visaljs 0.0.1 → 0.0.3

package/runtime/third_party/boringssl/ssl/tls13_client.cc

@@ -0,0 +1,1325 @@
+// Copyright 2016 The BoringSSL Authors
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <algorithm>
+#include <utility>
+
+#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
+#include <openssl/digest.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/sha2.h>
+#include <openssl/stack.h>
+
+#include "../crypto/internal.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
+
+enum client_hs_state_t {
+  state_read_hello_retry_request = 0,
+  state_send_second_client_hello,
+  state_read_server_hello,
+  state_read_encrypted_extensions,
+  state_read_certificate_request,
+  state_read_server_certificate,
+  state_read_server_certificate_verify,
+  state_server_certificate_reverify,
+  state_read_server_finished,
+  state_send_end_of_early_data,
+  state_send_client_encrypted_extensions,
+  state_send_client_certificate,
+  state_send_client_certificate_verify,
+  state_complete_second_flight,
+  state_done,
+};
+
+static const uint8_t kZeroes[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE] = {0};
+
+// end_of_early_data closes the early data stream for `hs` and switches the
+// encryption level to `level`. It returns true on success and false on error.
+static bool close_early_data(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, ssl_encryption_level_t level) {
+  SSLImpl *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  assert(hs->in_early_data);
+
+  // Note `can_early_write` may already be false if `SSL_write` exceeded the
+  // early data write limit.
+  hs->can_early_write = false;
+
+  // 0-RTT write states on the client differ between TLS 1.3, DTLS 1.3, and
+  // QUIC. TLS 1.3 has one write encryption level at a time. 0-RTT write keys
+  // overwrite the null cipher and defer handshake write keys. While a
+  // HelloRetryRequest can cause us to rewind back to the null cipher, sequence
+  // numbers have no effect, so we can install a "new" null cipher.
+  //
+  // In QUIC and DTLS 1.3, 0-RTT write state cannot override or defer the normal
+  // write state. The two ClientHello sequence numbers must align, and handshake
+  // write keys must be installed early to ACK the EncryptedExtensions.
+  //
+  // TODO(crbug.com/381113363): We do not support 0-RTT in DTLS 1.3 and, in
+  // QUIC, the caller handles 0-RTT data, so we can skip installing 0-RTT keys
+  // and act as if there is one write level. Now that we're implementing
+  // DTLS 1.3, switch the abstraction to the DTLS/QUIC model where handshake
+  // keys write keys are installed immediately, but the TLS record layer
+  // internally waits to activate that epoch until the 0-RTT channel is closed.
+  if (!SSL_is_quic(ssl)) {
+    if (level == ssl_encryption_initial) {
+      bssl::UniquePtr<SSLAEADContext> null_ctx =
+          SSLAEADContext::CreateNullCipher();
+      if (!null_ctx ||  //
+          !ssl->method->set_write_state(ssl, ssl_encryption_initial,
+                                        std::move(null_ctx),
+                                        /*traffic_secret=*/{})) {
+        return false;
+      }
+    } else {
+      assert(level == ssl_encryption_handshake);
+      if (!tls13_set_traffic_key(ssl, ssl_encryption_handshake, evp_aead_seal,
+                                 hs->new_session.get(),
+                                 hs->client_handshake_secret)) {
+        return false;
+      }
+    }
+  } else {
+    assert(ssl->s3->quic_write_level == level);
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool parse_server_hello_tls13(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                     ParsedServerHello *out, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                     const SSLMessage &msg) {
+  if (!ssl_parse_server_hello(out, out_alert, msg)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  uint16_t expected_version =
+      SSL_is_dtls(hs->ssl) ? DTLS1_2_VERSION : TLS1_2_VERSION;
+  // DTLS 1.3 disables "compatibility mode" (RFC 8446, appendix D.4). When
+  // disabled, servers MUST NOT echo the legacy_session_id (RFC 9147, section
+  // 5). The client could have sent a session ID indicating its willingness to
+  // resume a DTLS 1.2 session, so just checking that the session IDs match is
+  // incorrect.
+  Span<const uint8_t> expected_session_id =
+      SSL_is_dtls(hs->ssl) ? Span<const uint8_t>() : Span(hs->session_id);
+
+  // RFC 8446 fixes some legacy values. Check them.
+  if (out->legacy_version != expected_version ||  //
+      out->compression_method != 0 ||
+      Span<const uint8_t>(out->session_id) != expected_session_id ||
+      CBS_len(&out->extensions) == 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+    return false;
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool is_hello_retry_request(const ParsedServerHello &server_hello) {
+  return Span<const uint8_t>(server_hello.random) == kHelloRetryRequest;
+}
+
+static bool check_ech_confirmation(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, bool *out_accepted,
+                                   uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                   const ParsedServerHello &server_hello) {
+  const bool is_hrr = is_hello_retry_request(server_hello);
+  size_t offset;
+  if (is_hrr) {
+    // We check for an unsolicited extension when parsing all of them.
