visaljs 0.0.1 → 0.0.3

package/runtime/third_party/boringssl/crypto/x509/policy.cc

@@ -0,0 +1,686 @@
+// Copyright 2022 The BoringSSL Authors
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+#include <openssl/base.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#include <algorithm>
+#include <optional>
+#include <utility>
+
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/obj.h>
+#include <openssl/span.h>
+#include <openssl/stack.h>
+
+#include "../internal.h"
+#include "../mem_internal.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
+namespace {
+
+// This file computes the X.509 policy graph, as described in RFC 9618.
+// Implementation notes:
+//
+//  (1) It does not track "qualifier_set". This is not needed as it is not
+//      output by this implementation.
+//
+//  (2) "expected_policy_set" is not tracked explicitly and built temporarily
+//      as part of building the graph.
+//
+//  (3) anyPolicy nodes are not tracked explicitly.
+//
+//  (4) Some pruning steps are deferred to when policies are evaluated, as a
+//      reachability pass.
+
+bool is_any_policy(const ASN1_OBJECT *obj) {
+  return OBJ_obj2nid(obj) == NID_any_policy;
+}
+
+// An X509PolicyNode is a node in the policy graph. It corresponds to a node
+// from RFC 5280, section 6.1.2, step (a), but we store some fields differently.
+struct X509PolicyNode {
+  static std::optional<X509PolicyNode> Create(const ASN1_OBJECT *policy) {
+    assert(!is_any_policy(policy));
+    X509PolicyNode node;
+    node.policy.reset(OBJ_dup(policy));
+    if (node.policy == nullptr) {
+      return std::nullopt;
+    }
+    return node;
+  }
+
+  bool operator<(const X509PolicyNode &other) const {
+    return OBJ_cmp(policy.get(), other.policy.get()) < 0;
+  }
+
+  bool parent_is_any_policy() const { return parent_policies.empty(); }
+
+  // policy is the "valid_policy" field from RFC 5280.
+  UniquePtr<ASN1_OBJECT> policy;
+
+  // parent_policies, if non-empty, is the list of "valid_policy" values for all
+  // nodes which are a parent of this node. In this case, no entry in this list
+  // will be anyPolicy. This list is in no particular order and may contain
+  // duplicates if the corresponding certificate had duplicate mappings.
+  //
+  // If empty, this node has a single parent, anyPolicy. The node is then a root
+  // policy, and is in authorities-constrained-policy-set if it has a path to a
+  // leaf node.
+  //
+  // Note it is not possible for a policy to have both anyPolicy and a
+  // concrete policy as a parent. Section 6.1.3, step (d.1.ii) only runs if
+  // there was no match in step (d.1.i). We do not need to represent a parent
+  // list of, say, {anyPolicy, OID1, OID2}.
+  Vector<UniquePtr<ASN1_OBJECT>> parent_policies;
+
+  // mapped is whether this node matches a policy mapping in the certificate.
+  bool mapped = false;
+
+  // reachable is whether this node is reachable from some valid policy in the
+  // end-entity certificate. It is computed during `has_explicit_policy`.
+  bool reachable = false;
+};
+
+// An X509PolicyLevel is the collection of nodes at the same depth in the
+// policy graph. This structure can also be used to represent a level's
+// "expected_policy_set" values. See `process_policy_mappings`.
+class X509PolicyLevel {
+ public:
+  bool has_any_policy() const { return has_any_policy_; }
+  bool is_empty() const { return !has_any_policy_ && nodes_.empty(); }
+  Span<const X509PolicyNode> nodes() const { return nodes_; }
+
+  void set_has_any_policy(bool v) { has_any_policy_ = v; }
+
+  // Although this is mutable, callers may not modify the node's policy.
+  Span<X509PolicyNode> nodes() { return Span(nodes_); }
+
+  void Clear() {
+    has_any_policy_ = false;
+    nodes_.clear();
+  }
+
+  // Find returns the node corresponding to `policy`, or nullptr if none exists.
+  X509PolicyNode *Find(const ASN1_OBJECT *policy) {
+    // The list is sorted, so we can binary search.
+    auto it = std::lower_bound(
+        nodes_.begin(), nodes_.end(), policy,
+        [](const X509PolicyNode &node, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj) {
+          return OBJ_cmp(node.policy.get(), obj) < 0;
+        });
+    if (it == nodes_.end() || OBJ_cmp(it->policy.get(), policy) != 0) {
+      return nullptr;
+    }
+    return &*it;
+  }
+
+  // AddNodes adds the nodes in `nodes`. It returns true on success and false on
+  // error. No policy in `nodes` may already be present. This method leaves
+  // the objects in `nodes` in a moved-from state.
