visaljs 0.0.1 → 0.0.3

package/runtime/third_party/boringssl/crypto/fipsmodule/mlkem/mlkem.cc.inc

@@ -0,0 +1,1856 @@
+// Copyright 2014 The BoringSSL Authors
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+#include <openssl/base.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/base.h>
+#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+#include "../../internal.h"
+#include "../bcm_interface.h"
+#include "../keccak/internal.h"
+
+
+using namespace bssl;
+
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS)
+
+DEFINE_STATIC_ONCE(g_mlkem_keygen_self_test_once)
+DEFINE_STATIC_ONCE(g_mlkem_encap_self_test_once)
+DEFINE_STATIC_ONCE(g_mlkem_decap_self_test_once)
+
+#endif
+
+namespace mlkem {
+namespace {
+
+namespace fips {
+void ensure_keygen_self_test();
+void ensure_encap_self_test();
+void ensure_decap_self_test();
+}  // namespace fips
+
+// See
+// https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/203/final
+
+inline void prf(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len, const uint8_t in[33]) {
+  BORINGSSL_keccak(out, out_len, in, 33, boringssl_shake256);
+}
+
+#if defined(HAVE_KECCAK_X2)
+inline void prf_x2(uint8_t *outs[2], size_t out_len,
+                   const uint8_t *ins[2] /* 33 each */) {
+  BORINGSSL_keccak_short_x2(outs, out_len, ins, 33, boringssl_shake256);
+}
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_KECCAK_X4)
+inline void prf_x4(uint8_t *outs[4], size_t out_len,
+                   const uint8_t *ins[4] /* 33 each */) {
+  BORINGSSL_keccak_short_x4(outs, out_len, ins, 33, boringssl_shake256);
+}
+#endif
+
+// Section 4.1
+void hash_h(uint8_t out[32], const uint8_t *in, size_t len) {
+  BORINGSSL_keccak(out, 32, in, len, boringssl_sha3_256);
+}
+
+void hash_g(uint8_t out[64], const uint8_t *in, size_t len) {
+  BORINGSSL_keccak(out, 64, in, len, boringssl_sha3_512);
+}
+
+// This is called `J` in the spec.
+void kdf(uint8_t out[MLKEM_SHARED_SECRET_BYTES],
+         const uint8_t failure_secret[32], const uint8_t *ciphertext,
+         size_t ciphertext_len) {
+  BORINGSSL_keccak_st st;
+  BORINGSSL_keccak_init(&st, boringssl_shake256);
+  BORINGSSL_keccak_absorb(&st, failure_secret, 32);
+  BORINGSSL_keccak_absorb(&st, ciphertext, ciphertext_len);
+  BORINGSSL_keccak_squeeze(&st, out, MLKEM_SHARED_SECRET_BYTES);
+}
+
+// Constants that are common across all sizes.
+#define DEGREE 256
+const size_t kBarrettMultiplier = 1290167;
+const unsigned kBarrettShift = 32;
+const uint16_t kPrime = 3329;
+const int kLog2Prime = 12;
+const uint16_t kHalfPrime = (/*kPrime=*/3329 - 1) / 2;
+// kInverseDegree is 128^-1 mod 3329; 128 because kPrime does not have a 512th
+// root of unity.
+const uint16_t kInverseDegree = 3303;
+
+// Rank-specific constants.
+#define RANK768 3
+const int kDU768 = 10;
+const int kDV768 = 4;
+#define RANK1024 4
+const int kDU1024 = 11;
+const int kDV1024 = 5;
+
+constexpr size_t encoded_vector_size(int rank) {
+  return (kLog2Prime * DEGREE / 8) * static_cast<size_t>(rank);
+}
+
+constexpr size_t encoded_public_key_size(int rank) {
+  return encoded_vector_size(rank) + /*sizeof(rho)=*/32;
+}
+
+static_assert(encoded_public_key_size(RANK768) == MLKEM768_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES);
+static_assert(encoded_public_key_size(RANK1024) == MLKEM1024_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES);
+
+constexpr size_t compressed_vector_size(int rank) {
+  // `if constexpr` isn't available in C++17.
+  return (rank == RANK768 ? kDU768 : kDU1024) * static_cast<size_t>(rank) *
+         DEGREE / 8;
+}
+
+constexpr size_t ciphertext_size(int rank) {
+  return compressed_vector_size(rank) +
+         (rank == RANK768 ? kDV768 : kDV1024) * DEGREE / 8;
+}
+
+static_assert(ciphertext_size(RANK768) == MLKEM768_CIPHERTEXT_BYTES);
+static_assert(ciphertext_size(RANK1024) == MLKEM1024_CIPHERTEXT_BYTES);
+
+struct scalar {
+  // On every function entry and exit, 0 <= c < kPrime.
+  uint16_t c[DEGREE];
+};
+
+template <int RANK>
+struct vector {
+  scalar v[RANK];
+};
+
+template <int RANK>
+struct matrix {
+  scalar v[RANK][RANK];
+};
+
+// This bit of Python will be referenced in some of the following comments:
+//
+// p = 3329
+//
+// def bitreverse(i):
+//     ret = 0
+//     for n in range(7):
+//         bit = i & 1
+//         ret <<= 1
+//         ret |= bit
+//         i >>= 1
+//     return ret
+
+// kNTTRoots = [pow(17, bitreverse(i), p) for i in range(128)]
+const uint16_t kNTTRoots[128] = {
+    1,    1729, 2580, 3289, 2642, 630,  1897, 848,  1062, 1919, 193,  797,
+    2786, 3260, 569,  1746, 296,  2447, 1339, 1476, 3046, 56,   2240, 1333,
+    1426, 2094, 535,  2882, 2393, 2879, 1974, 821,  289,  331,  3253, 1756,
+    1197, 2304, 2277, 2055, 650,  1977, 2513, 632,  2865, 33,   1320, 1915,
+    2319, 1435, 807,  452,  1438, 2868, 1534, 2402, 2647, 2617, 1481, 648,
+    2474, 3110, 1227, 910,  17,   2761, 583,  2649, 1637, 723,  2288, 1100,
+    1409, 2662, 3281, 233,  756,  2156, 3015, 3050, 1703, 1651, 2789, 1789,
+    1847, 952,  1461, 2687, 939,  2308, 2437, 2388, 733,  2337, 268,  641,
+    1584, 2298, 2037, 3220, 375,  2549, 2090, 1645, 1063, 319,  2773, 757,
+    2099, 561,  2466, 2594, 2804, 1092, 403,  1026, 1143, 2150, 2775, 886,
+    1722, 1212, 1874, 1029, 2110, 2935, 885,  2154,
+};
+
+// kInverseNTTRoots = [pow(17, -bitreverse(i), p) for i in range(128)]
+const uint16_t kInverseNTTRoots[128] = {
+    1,    1600, 40,   749,  2481, 1432, 2699, 687,  1583, 2760, 69,   543,
+    2532, 3136, 1410, 2267, 2508, 1355, 450,  936,  447,  2794, 1235, 1903,
+    1996, 1089, 3273, 283,  1853, 1990, 882,  3033, 2419, 2102, 219,  855,
+    2681, 1848, 712,  682,  927,  1795, 461,  1891, 2877, 2522, 1894, 1010,
+    1414, 2009, 3296, 464,  2697, 816,  1352, 2679, 1274, 1052, 1025, 2132,
+    1573, 76,   2998, 3040, 1175, 2444, 394,  1219, 2300, 1455, 2117, 1607,
+    2443, 554,  1179, 2186, 2303, 2926, 2237, 525,  735,  863,  2768, 1230,
+    2572, 556,  3010, 2266, 1684, 1239, 780,  2954, 109,  1292, 1031, 1745,
+    2688, 3061, 992,  2596, 941,  892,  1021, 2390, 642,  1868, 2377, 1482,
+    1540, 540,  1678, 1626, 279,  314,  1173, 2573, 3096, 48,   667,  1920,
+    2229, 1041, 2606, 1692, 680,  2746, 568,  3312,
+};
+
+// kModRoots = [pow(17, 2*bitreverse(i) + 1, p) for i in range(128)]
+const uint16_t kModRoots[128] = {
+    17,   3312, 2761, 568,  583,  2746, 2649, 680,  1637, 1692, 723,  2606,
+    2288, 1041, 1100, 2229, 1409, 1920, 2662, 667,  3281, 48,   233,  3096,
+    756,  2573, 2156, 1173, 3015, 314,  3050, 279,  1703, 1626, 1651, 1678,
+    2789, 540,  1789, 1540, 1847, 1482, 952,  2377, 1461, 1868, 2687, 642,
+    939,  2390, 2308, 1021, 2437, 892,  2388, 941,  733,  2596, 2337, 992,
+    268,  3061, 641,  2688, 1584, 1745, 2298, 1031, 2037, 1292, 3220, 109,
+    375,  2954, 2549, 780,  2090, 1239, 1645, 1684, 1063, 2266, 319,  3010,
+    2773, 556,  757,  2572, 2099, 1230, 561,  2768, 2466, 863,  2594, 735,
+    2804, 525,  1092, 2237, 403,  2926, 1026, 2303, 1143, 2186, 2150, 1179,
+    2775, 554,  886,  2443, 1722, 1607, 1212, 2117, 1874, 1455, 1029, 2300,
+    2110, 1219, 2935, 394,  885,  2444, 2154, 1175,
+};
+
+// reduce_once reduces 0 <= x < 2*kPrime, mod kPrime.
+inline uint16_t reduce_once(uint16_t x) {
+  declassify_assert(x < 2 * kPrime);
+  const uint16_t subtracted = x - kPrime;
+  uint16_t mask = 0u - (subtracted >> 15);
+  // Although this is a constant-time select, we omit a value barrier here.
+  // Value barriers impede auto-vectorization (likely because it forces the
+  // value to transit through a general-purpose register). On AArch64, this is a
+  // difference of 2x.
+  //
+  // We usually add value barriers to selects because Clang turns consecutive
+  // selects with the same condition into a branch instead of CMOV/CSEL. This
+  // condition does not occur in ML-KEM, so omitting it seems to be safe so far,
+  // but see `scalar_centered_binomial_distribution_eta_2_with_prf`.
+  return (mask & x) | (~mask & subtracted);
+}
+
+// reduce_partial returns a number equivalent to x mod kPrime. The output is
+// less than 2 * kPrime. `x` can be any `uint32_t`.
+inline uint32_t reduce_partial(uint32_t x) {
+  uint64_t product = (uint64_t)x * kBarrettMultiplier;
+  uint32_t quotient = (uint32_t)(product >> kBarrettShift);
+  uint32_t remainder = x - quotient * kPrime;
+  return remainder;
+}
+
+// constant time reduce x mod kPrime using Barrett reduction. `x` can be any
+// `uint32_t`.
