visaljs 0.0.1 → 0.0.3

package/runtime/third_party/boringssl/ssl/handshake.cc

@@ -0,0 +1,694 @@
+// Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+// Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#include <algorithm>
+#include <utility>
+
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/pool.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+#include "../crypto/internal.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
+
+SSL_HANDSHAKE::SSL_HANDSHAKE(SSLImpl *ssl_arg)
+    : ssl(ssl_arg),
+      transcript(SSL_is_dtls(ssl_arg)),
+      inner_transcript(SSL_is_dtls(ssl_arg)),
+      ech_is_inner(false),
+      ech_authenticated_reject(false),
+      scts_requested(false),
+      handshake_finalized(false),
+      accept_psk_mode(false),
+      cert_request(false),
+      certificate_status_expected(false),
+      ocsp_stapling_requested(false),
+      should_ack_sni(false),
+      in_false_start(false),
+      in_early_data(false),
+      early_data_offered(false),
+      can_early_read(false),
+      can_early_write(false),
+      is_early_version(false),
+      next_proto_neg_seen(false),
+      ticket_expected(false),
+      extended_master_secret(false),
+      pending_private_key_op(false),
+      cert_compression_negotiated(false),
+      apply_jdk11_workaround(false),
+      can_release_private_key(false),
+      channel_id_negotiated(false),
+      received_hello_verify_request(false),
+      matched_peer_trust_anchor(false),
+      peer_matched_trust_anchor(false) {
+  assert(ssl);
+
+  // Draw entropy for all GREASE values at once. This avoids calling
+  // `RAND_bytes` repeatedly and makes the values consistent within a
+  // connection. The latter is so the second ClientHello matches after
+  // HelloRetryRequest and so supported_groups and key_shares are consistent.
+  RAND_bytes(grease_seed, sizeof(grease_seed));
+}
+
+SSL_HANDSHAKE::~SSL_HANDSHAKE() {
+  ssl->ctx->x509_method->hs_flush_cached_ca_names(this);
+}
+
+bool SSL_HANDSHAKE::GetClientHello(SSLMessage *out_msg,
+                                   SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *out_client_hello) {
+  if (!ech_client_hello_buf.empty()) {
+    // If the backing buffer is non-empty, the ClientHelloInner has been set.
+    out_msg->is_v2_hello = false;
+    out_msg->type = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
+    out_msg->raw = CBS(ech_client_hello_buf);
+    size_t header_len =
+        SSL_is_dtls(ssl) ? DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH : SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+    out_msg->body = CBS(Span(ech_client_hello_buf).subspan(header_len));
+  } else if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, out_msg)) {
+    // The message has already been read, so this cannot fail.
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (!SSL_parse_client_hello(ssl, out_client_hello, CBS_data(&out_msg->body),
+                              CBS_len(&out_msg->body))) {
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+    return false;
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
+UniquePtr<SSL_HANDSHAKE> ssl_handshake_new(SSLImpl *ssl) {
+  UniquePtr<SSL_HANDSHAKE> hs = MakeUnique<SSL_HANDSHAKE>(ssl);
+  if (!hs || !hs->transcript.Init()) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+  hs->config = ssl->config.get();
+  if (!hs->config) {
+    assert(hs->config);
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+  return hs;
+}
+
+bool ssl_check_message_type(SSLImpl *ssl, const SSLMessage &msg, int type) {
+  if (msg.type != type) {
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+    ERR_add_error_dataf("got type %d, wanted type %d", msg.type, type);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool ssl_add_message_cbb(SSLImpl *ssl, CBB *cbb) {
+  Array<uint8_t> msg;
+  if (!ssl->method->finish_message(ssl, cbb, &msg) ||
+      !ssl->method->add_message(ssl, std::move(msg))) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+size_t ssl_max_handshake_message_len(const SSLImpl *ssl) {
+  // kMaxMessageLen is the default maximum message size for handshakes which do
+  // not accept peer certificate chains.
+  static const size_t kMaxMessageLen = 16384;
+
+  if (SSL_in_init(ssl)) {
+    SSL_CONFIG *config = ssl->config.get();  // SSL_in_init() implies not NULL.