+  //
+  // This method re-sorts the nodes, so it runs in time proportional to the
+  // total size of the level. However, each level is only added to three times
+  // in the course of policy validation.
+  bool AddNodes(Span<X509PolicyNode> nodes) {
+    if (!nodes_.AppendMove(nodes)) {
+      return false;
+    }
+    std::sort(nodes_.begin(), nodes_.end());
+#if !defined(NDEBUG)
+    // There should be no duplicate nodes.
+    for (size_t i = 1; i < nodes_.size(); i++) {
+      assert(OBJ_cmp(nodes_[i - 1].policy.get(), nodes_[i].policy.get()) != 0);
+    }
+#endif
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // EraseNodesIf removes all nodes that satisfy the predicate `pred`.
+  template <typename Pred>
+  void EraseNodesIf(Pred pred) {
+    nodes_.EraseIf(pred);
+  }
+
+ private:
+  // nodes is the list of nodes at this depth, except for the anyPolicy node, if
+  // any. This list is sorted by policy OID for efficient lookup.
+  Vector<X509PolicyNode> nodes_;
+
+  // has_any_policy is whether there is an anyPolicy node at this depth.
+  bool has_any_policy_ = false;
+};
+
+int policyinfo_cmp(const POLICYINFO *const *a, const POLICYINFO *const *b) {
+  return OBJ_cmp((*a)->policyid, (*b)->policyid);
+}
+
+// process_certificate_policies updates `level` to incorporate `x509`'s
+// certificate policies extension. This implements steps (d) and (e) of RFC
+// 5280, section 6.1.3. `level` must contain the previous level's
+// "expected_policy_set" information. For all but the top-most level, this is
+// the output of `process_policy_mappings`. `any_policy_allowed` specifies
+// whether anyPolicy is allowed or inhibited, taking into account the exception
+// for self-issued certificates.
+bool process_certificate_policies(const X509 *x509, X509PolicyLevel *level,
+                                  int any_policy_allowed) {
+  int critical;
+  UniquePtr<CERTIFICATEPOLICIES> policies(
+      reinterpret_cast<CERTIFICATEPOLICIES *>(X509_get_ext_d2i(
+          x509, NID_certificate_policies, &critical, nullptr)));
+  if (policies == nullptr) {
+    if (critical != -1) {
+      return false;  // Syntax error in the extension.
+    }
+
+    // RFC 5280, section 6.1.3, step (e).
+    level->Clear();
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // certificatePolicies may not be empty. See RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.4.
+  // TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/443): Move this check into the parser.
+  if (sk_POLICYINFO_num(policies.get()) == 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  sk_POLICYINFO_set_cmp_func(policies.get(), policyinfo_cmp);
+  sk_POLICYINFO_sort(policies.get());
+  bool cert_has_any_policy = false;
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_POLICYINFO_num(policies.get()); i++) {
+    const POLICYINFO *policy = sk_POLICYINFO_value(policies.get(), i);
+    if (is_any_policy(policy->policyid)) {
+      cert_has_any_policy = true;
+    }
+    if (i > 0 && OBJ_cmp(sk_POLICYINFO_value(policies.get(), i - 1)->policyid,
+                         policy->policyid) == 0) {
+      // Per RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.4, `policies` may not have duplicates.
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION);
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // This does the same thing as RFC 5280, section 6.1.3, step (d), though in
+  // a slightly different order. `level` currently contains
+  // "expected_policy_set" values of the previous level. See
+  // `process_policy_mappings` for details.
+  const bool previous_level_has_any_policy = level->has_any_policy();
+
+  // First, we handle steps (d.1.i) and (d.2). The net effect of these two
+  // steps is to intersect `level` with `policies`, ignoring anyPolicy if it
+  // is inhibited.
+  if (!cert_has_any_policy || !any_policy_allowed) {
+    level->EraseNodesIf([&](const X509PolicyNode &node) {
+      assert(sk_POLICYINFO_is_sorted(policies.get()));
+      // Erase the node if it not present in the current certificate.
+      POLICYINFO info;
+      info.policyid = node.policy.get();
+      return !sk_POLICYINFO_find(policies.get(), nullptr, &info);
+    });
+    level->set_has_any_policy(false);
+  }
+
+  // Step (d.1.ii) may attach new nodes to the previous level's anyPolicy
+  // node.
