visaljs 0.0.1 → 0.0.3

package/runtime/third_party/boringssl/ssl/ssl_privkey.cc

@@ -0,0 +1,973 @@
+// Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#include <algorithm>
+
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+#include <openssl/ec_key.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/span.h>
+
+#include "../crypto/bytestring/internal.h"
+#include "../crypto/internal.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
+
+bool ssl_is_key_type_supported(int key_type) {
+  switch (key_type) {
+    case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
+    case EVP_PKEY_EC:
+    case EVP_PKEY_ED25519:
+    case EVP_PKEY_ML_DSA_44:
+    case EVP_PKEY_ML_DSA_65:
+    case EVP_PKEY_ML_DSA_87:
+      return true;
+  }
+  return false;
+}
+
+typedef struct {
+  uint16_t sigalg;
+  int pkey_type;
+  int curve;
+  const EVP_MD *(*digest_func)();
+  bool is_rsa_pss;
+  bool tls12_ok;
+  bool tls13_ok;
+  bool client_only;
+} SSL_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
+
+static const SSL_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM kSignatureAlgorithms[] = {
+    // PKCS#1 v1.5 code points are only allowed in TLS 1.2.
+    {SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_MD5_SHA1, EVP_PKEY_RSA, NID_undef, &EVP_md5_sha1,
+     /*is_rsa_pss=*/false, /*tls12_ok=*/true, /*tls13_ok=*/false,
+     /*client_only=*/false},
+    {SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1, EVP_PKEY_RSA, NID_undef, &EVP_sha1,
+     /*is_rsa_pss=*/false, /*tls12_ok=*/true, /*tls13_ok=*/false,
+     /*client_only=*/false},
+    {SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256, EVP_PKEY_RSA, NID_undef, &EVP_sha256,
+     /*is_rsa_pss=*/false, /*tls12_ok=*/true, /*tls13_ok=*/false,
+     /*client_only=*/false},
+    {SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384, EVP_PKEY_RSA, NID_undef, &EVP_sha384,
+     /*is_rsa_pss=*/false, /*tls12_ok=*/true, /*tls13_ok=*/false,
+     /*client_only=*/false},
+    {SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512, EVP_PKEY_RSA, NID_undef, &EVP_sha512,
+     /*is_rsa_pss=*/false, /*tls12_ok=*/true, /*tls13_ok=*/false,
+     /*client_only=*/false},
+
+    // Legacy PKCS#1 v1.5 code points are only allowed in TLS 1.3 and
+    // client-only. See RFC 9963.
+    {SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256_LEGACY, EVP_PKEY_RSA, NID_undef, &EVP_sha256,
+     /*is_rsa_pss=*/false, /*tls12_ok=*/false, /*tls13_ok=*/true,
+     /*client_only=*/true},
+
+    {SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256, EVP_PKEY_RSA, NID_undef, &EVP_sha256,
+     /*is_rsa_pss=*/true, /*tls12_ok=*/true, /*tls13_ok=*/true,
+     /*client_only=*/false},
+    {SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384, EVP_PKEY_RSA, NID_undef, &EVP_sha384,
+     /*is_rsa_pss=*/true, /*tls12_ok=*/true, /*tls13_ok=*/true,
+     /*client_only=*/false},
+    {SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512, EVP_PKEY_RSA, NID_undef, &EVP_sha512,
+     /*is_rsa_pss=*/true, /*tls12_ok=*/true, /*tls13_ok=*/true,
+     /*client_only=*/false},
+
+    {SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA1, EVP_PKEY_EC, NID_undef, &EVP_sha1,
+     /*is_rsa_pss=*/false, /*tls12_ok=*/true, /*tls13_ok=*/false,
+     /*client_only=*/false},
+    {SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256, EVP_PKEY_EC, NID_X9_62_prime256v1,
+     &EVP_sha256, /*is_rsa_pss=*/false, /*tls12_ok=*/true, /*tls13_ok=*/true,
+     /*client_only=*/false},
+    {SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384, EVP_PKEY_EC, NID_secp384r1, &EVP_sha384,
+     /*is_rsa_pss=*/false, /*tls12_ok=*/true, /*tls13_ok=*/true,
+     /*client_only=*/false},