+inline uint16_t reduce(uint32_t x) { return reduce_once(reduce_partial(x)); }
+
+inline void scalar_zero(scalar *out) { OPENSSL_memset(out, 0, sizeof(*out)); }
+
+template <int RANK>
+inline void vector_zero(vector<RANK> *out) {
+  OPENSSL_memset(out->v, 0, sizeof(scalar) * RANK);
+}
+
+// In place number theoretic transform of a given scalar.
+// Note that MLKEM's kPrime 3329 does not have a 512th root of unity, so this
+// transform leaves off the last iteration of the usual FFT code, with the 128
+// relevant roots of unity being stored in `kNTTRoots`. This means the output
+// should be seen as 128 elements in GF(3329^2), with the coefficients of the
+// elements being consecutive entries in `s->c`.
+inline void scalar_ntt(scalar *s) {
+  // Manually unrolled loop to maximize vectorization.
+  //
+  // Intermediate values of `s` are not fully reduced. `ITER` writes to every
+  // element of `s` exactly once. Each write adds less than 2*kPrime to some
+  // value from the previous iteration. After seven iterations, each element
+  // will be less than 15*kPrime. This fits in `uint16_t`, so we never overflow.
+#define ITER(step, offset)                                                    \
+  {                                                                           \
+    int k = 0;                                                                \
+    for (int i = 0; i < step; i++) {                                          \
+      const uint32_t step_root = kNTTRoots[step + i];                         \
+      for (int j = k; j < k + offset; j++) {                                  \
+        uint32_t even = s->c[j];                                              \
+        /* `reduce_partial` works on values up to 2^32.                       \
+         * `step_root < kPrime` because it's static data. `s->c[...] < 2^16`  \
+         * because it's 16-bit. */                                            \
+        uint32_t odd =                                                        \
+            reduce_partial(uint32_t{step_root} * uint32_t{s->c[j + offset]}); \
+        s->c[j] = even + odd;                                                 \
+        s->c[j + offset] = even + 2 * kPrime - odd;                           \
+      }                                                                       \
+      k += 2 * offset;                                                        \
+    }                                                                         \
+  }
+
+  // for (int step = 1; step < DEGREE / 2; step <<= 1)
+  ITER(1, 128)
+  ITER(2, 64)
+  ITER(4, 32)
+  ITER(8, 16)
+  ITER(16, 8)
+  ITER(32, 4)
+  ITER(64, 2)
+  static_assert(DEGREE == 256);
+#undef ITER
+
+  // Now `s` is correct but the elements are not fully reduced. Reduce them.
+  for (int i = 0; i < DEGREE; i++) {
+    s->c[i] = reduce(s->c[i]);
+  }
+}
+
+template <int RANK>
+inline void vector_ntt(vector<RANK> *a) {
+  for (int i = 0; i < RANK; i++) {
+    scalar_ntt(&a->v[i]);
+  }
+}
+
+// In place inverse number theoretic transform of a given scalar, with pairs of
+// entries of s->v being interpreted as elements of GF(3329^2). Just as with the
+// number theoretic transform, this leaves off the first step of the normal iFFT
+// to account for the fact that 3329 does not have a 512th root of unity, using
+// the precomputed 128 roots of unity stored in `kInverseNTTRoots`.
+//
+// FIPS 203, Algorithm 10 (`NTT^-1`).
+void scalar_inverse_ntt(scalar *s) {
+  // Manually unrolled loop to maximize vectorization.
+  //
+  // Intermediate values are not fully reduced. `ITER` writes to every element
+  // exactly once. Each write either adds two values from the previous
+  // iteration, or is at most 2 * kPrime. After seven iterations, each element
+  // will be less than 2^7 * kPrime = 128 * kPrime. This fits in `uint32_t`, so
+  // we never overflow.
+  uint32_t c[DEGREE];
+#define ITER(step, offset, src)                                              \
+  {                                                                          \
+    int k = 0;                                                               \
+    for (int i = 0; i < step; i++) {                                         \
+      const uint32_t step_root = kInverseNTTRoots[step + i];                 \
+      for (int j = k; j < k + offset; j++) {                                 \
+        uint32_t even = (src)[j];                                            \
+        uint32_t odd = (src)[j + offset];                                    \
+        c[j] = odd + even;                                                   \
+        /* `reduce_partial` works on values up to 2^32.                      \
+         * `step_root < kPrime` because it's static data. The other term is  \
+         * less than 2^32, and does not overflow because `odd` is at most    \
+         * 128 * kPrime per the above. */                                    \
+        c[j + offset] = reduce_partial(uint32_t{step_root} *                 \
+                                       uint32_t{128 * kPrime + even - odd}); \
+      }                                                                      \
+      k += 2 * offset;                                                       \
+    }                                                                        \
+  }
+
+  // for (int offset = 2; offset < DEGREE; offset <<= 1)
+  ITER(64, 2, s->c)
+  ITER(32, 4, c)
+  ITER(16, 8, c)
+  ITER(8, 16, c)
+  ITER(4, 32, c)
+  ITER(2, 64, c)
+  ITER(1, 128, c)
+  static_assert(DEGREE == 256);
+#undef ITER
+
+  // The final multiplication by `kInverseDegree` also fully reduces the
+  // partially-reduced values above.
+  for (int i = 0; i < DEGREE; i++) {
+    s->c[i] = reduce(c[i] * kInverseDegree);
+  }
+}
+
+template <int RANK>
+void vector_inverse_ntt(vector<RANK> *a) {
+  for (int i = 0; i < RANK; i++) {
+    scalar_inverse_ntt(&a->v[i]);
+  }
+}
+
+inline void scalar_add(scalar *lhs, const scalar *rhs) {
+  for (int i = 0; i < DEGREE; i++) {
+    lhs->c[i] = reduce_once(lhs->c[i] + rhs->c[i]);
+  }
+}
+
+inline void scalar_sub(scalar *lhs, const scalar *rhs) {
+  for (int i = 0; i < DEGREE; i++) {
+    lhs->c[i] = reduce_once(lhs->c[i] - rhs->c[i] + kPrime);
+  }
+}
+
+// Multiplying two scalars in the number theoretically transformed state. Since
+// 3329 does not have a 512th root of unity, this means we have to interpret
+// the 2*ith and (2*i+1)th entries of the scalar as elements of GF(3329)[X]/(X^2
+// - 17^(2*bitreverse(i)+1)) The value of 17^(2*bitreverse(i)+1) mod 3329 is
+// stored in the precomputed `kModRoots` table. Note that our Barrett transform
+// only allows us to multiply two reduced numbers together, so we need some
+// intermediate reduction steps, even if an uint64_t could hold 3 multiplied
+// numbers.
+inline void scalar_mult(scalar *out, const scalar *lhs, const scalar *rhs) {
+  for (int i = 0; i < DEGREE / 2; i++) {
+    uint32_t real_real = (uint32_t)lhs->c[2 * i] * rhs->c[2 * i];
+    uint32_t img_img = (uint32_t)lhs->c[2 * i + 1] * rhs->c[2 * i + 1];
+    uint32_t real_img = (uint32_t)lhs->c[2 * i] * rhs->c[2 * i + 1];
+    uint32_t img_real = (uint32_t)lhs->c[2 * i + 1] * rhs->c[2 * i];
+    out->c[2 * i] =
+        reduce(real_real + (uint32_t)reduce(img_img) * kModRoots[i]);
+    out->c[2 * i + 1] = reduce(img_real + real_img);
+  }
+}
+
+template <int RANK>
+inline void vector_add(vector<RANK> *lhs, const vector<RANK> *rhs) {
+  for (int i = 0; i < RANK; i++) {
+    scalar_add(&lhs->v[i], &rhs->v[i]);
+  }
+}
+
+template <int RANK>
+inline void matrix_mult(vector<RANK> *out, const matrix<RANK> *m,
+                        const vector<RANK> *a) {
+  vector_zero(out);
+  for (int i = 0; i < RANK; i++) {
+    for (int j = 0; j < RANK; j++) {
+      scalar product;
+      scalar_mult(&product, &m->v[i][j], &a->v[j]);
+      scalar_add(&out->v[i], &product);
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+template <int RANK>
+inline void matrix_mult_transpose(vector<RANK> *out, const matrix<RANK> *m,
+                           const vector<RANK> *a) {
+  vector_zero(out);
+  for (int i = 0; i < RANK; i++) {
+    for (int j = 0; j < RANK; j++) {
+      scalar product;
+      scalar_mult(&product, &m->v[j][i], &a->v[j]);
+      scalar_add(&out->v[i], &product);
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+template <int RANK>
+inline void scalar_inner_product(scalar *out, const vector<RANK> *lhs,
+                          const vector<RANK> *rhs) {
+  scalar_zero(out);
+  for (int i = 0; i < RANK; i++) {
+    scalar product;
+    scalar_mult(&product, &lhs->v[i], &rhs->v[i]);
+    scalar_add(out, &product);
+  }
+}
+
+inline void scalar_from_keccak_block_vartime(scalar *out, int *done,
+                                             const uint8_t block[168]) {
+  // kStep is the number of loop iterations to do at once. May need to become
+  // platform dependent at some point. Must be a compile-time constant - if we
+  // ever need to runtime dispatch on it, it has to be made a template argument.
+  const size_t kStep = 2;
+
+  // Branchless sampling as long as there is enough space in the output buffer
+  // even if all sampled numbers are < `kPrime`.
+  size_t i = 0;
+  for (; i <= size_t{168 - 3 * kStep} && *done <= int{DEGREE - 2 * kStep};
+       i += 3 * kStep) {
+    uint16_t d[2 * kStep];
+    for (size_t k = 0; k < kStep; ++k) {
+      size_t di = 2 * k;
+      size_t bi = i + 3 * k;
+      d[di] = block[bi] + 256 * (block[bi + 1] % 16);
+      d[di + 1] = block[bi + 1] / 16 + 16 * block[bi + 2];
+    }
+    for (size_t k = 0; k < 2 * kStep; ++k) {
+      out->c[*done] = d[k];
+      *done += d[k] < kPrime;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Branchful "tail".
+  for (; i < 168 && *done < DEGREE; i += 3) {
+    uint16_t d1 = block[i] + 256 * (block[i + 1] % 16);
+    uint16_t d2 = block[i + 1] / 16 + 16 * block[i + 2];
+    if (d1 < kPrime) {
+      out->c[(*done)++] = d1;
+    }
+    if (d2 < kPrime && *done < DEGREE) {
+      out->c[(*done)++] = d2;
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+// Algorithm 7 from the spec. Rejection samples a Keccak stream to get
+// uniformly distributed elements. This is used for matrix expansion and only
+// operates on public inputs.