+  if (previous_level_has_any_policy) {
+    Vector<X509PolicyNode> new_nodes;
+    for (const POLICYINFO *policy : policies.get()) {
+      // Though we've reordered the steps slightly, `policy` is in `level` if
+      // and only if it would have been a match in step (d.1.ii).
+      if (!is_any_policy(policy->policyid) &&
+          level->Find(policy->policyid) == nullptr) {
+        auto node = X509PolicyNode::Create(policy->policyid);
+        if (!node.has_value() || !new_nodes.Push(*std::move(node))) {
+          return false;
+        }
+      }
+    }
+    if (!level->AddNodes(Span(new_nodes))) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+int compare_issuer_policy(const POLICY_MAPPING *const *a,
+                          const POLICY_MAPPING *const *b) {
+  return OBJ_cmp((*a)->issuerDomainPolicy, (*b)->issuerDomainPolicy);
+}
+
+int compare_subject_policy(const POLICY_MAPPING *const *a,
+                           const POLICY_MAPPING *const *b) {
+  return OBJ_cmp((*a)->subjectDomainPolicy, (*b)->subjectDomainPolicy);
+}
+
+// process_policy_mappings processes the policy mappings extension of `cert`,
+// whose corresponding graph level is `level`. `mapping_allowed` specifies
+// whether policy mapping is inhibited at this point. On success, it returns an
+// `X509PolicyLevel` containing the "expected_policy_set" for `level`. On error,
+// it returns std::nullopt. This implements steps (a) and (b) of RFC 5280,
+// section 6.1.4.
+//
+// We represent the "expected_policy_set" as an `X509PolicyLevel`.
+// `has_any_policy` indicates whether there is an anyPolicy node with
+// "expected_policy_set" of {anyPolicy}. If a node with policy oid P1 contains
+// P2 in its "expected_policy_set", the level will contain a node of policy P2
+// with P1 in `parent_policies`.
+//
+// This is equivalent to the `X509PolicyLevel` that would result if the next
+// certificates contained anyPolicy. `process_certificate_policies` will filter
+// this result down to compute the actual level.
+std::optional<X509PolicyLevel> process_policy_mappings(const X509 *cert,
+                                                       X509PolicyLevel *level,
+                                                       bool mapping_allowed) {
+  int critical;
+  UniquePtr<POLICY_MAPPINGS> mappings(reinterpret_cast<POLICY_MAPPINGS *>(
+      X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_policy_mappings, &critical, nullptr)));
+  if (mappings == nullptr && critical != -1) {
+    // Syntax error in the policy mappings extension.
+    return std::nullopt;
+  }
+
+  if (mappings != nullptr) {
+    // PolicyMappings may not be empty. See RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.5.
+    // TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/443): Move this check into the parser.
+    if (sk_POLICY_MAPPING_num(mappings.get()) == 0) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION);
+      return std::nullopt;
+    }
+
+    // RFC 5280, section 6.1.4, step (a).
+    for (const POLICY_MAPPING *mapping : mappings.get()) {
+      if (is_any_policy(mapping->issuerDomainPolicy) ||
+          is_any_policy(mapping->subjectDomainPolicy)) {
+        return std::nullopt;
+      }
+    }
+
+    // Sort to group by issuerDomainPolicy.
+    sk_POLICY_MAPPING_set_cmp_func(mappings.get(), compare_issuer_policy);
+    sk_POLICY_MAPPING_sort(mappings.get());
+
+    if (mapping_allowed) {
+      // Mark nodes as mapped, and add any nodes to `level` which may be
+      // needed as part of RFC 5280, section 6.1.4, step (b.1).
+      Vector<X509PolicyNode> new_nodes;
+      const ASN1_OBJECT *last_policy = nullptr;
+      for (const POLICY_MAPPING *mapping : mappings.get()) {
+        // There may be multiple mappings with the same `issuerDomainPolicy`.
+        if (last_policy != nullptr &&
+            OBJ_cmp(mapping->issuerDomainPolicy, last_policy) == 0) {
+          continue;
+        }
+        last_policy = mapping->issuerDomainPolicy;
+
+        X509PolicyNode *node = level->Find(mapping->issuerDomainPolicy);
+        if (node != nullptr) {
+          node->mapped = true;
+        } else {
+          if (!level->has_any_policy()) {
+            continue;
+          }
+          auto new_node = X509PolicyNode::Create(mapping->issuerDomainPolicy);
+          if (!new_node.has_value()) {
+            return std::nullopt;
+          }
+          new_node->mapped = true;
+          if (!new_nodes.Push(*std::move(new_node))) {
+            return std::nullopt;
+          }
+        }
+      }
+      if (!level->AddNodes(Span(new_nodes))) {
+        return std::nullopt;
+      }
+    } else {
+      // RFC 5280, section 6.1.4, step (b.2). If mapping is inhibited, delete
+      // all mapped nodes.