+    {SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512, EVP_PKEY_EC, NID_secp521r1, &EVP_sha512,
+     /*is_rsa_pss=*/false, /*tls12_ok=*/true, /*tls13_ok=*/true,
+     /*client_only=*/false},
+
+    {SSL_SIGN_ED25519, EVP_PKEY_ED25519, NID_undef, nullptr,
+     /*is_rsa_pss=*/false, /*tls12_ok=*/true, /*tls13_ok=*/true,
+     /*client_only=*/false},
+
+    {SSL_SIGN_ML_DSA_44, EVP_PKEY_ML_DSA_44, NID_undef, nullptr,
+     /*is_rsa_pss=*/false, /*tls12_ok=*/false, /*tls13_ok=*/true,
+     /*client_only=*/false},
+    {SSL_SIGN_ML_DSA_65, EVP_PKEY_ML_DSA_65, NID_undef, nullptr,
+     /*is_rsa_pss=*/false, /*tls12_ok=*/false, /*tls13_ok=*/true,
+     /*client_only=*/false},
+    {SSL_SIGN_ML_DSA_87, EVP_PKEY_ML_DSA_87, NID_undef, nullptr,
+     /*is_rsa_pss=*/false, /*tls12_ok=*/false, /*tls13_ok=*/true,
+     /*client_only=*/false},
+};
+
+static const SSL_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM *get_signature_algorithm(uint16_t sigalg) {
+  for (const auto &alg : kSignatureAlgorithms) {
+    if (alg.sigalg == sigalg) {
+      return &alg;
+    }
+  }
+  return nullptr;
+}
+
+bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> ssl_parse_peer_subject_public_key_info(
+    Span<const uint8_t> spki) {
+  // Ideally the set of reachable algorithms would flow from `SSL_CTX` for dead
+  // code elimination, but for now we just specify every algorithm that might be
+  // reachable from libssl.
+  const EVP_PKEY_ALG *const algs[] = {
+      EVP_pkey_rsa(),       EVP_pkey_ec_p256(),   EVP_pkey_ec_p384(),
+      EVP_pkey_ec_p521(),   EVP_pkey_ed25519(),   EVP_pkey_ml_dsa_44(),
+      EVP_pkey_ml_dsa_65(), EVP_pkey_ml_dsa_87(),
+  };
+  return bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY>(EVP_PKEY_from_subject_public_key_info(
+      spki.data(), spki.size(), algs, std::size(algs)));
+}
+
+bool ssl_pkey_supports_algorithm(const SSLImpl *ssl, EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                                 uint16_t sigalg, bool is_verify) {
+  const SSL_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM *alg = get_signature_algorithm(sigalg);
+  if (alg == nullptr || EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != alg->pkey_type) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // Ensure the RSA key is large enough for the hash. RSASSA-PSS requires that
+  // emLen be at least hLen + sLen + 2. Both hLen and sLen are the size of the
+  // hash in TLS. Reasonable RSA key sizes are large enough for the largest
+  // defined RSASSA-PSS algorithm, but 1024-bit RSA is slightly too small for
+  // SHA-512. 1024-bit RSA is sometimes used for test credentials, so check the
+  // size so that we can fall back to another algorithm in that case.
+  if (alg->is_rsa_pss &&
+      (size_t)EVP_PKEY_size(pkey) < 2 * EVP_MD_size(alg->digest_func()) + 2) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+    // TLS 1.0 and 1.1 do not negotiate algorithms and always sign one of two
+    // hardcoded algorithms.
+    return sigalg == SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_MD5_SHA1 ||
+           sigalg == SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA1;
+  }
+
+  // `SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_MD5_SHA1` is not a real SignatureScheme for TLS 1.2 and
+  // higher. It is an internal value we use to represent TLS 1.0/1.1's MD5/SHA1
+  // concatenation.
+  if (sigalg == SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_MD5_SHA1) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    if (!alg->tls13_ok) {
+      return false;
+    }
+
+    bool is_client_sign = ssl->server == is_verify;
+    if (alg->client_only && !is_client_sign) {
+      return false;
+    }
+
+    // EC keys have a curve requirement.