+    SSLExtension ech(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypted_client_hello);
+    if (!ssl_parse_extensions(&server_hello.extensions, out_alert, {&ech},
+                              /*ignore_unknown=*/true)) {
+      return false;
+    }
+    if (!ech.present) {
+      *out_accepted = false;
+      return true;
+    }
+    if (CBS_len(&ech.data) != ECH_CONFIRMATION_SIGNAL_LEN) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+      return false;
+    }
+    offset = CBS_data(&ech.data) - CBS_data(&server_hello.raw);
+  } else {
+    offset = ssl_ech_confirmation_signal_hello_offset(hs->ssl);
+  }
+
+  if (!hs->selected_ech_config) {
+    *out_accepted = false;
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  uint8_t expected[ECH_CONFIRMATION_SIGNAL_LEN];
+  if (!ssl_ech_accept_confirmation(hs, expected, hs->inner_client_random,
+                                   hs->inner_transcript, is_hrr,
+                                   server_hello.raw, offset)) {
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  *out_accepted = CRYPTO_memcmp(CBS_data(&server_hello.raw) + offset, expected,
+                                sizeof(expected)) == 0;
+  return true;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_hello_retry_request(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  SSLImpl *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  assert(ssl->s3->version != 0);
+  SSLMessage msg;
+  if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
+    return ssl_hs_read_message;
+  }
+
+  // Queue up a ChangeCipherSpec for whenever we next send something. This
+  // will be before the second ClientHello. If we offered early data, this was
+  // already done.
+  if (!hs->early_data_offered &&  //
+      !ssl->method->add_change_cipher_spec(ssl)) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  ParsedServerHello server_hello;
+  uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+  if (!parse_server_hello_tls13(hs, &server_hello, &alert, msg)) {
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  // The cipher suite must be one we offered, and supported for the version.
+  const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = SSL_get_cipher_by_value(server_hello.cipher_suite);
+  if (cipher == nullptr ||
+      SSL_CIPHER_get_min_version(cipher) > ssl_protocol_version(ssl) ||
+      SSL_CIPHER_get_max_version(cipher) < ssl_protocol_version(ssl) ||
+      !ssl->config->tls13_cipher_list.Contains(server_hello.cipher_suite)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  hs->new_cipher = cipher;
+
+  const bool is_hrr = is_hello_retry_request(server_hello);
+  if (!hs->transcript.InitHash(ssl_protocol_version(ssl), hs->new_cipher) ||
+      (is_hrr && !hs->transcript.UpdateForHelloRetryRequest())) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+  if (hs->selected_ech_config) {
+    if (!hs->inner_transcript.InitHash(ssl_protocol_version(ssl),
+                                       hs->new_cipher) ||
+        (is_hrr && !hs->inner_transcript.UpdateForHelloRetryRequest())) {
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Determine which ClientHello the server is responding to. Run
+  // `check_ech_confirmation` unconditionally, so we validate the extension
+  // contents.
+  bool ech_accepted;
+  if (!check_ech_confirmation(hs, &ech_accepted, &alert, server_hello)) {
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+  if (hs->selected_ech_config) {
+    ssl->s3->ech_status = ech_accepted ? ssl_ech_accepted : ssl_ech_rejected;
+  }
+
+  if (!is_hrr) {
+    hs->tls13_state = state_read_server_hello;
+    return ssl_hs_ok;
+  }
+
+  // The ECH extension, if present, was already parsed by
+  // `check_ech_confirmation`.
+  SSLExtension cookie(TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie),
+      // If offering PAKE, we won't send key_share extensions and we should
+      // reject key_share from the peer. Otherwise, it is valid to have sent an
+      // empty key_share extension, and expect the HelloRetryRequest to contain
+      // a key_share.
+      key_share(TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share, !hs->pake_prover),
+      supported_versions(TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions),
+      ech_unused(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypted_client_hello,
+                 hs->selected_ech_config || hs->config->ech_grease_enabled);
+  if (!ssl_parse_extensions(
+          &server_hello.extensions, &alert,
+          {&cookie, &key_share, &supported_versions, &ech_unused},
+          /*ignore_unknown=*/false)) {
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  if (!cookie.present && !key_share.present) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EMPTY_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST);
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+  if (cookie.present) {
+    CBS cookie_value;
+    if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cookie.data, &cookie_value) ||  //
+        CBS_len(&cookie_value) == 0 ||                                //
+        CBS_len(&cookie.data) != 0) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+
+    if (!hs->cookie.CopyFrom(cookie_value)) {
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (key_share.present) {
+    assert(!hs->pake_prover);
+
+    uint16_t group_id;
+    if (!CBS_get_u16(&key_share.data, &group_id) ||
+        CBS_len(&key_share.data) != 0) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+
+    // The group must be supported.
+    if (!tls1_check_group_id(hs, group_id)) {
+      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+
+    // Check that the HelloRetryRequest does not request a key share that was
+    // provided in the initial ClientHello.