+    if ((!ssl->server || (config->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) &&
+        kMaxMessageLen < ssl->max_cert_list) {
+      return ssl->max_cert_list;
+    }
+    return kMaxMessageLen;
+  }
+
+  if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    // In TLS 1.2 and below, the largest acceptable post-handshake message is
+    // a HelloRequest.
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (ssl->server) {
+    // The largest acceptable post-handshake message for a server is a
+    // KeyUpdate. We will never initiate post-handshake auth.
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  // Clients must accept NewSessionTicket, so allow the default size or
+  // max_cert_list, whichever is greater.
+  return std::max(kMaxMessageLen, size_t{ssl->max_cert_list});
+}
+
+bool ssl_hash_message(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const SSLMessage &msg) {
+  // V2ClientHello messages are pre-hashed.
+  if (msg.is_v2_hello) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  return hs->transcript.Update(msg.raw);
+}
+
+bool ssl_parse_extensions(const CBS *cbs, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                          std::initializer_list<SSLExtension *> extensions,
+                          bool ignore_unknown) {
+  // Reset everything.
+  for (SSLExtension *ext : extensions) {
+    ext->present = false;
+    CBS_init(&ext->data, nullptr, 0);
+    if (!ext->allowed) {
+      assert(!ignore_unknown);
+    }
+  }
+
+  CBS copy = *cbs;
+  while (CBS_len(&copy) != 0) {
+    uint16_t type;
+    CBS data;
+    if (!CBS_get_u16(&copy, &type) ||
+        !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&copy, &data)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+      return false;
+    }
+
+    SSLExtension *found = nullptr;
+    for (SSLExtension *ext : extensions) {
+      if (type == ext->type && ext->allowed) {
+        found = ext;
+        break;
+      }
+    }
+
+    if (found == nullptr) {
+      if (ignore_unknown) {
+        continue;
+      }
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION);
+      ERR_add_error_dataf("extension %u", unsigned{type});
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
+      return false;
+    }
+
+    // Duplicate ext_types are forbidden.
+    if (found->present) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DUPLICATE_EXTENSION);
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+      return false;
+    }
+
+    found->present = true;
+    found->data = data;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool peer_certificates_equal(const SSLSession *session,
+                                    const SSLSession *prev_session) {
+  const uint8_t prev_cert_type = prev_session->peer_cert_type;
+  if (session->peer_cert_type != prev_cert_type) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  if (ssl_session_has_peer_cred(session) !=
+      ssl_session_has_peer_cred(prev_session)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  if (prev_cert_type == TLSEXT_cert_type_x509) {
+    if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(prev_session->certs.get()) !=
+        sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(session->certs.get())) {
+      return false;
+    }
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(session->certs.get());
+          i++) {
+      const CRYPTO_BUFFER *old_cert =
+          sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(prev_session->certs.get(), i);
+      const CRYPTO_BUFFER *new_cert =
+          sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(session->certs.get(), i);
+      if (Span(CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(old_cert), CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(old_cert)) !=
+          Span(CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(new_cert), CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(new_cert))) {
+        return false;
+      }
+    }
+  } else {
+    assert(prev_cert_type == TLSEXT_cert_type_rpk);
+    if (EVP_PKEY_eq(prev_session->peer_raw_public_key.get(),
+                    session->peer_raw_public_key.get()) != 1) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
+enum ssl_verify_result_t ssl_verify_peer_cert(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  SSLImpl *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  const SSLSession *prev_session = ssl->s3->established_session.get();
+  if (prev_session != nullptr) {
+    // If renegotiating, the server must not change the server certificate. See
+    // https://mitls.org/pages/attacks/3SHAKE. We never resume on renegotiation,
+    // so this check is sufficient to ensure the reported peer certificate never
+    // changes on renegotiation.
+    assert(!ssl->server);
+    if (!peer_certificates_equal(hs->new_session.get(), prev_session)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SERVER_CERT_CHANGED);
+      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+      return ssl_verify_invalid;
+    }
+
+    // The certificate is identical, so we may skip re-verifying the
+    // certificate. Since we only authenticated the previous one, copy other
+    // authentication from the established session and ignore what was newly
+    // received.