+    if (alg->pkey_type == EVP_PKEY_EC &&
+        (alg->curve == NID_undef ||
+         EVP_PKEY_get_ec_curve_nid(pkey) != alg->curve)) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  } else if (!alg->tls12_ok) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool setup_ctx(SSLImpl *ssl, EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                      uint16_t sigalg, bool is_verify) {
+  if (!ssl_pkey_supports_algorithm(ssl, pkey, sigalg, is_verify)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  const SSL_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM *alg = get_signature_algorithm(sigalg);
+  const EVP_MD *digest =
+      alg->digest_func != nullptr ? alg->digest_func() : nullptr;
+  EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
+  if (is_verify) {
+    if (!EVP_DigestVerifyInit(ctx, &pctx, digest, nullptr, pkey)) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  } else if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(ctx, &pctx, digest, nullptr, pkey)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (alg->is_rsa_pss) {
+    if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) ||
+        !EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST)) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+enum ssl_private_key_result_t ssl_private_key_sign(
+    SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, size_t max_out,
+    uint16_t sigalg, Span<const uint8_t> in) {
+  SSLImpl *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  const SSLCredential *const cred = hs->credential.get();
+  Array<uint8_t> spki;
+  if (hs->provided_hints != nullptr || hs->pending_hints != nullptr) {
+    ScopedCBB spki_cbb;
+    if (!CBB_init(spki_cbb.get(), 64) ||
+        !EVP_marshal_public_key(spki_cbb.get(), cred->pubkey.get()) ||
+        !CBBFinishArray(spki_cbb.get(), &spki)) {
+      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      return ssl_private_key_failure;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Replay the signature from handshake hints if available.
+  bool hint_applicable = hs->provided_hints != nullptr &&
+                         sigalg == hs->provided_hints->signature_algorithm &&
+                         in == hs->provided_hints->signature_input &&
+                         Span(spki) == hs->provided_hints->signature_spki &&
+                         !hs->provided_hints->signature.empty() &&
+                         hs->provided_hints->signature.size() <= max_out;
+  if (hint_applicable) {
+    // Signature algorithm and input both match. Reuse the signature from hints.
+    *out_len = hs->provided_hints->signature.size();
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(out, hs->provided_hints->signature.data(),
+                   hs->provided_hints->signature.size());
+  } else {
+    const SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD *key_method = cred->key_method;
+    EVP_PKEY *privkey = cred->privkey.get();
+    assert(!hs->can_release_private_key);
+
+    if (key_method != nullptr) {
+      if (key_method->sign == nullptr) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return ssl_private_key_failure;
+      }
+      enum ssl_private_key_result_t ret;
+      if (hs->pending_private_key_op) {
+        if (key_method->complete == nullptr) {
+          OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+          return ssl_private_key_failure;
+        }
+        ret = key_method->complete(ssl, out, out_len, max_out);
+      } else {
+        ret = key_method->sign(ssl, out, out_len, max_out, sigalg, in.data(),
+                              in.size());
+      }
+      if (ret == ssl_private_key_failure) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PRIVATE_KEY_OPERATION_FAILED);
+      }
+      hs->pending_private_key_op = ret == ssl_private_key_retry;
+      if (ret != ssl_private_key_success) {
+        return ret;
+      }
+    } else {
+      *out_len = max_out;
+      ScopedEVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+      if (!setup_ctx(ssl, ctx.get(), privkey, sigalg, false /* sign */) ||
+          !EVP_DigestSign(ctx.get(), out, out_len, in.data(), in.size())) {
+        return ssl_private_key_failure;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Save the hint if requested.