+    if (std::find_if(hs->key_shares.begin(), hs->key_shares.end(),
+                     [group_id](const auto &hs_key_share) {
+                       return hs_key_share->GroupID() == group_id;
+                     }) != hs->key_shares.end()) {
+      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+
+    if (!ssl_setup_key_shares(hs, group_id)) {
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Although we now know whether ClientHelloInner was used, we currently
+  // maintain both transcripts up to ServerHello. We could swap transcripts
+  // early, but then ClientHello construction and `check_ech_confirmation`
+  // become more complex.
+  if (!ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+  if (ssl->s3->ech_status == ssl_ech_accepted &&
+      !hs->inner_transcript.Update(msg.raw)) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  // Per RFC 8446 section 4.1.4, skip any PSKs whose hash does not match the
+  // selected cipher. This avoids performing the transcript hash transformation
+  // for multiple hashes.
+  const EVP_MD *cipher_md = SSL_CIPHER_get_handshake_digest(cipher);
+  hs->pre_shared_keys.EraseIf([=](const SSLPreSharedKey &psk) {
+    return ssl_pre_shared_key_hash(psk) != cipher_md;
+  });
+
+  // HelloRetryRequest should be the end of the flight.
+  if (ssl->method->has_unprocessed_handshake_data(ssl)) {
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EXCESS_HANDSHAKE_DATA);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
+  ssl->s3->used_hello_retry_request = true;
+  hs->tls13_state = state_send_second_client_hello;
+  // 0-RTT is rejected if we receive a HelloRetryRequest.
+  if (hs->in_early_data) {
+    ssl->s3->early_data_reason = ssl_early_data_hello_retry_request;
+    if (!close_early_data(hs, ssl_encryption_initial)) {
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+    return ssl_hs_early_data_rejected;
+  }
+  return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_second_client_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  // Build the second ClientHelloInner, if applicable. The second ClientHello
+  // uses an empty string for `enc`.
+  if (hs->ssl->s3->ech_status == ssl_ech_accepted &&
+      !ssl_encrypt_client_hello(hs, {})) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  if (!ssl_add_client_hello(hs)) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  ssl_done_writing_client_hello(hs);
+  hs->tls13_state = state_read_server_hello;
+  return ssl_hs_flush;
+}
+
+static bool check_session(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                          const SSLSession *session) {
+  const SSLImpl *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  if (session->ssl_version != ssl->s3->version) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_VERSION_NOT_RETURNED);
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (session->cipher->algorithm_prf != hs->new_cipher->algorithm_prf) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_PRF_HASH_MISMATCH);
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (!ssl_session_is_context_valid(hs, session)) {
+    // This is actually a client application bug.
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+    return false;
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool check_imported_psk(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                               const SSLImportedPSK &imported) {
+  const SSLImpl *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  const EVP_MD *md =
+      ssl_get_handshake_digest(ssl_protocol_version(ssl), hs->new_cipher);
+  if (imported.md != md || imported.protocol != ssl->s3->version) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_PSK_FOR_CONNECTION);
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+    return false;
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool using_certificate(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  const SSLImpl *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  // Resumption is not a certificate-based handshake.
+  if (ssl->s3->session_reused) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  // Non-private-key credentials imply a non-certificate handshake (PSK, etc.).
+  if (hs->credential != nullptr && !hs->credential->UsesPrivateKey()) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_server_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  SSLImpl *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  SSLMessage msg;
+  if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
+    return ssl_hs_read_message;
+  }
+  ParsedServerHello server_hello;
+  uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+  if (!parse_server_hello_tls13(hs, &server_hello, &alert, msg)) {
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  // Forbid a second HelloRetryRequest.
+  if (is_hello_retry_request(server_hello)) {
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  // Check the cipher suite, in case this is after HelloRetryRequest.
+  if (SSL_CIPHER_get_protocol_id(hs->new_cipher) != server_hello.cipher_suite) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  if (ssl->s3->ech_status == ssl_ech_accepted) {
+    if (ssl->s3->used_hello_retry_request) {
+      // HelloRetryRequest and ServerHello must accept ECH consistently.
+      bool ech_accepted;
+      if (!check_ech_confirmation(hs, &ech_accepted, &alert, server_hello)) {
+        ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+        return ssl_hs_error;
+      }
+      if (!ech_accepted) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_ECH_NEGOTIATION);
+        ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+        return ssl_hs_error;
+      }
+    }
+
+    hs->transcript = std::move(hs->inner_transcript);
+    hs->extensions.sent = hs->inner_extensions_sent;
+    // Report the inner random value through `SSL_get_client_random`.
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->client_random, hs->inner_client_random,
+                   SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+  }
+
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->server_random, CBS_data(&server_hello.random),
+                 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+
+  // When offering ECH, pre-shared keys are only offered in ClientHelloInner.
+  const bool pre_shared_key_allowed =
+      !hs->pre_shared_keys.empty() && ssl->s3->ech_status != ssl_ech_rejected;
+  SSLExtension key_share(TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share, !hs->key_shares.empty()),
+      pake_share(TLSEXT_TYPE_pake, hs->pake_prover != nullptr),
+      pre_shared_key(TLSEXT_TYPE_pre_shared_key, pre_shared_key_allowed),
+      supported_versions(TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions);
+  if (!ssl_parse_extensions(
+          &server_hello.extensions, &alert,
+          {&key_share, &pre_shared_key, &supported_versions, &pake_share},
+          /*ignore_unknown=*/false)) {
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  // Recheck supported_versions, in case this is after HelloRetryRequest.