+    hs->new_session->ocsp_response = UpRef(prev_session->ocsp_response);
+    hs->new_session->signed_cert_timestamp_list =
+        UpRef(prev_session->signed_cert_timestamp_list);
+    hs->new_session->verify_result = prev_session->verify_result;
+    return ssl_verify_ok;
+  }
+
+  uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
+  enum ssl_verify_result_t ret;
+  if (hs->config->custom_verify_callback != nullptr) {
+    ret = hs->config->custom_verify_callback(ssl, &alert);
+    switch (ret) {
+      case ssl_verify_ok:
+        hs->new_session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
+        break;
+      case ssl_verify_invalid:
+        // If `SSL_VERIFY_NONE`, the error is non-fatal, but we keep the result.
+        if (hs->config->verify_mode == SSL_VERIFY_NONE) {
+          ERR_clear_error();
+          ret = ssl_verify_ok;
+        }
+        hs->new_session->verify_result = X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION;
+        break;
+      case ssl_verify_retry:
+        break;
+    }
+  } else {
+    ret = ssl->ctx->x509_method->session_verify_cert_chain(
+              hs->new_session.get(), hs, &alert)
+              ? ssl_verify_ok
+              : ssl_verify_invalid;
+  }
+
+  if (ret == ssl_verify_invalid) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+  }
+
+  // Emulate OpenSSL's client OCSP callback. OpenSSL verifies certificates
+  // before it receives the OCSP, so it needs a second callback for OCSP.
+  if (ret == ssl_verify_ok && !ssl->server &&
+      hs->config->ocsp_stapling_enabled &&
+      ssl->ctx->legacy_ocsp_callback != nullptr) {
+    int cb_ret =
+        ssl->ctx->legacy_ocsp_callback(ssl, ssl->ctx->legacy_ocsp_callback_arg);
+    if (cb_ret <= 0) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_OCSP_CB_ERROR);
+      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
+                     cb_ret == 0 ? SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
+                                 : SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      ret = ssl_verify_invalid;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return ret;
+}
+
+// Verifies a stored certificate when resuming a session. A few things are
+// different from verify_peer_cert:
+// 1. We can't be renegotiating if we're resuming a session.
+// 2. The session is immutable, so we don't support verify_mode ==
+// SSL_VERIFY_NONE
+// 3. We don't call the OCSP callback.
+// 4. We only support custom verify callbacks.
+enum ssl_verify_result_t ssl_reverify_peer_cert(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                                bool send_alert) {
+  SSLImpl *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  assert(ssl->s3->established_session == nullptr);
+  assert(hs->config->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE);
+
+  uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
+  enum ssl_verify_result_t ret = ssl_verify_invalid;
+  if (hs->config->custom_verify_callback != nullptr) {
+    ret = hs->config->custom_verify_callback(ssl, &alert);
+  }
+
+  if (ret == ssl_verify_invalid) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
+    if (send_alert) {
+      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+    }
+  }
+
+  return ret;
+}
+
+static uint16_t grease_index_to_value(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                      enum ssl_grease_index_t index) {
+  // This generates a random value of the form 0xωaωa, for all 0 ≤ ω < 16.
+  uint16_t ret = hs->grease_seed[index];
+  ret = (ret & 0xf0) | 0x0a;
+  ret |= ret << 8;
+  return ret;
+}
+
+uint16_t ssl_get_grease_value(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                              enum ssl_grease_index_t index) {
+  uint16_t ret = grease_index_to_value(hs, index);
+  if (index == ssl_grease_extension2 &&
+      ret == grease_index_to_value(hs, ssl_grease_extension1)) {
+    // The two fake extensions must not have the same value. GREASE values are
+    // of the form 0x1a1a, 0x2a2a, 0x3a3a, etc., so XOR to generate a different
+    // one.
+    ret ^= 0x1010;
+  }
+  return ret;
+}
+
+enum ssl_hs_wait_t ssl_get_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  SSLImpl *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  SSLMessage msg;
+  if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
+    return ssl_hs_read_message;
+  }
+
+  if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, msg, SSL3_MT_FINISHED)) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  // Snapshot the finished hash before incorporating the new message.
+  uint8_t finished[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+  size_t finished_len;
+  if (!hs->transcript.GetFinishedMAC(finished, &finished_len,
+                                     ssl_handshake_session(hs), !ssl->server) ||
+      !ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  bool finished_ok = CBS_mem_equal(&msg.body, finished, finished_len);
+  if (CRYPTO_fuzzer_mode_enabled()) {
+    finished_ok = true;
+  }
+  if (!finished_ok) {
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  // Copy the Finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks.