+inline void scalar_from_keccak_vartime(scalar *out,
+                                       BORINGSSL_keccak_st *keccak_ctx) {
+  assert(keccak_ctx->squeeze_offset == 0);
+  assert(keccak_ctx->rate_bytes == 168);
+  static_assert(168 % 3 == 0, "block and coefficient boundaries do not align");
+
+  int done = 0;
+  while (done < DEGREE) {
+    uint8_t block[168];
+    BORINGSSL_keccak_squeeze(keccak_ctx, block, sizeof(block));
+    scalar_from_keccak_block_vartime(out, &done, block);
+  }
+}
+
+#if defined(HAVE_KECCAK_X2)
+inline void scalar_from_keccak_vartime_x2(scalar *out[2],
+                                          BORINGSSL_keccak_st keccak_ctx[2]) {
+  assert(keccak_ctx[0].squeeze_offset == 0);
+  assert(keccak_ctx[0].rate_bytes == 168);
+  assert(keccak_ctx[1].squeeze_offset == 0);
+  assert(keccak_ctx[1].rate_bytes == 168);
+  static_assert(168 % 3 == 0, "block and coefficient boundaries do not align");
+
+  int done[2] = {0, 0};
+  while (done[0] < DEGREE || done[1] < DEGREE) {
+    uint8_t block[2][168];
+    uint8_t *blocks[] = {block[0], block[1]};
+    BORINGSSL_keccak_squeeze_x2(keccak_ctx, blocks, sizeof(block[0]));
+    scalar_from_keccak_block_vartime(out[0], &done[0], block[0]);
+    scalar_from_keccak_block_vartime(out[1], &done[1], block[1]);
+  }
+}
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_KECCAK_X4)
+inline void scalar_from_keccak_vartime_x4(scalar *out[4],
+                                          BORINGSSL_keccak_st keccak_ctx[]) {
+  for (int i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
+    assert(keccak_ctx[i].squeeze_offset == 0);
+    assert(keccak_ctx[i].rate_bytes == 168);
+  }
+  static_assert(168 % 3 == 0, "block and coefficient boundaries do not align");
+
+  int done[4] = {0, 0, 0, 0};
+  while (done[0] < DEGREE || done[1] < DEGREE || done[2] < DEGREE ||
+         done[3] < DEGREE) {
+    uint8_t block[4][168];
+    uint8_t *blocks[] = {block[0], block[1], block[2], block[3]};
+    BORINGSSL_keccak_squeeze_x4(keccak_ctx, blocks, sizeof(block[0]));
+    scalar_from_keccak_block_vartime(out[0], &done[0], block[0]);
+    scalar_from_keccak_block_vartime(out[1], &done[1], block[1]);
+    scalar_from_keccak_block_vartime(out[2], &done[2], block[2]);
+    scalar_from_keccak_block_vartime(out[3], &done[3], block[3]);
+  }
+}
+#endif
+
+static void scalar_centered_binomial_distribution_eta_2(
+    scalar *out, const uint8_t entropy[128]) {
+  for (int i = 0; i < DEGREE; i += 2) {
+    uint8_t byte = entropy[i / 2];
+
+    uint16_t value = (byte & 1) + ((byte >> 1) & 1);
+    value -= ((byte >> 2) & 1) + ((byte >> 3) & 1);
+    // Add `kPrime` if `value` underflowed. See `reduce_once` for a discussion
+    // on why the value barrier is omitted. While this could have been written
+    // reduce_once(value + kPrime), this is one extra addition and small range
+    // of `value` tempts some versions of Clang to emit a branch.
+    uint16_t mask = 0u - (value >> 15);
+    out->c[i] = ((value + kPrime) & mask) | (value & ~mask);
+
+    byte >>= 4;
+    value = (byte & 1) + ((byte >> 1) & 1);
+    value -= ((byte >> 2) & 1) + ((byte >> 3) & 1);
+    // See above.
+    mask = 0u - (value >> 15);
+    out->c[i + 1] = ((value + kPrime) & mask) | (value & ~mask);
+  }
+}
+
+// Algorithm 8 from the spec, with eta fixed to two and the PRF call
+// included. Creates binominally distributed elements by sampling 2*`eta` bits,
+// and setting the coefficient to the count of the first bits minus the count of
+// the second bits, resulting in a centered binomial distribution. Since eta is
+// two this gives -2/2 with a probability of 1/16, -1/1 with probability 1/4,
+// and 0 with probability 3/8.
+void scalar_centered_binomial_distribution_eta_2_with_prf(
+    scalar *out, const uint8_t input[33]) {
+  uint8_t entropy[128];
+  static_assert(sizeof(entropy) == 2 * /*kEta=*/2 * DEGREE / 8);
+  prf(entropy, sizeof(entropy), input);
+  scalar_centered_binomial_distribution_eta_2(out, entropy);
+}
+
+#if defined(HAVE_KECCAK_X2)
+// scalar_centered_binomial_distribution_eta_2_with_prf_x2 computes two blocks
+// of scalar_centered_binomial_distribution_eta_2_with_prf.
+static void scalar_centered_binomial_distribution_eta_2_with_prf_x2(
+    scalar out[2], uint8_t input[33]) {
+  uint8_t entropy[2][128];
+  static_assert(sizeof(entropy[0]) == 2 * /*kEta=*/2 * DEGREE / 8);
+
+  uint8_t input1[33];
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(input1, input, 33);
+  ++input1[32];  // Counter.
+
+  uint8_t *entropies[] = {entropy[0], entropy[1]};
+  const uint8_t *inputs[2] = {input, input1};
+  prf_x2(entropies, sizeof(entropy[0]), inputs);
+
+  for (int k = 0; k < 2; k++) {
+    scalar_centered_binomial_distribution_eta_2(&out[k], entropy[k]);
+  }
+}
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_KECCAK_X4)
+// scalar_centered_binomial_distribution_eta_2_with_prf_x4 computes four blocks
+// of scalar_centered_binomial_distribution_eta_2_with_prf.
+static void scalar_centered_binomial_distribution_eta_2_with_prf_x4(
+    scalar out[4], uint8_t input[33]) {
+  uint8_t entropy[4][128];
+  static_assert(sizeof(entropy[0]) == 2 * /*kEta=*/2 * DEGREE / 8);
+
+  uint8_t inputs[4][33];
+  for (int i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(inputs[i], input, 33);
+    inputs[i][32] += i;
+  }
+  uint8_t *entropies[] = {entropy[0], entropy[1], entropy[2], entropy[3]};
+  const uint8_t *input_ptrs[4] = {inputs[0], inputs[1], inputs[2], inputs[3]};
+  prf_x4(entropies, sizeof(entropy[0]), input_ptrs);
+
+  for (int k = 0; k < 4; k++) {
+    scalar_centered_binomial_distribution_eta_2(&out[k], entropy[k]);
+  }
+}
+#endif
+
+// Generates a secret vector by using
+// `scalar_centered_binomial_distribution_eta_2_with_prf`, using the given seed
+// appending and incrementing `counter` for entry of the vector.
+template <int RANK>
+void vector_generate_secret_eta_2(vector<RANK> *out, uint8_t *counter,
+                                  const uint8_t seed[32]) {
+  uint8_t input[33];
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(input, seed, 32);
+
+  int i = 0;
+#if defined(HAVE_KECCAK_X4)
+  if (BORINGSSL_have_keccak_x4()) {
+    for (; i + 4 <= RANK; i += 4) {
+      input[32] = *counter;
+      *counter += 4;
+      scalar_centered_binomial_distribution_eta_2_with_prf_x4(&out->v[i],
+                                                              input);
+    }
+  }
+#endif
+#if defined(HAVE_KECCAK_X2)
+  for (; i + 2 <= RANK; i += 2) {
+    input[32] = *counter;
+    *counter += 2;
+    scalar_centered_binomial_distribution_eta_2_with_prf_x2(&out->v[i], input);
+  }
+#endif
+
+  for (; i < RANK; i++) {
+    input[32] = (*counter)++;
+    scalar_centered_binomial_distribution_eta_2_with_prf(&out->v[i], input);
+  }
+}
+
+template <int RANK>
+void matrix_expand_step(scalar *out, uint8_t input[34], int i) {
+  input[32] = i / RANK;
+  input[33] = i % RANK;
+  BORINGSSL_keccak_st keccak_ctx;
+  BORINGSSL_keccak_init(&keccak_ctx, boringssl_shake128);
+  BORINGSSL_keccak_absorb(&keccak_ctx, input, 34);
+  scalar_from_keccak_vartime(out, &keccak_ctx);
+}
+
+#if defined(HAVE_KECCAK_X2)
+template <int RANK>
+void matrix_expand_step_x2(matrix<RANK> *out, uint8_t input[34], int i) {
+  input[32] = i / RANK;
+  input[33] = i % RANK;
+  uint8_t input1[34];
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(input1, input, 32);
+  input1[32] = (i + 1) / RANK;
+  input1[33] = (i + 1) % RANK;
+  BORINGSSL_keccak_st keccak_ctx[2];
+  BORINGSSL_keccak_init(&keccak_ctx[0], boringssl_shake128);
+  BORINGSSL_keccak_init(&keccak_ctx[1], boringssl_shake128);
+  BORINGSSL_keccak_absorb(&keccak_ctx[0], input, 34);
+  BORINGSSL_keccak_absorb(&keccak_ctx[1], input1, 34);
+  scalar *outs[] = {&out->v[i / RANK][i % RANK],
+                    &out->v[(i + 1) / RANK][(i + 1) % RANK]};
+  scalar_from_keccak_vartime_x2(outs, keccak_ctx);
+}
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_KECCAK_X4)
+template <int RANK>
+void matrix_expand_step_x4(matrix<RANK> *out, uint8_t input[34], int i) {
+  uint8_t inputs[4][34];
+  BORINGSSL_keccak_st keccak_ctx[4];
+  for (int k = 0; k < 4; k++) {
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(inputs[k], input, 32);
+    inputs[k][32] = (i + k) / RANK;
+    inputs[k][33] = (i + k) % RANK;
+    BORINGSSL_keccak_init(&keccak_ctx[k], boringssl_shake128);
+    BORINGSSL_keccak_absorb(&keccak_ctx[k], inputs[k], 34);
+  }
+  scalar *outs[] = {&out->v[i / RANK][i % RANK],
+                    &out->v[(i + 1) / RANK][(i + 1) % RANK],
+                    &out->v[(i + 2) / RANK][(i + 2) % RANK],
+                    &out->v[(i + 3) / RANK][(i + 3) % RANK]};
+  scalar_from_keccak_vartime_x4(outs, keccak_ctx);
+}
+#endif
+
+// Expands the matrix of a seed for key generation and for encaps-CPA.