+  uint16_t version;
+  if (!supported_versions.present ||                       //
+      !CBS_get_u16(&supported_versions.data, &version) ||  //
+      CBS_len(&supported_versions.data) != 0 ||            //
+      version != ssl->s3->version) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SECOND_SERVERHELLO_VERSION_MISMATCH);
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  // The combination of ServerHello extensions determines the kind of handshake
+  // that the server selected. Check for invalid combinations.
+
+  // If the server specified no alternative authentication mode, it is using
+  // certificate authentication. Check that this is acceptable.
+  if (!pake_share.present && !pre_shared_key.present &&
+      !ssl_accepts_server_certificate_auth(hs)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_MISSING_EXTENSION);
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+  // pake replaces key_share and may not be used with pre_shared_key.
+  if (pake_share.present && (key_share.present || pre_shared_key.present)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION);
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+  // In PAKE mode, we require a PAKE handshake and do not support resumption.
+  if (hs->pake_prover != nullptr && !pake_share.present) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_MISSING_EXTENSION);
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+  // In non-PAKE modes, we require per-connection forward secrecy and do not
+  // support psk_ke.
+  if (hs->pake_prover == nullptr && !key_share.present) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_MISSING_KEY_SHARE);
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+  // The above implies only one of three handshake forms will be allowed. The
+  // checks for unsolicited extensions ensure the server did not select
+  // something we cannot respond to.
+  assert(
+      // Full handshake
+      (key_share.present && !pake_share.present && !pre_shared_key.present) ||
+      // PSK/resumption handshake
+      (key_share.present && !pake_share.present && pre_shared_key.present) ||
+      // PAKE handshake
+      (!key_share.present && pake_share.present && !pre_shared_key.present));
+
+  // Determine the PSK used.
+  const EVP_MD *cipher_md =
+      ssl_get_handshake_digest(ssl_protocol_version(ssl), hs->new_cipher);
+  Span<const uint8_t> psk_secret = Span(kZeroes, EVP_MD_size(cipher_md));
+  alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+  if (pre_shared_key.present) {
+    const SSLPreSharedKey *psk = ssl_ext_pre_shared_key_parse_serverhello(
+        hs, &alert, &pre_shared_key.data);
+    if (psk == nullptr) {
+      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+
+    if (const auto *imported = std::get_if<SSLImportedPSK>(psk);
+        imported != nullptr) {
+      if (!check_imported_psk(hs, &alert, *imported)) {
+        ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+        return ssl_hs_error;
+      }
+
+      psk_secret = imported->ipskx;
+      hs->credential = UpRef(imported->credential);
+      if (!ssl_get_new_session(hs)) {
+        ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return ssl_hs_error;
+      }
+    } else {
+      const SSLSession *session = std::get<UniquePtr<SSLSession>>(*psk).get();
+      assert(session == ssl->session.get());
+      if (!check_session(hs, &alert, session)) {
+        ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+        return ssl_hs_error;
+      }
+
+      psk_secret = session->secret;
+      ssl->s3->session_reused = true;
+      // Only authentication information carries over in TLS 1.3.
+      hs->new_session = SSL_SESSION_dup(session, SSL_SESSION_DUP_AUTH_ONLY);
+      if (!hs->new_session) {
+        ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return ssl_hs_error;
+      }
+      ssl_set_session(ssl, nullptr);
+
+      // Resumption incorporates fresh key material, so refresh the timeout.
+      ssl_session_renew_timeout(ssl, hs->new_session.get(),
+                                ssl->session_ctx->session_psk_dhe_timeout);
+    }
+  } else if (!ssl_get_new_session(hs)) {
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  hs->new_session->cipher = hs->new_cipher;
+  hs->can_release_private_key = !using_certificate(hs);
+  assert(!using_certificate(hs) || ssl_accepts_server_certificate_auth(hs));
+
+  // Set up the key schedule and incorporate the PSK into the running secret.
+  if (!tls13_init_key_schedule(hs, psk_secret)) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  // Resolve ECDHE or PAKE and incorporate it into the secret.
+  Array<uint8_t> shared_secret;
+  alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+  if (key_share.present) {
+    if (!ssl_ext_key_share_parse_serverhello(hs, &shared_secret, &alert,
+                                             &key_share.data)) {
+      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+  } else if (pake_share.present) {
+    if (!ssl_ext_pake_parse_serverhello(hs, &shared_secret, &alert,
+                                        &pake_share.data)) {
+      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+  } else {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  if (!tls13_advance_key_schedule(hs, shared_secret) ||  //
+      !ssl_hash_message(hs, msg) ||                      //
+      !tls13_derive_handshake_secrets(hs)) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  // If currently sending early data over TCP, we defer installing client
+  // traffic keys to when the early data stream is closed. See
+  // `close_early_data`. Note if the server has already rejected 0-RTT via
+  // HelloRetryRequest, `in_early_data` is already false.