+  if (finished_len > ssl->s3->previous_client_finished.capacity() ||
+      finished_len > ssl->s3->previous_server_finished.capacity()) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  if (ssl->server) {
+    ssl->s3->previous_client_finished.CopyFrom(Span(finished, finished_len));
+  } else {
+    ssl->s3->previous_server_finished.CopyFrom(Span(finished, finished_len));
+  }
+
+  // The Finished message should be the end of a flight.
+  if (ssl->method->has_unprocessed_handshake_data(ssl)) {
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EXCESS_HANDSHAKE_DATA);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
+  return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+bool ssl_send_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  SSLImpl *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  const SSLSession *session = ssl_handshake_session(hs);
+
+  uint8_t finished_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+  size_t finished_len;
+  if (!hs->transcript.GetFinishedMAC(finished_buf, &finished_len, session,
+                                     ssl->server)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  auto finished = Span(finished_buf, finished_len);
+
+  // Log the master secret, if logging is enabled.
+  if (!ssl_log_secret(ssl, "CLIENT_RANDOM", session->secret)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // Copy the Finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks.
+  bool ok = ssl->server
+                ? ssl->s3->previous_server_finished.TryCopyFrom(finished)
+                : ssl->s3->previous_client_finished.TryCopyFrom(finished);
+  if (!ok) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  ScopedCBB cbb;
+  CBB body;
+  if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body, SSL3_MT_FINISHED) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&body, finished.data(), finished.size()) ||
+      !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool ssl_send_tls12_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  ScopedCBB cbb;
+  CBB body, certs, cert;
+  if (!hs->ssl->method->init_message(hs->ssl, cbb.get(), &body,
+                                     SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) ||
+      !CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(&body, &certs)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (hs->credential != nullptr) {
+    // Write the Certificate format for a RawPublicKey (RFC 7250).
+    if (hs->credential->type == SSLCredentialType::kRawPublicKey) {
+      if (!EVP_marshal_public_key(&certs, hs->credential->pubkey.get())) {
+        return false;
+      }
+      return ssl_add_message_cbb(hs->ssl, cbb.get());
+    }
+
+    assert(hs->credential->type == SSLCredentialType::kX509);
+    STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) *chain = hs->credential->chain.get();
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(chain); i++) {
+      CRYPTO_BUFFER *buffer = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(chain, i);
+      if (!CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(&certs, &cert) ||
+          !CBB_add_bytes(&cert, CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(buffer),
+                         CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(buffer))) {
+        return false;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  return ssl_add_message_cbb(hs->ssl, cbb.get());
+}
+
+const SSLSession *ssl_handshake_session(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  if (hs->new_session) {
+    return hs->new_session.get();
+  }
+  return hs->ssl->session.get();
+}
+
+int ssl_run_handshake(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, bool *out_early_return) {
+  SSLImpl *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  for (;;) {
+    // If a timeout during the handshake triggered a DTLS ACK or retransmit, we
+    // resolve that first. E.g., if `ssl_hs_private_key_operation` is slow, the
+    // ACK timer may fire.
+    if (hs->wait != ssl_hs_error && SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
+      int ret = ssl->method->flush(ssl);
+      if (ret <= 0) {
+        return ret;
+      }
+    }
+
+    // Resolve the operation the handshake was waiting on. Each condition may
+    // halt the handshake by returning, or continue executing if the handshake
+    // may immediately proceed. Cases which halt the handshake can clear
+    // `hs->wait` to re-enter the state machine on the next iteration, or leave
+    // it set to keep the condition sticky.
+    switch (hs->wait) {
+      case ssl_hs_error:
+        ERR_restore_state(hs->error.get());
+        return -1;
+
+      case ssl_hs_flush: {
+        int ret = ssl->method->flush(ssl);
+        if (ret <= 0) {
+          return ret;
+        }
+        break;
+      }
+
+      case ssl_hs_read_server_hello:
+      case ssl_hs_read_message:
+      case ssl_hs_read_change_cipher_spec: {
+        if (SSL_is_quic(ssl)) {
+          // QUIC has no ChangeCipherSpec messages.
+          assert(hs->wait != ssl_hs_read_change_cipher_spec);
+          // The caller should call `SSL_provide_quic_data`. Clear `hs->wait` so
+          // the handshake can check if there is sufficient data next iteration.
