov rdx, [ rax + 0x18 ]
+mov [ rsp - 0x48 ], r13
+mov [ rsp - 0x40 ], r9
+mulx r9, r13, [ rsi + 0x0 ]
+test al, al
+adox rcx, rdi
+mov rdx, [ rsi + 0x10 ]
+mov [ rsp - 0x38 ], r13
+mulx r13, rdi, [ rax + 0x8 ]
+adox r10, r9
+mov rdx, 0x0
+adox rbx, rdx
+adcx rdi, rcx
+adcx r8, r10
+mov r9, rdx
+adcx r9, rbx
+mov rdx, [ rsi + 0x10 ]
+mulx r10, rcx, [ rax + 0x0 ]
+mov rdx, [ rsi + 0x0 ]
+mov [ rsp - 0x30 ], r15
+mulx r15, rbx, [ rax + 0x8 ]
+mov rdx, -0x2
+inc rdx
+adox rcx, r15
+setc r15b
+clc
+adcx rcx, r12
+adox r10, rdi
+mov rdx, [ rax + 0x10 ]
+mov [ rsp - 0x78 ], rcx
+mulx rcx, rdi, [ rsi + 0x10 ]
+adox rdi, r8
+mov rdx, [ rax + 0x18 ]
+mov [ rsp - 0x28 ], rcx
+mulx rcx, r8, [ rsi + 0x10 ]
+mov rdx, [ rax + 0x10 ]
+mov [ rsp - 0x20 ], r8
+mulx r12, r8, [ rsi + 0x18 ]
+adox r8, r9
+mov rdx, [ rsi + 0x8 ]
+mov [ rsp - 0x10 ], r12
+mulx r12, r9, [ rax + 0x10 ]
+movzx rdx, r15b
+lea rdx, [ rdx + rcx ]
+adcx r9, r10
+adcx r13, rdi
+mov r15, 0x0
+mov r10, r15
+adox r10, rdx
+mov rdx, [ rax + 0x18 ]
+mulx rcx, rdi, [ rsi + 0x18 ]
+adox rcx, r15
+adcx r11, r8
+mov rdx, r15
+adcx rdx, r10
+adcx rcx, r15
+mov r8, rdx
+mov rdx, [ rax + 0x0 ]
+mulx r15, r10, [ rsi + 0x8 ]
+test al, al
+adox r10, r14
+adcx rbx, r10
+adox r15, [ rsp - 0x78 ]
+adcx r15, [ rsp - 0x30 ]
+adox r9, [ rsp - 0x18 ]
+adcx r9, [ rsp - 0x38 ]
+adox r13, [ rsp - 0x40 ]
+adcx r12, r13
+adox r11, [ rsp - 0x20 ]
+adcx r11, [ rsp - 0x28 ]
+mov rdx, 0x26
+mulx rsi, r14, r12
+adox rdi, r8
+adcx rdi, [ rsp - 0x10 ]
+mulx r10, r8, r11
+mov r13, 0x0
+adox rcx, r13
+adcx rcx, r13
+mulx r11, r12, rdi
+xor rdi, rdi
+adox r8, rbx
+adox r12, r15
+mulx rbx, r13, rcx
+adcx r14, [ rsp - 0x48 ]
+adox r13, r9
+adox rbx, rdi
+adcx rsi, r8
+adcx r10, r12
+adcx r11, r13
+adc rbx, 0x0
+mulx r9, r15, rbx
+xor r9, r9
+adox r15, r14
+mov rdi, r9
+adox rdi, rsi
+mov rcx, r9
+adox rcx, r10
+mov r8, [ rsp - 0x50 ]
+mov [ r8 + 0x8 ], rdi
+mov r12, r9
+adox r12, r11
+mov r14, r9
+cmovo r14, rdx
+mov [ r8 + 0x18 ], r12
+adcx r15, r14
+mov [ r8 + 0x0 ], r15
+mov [ r8 + 0x10 ], rcx
+mov rbx, [ rsp - 0x80 ]
+.cfi_restore rbx
+mov r12, [ rsp - 0x70 ]
+.cfi_restore r12
+mov r13, [ rsp - 0x68 ]
+.cfi_restore r13
+mov r14, [ rsp - 0x60 ]
+.cfi_restore r14
+mov r15, [ rsp - 0x58 ]
+.cfi_restore r15
+
+pop rbp
+.cfi_restore rbp
+.cfi_adjust_cfa_offset -8
+ret
+.cfi_endproc
+#if defined(__ELF__)
+.size fiat_curve25519_adx_mul, .-fiat_curve25519_adx_mul
+#endif
+
+#endif