+  if (!hs->in_early_data || SSL_is_quic(ssl)) {
+    if (!tls13_set_traffic_key(ssl, ssl_encryption_handshake, evp_aead_seal,
+                               hs->new_session.get(),
+                               hs->client_handshake_secret)) {
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (!tls13_set_traffic_key(ssl, ssl_encryption_handshake, evp_aead_open,
+                             hs->new_session.get(),
+                             hs->server_handshake_secret)) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
+  hs->tls13_state = state_read_encrypted_extensions;
+  return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_encrypted_extensions(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  SSLImpl *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  SSLMessage msg;
+  if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
+    return ssl_hs_read_message;
+  }
+  if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, msg, SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS)) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  CBS body = msg.body, extensions;
+  if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &extensions) ||  //
+      CBS_len(&body) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(hs, &extensions)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  if (ssl->s3->early_data_accepted) {
+    // The extension parser checks the server resumed the session.
+    assert(ssl->s3->session_reused);
+    // If offering ECH, the server may not accept early data with
+    // ClientHelloOuter. We do not offer sessions with ClientHelloOuter, so this
+    // this should be implied by checking `session_reused`.
+    assert(ssl->s3->ech_status != ssl_ech_rejected);
+
+    if (hs->early_session->cipher != hs->new_session->cipher) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CIPHER_MISMATCH_ON_EARLY_DATA);
+      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+    if (Span(hs->early_session->early_alpn) != ssl->s3->alpn_selected) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ALPN_MISMATCH_ON_EARLY_DATA);
+      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+    // Channel ID is incompatible with 0-RTT. The ALPS extension should be
+    // negotiated implicitly.
+    if (hs->channel_id_negotiated ||
+        hs->new_session->has_application_settings) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION_ON_EARLY_DATA);
+      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+    hs->new_session->has_application_settings =
+        hs->early_session->has_application_settings;
+    if (!hs->new_session->local_application_settings.CopyFrom(
+            hs->early_session->local_application_settings) ||
+        !hs->new_session->peer_application_settings.CopyFrom(
+            hs->early_session->peer_application_settings)) {
+      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Store the negotiated ALPN in the session.
+  if (!hs->new_session->early_alpn.CopyFrom(ssl->s3->alpn_selected)) {
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  if (!ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
+  hs->tls13_state = state_read_certificate_request;
+  if (hs->in_early_data && !ssl->s3->early_data_accepted) {
+    if (!close_early_data(hs, ssl_encryption_handshake)) {
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+    return ssl_hs_early_data_rejected;
+  }
+  return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_certificate_request(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  SSLImpl *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  // CertificateRequest may only be sent in certificate-based handshakes.
+  if (!using_certificate(hs)) {
+    if (ssl->s3->session_reused && ssl->ctx->reverify_on_resume &&
+        !ssl->s3->early_data_accepted) {
+      hs->tls13_state = state_server_certificate_reverify;
+      return ssl_hs_ok;
+    }
+    hs->tls13_state = state_read_server_finished;
+    return ssl_hs_ok;
+  }
+
+  SSLMessage msg;
+  if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
+    return ssl_hs_read_message;
+  }
+
+  // CertificateRequest is optional.
+  if (msg.type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
+    hs->tls13_state = state_read_server_certificate;
+    return ssl_hs_ok;
+  }
+
+  SSLExtension sigalgs(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms),
+      ca(TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_authorities);
+  CBS body = msg.body, context, extensions, supported_signature_algorithms;
+  uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+  if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &context) ||
+      // The request context is always empty during the handshake.