+  if (hs->pending_hints != nullptr) {
+    hs->pending_hints->signature_algorithm = sigalg;
+    hs->pending_hints->signature_spki = std::move(spki);
+    if (!hs->pending_hints->signature_input.CopyFrom(in) ||
+        !hs->pending_hints->signature.CopyFrom(Span(out, *out_len))) {
+      return ssl_private_key_failure;
+    }
+  }
+  return ssl_private_key_success;
+}
+
+bool ssl_public_key_verify(SSLImpl *ssl, Span<const uint8_t> signature,
+                           uint16_t sigalg, EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                           Span<const uint8_t> in) {
+  ScopedEVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+  if (!setup_ctx(ssl, ctx.get(), pkey, sigalg, true /* verify */)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  bool ok = EVP_DigestVerify(ctx.get(), signature.data(), signature.size(),
+                             in.data(), in.size());
+  if (CRYPTO_fuzzer_mode_enabled()) {
+    ok = true;
+    ERR_clear_error();
+  }
+  return ok;
+}
+
+enum ssl_private_key_result_t ssl_private_key_decrypt(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                                      uint8_t *out,
+                                                      size_t *out_len,
+                                                      size_t max_out,
+                                                      Span<const uint8_t> in) {
+  SSLImpl *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  const SSLCredential *const cred = hs->credential.get();
+  assert(!hs->can_release_private_key);
+  if (cred->key_method != nullptr) {
+    if (cred->key_method->decrypt == nullptr) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      return ssl_private_key_failure;
+    }
+    enum ssl_private_key_result_t ret;
+    if (hs->pending_private_key_op) {
+      if (cred->key_method->complete == nullptr) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return ssl_private_key_failure;
+      }
+      ret = cred->key_method->complete(ssl, out, out_len, max_out);
+    } else {
+      ret = cred->key_method->decrypt(ssl, out, out_len, max_out, in.data(),
+                                      in.size());
+    }
+    if (ret == ssl_private_key_failure) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PRIVATE_KEY_OPERATION_FAILED);
+    }
+    hs->pending_private_key_op = ret == ssl_private_key_retry;
+    return ret;
+  }
+
+  RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(cred->privkey.get());
+  if (rsa == nullptr) {
+    // Decrypt operations are only supported for RSA keys.
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return ssl_private_key_failure;
+  }
+
+  // Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of the
+  // timing-sensitive code by the caller.
+  if (!RSA_decrypt(rsa, out_len, out, max_out, in.data(), in.size(),
+                   RSA_NO_PADDING)) {
+    return ssl_private_key_failure;
+  }
+  return ssl_private_key_success;
+}
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_END
+
+using namespace bssl;
+
+int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL *ssl, RSA *rsa) {
+  if (rsa == nullptr || FromOpaque(ssl)->config == nullptr) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> pkey(EVP_PKEY_new());
+  if (!pkey ||  //
+      !EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey.get(), rsa)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return SSL_use_PrivateKey(ssl, pkey.get());
+}
+
+int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *der, size_t der_len) {
+  UniquePtr<RSA> rsa(RSA_private_key_from_bytes(der, der_len));
+  if (!rsa) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey(ssl, rsa.get());
+}
+
+int SSL_use_PrivateKey(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
+  auto *ssl_impl = FromOpaque(ssl);
+  if (pkey == nullptr || ssl_impl->config == nullptr) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return SSL_CREDENTIAL_set1_private_key(
+      ssl_impl->config->cert->legacy_credential.get(), pkey);
+}
+
+int SSL_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(int type, SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *der,
+                            size_t der_len) {
+  if (der_len > LONG_MAX) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  const uint8_t *p = der;
+  UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> pkey(d2i_PrivateKey(type, nullptr, &p, (long)der_len));
+  if (!pkey || p != der + der_len) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return SSL_use_PrivateKey(ssl, pkey.get());
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL_CTX *ctx, RSA *rsa) {
+  if (rsa == nullptr) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> pkey(EVP_PKEY_new());
+  if (!pkey || !EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey.get(), rsa)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ctx, pkey.get());
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1(SSL_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *der,
+                                   size_t der_len) {
+  UniquePtr<RSA> rsa(RSA_private_key_from_bytes(der, der_len));
+  if (!rsa) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey(ctx, rsa.get());
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(SSL_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
+  if (pkey == nullptr) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return SSL_CREDENTIAL_set1_private_key(
+      FromOpaque(ctx)->cert->legacy_credential.get(), pkey);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(int type, SSL_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *der,
+                                size_t der_len) {