+template <int RANK>
+void matrix_expand(matrix<RANK> *out, const uint8_t rho[32]) {
+  uint8_t input[34];
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(input, rho, 32);
+
+  int i = 0;
+#if defined(HAVE_KECCAK_X4)
+  if (BORINGSSL_have_keccak_x4()) {
+    for (; i + 4 <= RANK * RANK; i += 4) {
+      matrix_expand_step_x4<RANK>(out, input, i);
+    }
+  }
+#endif
+#if defined(HAVE_KECCAK_X2)
+  for (; i + 2 <= RANK * RANK; i += 2) {
+    matrix_expand_step_x2<RANK>(out, input, i);
+  }
+#endif
+
+  for (; i < RANK * RANK; i++) {
+    matrix_expand_step<RANK>(&out->v[i / RANK][i % RANK], input, i);
+  }
+}
+
+// Encodes a scalar of 256 `BITS`-bit words into 32*`BITS` bytes by splitting
+// and joining into bytes using LSB-first bit order (i.e. opposite to standard
+// reading order). See below for examples. If an input is >= 1 << `BITS`, the
+// result is undefined.
+template <int BITS>
+void scalar_encode(uint8_t *out, const scalar *s);
+
+// Encodes a scalar of 256 10-bit words into 320 bytes as follows:
+// 000000Aaaaaaaaaa 000000Bbbbbbbbbb 000000Cccccccccc 000000Dddddddddd ...
+// -> aaaaaaaa bbbbbbAa ccccBbbb ddCccccc Dddddddd ...
+template <>
+void scalar_encode<10>(uint8_t out[320], const scalar *s) {
+  for (int i = 0; i < DEGREE; i += 4) {
+    uint16_t s0 = s->c[i];
+    uint16_t s1 = s->c[i + 1];
+    uint16_t s2 = s->c[i + 2];
+    uint16_t s3 = s->c[i + 3];
+    declassify_assert((s0 | s1 | s2 | s3) < (1 << 10));
+    out[0] = (uint8_t)s0;
+    out[1] = (uint8_t)((s0 >> 8) | (s1 << 2));
+    out[2] = (uint8_t)((s1 >> 6) | (s2 << 4));
+    out[3] = (uint8_t)((s2 >> 4) | (s3 << 6));
+    out[4] = (uint8_t)(s3 >> 2);
+    out += 5;
+  }
+}
+
+// Encodes a scalar of 256 12-bit words into 384 bytes as follows:
+// 0000Aaaaaaaaaaaa 0000Bbbbbbbbbbbb 0000Cccccccccccc 0000Dddddddddddd ...
+// -> aaaaaaaa bbbbAaaa Bbbbbbbb cccccccc ddddCccc Dddddddd ....
+template <>
+void scalar_encode<12>(uint8_t out[384], const scalar *s) {
+  for (int i = 0; i < DEGREE; i += 2) {
+    uint16_t s0 = s->c[i];
+    uint16_t s1 = s->c[i + 1];
+    declassify_assert((s0 | s1) < (1 << 12));
+    out[0] = (uint8_t)s0;
+    out[1] = (uint8_t)((s0 >> 8) | (s1 << 4));
+    out[2] = (uint8_t)(s1 >> 4);
+    out += 3;
+  }
+}
+
+// Encodes a scalar of 256 4-bit words into 128 bytes as follows:
+// 000000000000Aaaa 00000000000Bbbb 000000000000Cccc 000000000000Dddd ...
+// -> BbbbAaaa DdddCccc ...
+template <>
+void scalar_encode<4>(uint8_t out[128], const scalar *s) {
+  for (int i = 0; i < DEGREE; i += 2) {
+    uint16_t s0 = s->c[i];
+    uint16_t s1 = s->c[i + 1];
+    declassify_assert((s0 | s1) < (1 << 4));
+    out[0] = (uint8_t)(s0 | (s1 << 4));
+    out += 1;
+  }
+}
+
+// Encodes a scalar of 256 11-bit words into 352 bytes as follows:
+// 00000Aaaaaaaaaaa 00000Bbbbbbbbbbb 00000Ccccccccccc 00000Ddddddddddd ...
+// -> aaaaaaaa bbbbbAaa ccBbbbbb cccccccc dddddddC eeeeDddd fEeeeeee ...
+template <>
+void scalar_encode<11>(uint8_t out[352], const scalar *s) {
+  for (int i = 0; i < DEGREE; i += 8) {
+    uint16_t s0 = s->c[i];
+    uint16_t s1 = s->c[i + 1];
+    uint16_t s2 = s->c[i + 2];
+    uint16_t s3 = s->c[i + 3];
+    uint16_t s4 = s->c[i + 4];
+    uint16_t s5 = s->c[i + 5];
+    uint16_t s6 = s->c[i + 6];
+    uint16_t s7 = s->c[i + 7];
+    declassify_assert((s0 | s1 | s2 | s3 | s4 | s5 | s6 | s7) < (1 << 11));
+    out[0] = (uint8_t)s0;
+    out[1] = (uint8_t)((s0 >> 8) | (s1 << 3));
+    out[2] = (uint8_t)((s1 >> 5) | (s2 << 6));
+    out[3] = (uint8_t)(s2 >> 2);
+    out[4] = (uint8_t)((s2 >> 10) | (s3 << 1));
+    out[5] = (uint8_t)((s3 >> 7) | (s4 << 4));
+    out[6] = (uint8_t)((s4 >> 4) | (s5 << 7));
+    out[7] = (uint8_t)(s5 >> 1);
+    out[8] = (uint8_t)((s5 >> 9) | (s6 << 2));
+    out[9] = (uint8_t)((s6 >> 6) | (s7 << 5));
+    out[10] = (uint8_t)(s7 >> 3);
+    out += 11;
+  }
+}
+
+// Encodes a scalar of 256 5-bit words into 160 bytes as follows:
+// 00000000000Aaaaa 00000000000Bbbbb 00000000000Ccccc 00000000000Ddddd ...
+// -> bbbAaaaa dCccccBb eeeeDddd ggFffffE HhhhhGgg ...
+template <>
+void scalar_encode<5>(uint8_t out[160], const scalar *s) {
+  for (int i = 0; i < DEGREE; i += 8) {
+    uint16_t s0 = s->c[i];
+    uint16_t s1 = s->c[i + 1];
+    uint16_t s2 = s->c[i + 2];
+    uint16_t s3 = s->c[i + 3];
+    uint16_t s4 = s->c[i + 4];
+    uint16_t s5 = s->c[i + 5];
+    uint16_t s6 = s->c[i + 6];
+    uint16_t s7 = s->c[i + 7];
+    declassify_assert((s0 | s1 | s2 | s3 | s4 | s5 | s6 | s7) < (1 << 5));
+    out[0] = (uint8_t)(s0 | (s1 << 5));
+    out[1] = (uint8_t)((s1 >> 3) | (s2 << 2) | (s3 << 7));
+    out[2] = (uint8_t)((s3 >> 1) | (s4 << 4));
+    out[3] = (uint8_t)((s4 >> 4) | (s5 << 1) | (s6 << 6));
+    out[4] = (uint8_t)((s6 >> 2) | (s7 << 3));
+    out += 5;
+  }
+}
+
+// Encodes a scalar of 256 1-bit "words" into 32 bytes as follows:
+// 0000000000000A 000000000000000B 000000000000000C 000000000000000D ...
+// -> HGFEDCBA PONMLKJI XWVUTSRQ ...
+// This order is best understood as the natural way of joining into bytes
+// assuming LSB-first bit order.
+template <>
+void scalar_encode<1>(uint8_t out[32], const scalar *s) {
+  for (int i = 0; i < DEGREE; i += 8) {
+    uint8_t out_byte = 0;
+    for (int j = 0; j < 8; j++) {
+      declassify_assert(s->c[i + j] <= 1);
+      out_byte |= s->c[i + j] << j;
+    }
+    out[i / 8] = out_byte;
+  }
+}
+
+// Encodes an entire vector into 32*`RANK`*`bits` bytes. Note that since 256
+// (DEGREE) is divisible by 8, the individual vector entries will always fill a
+// whole number of bytes, so we do not need to worry about bit packing here.
+template <int bits, int RANK>
+void vector_encode(uint8_t *out, const vector<RANK> *a) {
+  for (int i = 0; i < RANK; i++) {
+    scalar_encode<bits>(out + i * bits * DEGREE / 8, &a->v[i]);
+  }
+}
+
+// scalar_decode parses `DEGREE * BITS` bits from `in` into `DEGREE` values in
+// `out`. This is the inverse of `scalar_encode`. This is only defined for `BITS
+// < 12`. Otherwise, the decoding is fallible and must use `scalar_decode_12`
+// instead.
+template <int BITS>
+void scalar_decode(scalar *out, const uint8_t *in);
+
+template <>
+void scalar_decode<10>(scalar *out, const uint8_t in[320]) {
+  for (int i = 0; i < DEGREE; i += 4) {
+    uint16_t s0 = (uint16_t)(in[0] | ((in[1] & 0x03) << 8));
+    uint16_t s1 = (uint16_t)((in[1] >> 2) | ((in[2] & 0x0f) << 6));
+    uint16_t s2 = (uint16_t)((in[2] >> 4) | ((in[3] & 0x3f) << 4));
+    uint16_t s3 = (uint16_t)((in[3] >> 6) | (in[4] << 2));
+    out->c[i] = s0;
+    out->c[i + 1] = s1;
+    out->c[i + 2] = s2;
+    out->c[i + 3] = s3;
+    in += 5;
+  }
+}
+
+template <>
+void scalar_decode<4>(scalar *out, const uint8_t in[128]) {
+  for (int i = 0; i < DEGREE; i += 2) {
+    uint16_t s0 = (uint16_t)(in[0] & 0x0f);
+    uint16_t s1 = (uint16_t)(in[0] >> 4);
+    // kPrime is 3329, so 4-bit values are always < kPrime.