+      CBS_len(&context) != 0 ||
+      !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &extensions) ||  //
+      CBS_len(&body) != 0 ||
+      !ssl_parse_extensions(&extensions, &alert, {&sigalgs, &ca},
+                            /*ignore_unknown=*/true) ||
+      !sigalgs.present ||
+      !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&sigalgs.data,
+                                   &supported_signature_algorithms) ||
+      !tls1_parse_peer_sigalgs(hs, &supported_signature_algorithms)) {
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  if (ca.present) {
+    hs->ca_names = SSL_parse_CA_list(ssl, &alert, &ca.data);
+    if (!hs->ca_names || sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(hs->ca_names.get()) == 0 ||
+        CBS_len(&ca.data) != 0) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ERROR_PARSING_EXTENSION);
+      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+  } else {
+    hs->ca_names.reset(sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_null());
+    if (!hs->ca_names) {
+      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+  }
+
+  hs->cert_request = true;
+  ssl->ctx->x509_method->hs_flush_cached_ca_names(hs);
+
+  if (!ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
+  hs->tls13_state = state_read_server_certificate;
+  return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_server_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  SSLImpl *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  SSLMessage msg;
+  if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
+    return ssl_hs_read_message;
+  }
+
+  if (msg.type != SSL3_MT_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE &&
+      !ssl_check_message_type(ssl, msg, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  if (!tls13_process_certificate(hs, msg, false /* certificate required */) ||
+      !ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
+  hs->tls13_state = state_read_server_certificate_verify;
+  return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_server_certificate_verify(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  SSLImpl *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  SSLMessage msg;
+  if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
+    return ssl_hs_read_message;
+  }
+  switch (ssl_verify_peer_cert(hs)) {
+    case ssl_verify_ok:
+      break;
+    case ssl_verify_invalid:
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    case ssl_verify_retry:
+      hs->tls13_state = state_read_server_certificate_verify;
+      return ssl_hs_certificate_verify;
+  }
+
+  if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, msg, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) ||
+      !tls13_process_certificate_verify(hs, msg) ||
+      !ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
+  hs->tls13_state = state_read_server_finished;
+  return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_server_certificate_reverify(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  switch (ssl_reverify_peer_cert(hs, /*send_alert=*/true)) {
+    case ssl_verify_ok:
+      break;
+    case ssl_verify_invalid:
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    case ssl_verify_retry:
+      hs->tls13_state = state_server_certificate_reverify;
+      return ssl_hs_certificate_verify;
+  }
+  hs->tls13_state = state_read_server_finished;
+  return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_server_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  SSLImpl *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  SSLMessage msg;
+  if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
+    return ssl_hs_read_message;
+  }
+  if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, msg, SSL3_MT_FINISHED) ||
+      !tls13_process_finished(hs, msg, false /* don't use saved value */) ||
+      !ssl_hash_message(hs, msg) ||
+      // Update the secret to the master secret and derive traffic keys.
+      !tls13_advance_key_schedule(hs,
+                                  Span(kZeroes, hs->transcript.DigestLen())) ||
+      !tls13_derive_application_secrets(hs)) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  // Finished should be the end of the flight.
+  if (ssl->method->has_unprocessed_handshake_data(ssl)) {
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EXCESS_HANDSHAKE_DATA);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
+  hs->tls13_state = state_send_end_of_early_data;
+  return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_end_of_early_data(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  SSLImpl *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+
+  if (ssl->s3->early_data_accepted) {
+    // DTLS and QUIC omit the EndOfEarlyData message. See RFC 9001, section 8.3,
+    // and RFC 9147, section 5.6.
+    if (!SSL_is_quic(ssl) && !SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
+      ScopedCBB cbb;
+      CBB body;
+      if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body,
+                                     SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) ||
+          !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) {
+        return ssl_hs_error;
+      }
+    }
+
+    if (!close_early_data(hs, ssl_encryption_handshake)) {
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+  }
+
+  hs->tls13_state = state_send_client_encrypted_extensions;
+  return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_client_encrypted_extensions(
+    SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  SSLImpl *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  // For now, only one extension uses client EncryptedExtensions. This function
+  // may be generalized if others use it in the future.
+  if (hs->new_session->has_application_settings &&
+      !ssl->s3->early_data_accepted) {
+    ScopedCBB cbb;
+    CBB body, extensions, extension;
+    uint16_t extension_type = TLSEXT_TYPE_application_settings_old;
+    if (hs->config->alps_use_new_codepoint) {
+      extension_type = TLSEXT_TYPE_application_settings;
+    }
+    if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body,
+                                   SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) ||
+        !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &extensions) ||
+        !CBB_add_u16(&extensions, extension_type) ||
+        !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension) ||
+        !CBB_add_bytes(&extension,
+                       hs->new_session->local_application_settings.data(),
+                       hs->new_session->local_application_settings.size()) ||
+        !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) {
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+  }
+
+  hs->tls13_state = state_send_client_certificate;
+  return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+static bool check_credential(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const SSLCredential *cred,
+                             uint16_t *out_sigalg) {
+  bool cert_type_ok = false;
+  if (hs->client_cert_type == TLSEXT_cert_type_x509) {
+    cert_type_ok = cred->type == SSLCredentialType::kX509;
+  } else if (hs->client_cert_type == TLSEXT_cert_type_rpk) {
+    cert_type_ok = cred->type == SSLCredentialType::kRawPublicKey;
+  }
+  if (!cert_type_ok) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // All currently supported credentials require a signature.
+  if (!tls1_choose_signature_algorithm(hs, cred, out_sigalg)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  // Use this credential if it either matches a requested issuer,
+  // or does not require issuer matching.
+  return ssl_credential_matches_requested_issuers(hs, cred);
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_client_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  SSLImpl *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+
+  // The peer didn't request a certificate.
+  if (!hs->cert_request) {
+    hs->tls13_state = state_complete_second_flight;
+    return ssl_hs_ok;
+  }
+
+  if (ssl->s3->ech_status == ssl_ech_rejected) {
+    // Do not send client certificates on ECH reject. We have not authenticated
+    // the server for the name that can learn the certificate.
+    SSL_certs_clear(ssl);
+  } else if (hs->config->cert->cert_cb) {
+    uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    // Call cert_cb to update the certificate.