+      level->EraseNodesIf([&](const X509PolicyNode &node) {
+        // `mappings` must have been sorted by `compare_issuer_policy`.
+        assert(sk_POLICY_MAPPING_is_sorted(mappings.get()));
+        // Check if the node was mapped.
+        POLICY_MAPPING mapping;
+        mapping.issuerDomainPolicy = node.policy.get();
+        return sk_POLICY_MAPPING_find(mappings.get(), /*out_index=*/nullptr,
+                                      &mapping);
+      });
+      // Dropping the mappings.
+      mappings = nullptr;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // If a node was not mapped, it retains the original "explicit_policy_set"
+  // value, itself. Add those to `mappings`.
+  if (mappings == nullptr) {
+    mappings.reset(sk_POLICY_MAPPING_new_null());
+    if (mappings == nullptr) {
+      return std::nullopt;
+    }
+  }
+  for (const X509PolicyNode &node : level->nodes()) {
+    if (!node.mapped) {
+      UniquePtr<POLICY_MAPPING> mapping(POLICY_MAPPING_new());
+      if (mapping == nullptr) {
+        return std::nullopt;
+      }
+      mapping->issuerDomainPolicy = OBJ_dup(node.policy.get());
+      mapping->subjectDomainPolicy = OBJ_dup(node.policy.get());
+      if (mapping->issuerDomainPolicy == nullptr ||
+          mapping->subjectDomainPolicy == nullptr ||
+          !PushToStack(mappings.get(), std::move(mapping))) {
+        return std::nullopt;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Sort to group by subjectDomainPolicy.
+  sk_POLICY_MAPPING_set_cmp_func(mappings.get(), compare_subject_policy);
+  sk_POLICY_MAPPING_sort(mappings.get());
+
+  // Convert `mappings` to our "expected_policy_set" representation.
+  Vector<X509PolicyNode> next_nodes;
+  for (POLICY_MAPPING *mapping : mappings.get()) {
+    // Skip mappings where `issuerDomainPolicy` does not appear in the graph.
+    if (!level->has_any_policy() &&
+        level->Find(mapping->issuerDomainPolicy) == nullptr) {
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    if (next_nodes.empty() || OBJ_cmp(next_nodes.back().policy.get(),
+                                      mapping->subjectDomainPolicy) != 0) {
+      auto new_node = X509PolicyNode::Create(mapping->subjectDomainPolicy);
+      if (!new_node.has_value() || !next_nodes.Push(*std::move(new_node))) {
+        return std::nullopt;
+      }
+    }
+
+    // `mapping` is going to be destroyed, so steal its policy object.
+    UniquePtr<ASN1_OBJECT> policy(
+        std::exchange(mapping->issuerDomainPolicy, nullptr));
+    if (!next_nodes.back().parent_policies.Push(std::move(policy))) {
+      return std::nullopt;
+    }
+  }
+
+  X509PolicyLevel next;
+  next.set_has_any_policy(level->has_any_policy());
+  if (!next.AddNodes(Span(next_nodes))) {
+    return std::nullopt;
+  }
+  return next;
+}
+
+// apply_skip_certs, if `skip_certs` is non-NULL, sets `*value` to the minimum
+// of its current value and `skip_certs`. It returns true on success and false
+// if `skip_certs` is negative.
+bool apply_skip_certs(const ASN1_INTEGER *skip_certs, size_t *value) {
+  if (skip_certs == nullptr) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/443): Move this check into the parser.
+  if (skip_certs->type & V_ASN1_NEG) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // If `skip_certs` does not fit in `uint64_t`, it must exceed `*value`.
+  uint64_t u64;
+  if (ASN1_INTEGER_get_uint64(&u64, skip_certs) && u64 < *value) {
+    *value = (size_t)u64;
+  }
+  ERR_clear_error();
+  return true;
+}
+
+// process_policy_constraints updates `*explicit_policy`, `*policy_mapping`, and
+// `*inhibit_any_policy` according to `x509`'s policy constraints and inhibit
+// anyPolicy extensions. It returns one on success and zero on error. This
+// implements steps (i) and (j) of RFC 5280, section 6.1.4.