+    out->c[i] = s0;
+    out->c[i + 1] = s1;
+    in += 1;
+  }
+}
+
+template <>
+void scalar_decode<11>(scalar *out, const uint8_t in[352]) {
+  for (int i = 0; i < DEGREE; i += 8) {
+    uint16_t s0 = (uint16_t)(in[0] | ((in[1] & 0x07) << 8));
+    uint16_t s1 = (uint16_t)((in[1] >> 3) | ((in[2] & 0x3f) << 5));
+    uint16_t s2 =
+        (uint16_t)((in[2] >> 6) | (in[3] << 2) | ((in[4] & 0x01) << 10));
+    uint16_t s3 = (uint16_t)((in[4] >> 1) | ((in[5] & 0x0f) << 7));
+    uint16_t s4 = (uint16_t)((in[5] >> 4) | ((in[6] & 0x7f) << 4));
+    uint16_t s5 =
+        (uint16_t)((in[6] >> 7) | (in[7] << 1) | ((in[8] & 0x03) << 9));
+    uint16_t s6 = (uint16_t)((in[8] >> 2) | ((in[9] & 0x1f) << 6));
+    uint16_t s7 = (uint16_t)((in[9] >> 5) | (in[10] << 3));
+    out->c[i] = s0;
+    out->c[i + 1] = s1;
+    out->c[i + 2] = s2;
+    out->c[i + 3] = s3;
+    out->c[i + 4] = s4;
+    out->c[i + 5] = s5;
+    out->c[i + 6] = s6;
+    out->c[i + 7] = s7;
+    in += 11;
+  }
+}
+
+template <>
+void scalar_decode<5>(scalar *out, const uint8_t in[160]) {
+  for (int i = 0; i < DEGREE; i += 8) {
+    uint16_t s0 = (uint16_t)(in[0] & 0x1f);
+    uint16_t s1 = (uint16_t)((in[0] >> 5) | ((in[1] & 0x03) << 3));
+    uint16_t s2 = (uint16_t)((in[1] >> 2) & 0x1f);
+    uint16_t s3 = (uint16_t)((in[1] >> 7) | ((in[2] & 0x0f) << 1));
+    uint16_t s4 = (uint16_t)((in[2] >> 4) | ((in[3] & 0x01) << 4));
+    uint16_t s5 = (uint16_t)((in[3] >> 1) & 0x1f);
+    uint16_t s6 = (uint16_t)((in[3] >> 6) | ((in[4] & 0x07) << 2));
+    uint16_t s7 = (uint16_t)(in[4] >> 3);
+    // kPrime is 3329, so 5-bit values are always < kPrime.
+    out->c[i] = s0;
+    out->c[i + 1] = s1;
+    out->c[i + 2] = s2;
+    out->c[i + 3] = s3;
+    out->c[i + 4] = s4;
+    out->c[i + 5] = s5;
+    out->c[i + 6] = s6;
+    out->c[i + 7] = s7;
+    in += 5;
+  }
+}
+
+template <>
+void scalar_decode<1>(scalar *out, const uint8_t in[32]) {
+  for (int i = 0; i < DEGREE; i += 8) {
+    uint8_t in_byte = in[i / 8];
+    for (int j = 0; j < 8; j++) {
+      out->c[i + j] = (in_byte >> j) & 1;
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+// The inverse of `scalar_encode<12>`. Returns 1 iff the encoded scalar is
+// valid, i.e. all components are < `kPrime`. Otherwise, returns 0 and the value
+// of `out` is undefined.
+int scalar_decode_12(scalar *out, const uint8_t in[384]) {
+  for (int i = 0; i < DEGREE; i += 2) {
+    uint16_t s0 = (uint16_t)(in[0] | ((in[1] & 0x0f) << 8));
+    uint16_t s1 = (uint16_t)((in[1] >> 4) | (in[2] << 4));
+    // This is only used with secret input when parsing the test-only
+    // semi-expanded format. Leaking information about invalid inputs is OK.
+    if (constant_time_declassify_int(s0 >= kPrime) ||
+        constant_time_declassify_int(s1 >= kPrime)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+    out->c[i] = s0;
+    out->c[i + 1] = s1;
+    in += 3;
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+// Decodes 32*`RANK`*`bits` bytes from `in` into `out`. This only supports `bits
+// < 12`, necessary for decoding to be infallible.
+template <int bits, int RANK>
+inline void vector_decode(vector<RANK> *out, const uint8_t *in) {
+  static_assert(bits < 12);
+  for (int i = 0; i < RANK; i++) {
+    scalar_decode<bits>(&out->v[i], in + i * bits * DEGREE / 8);
+  }
+}
+
+// Decodes 32*`RANK`*12 bytes from `in` into `out` It returns one on success or
+// zero if any parsed value is >= `kPrime`.
+template <int RANK>
+inline int vector_decode_12(vector<RANK> *out, const uint8_t *in) {
+  for (int i = 0; i < RANK; i++) {
+    if (!scalar_decode_12(&out->v[i], in + i * 12 * DEGREE / 8)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+// Compresses (lossily) an input `x` mod 3329 into `bits` many bits by grouping
+// numbers close to each other together. The formula used is
+// round(2^`bits`/kPrime*x) mod 2^`bits`.
+// Uses Barrett reduction to achieve constant time. Since we need both the
+// remainder (for rounding) and the quotient (as the result), we cannot use
+// `reduce` here, but need to do the Barrett reduction directly.
+inline uint16_t compress(uint16_t x, int bits) {
+  uint32_t shifted = (uint32_t)x << bits;
+  uint64_t product = (uint64_t)shifted * kBarrettMultiplier;
+  uint32_t quotient = (uint32_t)(product >> kBarrettShift);
+  uint32_t remainder = shifted - quotient * kPrime;
+
+  // Adjust the quotient to round correctly:
+  //   0 <= remainder <= kHalfPrime round to 0
+  //   kHalfPrime < remainder <= kPrime + kHalfPrime round to 1
+  //   kPrime + kHalfPrime < remainder < 2 * kPrime round to 2
+  declassify_assert(remainder < 2u * kPrime);
+  quotient += 1 & constant_time_lt_w(kHalfPrime, remainder);
+  quotient += 1 & constant_time_lt_w(kPrime + kHalfPrime, remainder);
+  return quotient & ((1 << bits) - 1);
+}
+
+// Decompresses `x` by using an equi-distant representative. The formula is
+// round(kPrime/2^`bits`*x). Note that 2^`bits` being the divisor allows us to
+// implement this logic using only bit operations.
+inline uint16_t decompress(uint16_t x, int bits) {
+  uint32_t product = (uint32_t)x * kPrime;
+  uint32_t power = 1 << bits;
+  // This is `product` % power, since `power` is a power of 2.
+  uint32_t remainder = product & (power - 1);
+  // This is `product` / power, since `power` is a power of 2.
+  uint32_t lower = product >> bits;
+  // The rounding logic works since the first half of numbers mod `power` have a
+  // 0 as first bit, and the second half has a 1 as first bit, since `power` is
+  // a power of 2. As a 12 bit number, `remainder` is always positive, so we
+  // will shift in 0s for a right shift.
+  return lower + (remainder >> (bits - 1));
+}
+
+inline void scalar_compress(scalar *s, int bits) {
+  for (int i = 0; i < DEGREE; i++) {
+    s->c[i] = compress(s->c[i], bits);
+  }
+}
+
+inline void scalar_decompress(scalar *s, int bits) {
+  for (int i = 0; i < DEGREE; i++) {
+    s->c[i] = decompress(s->c[i], bits);
+  }
+}
+
+template <int RANK>
+void vector_compress(vector<RANK> *a, int bits) {
+  for (int i = 0; i < RANK; i++) {
+    scalar_compress(&a->v[i], bits);
+  }
+}
+
+template <int RANK>
+void vector_decompress(vector<RANK> *a, int bits) {
+  for (int i = 0; i < RANK; i++) {
+    scalar_decompress(&a->v[i], bits);
+  }
+}
+
+template <int RANK>
+struct public_key {
+  vector<RANK> t;
+  uint8_t rho[32];
+  uint8_t public_key_hash[32];
+  matrix<RANK> m;
+};
+
+template <int RANK>
+struct private_key {
+  public_key<RANK> pub;
+  vector<RANK> s;
+  uint8_t fo_failure_secret[32];
+};
+
+template <int RANK>
+inline void decrypt_cpa(uint8_t out[32], const private_key<RANK> *priv,
+                        const uint8_t ciphertext[MLKEM768_CIPHERTEXT_BYTES]) {
+  constexpr int du = RANK == RANK768 ? kDU768 : kDU1024;
+  constexpr int dv = RANK == RANK768 ? kDV768 : kDV1024;
+
+  vector<RANK> u;
+  vector_decode<du>(&u, ciphertext);
+  vector_decompress(&u, du);
+  vector_ntt(&u);
+  scalar v;
+  scalar_decode<dv>(&v, ciphertext + compressed_vector_size(RANK));
+  scalar_decompress(&v, dv);
+  scalar mask;
+  scalar_inner_product(&mask, &priv->s, &u);
+  scalar_inverse_ntt(&mask);
+  scalar_sub(&v, &mask);
+  scalar_compress(&v, 1);
+  scalar_encode<1>(out, &v);
+}
+
+template <int RANK>
+inline bcm_status mlkem_marshal_public_key(CBB *out,
+                                           const public_key<RANK> *pub) {
+  uint8_t *vector_output;
+  if (!CBB_add_space(out, &vector_output, encoded_vector_size(RANK))) {
+    return bcm_status::failure;
+  }
+  vector_encode<kLog2Prime>(vector_output, &pub->t);
+  if (!CBB_add_bytes(out, pub->rho, sizeof(pub->rho))) {
+    return bcm_status::failure;
+  }
+  return bcm_status::approved;
+}
+
+template <int RANK>
+inline bool mlkem_public_keys_equal(const public_key<RANK> *a,
+                                    const public_key<RANK> *b) {
+  return OPENSSL_memcmp(a->public_key_hash, b->public_key_hash, 32) == 0;
+}
+
+template <int RANK>
+void mlkem_generate_key_external_seed_no_self_test(
+    uint8_t *out_encoded_public_key, private_key<RANK> *priv,
+    const uint8_t seed[MLKEM_SEED_BYTES]) {
+  uint8_t augmented_seed[33];
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(augmented_seed, seed, 32);
+  augmented_seed[32] = RANK;
+
+  uint8_t hashed[64];
+  hash_g(hashed, augmented_seed, sizeof(augmented_seed));
+  const uint8_t *const rho = hashed;
+  const uint8_t *const sigma = hashed + 32;
+  // rho is public.
+  CONSTTIME_DECLASSIFY(rho, 32);
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(priv->pub.rho, hashed, sizeof(priv->pub.rho));
+  matrix_expand(&priv->pub.m, rho);
+  uint8_t counter = 0;
+  vector_generate_secret_eta_2(&priv->s, &counter, sigma);
+  vector_ntt(&priv->s);
+  vector<RANK> error;
+  vector_generate_secret_eta_2(&error, &counter, sigma);
+  vector_ntt(&error);
+  matrix_mult_transpose(&priv->pub.t, &priv->pub.m, &priv->s);
+  vector_add(&priv->pub.t, &error);
+  // t is part of the public key and thus is public.