+          ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ;
+          hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
+          return -1;
+        }
+
+        uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        size_t consumed = 0;
+        ssl_open_record_t ret;
+        if (hs->wait == ssl_hs_read_change_cipher_spec) {
+          ret = ssl_open_change_cipher_spec(ssl, &consumed, &alert,
+                                            ssl->s3->read_buffer.span());
+        } else {
+          ret = ssl_open_handshake(ssl, &consumed, &alert,
+                                   ssl->s3->read_buffer.span());
+        }
+        if (ret == ssl_open_record_error &&
+            hs->wait == ssl_hs_read_server_hello) {
+          if (ERR_equals(ERR_peek_error(), ERR_LIB_SSL,
+                         SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE)) {
+            // Add a dedicated error code to the queue for a handshake_failure
+            // alert in response to ClientHello. This matches NSS's client
+            // behavior and gives a better error on a (probable) failure to
+            // negotiate initial parameters. Note: this error code comes after
+            // the original one.
+            //
+            // See https://crbug.com/446505.
+            OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE_ON_CLIENT_HELLO);
+          }
+        }
+        bool retry;
+        int bio_ret = ssl_handle_open_record(ssl, &retry, ret, consumed, alert);
+        if (bio_ret <= 0) {
+          return bio_ret;
+        }
+        if (retry) {
+          continue;
+        }
+        ssl->s3->read_buffer.DiscardConsumed();
+        break;
+      }
+
+      case ssl_hs_read_end_of_early_data: {
+        if (ssl->s3->hs->can_early_read) {
+          // While we are processing early data, the handshake returns early.
+          *out_early_return = true;
+          return 1;
+        }
+        hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
+        break;
+      }
+
+      case ssl_hs_certificate_selection_pending:
+        ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_ERROR_PENDING_CERTIFICATE;
+        hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
+        return -1;
+
+        // The following cases are associated with callback APIs which expect to
+        // be called each time the state machine runs. Thus they set `hs->wait`
+        // to `ssl_hs_ok` so that, next time, we re-enter the state machine and
+        // call the callback again.
+      case ssl_hs_x509_lookup:
+        ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP;
+        hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
+        return -1;
+      case ssl_hs_private_key_operation:
+        ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_ERROR_WANT_PRIVATE_KEY_OPERATION;
+        hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
+        return -1;
+      case ssl_hs_pending_session:
+        ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_ERROR_PENDING_SESSION;
+        hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
+        return -1;
+      case ssl_hs_pending_ticket:
+        ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_ERROR_PENDING_TICKET;
+        hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
+        return -1;
+      case ssl_hs_certificate_verify:
+        ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_ERROR_WANT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
+        hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
+        return -1;
+
+      case ssl_hs_early_data_rejected:
+        assert(ssl->s3->early_data_reason != ssl_early_data_unknown);
+        assert(!hs->can_early_write);
+        ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_ERROR_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED;
+        return -1;
+
+      case ssl_hs_early_return:
+        if (!ssl->server) {
+          // On ECH reject, the handshake should never complete.
+          assert(ssl->s3->ech_status != ssl_ech_rejected);
+        }
+        *out_early_return = true;
+        hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
+        return 1;
+
+      case ssl_hs_hints_ready:
+        ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_HINTS_READY;
+        return -1;
+
+      case ssl_hs_ok:
+        break;
+    }
+
+    // Run the state machine again.
+    hs->wait = ssl->do_handshake(hs);
+    if (hs->wait == ssl_hs_error) {
+      hs->error.reset(ERR_save_state());
+      return -1;
+    }
+    if (hs->wait == ssl_hs_ok) {
+      if (!ssl->server) {
+        // On ECH reject, the handshake should never complete.
+        assert(ssl->s3->ech_status != ssl_ech_rejected);
+      }
+      // The handshake has completed.
+      *out_early_return = false;
+      return 1;
+    }
+    // If the handshake returns `ssl_hs_flush`, implicitly finish the flight.
+    // This is a convenience so we do not need to manually insert this
+    // throughout the handshake.
+    if (hs->wait == ssl_hs_flush) {
+      ssl->method->finish_flight(ssl);
+    }
+
+    // Loop to the beginning and resolve what was blocking the handshake.
+  }
+}
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_END