+bool process_policy_constraints(const X509 *x509, size_t *explicit_policy,
+                                size_t *policy_mapping,
+                                size_t *inhibit_any_policy) {
+  int critical;
+  UniquePtr<POLICY_CONSTRAINTS> constraints(
+      reinterpret_cast<POLICY_CONSTRAINTS *>(
+          X509_get_ext_d2i(x509, NID_policy_constraints, &critical, nullptr)));
+  if (constraints == nullptr && critical != -1) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  if (constraints != nullptr) {
+    if (constraints->requireExplicitPolicy == nullptr &&
+        constraints->inhibitPolicyMapping == nullptr) {
+      // Per RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.11, at least one of the fields must be
+      // present.
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION);
+      return false;
+    }
+    if (!apply_skip_certs(constraints->requireExplicitPolicy,
+                          explicit_policy) ||
+        !apply_skip_certs(constraints->inhibitPolicyMapping, policy_mapping)) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  UniquePtr<ASN1_INTEGER> inhibit_any_policy_ext(
+      reinterpret_cast<ASN1_INTEGER *>(
+          X509_get_ext_d2i(x509, NID_inhibit_any_policy, &critical, nullptr)));
+  if (inhibit_any_policy_ext == nullptr && critical != -1) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  return apply_skip_certs(inhibit_any_policy_ext.get(), inhibit_any_policy);
+}
+
+// has_explicit_policy returns true if the set of authority-space policy OIDs
+// `levels` has some non-empty intersection with `user_policies`, and false
+// otherwise. This mirrors the logic in RFC 5280, section 6.1.5, step (g). This
+// function modifies `levels` and should only be called at the end of policy
+// evaluation.
+bool has_explicit_policy(Span<X509PolicyLevel> levels,
+                         const STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *user_policies) {
+  assert(user_policies == nullptr || sk_ASN1_OBJECT_is_sorted(user_policies));
+
+  // Step (g.i). If the policy graph is empty, the intersection is empty.
+  if (levels.empty() || levels.back().is_empty()) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // Step (g.ii). If the policy graph is not empty and the user set contains
+  // anyPolicy, the intersection is the entire (non-empty) graph.
+  //
+  // If `user_policies` is empty, we interpret it as having a single anyPolicy
+  // value. The caller may also have supplied anyPolicy explicitly.
+  if (sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(user_policies) == 0) {
+    return true;
+  }
+  for (const ASN1_OBJECT *user_policy : user_policies) {
+    if (is_any_policy(user_policy)) {
+      return true;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Step (g.iii) does not delete anyPolicy nodes, so if the graph has
+  // anyPolicy, some explicit policy will survive. The actual intersection may
+  // synthesize some nodes in step (g.iii.3), but we do not return the policy
+  // list itself, so we skip actually computing this.
+  if (levels.back().has_any_policy()) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // We defer pruning the tree, so as we look for nodes with parent anyPolicy,
+  // step (g.iii.1), we must limit to nodes reachable from the bottommost level.
+  // Start by marking each of those nodes as reachable.
+  for (X509PolicyNode &node : levels.back().nodes()) {
+    node.reachable = true;
+  }
+
+  const size_t num_levels = levels.size();
+  for (size_t i = num_levels - 1; i < num_levels; i--) {
+    X509PolicyLevel &level = levels[i];
+    for (X509PolicyNode &node : level.nodes()) {
+      if (!node.reachable) {
+        continue;
+      }
+      if (node.parent_is_any_policy()) {
+        // `node`'s parent is anyPolicy and is part of "valid_policy_node_set".
+        // If it exists in `user_policies`, the intersection is non-empty and we
+        // can return immediately.
+        if (sk_ASN1_OBJECT_find(user_policies, /*out_index=*/nullptr,
+                                node.policy.get())) {
+          return true;
+        }
+      } else if (i > 0) {
+        // `node`'s parents are concrete policies. Mark the parents reachable,
+        // to be inspected by the next loop iteration.
+        X509PolicyLevel &prev = levels[i - 1];
+        for (const auto &parent_policy : node.parent_policies) {
+          X509PolicyNode *parent_node = prev.Find(parent_policy.get());
+          if (parent_node != nullptr) {
+            parent_node->reachable = true;
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  return false;
+}
+
+int asn1_object_cmp(const ASN1_OBJECT *const *a, const ASN1_OBJECT *const *b) {
+  return OBJ_cmp(*a, *b);
+}
+
+}  // namespace
+
+int X509_policy_check(const STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+                      const STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *user_policies,
+                      unsigned long flags, X509 **out_current_cert) {
+  *out_current_cert = nullptr;
+
+  // Skip policy checking if the chain is just the trust anchor.