+  CONSTTIME_DECLASSIFY(&priv->pub.t, sizeof(priv->pub.t));
+
+  CBB cbb;
+  CBB_init_fixed(&cbb, out_encoded_public_key, encoded_public_key_size(RANK));
+  if (!bcm_success(mlkem_marshal_public_key(&cbb, &priv->pub))) {
+    abort();
+  }
+
+  hash_h(priv->pub.public_key_hash, out_encoded_public_key,
+         encoded_public_key_size(RANK));
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(priv->fo_failure_secret, seed + 32, 32);
+}
+
+template <int RANK>
+void mlkem_generate_key_external_seed(uint8_t *out_encoded_public_key,
+                                      private_key<RANK> *priv,
+                                      const uint8_t seed[MLKEM_SEED_BYTES]) {
+  fips::ensure_keygen_self_test();
+  mlkem_generate_key_external_seed_no_self_test(out_encoded_public_key, priv,
+                                                seed);
+}
+
+// Encrypts a message with given randomness to
+// the ciphertext in `out`. Without applying the Fujisaki-Okamoto transform this
+// would not result in a CCA secure scheme, since lattice schemes are vulnerable
+// to decryption failure oracles.
+template <int RANK>
+void encrypt_cpa(uint8_t *out, const mlkem::public_key<RANK> *pub,
+                 const uint8_t message[32], const uint8_t randomness[32]) {
+  constexpr int du = RANK == RANK768 ? mlkem::kDU768 : mlkem::kDU1024;
+  constexpr int dv = RANK == RANK768 ? mlkem::kDV768 : mlkem::kDV1024;
+
+  uint8_t counter = 0;
+  mlkem::vector<RANK> secret;
+  vector_generate_secret_eta_2(&secret, &counter, randomness);
+  vector_ntt(&secret);
+  mlkem::vector<RANK> error;
+  vector_generate_secret_eta_2(&error, &counter, randomness);
+  uint8_t input[33];
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(input, randomness, 32);
+  input[32] = counter;
+  mlkem::scalar scalar_error;
+  scalar_centered_binomial_distribution_eta_2_with_prf(&scalar_error, input);
+  mlkem::vector<RANK> u;
+  matrix_mult(&u, &pub->m, &secret);
+  vector_inverse_ntt(&u);
+  vector_add(&u, &error);
+  mlkem::scalar v;
+  scalar_inner_product(&v, &pub->t, &secret);
+  scalar_inverse_ntt(&v);
+  scalar_add(&v, &scalar_error);
+  mlkem::scalar expanded_message;
+  scalar_decode<1>(&expanded_message, message);
+  scalar_decompress(&expanded_message, 1);
+  scalar_add(&v, &expanded_message);
+  vector_compress(&u, du);
+  vector_encode<du>(out, &u);
+  scalar_compress(&v, dv);
+  scalar_encode<dv>(out + mlkem::compressed_vector_size(RANK), &v);
+}
+
+// See section 6.3
+template <int RANK>
+void mlkem_decap_no_self_test(
+    uint8_t out_shared_secret[MLKEM_SHARED_SECRET_BYTES],
+    const uint8_t *ciphertext, const private_key<RANK> *priv) {
+  uint8_t decrypted[64];
+  decrypt_cpa(decrypted, priv, ciphertext);
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(decrypted + 32, priv->pub.public_key_hash,
+                 sizeof(decrypted) - 32);
+  uint8_t key_and_randomness[64];
+  hash_g(key_and_randomness, decrypted, sizeof(decrypted));
+  constexpr size_t ciphertext_len = ciphertext_size(RANK);
+  uint8_t expected_ciphertext[MLKEM1024_CIPHERTEXT_BYTES];
+  static_assert(ciphertext_len <= sizeof(expected_ciphertext));
+  encrypt_cpa(expected_ciphertext, &priv->pub, decrypted,
+              key_and_randomness + 32);
+
+  uint8_t failure_key[32];
+  kdf(failure_key, priv->fo_failure_secret, ciphertext, ciphertext_len);
+
+  uint8_t mask = constant_time_eq_int_8(
+      CRYPTO_memcmp(ciphertext, expected_ciphertext, ciphertext_len), 0);
+  for (int i = 0; i < MLKEM_SHARED_SECRET_BYTES; i++) {
+    out_shared_secret[i] =
+        constant_time_select_8(mask, key_and_randomness[i], failure_key[i]);
+  }
+}
+
+template <int RANK>
+void mlkem_decap(uint8_t out_shared_secret[MLKEM_SHARED_SECRET_BYTES],
+                 const uint8_t *ciphertext, const private_key<RANK> *priv) {
+  fips::ensure_decap_self_test();
+  mlkem_decap_no_self_test(out_shared_secret, ciphertext, priv);
+}
+
+// mlkem_parse_public_key_with_trailing_data parses `in` into `pub` but leaves
+// trailing data in `in` for the caller.
+template <int RANK>
+int mlkem_parse_public_key_with_trailing_data(public_key<RANK> *pub, CBS *in) {
+  CBS orig_in = *in;
+  CBS t_bytes;
+  if (!CBS_get_bytes(in, &t_bytes, encoded_vector_size(RANK)) ||
+      !vector_decode_12(&pub->t, CBS_data(&t_bytes)) ||
+      !CBS_copy_bytes(in, pub->rho, sizeof(pub->rho))) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  matrix_expand(&pub->m, pub->rho);
+  size_t pub_key_len = CBS_len(&orig_in) - CBS_len(in);
+  assert(pub_key_len == encoded_public_key_size(RANK));
+  hash_h(pub->public_key_hash, CBS_data(&orig_in), pub_key_len);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+template <int RANK>
+int mlkem_parse_public_key(public_key<RANK> *pub, CBS *in) {
+  if (!mlkem_parse_public_key_with_trailing_data(pub, in) ||  //
+      CBS_len(in) != 0) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+template <int RANK>
+int mlkem_parse_private_key(private_key<RANK> *priv, CBS *in) {
+  CBS s_bytes, public_key_hash;
+  if (!CBS_get_bytes(in, &s_bytes, encoded_vector_size(RANK)) ||
+      !vector_decode_12(&priv->s, CBS_data(&s_bytes)) ||
+      !mlkem_parse_public_key_with_trailing_data(&priv->pub, in) ||
+      // We compute the public key hash ourselves, but check it matched.
+      !CBS_get_bytes(in, &public_key_hash, sizeof(priv->pub.public_key_hash)) ||
+      !CBS_mem_equal(&public_key_hash, priv->pub.public_key_hash,
+                     sizeof(priv->pub.public_key_hash)) ||
+      !CBS_copy_bytes(in, priv->fo_failure_secret,
+                      sizeof(priv->fo_failure_secret)) ||
+      CBS_len(in) != 0) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+template <int RANK>
+int mlkem_marshal_private_key(CBB *out, const private_key<RANK> *priv) {
+  uint8_t *s_output;
+  if (!CBB_add_space(out, &s_output, encoded_vector_size(RANK))) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  vector_encode<kLog2Prime>(s_output, &priv->s);
+  if (!bcm_success(mlkem_marshal_public_key(out, &priv->pub)) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(out, priv->pub.public_key_hash,
+                     sizeof(priv->pub.public_key_hash)) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(out, priv->fo_failure_secret,
+                     sizeof(priv->fo_failure_secret))) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static_assert(sizeof(MLKEM768_public_key) == sizeof(public_key<RANK768>));
+static_assert(alignof(MLKEM768_public_key) == alignof(public_key<RANK768>));
+
+const public_key<RANK768> *public_key_768_from_external(
+    const MLKEM768_public_key *external) {
+  return reinterpret_cast<const public_key<RANK768> *>(external);
+}
+public_key<RANK768> *public_key_768_from_external(
+    MLKEM768_public_key *external) {
+  return reinterpret_cast<public_key<RANK768> *>(external);
+}
+const MLKEM768_public_key *public_key_768_to_external(
+    const public_key<RANK768> *public_key) {
+  return reinterpret_cast<const MLKEM768_public_key *>(public_key);
+}
+
+static_assert(sizeof(MLKEM1024_public_key) == sizeof(public_key<RANK1024>));
+static_assert(alignof(MLKEM1024_public_key) == alignof(public_key<RANK1024>));
+
+const public_key<RANK1024> *public_key_1024_from_external(
+    const MLKEM1024_public_key *external) {
+  return reinterpret_cast<const public_key<RANK1024> *>(external);
+}
+public_key<RANK1024> *public_key_1024_from_external(
+    MLKEM1024_public_key *external) {
+  return reinterpret_cast<public_key<RANK1024> *>(external);
+}
+
+const MLKEM1024_public_key *public_key_1024_to_external(
+    const public_key<RANK1024> *public_key) {
+  return reinterpret_cast<const MLKEM1024_public_key *>(public_key);
+}
+
+static_assert(sizeof(MLKEM768_private_key) >= sizeof(private_key<RANK768>));
+static_assert(alignof(MLKEM768_private_key) >= alignof(private_key<RANK768>));
+
+const private_key<RANK768> *private_key_768_from_external(
+    const MLKEM768_private_key *external) {
+  return reinterpret_cast<const private_key<RANK768> *>(external);
+}
+private_key<RANK768> *private_key_768_from_external(
+    MLKEM768_private_key *external) {
+  return reinterpret_cast<private_key<RANK768> *>(external);
+}
+
+static_assert(sizeof(MLKEM1024_private_key) >= sizeof(private_key<RANK1024>));
+static_assert(alignof(MLKEM1024_private_key) >= alignof(private_key<RANK1024>));
+
+const private_key<RANK1024> *private_key_1024_from_external(
+    const MLKEM1024_private_key *external) {
+  return reinterpret_cast<const private_key<RANK1024> *>(external);
+}
+private_key<RANK1024> *private_key_1024_from_external(
+    MLKEM1024_private_key *external) {
+  return reinterpret_cast<private_key<RANK1024> *>(external);
+}
+
+// See section 6.2.
+template <int RANK>
+void mlkem_encap_external_entropy_no_self_test(
+    uint8_t *out_ciphertext,
+    uint8_t out_shared_secret[MLKEM_SHARED_SECRET_BYTES],
+    const mlkem::public_key<RANK> *pub,
+    const uint8_t entropy[BCM_MLKEM_ENCAP_ENTROPY]) {
+  uint8_t input[64];
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(input, entropy, BCM_MLKEM_ENCAP_ENTROPY);
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(input + BCM_MLKEM_ENCAP_ENTROPY, pub->public_key_hash,
+                 sizeof(input) - BCM_MLKEM_ENCAP_ENTROPY);
+  uint8_t key_and_randomness[64];
+  mlkem::hash_g(key_and_randomness, input, sizeof(input));
+  encrypt_cpa(out_ciphertext, pub, entropy, key_and_randomness + 32);
+  // The ciphertext is public.