+  if (der_len > LONG_MAX) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  const uint8_t *p = der;
+  UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> pkey(d2i_PrivateKey(type, nullptr, &p, (long)der_len));
+  if (!pkey || p != der + der_len) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ctx, pkey.get());
+}
+
+void SSL_set_private_key_method(SSL *ssl,
+                                const SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD *key_method) {
+  auto *ssl_impl = FromOpaque(ssl);
+  if (!ssl_impl->config) {
+    return;
+  }
+  BSSL_CHECK(SSL_CREDENTIAL_set_private_key_method(
+      ssl_impl->config->cert->legacy_credential.get(), key_method));
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_private_key_method(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                    const SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD *key_method) {
+  BSSL_CHECK(SSL_CREDENTIAL_set_private_key_method(
+      FromOpaque(ctx)->cert->legacy_credential.get(), key_method));
+}
+
+static constexpr size_t kMaxSignatureAlgorithmNameLen = 24;
+
+struct SignatureAlgorithmName {
+  uint16_t signature_algorithm;
+  const char name[kMaxSignatureAlgorithmNameLen];
+};
+
+// This was "constexpr" rather than "const", but that triggered a bug in MSVC
+// where it didn't pad the strings to the correct length.
+static const SignatureAlgorithmName kSignatureAlgorithmNames[] = {
+    {SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_MD5_SHA1, "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1"},
+    {SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1, "rsa_pkcs1_sha1"},
+    {SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256, "rsa_pkcs1_sha256"},
+    {SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256_LEGACY, "rsa_pkcs1_sha256_legacy"},
+    {SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384, "rsa_pkcs1_sha384"},
+    {SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512, "rsa_pkcs1_sha512"},
+    {SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA1, "ecdsa_sha1"},
+    {SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256, "ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256"},
+    {SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384, "ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384"},
+    {SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512, "ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512"},
+    {SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256, "rsa_pss_rsae_sha256"},
+    {SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384, "rsa_pss_rsae_sha384"},
+    {SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512, "rsa_pss_rsae_sha512"},
+    {SSL_SIGN_ED25519, "ed25519"},
+    {SSL_SIGN_ML_DSA_44, "mldsa44"},
+    {SSL_SIGN_ML_DSA_65, "mldsa65"},
+    {SSL_SIGN_ML_DSA_87, "mldsa87"},
+};
+
+const char *SSL_get_signature_algorithm_name(uint16_t sigalg,
+                                             int include_curve) {
+  if (!include_curve) {
+    switch (sigalg) {
+      case SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256:
+        return "ecdsa_sha256";
+      case SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384:
+        return "ecdsa_sha384";
+      case SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512:
+        return "ecdsa_sha512";
+        // If adding more here, also update
+        // `SSL_get_all_signature_algorithm_names`.
+    }
+  }
+
+  for (const auto &candidate : kSignatureAlgorithmNames) {
+    if (candidate.signature_algorithm == sigalg) {
+      return candidate.name;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return nullptr;
+}
+
+size_t SSL_get_all_signature_algorithm_names(const char **out, size_t max_out) {
+  const char *const kPredefinedNames[] = {"ecdsa_sha256", "ecdsa_sha384",
+                                          "ecdsa_sha512"};
+  return GetAllNames(out, max_out, Span(kPredefinedNames),
+                     &SignatureAlgorithmName::name,
+                     Span(kSignatureAlgorithmNames));
+}
+
+int SSL_get_signature_algorithm_key_type(uint16_t sigalg) {
+  const SSL_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM *alg = get_signature_algorithm(sigalg);
+  return alg != nullptr ? alg->pkey_type : EVP_PKEY_NONE;
+}
+
+const EVP_MD *SSL_get_signature_algorithm_digest(uint16_t sigalg) {
+  const SSL_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM *alg = get_signature_algorithm(sigalg);
+  if (alg == nullptr || alg->digest_func == nullptr) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+  return alg->digest_func();
+}
+
+int SSL_is_signature_algorithm_rsa_pss(uint16_t sigalg) {
+  const SSL_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM *alg = get_signature_algorithm(sigalg);
+  return alg != nullptr && alg->is_rsa_pss;
+}
+
+static bool sigalgs_unique(Span<const uint16_t> in_sigalgs) {
+  if (in_sigalgs.size() < 2) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  Array<uint16_t> sigalgs;
+  if (!sigalgs.CopyFrom(in_sigalgs)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  std::sort(sigalgs.begin(), sigalgs.end());
+  for (size_t i = 1; i < sigalgs.size(); i++) {
+    if (sigalgs[i - 1] == sigalgs[i]) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DUPLICATE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool set_sigalg_prefs(Array<uint16_t> *out, Span<const uint16_t> prefs) {
+  if (!sigalgs_unique(prefs)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // Check for invalid algorithms, and filter out `SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_MD5_SHA1`.