+  const size_t num_certs = sk_X509_num(certs);
+  if (num_certs <= 1) {
+    return X509_V_OK;
+  }
+
+  // See RFC 5280, section 6.1.2, steps (d) through (f).
+  size_t explicit_policy =
+      (flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY) ? 0 : num_certs + 1;
+  size_t inhibit_any_policy =
+      (flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY) ? 0 : num_certs + 1;
+  size_t policy_mapping = (flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) ? 0 : num_certs + 1;
+
+  Vector<X509PolicyLevel> levels;
+  std::optional<X509PolicyLevel> level;
+  for (size_t i = num_certs - 2; i < num_certs; i--) {
+    X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
+    uint32_t ex_flags = X509_get_extension_flags(cert);
+    if (ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID) {
+      return X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
+    }
+    const bool is_self_issued = (ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) != 0;
+
+    // In all but the first iteration, the previous iteration will have prepared
+    // "expected_policy_set" for us as a staging level.
+    if (!level.has_value()) {
+      assert(i == num_certs - 2);
+      level.emplace();
+      level->set_has_any_policy(true);
+    }
+
+    // RFC 5280, section 6.1.3, steps (d) and (e). `any_policy_allowed` is
+    // computed as in step (d.2).
+    const int any_policy_allowed =
+        inhibit_any_policy > 0 || (i > 0 && is_self_issued);
+    if (!process_certificate_policies(cert, &*level, any_policy_allowed)) {
+      *out_current_cert = cert;
+      return X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
+    }
+
+    // RFC 5280, section 6.1.3, step (f).
+    if (explicit_policy == 0 && level->is_empty()) {
+      return X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
+    }
+
+    // Insert the completed level into the list.
+    if (!levels.Push(*std::exchange(level, std::nullopt))) {
+      return X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
+    }
+    level = std::nullopt;
+
+    // If this is not the leaf certificate, we go to section 6.1.4. If it
+    // is the leaf certificate, we go to section 6.1.5 instead.
+    if (i != 0) {
+      // RFC 5280, section 6.1.4, steps (a) and (b).
+      level = process_policy_mappings(cert, &levels.back(), policy_mapping > 0);
+      if (!level.has_value()) {
+        *out_current_cert = cert;
+        return X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
+      }
+    }
+
+    // RFC 5280, section 6.1.4, step (h-j) for non-leaves, and section 6.1.5,
+    // step (a-b) for leaves. In the leaf case, RFC 5280 says only to update
+    // `explicit_policy`, but `policy_mapping` and `inhibit_any_policy` are no
+    // longer read at this point, so we use the same process.
+    if (i == 0 || !is_self_issued) {
+      if (explicit_policy > 0) {
+        explicit_policy--;
+      }
+      if (policy_mapping > 0) {
+        policy_mapping--;
+      }
+      if (inhibit_any_policy > 0) {
+        inhibit_any_policy--;
+      }
+    }
+    if (!process_policy_constraints(cert, &explicit_policy, &policy_mapping,
+                                    &inhibit_any_policy)) {
+      *out_current_cert = cert;
+      return X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // RFC 5280, section 6.1.5, step (g). We do not output the policy set, so it
+  // is only necessary to check if the user-constrained-policy-set is not empty.
+  if (explicit_policy == 0) {
+    // Build a sorted copy of `user_policies` for more efficient lookup.
+    STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *user_policies_sorted = nullptr;
+    // `user_policies_sorted`'s contents are owned by `user_policies`, so we do
+    // not use `sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free`.
+    Cleanup cleanup = [&] { sk_ASN1_OBJECT_free(user_policies_sorted); };
+    if (user_policies != nullptr) {
+      user_policies_sorted = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_dup(user_policies);
+      if (user_policies_sorted == nullptr) {
+        return X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
+      }
+      sk_ASN1_OBJECT_set_cmp_func(user_policies_sorted, asn1_object_cmp);
+      sk_ASN1_OBJECT_sort(user_policies_sorted);
+    }
+
+    if (!has_explicit_policy(Span(levels), user_policies_sorted)) {
+      return X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return X509_V_OK;
+}
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_END