+    int rv =
+        hs->config->cert->cert_cb(ssl, hs->config->cert->cert_cb_arg, &alert);
+    if (rv == 0) {
+      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+    if (rv < 0) {
+      hs->tls13_state = state_send_client_certificate;
+      return ssl_hs_x509_lookup;
+    }
+  }
+
+  Array<SSLCredential *> creds;
+  if (!ssl_get_full_credential_list(hs, &creds)) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  // Select the credential, if any, to use.
+  bool may_proceed_anonymously = true;
+  for (SSLCredential *cred : creds) {
+    if (!cred->UsesPrivateKey()) {
+      // Non-certificate credentials (e.g. PSKs) do not participate in deciding
+      // whether to error or proceed anonymously.
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    ERR_clear_error();
+    may_proceed_anonymously = false;
+    uint16_t sigalg;
+    if (check_credential(hs, cred, &sigalg)) {
+      hs->credential = UpRef(cred);
+      hs->signature_algorithm = sigalg;
+      break;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Fail the connection if no credentials matched, but only if the caller
+  // configured at least one certificate credential. If there were no
+  // candidates, proceed anonymously.
+  if (!may_proceed_anonymously && hs->credential == nullptr) {
+    // The error from the last attempt is in the error queue.
+    assert(ERR_peek_error() != 0);
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  if (!tls13_add_certificate(hs)) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  hs->tls13_state = state_send_client_certificate_verify;
+  return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_client_certificate_verify(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  // Don't send CertificateVerify if there is no certificate.
+  if (hs->credential == nullptr) {
+    hs->tls13_state = state_complete_second_flight;
+    return ssl_hs_ok;
+  }
+
+  switch (tls13_add_certificate_verify(hs)) {
+    case ssl_private_key_success:
+      hs->tls13_state = state_complete_second_flight;
+      return ssl_hs_ok;
+
+    case ssl_private_key_retry:
+      hs->tls13_state = state_send_client_certificate_verify;
+      return ssl_hs_private_key_operation;
+
+    case ssl_private_key_failure:
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  assert(0);
+  return ssl_hs_error;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_complete_second_flight(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  SSLImpl *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  hs->can_release_private_key = true;
+
+  // Send a Channel ID assertion if necessary.
+  if (hs->channel_id_negotiated) {
+    ScopedCBB cbb;
+    CBB body;
+    if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body, SSL3_MT_CHANNEL_ID) ||
+        !tls1_write_channel_id(hs, &body) ||
+        !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) {
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Send a Finished message.
+  if (!tls13_add_finished(hs)) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  // Derive the final keys and enable them.
+  if (!tls13_set_traffic_key(ssl, ssl_encryption_application, evp_aead_seal,
+                             hs->new_session.get(),
+                             hs->client_traffic_secret_0) ||
+      !tls13_set_traffic_key(ssl, ssl_encryption_application, evp_aead_open,
+                             hs->new_session.get(),
+                             hs->server_traffic_secret_0) ||
+      !tls13_derive_resumption_secret(hs)) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  hs->tls13_state = state_done;
+  return ssl_hs_flush;
+}
+
+enum ssl_hs_wait_t tls13_client_handshake(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  while (hs->tls13_state != state_done) {
+    enum ssl_hs_wait_t ret = ssl_hs_error;
+    enum client_hs_state_t state =
+        static_cast<enum client_hs_state_t>(hs->tls13_state);
+    switch (state) {
+      case state_read_hello_retry_request:
+        ret = do_read_hello_retry_request(hs);
+        break;
+      case state_send_second_client_hello:
+        ret = do_send_second_client_hello(hs);
+        break;
+      case state_read_server_hello:
+        ret = do_read_server_hello(hs);
+        break;
+      case state_read_encrypted_extensions:
+        ret = do_read_encrypted_extensions(hs);
+        break;
+      case state_read_certificate_request:
+        ret = do_read_certificate_request(hs);
+        break;
+      case state_read_server_certificate:
+        ret = do_read_server_certificate(hs);
+        break;
+      case state_read_server_certificate_verify:
+        ret = do_read_server_certificate_verify(hs);
+        break;
+      case state_server_certificate_reverify:
+        ret = do_server_certificate_reverify(hs);
+        break;
+      case state_read_server_finished:
+        ret = do_read_server_finished(hs);
+        break;
+      case state_send_end_of_early_data:
+        ret = do_send_end_of_early_data(hs);
+        break;
+      case state_send_client_certificate:
+        ret = do_send_client_certificate(hs);
+        break;
+      case state_send_client_encrypted_extensions:
+        ret = do_send_client_encrypted_extensions(hs);
+        break;
+      case state_send_client_certificate_verify:
+        ret = do_send_client_certificate_verify(hs);
+        break;
+      case state_complete_second_flight:
+        ret = do_complete_second_flight(hs);
+        break;
+      case state_done:
+        ret = ssl_hs_ok;
+        break;
+    }
+
+    if (hs->tls13_state != state) {
+      ssl_do_info_callback(hs->ssl, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP, 1);
+    }
+
+    if (ret != ssl_hs_ok) {