+  Array<uint16_t> filtered;
+  if (!filtered.InitForOverwrite(prefs.size())) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  size_t added = 0;
+  for (uint16_t pref : prefs) {
+    if (pref == SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_MD5_SHA1) {
+      // Though not intended to be used with this API, we treat
+      // `SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_MD5_SHA1` as a real signature algorithm in
+      // `SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD`. Not accepting it here makes for a confusing
+      // abstraction.
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (get_signature_algorithm(pref) == nullptr) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
+      return false;
+    }
+    filtered[added] = pref;
+    added++;
+  }
+  filtered.Shrink(added);
+
+  // This can happen if `prefs` contained only `SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_MD5_SHA1`.
+  // Leaving it empty would revert to the default, so treat this as an error
+  // condition.
+  if (!prefs.empty() && filtered.empty()) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  *out = std::move(filtered);
+  return true;
+}
+
+int SSL_CREDENTIAL_set1_signing_algorithm_prefs(SSL_CREDENTIAL *cred,
+                                                const uint16_t *prefs,
+                                                size_t num_prefs) {
+  auto *cred_impl = FromOpaque(cred);
+  if (!cred_impl->UsesPrivateKey()) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // Delegated credentials are constrained to a single algorithm, so there is no
+  // need to configure this.
+  if (cred_impl->type == SSLCredentialType::kDelegated) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return set_sigalg_prefs(&cred_impl->sigalgs, Span(prefs, num_prefs));
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_signing_algorithm_prefs(SSL_CTX *ctx, const uint16_t *prefs,
+                                        size_t num_prefs) {
+  return SSL_CREDENTIAL_set1_signing_algorithm_prefs(
+      FromOpaque(ctx)->cert->legacy_credential.get(), prefs, num_prefs);
+}
+
+int SSL_set_signing_algorithm_prefs(SSL *ssl, const uint16_t *prefs,
+                                    size_t num_prefs) {
+  auto *ssl_impl = FromOpaque(ssl);
+  if (!ssl_impl->config) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return SSL_CREDENTIAL_set1_signing_algorithm_prefs(
+      ssl_impl->config->cert->legacy_credential.get(), prefs, num_prefs);
+}
+
+static constexpr struct {
+  int pkey_type;
+  int hash_nid;
+  uint16_t signature_algorithm;
+} kSignatureAlgorithmsMapping[] = {
+    {EVP_PKEY_RSA, NID_sha1, SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1},
+    {EVP_PKEY_RSA, NID_sha256, SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256},
+    {EVP_PKEY_RSA, NID_sha384, SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384},
+    {EVP_PKEY_RSA, NID_sha512, SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512},
+    {EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, NID_sha256, SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256},
+    {EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, NID_sha384, SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384},
+    {EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, NID_sha512, SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512},
+    {EVP_PKEY_EC, NID_sha1, SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA1},
+    {EVP_PKEY_EC, NID_sha256, SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256},
+    {EVP_PKEY_EC, NID_sha384, SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384},
+    {EVP_PKEY_EC, NID_sha512, SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512},
+    {EVP_PKEY_ED25519, NID_undef, SSL_SIGN_ED25519},
+    {EVP_PKEY_ML_DSA_44, NID_undef, SSL_SIGN_ML_DSA_44},
+    {EVP_PKEY_ML_DSA_65, NID_undef, SSL_SIGN_ML_DSA_65},
+    {EVP_PKEY_ML_DSA_87, NID_undef, SSL_SIGN_ML_DSA_87},
+};
+
+static bool parse_sigalg_pairs(Array<uint16_t> *out, const int *values,
+                               size_t num_values) {
+  if ((num_values & 1) == 1) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  const size_t num_pairs = num_values / 2;