+  CONSTTIME_DECLASSIFY(out_ciphertext, mlkem::ciphertext_size(RANK));
+  static_assert(MLKEM_SHARED_SECRET_BYTES == 32);
+  memcpy(out_shared_secret, key_and_randomness, 32);
+}
+
+template <int RANK>
+void mlkem_encap_external_entropy(
+    uint8_t *out_ciphertext,
+    uint8_t out_shared_secret[MLKEM_SHARED_SECRET_BYTES],
+    const mlkem::public_key<RANK> *pub,
+    const uint8_t entropy[BCM_MLKEM_ENCAP_ENTROPY]) {
+  fips::ensure_encap_self_test();
+  mlkem_encap_external_entropy_no_self_test(out_ciphertext, out_shared_secret,
+                                            pub, entropy);
+}
+
+namespace fips {
+
+#include "fips_known_values.inc"
+
+inline int keygen_self_test() {
+  uint8_t pub_key[MLKEM768_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES];
+  private_key<RANK768> priv;
+  static_assert(sizeof(kTestEntropy) >= MLKEM_SEED_BYTES);
+  mlkem_generate_key_external_seed_no_self_test(pub_key, &priv, kTestEntropy);
+  CBB cbb;
+  constexpr size_t kMarshaledPrivateKeySize = 2400;
+  uint8_t priv_bytes[kMarshaledPrivateKeySize];
+  CBB_init_fixed(&cbb, priv_bytes, sizeof(priv_bytes));
+  if (!mlkem_marshal_private_key(&cbb, &priv) ||
+      !BORINGSSL_check_test(kExpectedPrivateKeyBytes, priv_bytes,
+                            "ML-KEM keygen private key") ||
+      !BORINGSSL_check_test(kExpectedPublicKeyBytes, pub_key,
+                            "ML-KEM keygen public key")) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+inline int encap_self_test() {
+  CBS cbs;
+  CBS_init(&cbs, kExpectedPublicKeyBytes, sizeof(kExpectedPublicKeyBytes));
+  public_key<RANK768> pub;
+  if (!mlkem_parse_public_key(&pub, &cbs)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  uint8_t ciphertext[MLKEM768_CIPHERTEXT_BYTES];
+  uint8_t shared_secret[MLKEM_SHARED_SECRET_BYTES];
+  static_assert(sizeof(kTestEntropy) >= BCM_MLKEM_ENCAP_ENTROPY);
+  mlkem_encap_external_entropy_no_self_test(ciphertext, shared_secret, &pub,
+                                            kTestEntropy);
+  if (!BORINGSSL_check_test(ciphertext, kExpectedCiphertext,
+                            "ML-KEM encap ciphertext") ||
+      !BORINGSSL_check_test(kExpectedSharedSecret, shared_secret,
+                            "ML-KEM encap shared secret")) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+inline int decap_self_test() {
+  CBS cbs;
+  CBS_init(&cbs, kExpectedPrivateKeyBytes, sizeof(kExpectedPrivateKeyBytes));
+  private_key<RANK768> priv;
+  if (!mlkem_parse_private_key(&priv, &cbs)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  uint8_t shared_secret[MLKEM_SHARED_SECRET_BYTES];
+  mlkem_decap_no_self_test(shared_secret, kExpectedCiphertext, &priv);
+  if (!BORINGSSL_check_test(kExpectedSharedSecret, shared_secret,
+                            "ML-KEM decap shared secret")) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  uint8_t implicit_rejection_shared_secret[MLKEM_SHARED_SECRET_BYTES];
+  static_assert(sizeof(kExpectedPrivateKeyBytes) >=
+                sizeof(kExpectedCiphertext));
+  mlkem_decap_no_self_test(implicit_rejection_shared_secret,
+                           kExpectedPrivateKeyBytes, &priv);
+  if (!BORINGSSL_check_test(kExpectedImplicitRejectionSharedSecret,
+                            implicit_rejection_shared_secret,
+                            "ML-KEM decap implicit rejection shared secret")) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS)
+
+void ensure_keygen_self_test() {
+  CRYPTO_once(g_mlkem_keygen_self_test_once_bss_get(), []() {
+    if (!keygen_self_test()) {
+      BORINGSSL_FIPS_abort();
+    }
+  });
+}
+
+void ensure_encap_self_test() {
+  CRYPTO_once(g_mlkem_encap_self_test_once_bss_get(), []() {
+    if (!encap_self_test()) {
+      BORINGSSL_FIPS_abort();
+    }
+  });
+}
+
+void ensure_decap_self_test() {
+  CRYPTO_once(g_mlkem_decap_self_test_once_bss_get(), []() {
+    if (!decap_self_test()) {
+      BORINGSSL_FIPS_abort();
+    }
+  });
+}
+
+#else
+
+void ensure_keygen_self_test() {}
+void ensure_encap_self_test() {}
+void ensure_decap_self_test() {}
+
+#endif
+}  // namespace fips
+
+}  // namespace
+}  // namespace mlkem
+
+bcm_status bssl::BCM_mlkem768_check_fips(
+    const MLKEM768_private_key *private_key) {
+  const mlkem::private_key<RANK768> *priv =
+      mlkem::private_key_768_from_external(private_key);
+
+  const uint8_t entropy[BCM_MLKEM_ENCAP_ENTROPY] = {1, 2, 3, 4};
+  uint8_t ciphertext[MLKEM768_CIPHERTEXT_BYTES];
+  uint8_t shared_secret[MLKEM_SHARED_SECRET_BYTES];
+  mlkem_encap_external_entropy_no_self_test(ciphertext, shared_secret,
+                                            &priv->pub, entropy);
+
+  if (boringssl_fips_break_test("MLKEM_PWCT")) {
+    shared_secret[0] ^= 1;
+  }
+
+  uint8_t shared_secret2[MLKEM_SHARED_SECRET_BYTES];
+  mlkem::mlkem_decap_no_self_test(shared_secret2, ciphertext, priv);
+  if (CRYPTO_memcmp(shared_secret, shared_secret2, sizeof(shared_secret)) !=
+      0) {
+    return bcm_status::failure;
+  }
+  return bcm_status::approved;
+}
+
+bcm_status bssl::BCM_mlkem768_generate_key_fips(
+    uint8_t out_encoded_public_key[MLKEM768_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
+    uint8_t optional_out_seed[MLKEM_SEED_BYTES],
+    MLKEM768_private_key *out_private_key) {
+  if (out_encoded_public_key == nullptr || out_private_key == nullptr) {
+    return bcm_status::failure;
+  }
+  BCM_mlkem768_generate_key(out_encoded_public_key, optional_out_seed,
+                            out_private_key);
+  return BCM_mlkem768_check_fips(out_private_key);
+}
+
+bcm_infallible bssl::BCM_mlkem768_generate_key(
+    uint8_t out_encoded_public_key[MLKEM768_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
+    uint8_t optional_out_seed[MLKEM_SEED_BYTES],
+    MLKEM768_private_key *out_private_key) {
+  uint8_t seed[MLKEM_SEED_BYTES];
+  BCM_rand_bytes(seed, sizeof(seed));
+  CONSTTIME_SECRET(seed, sizeof(seed));
+  if (optional_out_seed) {
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(optional_out_seed, seed, sizeof(seed));
+  }
+  BCM_mlkem768_generate_key_external_seed(out_encoded_public_key,
+                                          out_private_key, seed);
+  return bcm_infallible::not_approved;
+}
+
+bcm_status bssl::BCM_mlkem768_private_key_from_seed(
+    MLKEM768_private_key *out_private_key, const uint8_t *seed,
+    size_t seed_len) {
+  if (seed_len != MLKEM_SEED_BYTES) {
+    return bcm_status::failure;
+  }
+
+  uint8_t public_key_bytes[MLKEM768_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES];
+  BCM_mlkem768_generate_key_external_seed(public_key_bytes, out_private_key,
+                                          seed);
+  return bcm_status::not_approved;
+}
+
+bcm_status bssl::BCM_mlkem1024_check_fips(
+    const MLKEM1024_private_key *private_key) {
+  const mlkem::private_key<RANK1024> *priv =
+      mlkem::private_key_1024_from_external(private_key);
+
+  const uint8_t entropy[BCM_MLKEM_ENCAP_ENTROPY] = {1, 2, 3, 4};
+  uint8_t ciphertext[MLKEM1024_CIPHERTEXT_BYTES];
+  uint8_t shared_secret[MLKEM_SHARED_SECRET_BYTES];
+  mlkem_encap_external_entropy_no_self_test(ciphertext, shared_secret,
+                                            &priv->pub, entropy);
+
+  if (boringssl_fips_break_test("MLKEM_PWCT")) {
+    shared_secret[0] ^= 1;
+  }
+
+  uint8_t shared_secret2[MLKEM_SHARED_SECRET_BYTES];
+  mlkem::mlkem_decap_no_self_test(shared_secret2, ciphertext, priv);
+  if (CRYPTO_memcmp(shared_secret, shared_secret2, sizeof(shared_secret)) !=
+      0) {
+    return bcm_status::failure;
+  }
+  return bcm_status::approved;
+}
+
+bcm_status bssl::BCM_mlkem1024_generate_key_fips(
+    uint8_t out_encoded_public_key[MLKEM1024_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
+    uint8_t optional_out_seed[MLKEM_SEED_BYTES],
+    MLKEM1024_private_key *out_private_key) {
+  if (out_encoded_public_key == nullptr || out_private_key == nullptr) {
+    return bcm_status::failure;
+  }
+  BCM_mlkem1024_generate_key(out_encoded_public_key, optional_out_seed,
+                             out_private_key);
+  return BCM_mlkem1024_check_fips(out_private_key);
+}
+
+bcm_infallible bssl::BCM_mlkem1024_generate_key(
+    uint8_t out_encoded_public_key[MLKEM1024_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
+    uint8_t optional_out_seed[MLKEM_SEED_BYTES],
+    MLKEM1024_private_key *out_private_key) {
+  uint8_t seed[MLKEM_SEED_BYTES];
+  BCM_rand_bytes(seed, sizeof(seed));
+  CONSTTIME_SECRET(seed, sizeof(seed));
+  if (optional_out_seed) {
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(optional_out_seed, seed, sizeof(seed));
+  }
+  BCM_mlkem1024_generate_key_external_seed(out_encoded_public_key,
+                                           out_private_key, seed);
+  return bcm_infallible::not_approved;
+}
+
+bcm_status bssl::BCM_mlkem1024_private_key_from_seed(
+    MLKEM1024_private_key *out_private_key, const uint8_t *seed,
+    size_t seed_len) {
+  if (seed_len != MLKEM_SEED_BYTES) {
+    return bcm_status::failure;
+  }
+  uint8_t public_key_bytes[MLKEM1024_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES];
+  BCM_mlkem1024_generate_key_external_seed(public_key_bytes, out_private_key,