+      return ret;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+const char *tls13_client_handshake_state(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  enum client_hs_state_t state =
+      static_cast<enum client_hs_state_t>(hs->tls13_state);
+  switch (state) {
+    case state_read_hello_retry_request:
+      return "TLS 1.3 client read_hello_retry_request";
+    case state_send_second_client_hello:
+      return "TLS 1.3 client send_second_client_hello";
+    case state_read_server_hello:
+      return "TLS 1.3 client read_server_hello";
+    case state_read_encrypted_extensions:
+      return "TLS 1.3 client read_encrypted_extensions";
+    case state_read_certificate_request:
+      return "TLS 1.3 client read_certificate_request";
+    case state_read_server_certificate:
+      return "TLS 1.3 client read_server_certificate";
+    case state_read_server_certificate_verify:
+      return "TLS 1.3 client read_server_certificate_verify";
+    case state_server_certificate_reverify:
+      return "TLS 1.3 client server_certificate_reverify";
+    case state_read_server_finished:
+      return "TLS 1.3 client read_server_finished";
+    case state_send_end_of_early_data:
+      return "TLS 1.3 client send_end_of_early_data";
+    case state_send_client_encrypted_extensions:
+      return "TLS 1.3 client send_client_encrypted_extensions";
+    case state_send_client_certificate:
+      return "TLS 1.3 client send_client_certificate";
+    case state_send_client_certificate_verify:
+      return "TLS 1.3 client send_client_certificate_verify";
+    case state_complete_second_flight:
+      return "TLS 1.3 client complete_second_flight";
+    case state_done:
+      return "TLS 1.3 client done";
+  }
+
+  return "TLS 1.3 client unknown";
+}
+
+bool tls13_process_new_session_ticket(SSLImpl *ssl, const SSLMessage &msg) {
+  if (ssl->s3->write_shutdown != ssl_shutdown_none) {
+    // Ignore tickets on shutdown. Callers tend to indiscriminately call
+    // `SSL_shutdown` before destroying an `SSL`, at which point calling the new
+    // session callback may be confusing.
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  CBS body = msg.body;
+  UniquePtr<SSLSession> session = tls13_create_session_with_ticket(ssl, &body);
+  if (!session) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if ((ssl->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) &&
+      ssl->session_ctx->new_session_cb != nullptr &&
+      ssl->session_ctx->new_session_cb(ssl, session.get())) {
+    // `new_session_cb`'s return value signals that it took ownership.
+    session.release();
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+UniquePtr<SSLSession> tls13_create_session_with_ticket(SSLImpl *ssl,
+                                                       CBS *body) {
+  UniquePtr<SSLSession> session = SSL_SESSION_dup(
+      ssl->s3->established_session.get(), SSL_SESSION_INCLUDE_NONAUTH);
+  if (!session) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  ssl_session_rebase_time(ssl, session.get());
+
+  uint32_t server_timeout;
+  CBS ticket_nonce, ticket, extensions;
+  if (!CBS_get_u32(body, &server_timeout) ||
+      !CBS_get_u32(body, &session->ticket_age_add) ||
+      !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(body, &ticket_nonce) ||
+      !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(body, &ticket) ||
+      CBS_len(&ticket) == 0 ||  //
+      !session->ticket.CopyFrom(ticket) ||
+      !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(body, &extensions) ||  //
+      CBS_len(body) != 0) {
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  // Cap the renewable lifetime by the server advertised value. This avoids
+  // wasting bandwidth on 0-RTT when we know the server will reject it.
+  if (session->timeout > server_timeout) {
+    session->timeout = server_timeout;
+  }
+
+  if (!tls13_derive_session_psk(session.get(), ticket_nonce,
+                                SSL_is_dtls(ssl))) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  SSLExtension early_data(TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data);
+  SSLExtension flags(TLSEXT_TYPE_tls_flags);
+  uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+  if (!ssl_parse_extensions(&extensions, &alert, {&early_data, &flags},
+                            /*ignore_unknown=*/true)) {
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  if (early_data.present) {
+    if (!CBS_get_u32(&early_data.data, &session->ticket_max_early_data) ||
+        CBS_len(&early_data.data) != 0) {
+      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+      return nullptr;
+    }
+
+    // QUIC does not use the max_early_data_size parameter and always sets it to
+    // a fixed value. See RFC 9001, section 4.6.1.
+    if (SSL_is_quic(ssl) && session->ticket_max_early_data != 0xffffffff) {
+      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+      return nullptr;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (flags.present) {
+    SSLFlags parsed;
+    if (!ssl_parse_flags_extension_request(&flags.data, &parsed, &alert)) {
+      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+      return nullptr;
+    }
+    if (parsed & kSSLFlagResumptionAcrossNames) {
+      session->is_resumable_across_names = true;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Historically, OpenSSL filled in fake session IDs for ticket-based sessions.
+  // Envoy's tests depend on this, although perhaps they shouldn't.
+  session->session_id.ResizeForOverwrite(SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+  SHA256(CBS_data(&ticket), CBS_len(&ticket), session->session_id.data());
+
+  session->ticket_age_add_valid = true;
+  session->not_resumable = false;
+
+  return session;
+}
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_END