+  if (!out->InitForOverwrite(num_pairs)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < num_values; i += 2) {
+    const int hash_nid = values[i];
+    const int pkey_type = values[i + 1];
+
+    bool found = false;
+    for (const auto &candidate : kSignatureAlgorithmsMapping) {
+      if (candidate.pkey_type == pkey_type && candidate.hash_nid == hash_nid) {
+        (*out)[i / 2] = candidate.signature_algorithm;
+        found = true;
+        break;
+      }
+    }
+
+    if (!found) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
+      ERR_add_error_dataf("unknown hash:%d pkey:%d", hash_nid, pkey_type);
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs(SSL_CTX *ctx, const int *values, size_t num_values) {
+  Array<uint16_t> sigalgs;
+  if (!parse_sigalg_pairs(&sigalgs, values, num_values)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (!SSL_CTX_set_signing_algorithm_prefs(ctx, sigalgs.data(),
+                                           sigalgs.size()) ||
+      !SSL_CTX_set_verify_algorithm_prefs(ctx, sigalgs.data(),
+                                          sigalgs.size())) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_set1_sigalgs(SSL *ssl, const int *values, size_t num_values) {
+  auto *ssl_impl = FromOpaque(ssl);
+  if (!ssl_impl->config) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  Array<uint16_t> sigalgs;
+  if (!parse_sigalg_pairs(&sigalgs, values, num_values)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (!SSL_set_signing_algorithm_prefs(ssl_impl, sigalgs.data(),
+                                       sigalgs.size()) ||
+      !SSL_set_verify_algorithm_prefs(ssl_impl, sigalgs.data(),
+                                      sigalgs.size())) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static bool parse_sigalgs_list(Array<uint16_t> *out, const char *str) {
+  // str looks like "RSA+SHA1:ECDSA+SHA256:ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256".
+
+  // Count colons to give the number of output elements from any successful
+  // parse.
+  size_t num_elements = 1;
+  size_t len = 0;
+  for (const char *p = str; *p; p++) {
+    len++;
+    if (*p == ':') {
+      num_elements++;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (!out->InitForOverwrite(num_elements)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  size_t out_i = 0;
+
+  enum {
+    pkey_or_name,
+    hash_name,
+  } state = pkey_or_name;
+
+  char buf[kMaxSignatureAlgorithmNameLen];
+  // buf_used is always < sizeof(buf). I.e. it's always safe to write
+  // buf[buf_used] = 0.
+  size_t buf_used = 0;
+
+  int pkey_type = 0, hash_nid = 0;
+
+  // Note that the loop runs to len+1, i.e. it'll process the terminating NUL.
+  for (size_t offset = 0; offset < len + 1; offset++) {
+    const unsigned char c = str[offset];
+
+    switch (c) {
+      case '+':
+        if (state == hash_name) {
+          OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
+          ERR_add_error_dataf("+ found in hash name at offset %zu", offset);
+          return false;
+        }
+        if (buf_used == 0) {
+          OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
+          ERR_add_error_dataf("empty public key type at offset %zu", offset);
+          return false;
+        }
+        buf[buf_used] = 0;
+
+        if (strcmp(buf, "RSA") == 0) {
+          pkey_type = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
+        } else if (strcmp(buf, "RSA-PSS") == 0 ||  //
+                   strcmp(buf, "PSS") == 0) {
+          pkey_type = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
+        } else if (strcmp(buf, "ECDSA") == 0) {
+          pkey_type = EVP_PKEY_EC;
+        } else {
+          OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
+          ERR_add_error_dataf("unknown public key type '%s'", buf);
+          return false;
+        }
+
+        state = hash_name;
+        buf_used = 0;
+        break;
+
+      case ':':
+        [[fallthrough]];
+      case 0:
+        if (buf_used == 0) {
+          OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
+          ERR_add_error_dataf("empty element at offset %zu", offset);
+          return false;
+        }
+
+        buf[buf_used] = 0;
+
+        if (state == pkey_or_name) {
+          // No '+' was seen thus this is a TLS 1.3-style name.