+                                           seed);
+  return bcm_status::not_approved;
+}
+
+bcm_infallible bssl::BCM_mlkem768_generate_key_external_seed(
+    uint8_t out_encoded_public_key[MLKEM768_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
+    MLKEM768_private_key *out_private_key,
+    const uint8_t seed[MLKEM_SEED_BYTES]) {
+  mlkem::private_key<RANK768> *priv =
+      mlkem::private_key_768_from_external(out_private_key);
+  mlkem_generate_key_external_seed(out_encoded_public_key, priv, seed);
+  return bcm_infallible::approved;
+}
+
+bcm_infallible bssl::BCM_mlkem1024_generate_key_external_seed(
+    uint8_t out_encoded_public_key[MLKEM1024_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
+    MLKEM1024_private_key *out_private_key,
+    const uint8_t seed[MLKEM_SEED_BYTES]) {
+  mlkem::private_key<RANK1024> *priv =
+      mlkem::private_key_1024_from_external(out_private_key);
+  mlkem_generate_key_external_seed(out_encoded_public_key, priv, seed);
+  return bcm_infallible::approved;
+}
+
+bcm_infallible bssl::BCM_mlkem768_public_from_private(
+    MLKEM768_public_key *out_public_key,
+    const MLKEM768_private_key *private_key) {
+  mlkem::public_key<RANK768> *const pub =
+      mlkem::public_key_768_from_external(out_public_key);
+  const mlkem::private_key<RANK768> *const priv =
+      mlkem::private_key_768_from_external(private_key);
+  *pub = priv->pub;
+  return bcm_infallible::approved;
+}
+
+bcm_infallible bssl::BCM_mlkem1024_public_from_private(
+    MLKEM1024_public_key *out_public_key,
+    const MLKEM1024_private_key *private_key) {
+  mlkem::public_key<RANK1024> *const pub =
+      mlkem::public_key_1024_from_external(out_public_key);
+  const mlkem::private_key<RANK1024> *const priv =
+      mlkem::private_key_1024_from_external(private_key);
+  *pub = priv->pub;
+  return bcm_infallible::approved;
+}
+
+const MLKEM768_public_key *bssl::BCM_mlkem768_public_of_private(
+    const MLKEM768_private_key *private_key) {
+  const mlkem::private_key<RANK768> *const priv =
+      mlkem::private_key_768_from_external(private_key);
+  return mlkem::public_key_768_to_external(&priv->pub);
+}
+
+const MLKEM1024_public_key *bssl::BCM_mlkem1024_public_of_private(
+    const MLKEM1024_private_key *private_key) {
+  const mlkem::private_key<RANK1024> *const priv =
+      mlkem::private_key_1024_from_external(private_key);
+  return mlkem::public_key_1024_to_external(&priv->pub);
+}
+
+// Calls `MLKEM768_encap_external_entropy` with random bytes from
+// `BCM_rand_bytes`
+bcm_infallible bssl::BCM_mlkem768_encap(
+    uint8_t out_ciphertext[MLKEM768_CIPHERTEXT_BYTES],
+    uint8_t out_shared_secret[MLKEM_SHARED_SECRET_BYTES],
+    const MLKEM768_public_key *public_key) {
+  uint8_t entropy[BCM_MLKEM_ENCAP_ENTROPY];
+  BCM_rand_bytes(entropy, BCM_MLKEM_ENCAP_ENTROPY);
+  CONSTTIME_SECRET(entropy, BCM_MLKEM_ENCAP_ENTROPY);
+  BCM_mlkem768_encap_external_entropy(out_ciphertext, out_shared_secret,
+                                      public_key, entropy);
+  return bcm_infallible::approved;
+}
+
+bcm_infallible bssl::BCM_mlkem1024_encap(
+    uint8_t out_ciphertext[MLKEM1024_CIPHERTEXT_BYTES],
+    uint8_t out_shared_secret[MLKEM_SHARED_SECRET_BYTES],
+    const MLKEM1024_public_key *public_key) {
+  uint8_t entropy[BCM_MLKEM_ENCAP_ENTROPY];
+  BCM_rand_bytes(entropy, BCM_MLKEM_ENCAP_ENTROPY);
+  CONSTTIME_SECRET(entropy, BCM_MLKEM_ENCAP_ENTROPY);
+  BCM_mlkem1024_encap_external_entropy(out_ciphertext, out_shared_secret,
+                                       public_key, entropy);
+  return bcm_infallible::approved;
+}
+
+bcm_infallible bssl::BCM_mlkem768_encap_external_entropy(
+    uint8_t out_ciphertext[MLKEM768_CIPHERTEXT_BYTES],
+    uint8_t out_shared_secret[MLKEM_SHARED_SECRET_BYTES],
+    const MLKEM768_public_key *public_key,
+    const uint8_t entropy[BCM_MLKEM_ENCAP_ENTROPY]) {
+  const mlkem::public_key<RANK768> *pub =
+      mlkem::public_key_768_from_external(public_key);
+  mlkem_encap_external_entropy(out_ciphertext, out_shared_secret, pub, entropy);
+  return bcm_infallible::approved;
+}
+
+bcm_infallible bssl::BCM_mlkem1024_encap_external_entropy(
+    uint8_t out_ciphertext[MLKEM1024_CIPHERTEXT_BYTES],
+    uint8_t out_shared_secret[MLKEM_SHARED_SECRET_BYTES],
+    const MLKEM1024_public_key *public_key,
+    const uint8_t entropy[BCM_MLKEM_ENCAP_ENTROPY]) {
+  const mlkem::public_key<RANK1024> *pub =
+      mlkem::public_key_1024_from_external(public_key);
+  mlkem_encap_external_entropy(out_ciphertext, out_shared_secret, pub, entropy);
+  return bcm_infallible::approved;
+}
+
+bcm_status bssl::BCM_mlkem768_decap(
+    uint8_t out_shared_secret[MLKEM_SHARED_SECRET_BYTES],
+    const uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_len,
+    const MLKEM768_private_key *private_key) {
+  if (ciphertext_len != MLKEM768_CIPHERTEXT_BYTES) {
+    BCM_rand_bytes(out_shared_secret, MLKEM_SHARED_SECRET_BYTES);
+    return bcm_status::failure;
+  }
+  const mlkem::private_key<RANK768> *priv =
+      mlkem::private_key_768_from_external(private_key);
+  mlkem_decap(out_shared_secret, ciphertext, priv);
+  return bcm_status::approved;
+}
+
+bcm_status bssl::BCM_mlkem1024_decap(
+    uint8_t out_shared_secret[MLKEM_SHARED_SECRET_BYTES],
+    const uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_len,
+    const MLKEM1024_private_key *private_key) {
+  if (ciphertext_len != MLKEM1024_CIPHERTEXT_BYTES) {
+    BCM_rand_bytes(out_shared_secret, MLKEM_SHARED_SECRET_BYTES);
+    return bcm_status::failure;
+  }
+  const mlkem::private_key<RANK1024> *priv =
+      mlkem::private_key_1024_from_external(private_key);
+  mlkem_decap(out_shared_secret, ciphertext, priv);
+  return bcm_status::approved;
+}
+
+bcm_status bssl::BCM_mlkem768_marshal_public_key(
+    CBB *out, const MLKEM768_public_key *public_key) {
+  return mlkem_marshal_public_key(
+      out, mlkem::public_key_768_from_external(public_key));
+}
+
+bcm_status bssl::BCM_mlkem1024_marshal_public_key(
+    CBB *out, const MLKEM1024_public_key *public_key) {
+  return mlkem_marshal_public_key(
+      out, mlkem::public_key_1024_from_external(public_key));
+}
+
+int bssl::BCM_mlkem768_public_keys_equal(const MLKEM768_public_key *a,
+                                         const MLKEM768_public_key *b) {
+  const auto *pub_a = mlkem::public_key_768_from_external(a);
+  const auto *pub_b = mlkem::public_key_768_from_external(b);
+  if (mlkem_public_keys_equal(pub_a, pub_b)) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+  return 0;
+}
+
+int bssl::BCM_mlkem1024_public_keys_equal(const MLKEM1024_public_key *a,
+                                          const MLKEM1024_public_key *b) {
+  const auto *pub_a = mlkem::public_key_1024_from_external(a);
+  const auto *pub_b = mlkem::public_key_1024_from_external(b);
+  if (mlkem_public_keys_equal(pub_a, pub_b)) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+  return 0;
+}
+
+bcm_status bssl::BCM_mlkem768_parse_public_key(MLKEM768_public_key *public_key,
+                                               CBS *in) {
+  mlkem::public_key<RANK768> *pub =
+      mlkem::public_key_768_from_external(public_key);
+  if (!mlkem_parse_public_key(pub, in)) {
+    return bcm_status::failure;
+  }
+  return bcm_status::approved;
+}
+
+bcm_status bssl::BCM_mlkem1024_parse_public_key(
+    MLKEM1024_public_key *public_key, CBS *in) {
+  mlkem::public_key<RANK1024> *pub =
+      mlkem::public_key_1024_from_external(public_key);
+  if (!mlkem_parse_public_key(pub, in)) {
+    return bcm_status::failure;
+  }
+  return bcm_status::approved;
+}
+
+bcm_status bssl::BCM_mlkem768_marshal_private_key(
+    CBB *out, const MLKEM768_private_key *private_key) {
+  const mlkem::private_key<RANK768> *const priv =
+      mlkem::private_key_768_from_external(private_key);
+  if (!mlkem_marshal_private_key(out, priv)) {
+    return bcm_status::failure;
+  }
+  return bcm_status::approved;
+}
+
+bcm_status bssl::BCM_mlkem1024_marshal_private_key(
+    CBB *out, const MLKEM1024_private_key *private_key) {
+  const mlkem::private_key<RANK1024> *const priv =
+      mlkem::private_key_1024_from_external(private_key);
+  if (!mlkem_marshal_private_key(out, priv)) {
+    return bcm_status::failure;
+  }
+  return bcm_status::approved;
+}
+
+bcm_status bssl::BCM_mlkem768_parse_private_key(
+    MLKEM768_private_key *out_private_key, CBS *in) {
+  mlkem::private_key<RANK768> *const priv =
+      mlkem::private_key_768_from_external(out_private_key);
+  if (!mlkem_parse_private_key(priv, in)) {
+    return bcm_status::failure;
+  }
+  return bcm_status::approved;
+}
+
+bcm_status bssl::BCM_mlkem1024_parse_private_key(
+    MLKEM1024_private_key *out_private_key, CBS *in) {
+  mlkem::private_key<RANK1024> *const priv =
+      mlkem::private_key_1024_from_external(out_private_key);
+  if (!mlkem_parse_private_key(priv, in)) {
+    return bcm_status::failure;
+  }
+  return bcm_status::approved;
+}
+
+int bssl::boringssl_self_test_mlkem() {
+  return mlkem::fips::keygen_self_test() && mlkem::fips::encap_self_test() &&
+         mlkem::fips::decap_self_test();
+}