+          bool found = false;
+          for (const auto &candidate : kSignatureAlgorithmNames) {
+            if (strcmp(candidate.name, buf) == 0) {
+              assert(out_i < num_elements);
+              (*out)[out_i++] = candidate.signature_algorithm;
+              found = true;
+              break;
+            }
+          }
+
+          if (!found) {
+            OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
+            ERR_add_error_dataf("unknown signature algorithm '%s'", buf);
+            return false;
+          }
+        } else {
+          if (strcmp(buf, "SHA1") == 0) {
+            hash_nid = NID_sha1;
+          } else if (strcmp(buf, "SHA256") == 0) {
+            hash_nid = NID_sha256;
+          } else if (strcmp(buf, "SHA384") == 0) {
+            hash_nid = NID_sha384;
+          } else if (strcmp(buf, "SHA512") == 0) {
+            hash_nid = NID_sha512;
+          } else {
+            OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
+            ERR_add_error_dataf("unknown hash function '%s'", buf);
+            return false;
+          }
+
+          bool found = false;
+          for (const auto &candidate : kSignatureAlgorithmsMapping) {
+            if (candidate.pkey_type == pkey_type &&
+                candidate.hash_nid == hash_nid) {
+              assert(out_i < num_elements);
+              (*out)[out_i++] = candidate.signature_algorithm;
+              found = true;
+              break;
+            }
+          }
+
+          if (!found) {
+            OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
+            ERR_add_error_dataf("unknown pkey:%d hash:%s", pkey_type, buf);
+            return false;
+          }
+        }
+
+        state = pkey_or_name;
+        buf_used = 0;
+        break;
+
+      default:
+        if (buf_used == sizeof(buf) - 1) {
+          OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
+          ERR_add_error_dataf("substring too long at offset %zu", offset);
+          return false;
+        }
+
+        if (OPENSSL_isalnum(c) || c == '-' || c == '_') {
+          buf[buf_used++] = c;
+        } else {
+          OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
+          ERR_add_error_dataf("invalid character 0x%02x at offset %zu", c,
+                              offset);
+          return false;
+        }
+    }
+  }
+
+  assert(out_i == out->size());
+  return true;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str) {
+  Array<uint16_t> sigalgs;
+  if (!parse_sigalgs_list(&sigalgs, str)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (!SSL_CTX_set_signing_algorithm_prefs(ctx, sigalgs.data(),
+                                           sigalgs.size()) ||
+      !SSL_CTX_set_verify_algorithm_prefs(ctx, sigalgs.data(),
+                                          sigalgs.size())) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_set1_sigalgs_list(SSL *ssl, const char *str) {
+  auto *ssl_impl = FromOpaque(ssl);
+  if (!ssl_impl->config) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  Array<uint16_t> sigalgs;
+  if (!parse_sigalgs_list(&sigalgs, str)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (!SSL_set_signing_algorithm_prefs(ssl_impl, sigalgs.data(),
+                                       sigalgs.size()) ||
+      !SSL_set_verify_algorithm_prefs(ssl_impl, sigalgs.data(),
+                                      sigalgs.size())) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_verify_algorithm_prefs(SSL_CTX *ctx, const uint16_t *prefs,
+                                       size_t num_prefs) {
+  return set_sigalg_prefs(&FromOpaque(ctx)->verify_sigalgs,
+                          Span(prefs, num_prefs));
+}
+
+int SSL_set_verify_algorithm_prefs(SSL *ssl, const uint16_t *prefs,
+                                   size_t num_prefs) {
+  auto *ssl_impl = FromOpaque(ssl);
+  if (!ssl_impl->config) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return set_sigalg_prefs(&ssl_impl->config->verify_sigalgs,
+                          Span(prefs, num_prefs));
+}