visaljs 0.0.1 → 0.0.3

package/runtime/third_party/boringssl/crypto/fipsmodule/rand/android_entropy_client.cc.inc

@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+// Copyright 2020 The BoringSSL Authors
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+#include <openssl/base.h>
+
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS) && defined(OPENSSL_ANDROID)
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/un.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
+
+int bssl_get_seed_from_daemon(uint8_t *out_entropy, size_t *inout_entropy_len) {
+  const int sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+  if (sock < 0) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  struct sockaddr_un sun;
+  memset(&sun, 0, sizeof(sun));
+  sun.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
+  static const char kSocketPath[] = "/dev/socket/prng_seeder";
+  static_assert(sizeof(kSocketPath) <= UNIX_PATH_MAX, "kSocketPath too long");
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(sun.sun_path, kSocketPath, sizeof(kSocketPath));
+
+  int ret = 0;
+  size_t done = 0;
+  if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sun, sizeof(sun))) {
+    goto out;
+  }
+
+  uint8_t buffer[BSSL_ENTROPY_DAEMON_RESPONSE_LEN];
+  while (done < sizeof(buffer)) {
+    ssize_t n;
+    do {
+      n = read(sock, buffer + done, sizeof(buffer) - done);
+    } while (n == -1 && errno == EINTR);
+
+    if (n < 1) {
+      goto out;
+    }
+    done += n;
+  }
+
+  if (done != BSSL_ENTROPY_DAEMON_RESPONSE_LEN) {
+    // The daemon should always write `BSSL_ENTROPY_DAEMON_RESPONSE_LEN` bytes
+    // on every connection.
+    goto out;
+  }
+
+  if (*inout_entropy_len > sizeof(buffer)) {
+    *inout_entropy_len = sizeof(buffer);
+  }
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(out_entropy, buffer, *inout_entropy_len);
+  ret = 1;
+
+out:
+  if (sock >= 0) {
+    close(sock);
+  }
+  return ret;
+}
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_END
+
+#endif  // FIPS && ANDROID

package/runtime/third_party/boringssl/crypto/fipsmodule/rand/ctrdrbg.cc.inc

@@ -0,0 +1,401 @@
+// Copyright 2017 The BoringSSL Authors
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+#include <openssl/ctrdrbg.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <algorithm>
+
+#include "../../mem_internal.h"
+#include "../aes/internal.h"
+#include "../service_indicator/internal.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+using namespace bssl;
+
+// Section references in this file refer to SP 800-90Ar1:
+// http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.pdf
+
+// Also see table 3.
+constexpr uint64_t kMaxReseedCount = UINT64_C(1) << 48;
+
+// Implements the BCC function as described in Section 10.3.3.
+static void bcc(uint8_t out[AES_BLOCK_SIZE], const AES_KEY *aes_key,
+                const uint8_t *data, size_t data_len) {
+  // 1. chaining_value = 0^outlen.
+  uint8_t *chaining_value = out;
+  OPENSSL_memset(chaining_value, 0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+  // 2. n = len (data)/outlen.
+  BSSL_CHECK(data_len % AES_BLOCK_SIZE == 0);
+  const size_t n = data_len / AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+    const uint8_t *block = data + (i * AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+    uint8_t input_block[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+
+    // 4.1: input_block = chaining_value ⊕ block_i.
+    CRYPTO_xor16(input_block, chaining_value, block);
+
+    // 4.2: chaining_value = Block_Encrypt (Key, input_block).
+    BCM_aes_encrypt(input_block, chaining_value, aes_key);
+  }
+
+  // 5. output_block = chaining_value.
+}
+
+// Implements the derivation function as described in Section 10.3.2.
+static int block_cipher_df(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len, const uint8_t *input,
+                           size_t input_len) {
+  // Constants for AES-256
+  constexpr size_t kAESKeyLen = 32;
+  constexpr size_t kAESOutLen = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+  constexpr size_t kMaxNumBits = 512;
+
+  if (out_len > kMaxNumBits / 8 || input_len > (1u << 30)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // 4. S = L || N || input_string || 0x80.
+  const size_t s_rawlen = sizeof(uint32_t) + sizeof(uint32_t) + input_len + 1;
+  // S is padded up to a block size.
+  const size_t s_len = (s_rawlen + kAESOutLen - 1) & ~(kAESOutLen - 1);
+  uint8_t iv_plus_s[/* space used below */ kAESOutLen + 4 + 4 +
+                    CTR_DRBG_MAX_ENTROPY_LEN + CTR_DRBG_NONCE_LEN +
+                    CTR_DRBG_SEED_LEN + 1 +
+                    /* padding */ 7];
+  if (kAESOutLen + s_len > sizeof(iv_plus_s)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  OPENSSL_memset(iv_plus_s, 0, sizeof(iv_plus_s));
+  uint8_t *s_ptr = iv_plus_s + kAESOutLen;
+  // 2. L = len (input_string)/8.
+  CRYPTO_store_u32_be(s_ptr, (uint32_t)input_len);
+  s_ptr += sizeof(uint32_t);
+  // 3. N = number_of_bits_to_return/8.
+  CRYPTO_store_u32_be(s_ptr, (uint32_t)out_len);
+  s_ptr += sizeof(uint32_t);
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(s_ptr, input, input_len);
+  s_ptr += input_len;
+  *s_ptr = 0x80;
+
+  uint8_t temp[kAESKeyLen + kAESOutLen];
+  size_t temp_len = 0;
+
+  // 8. K = leftmost (0x00010203...1D1E1F, keylen).
+  static const uint8_t kInitialKey[kAESKeyLen] = {
+      0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a,
+      0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15,
+      0x16, 0x17, 0x18, 0x19, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x1c, 0x1d, 0x1e, 0x1f};
+  AES_KEY aes_key;
+  bcm_status status =
+      BCM_aes_set_encrypt_key(kInitialKey, 8 * sizeof(kInitialKey), &aes_key);
+  BSSL_CHECK(status != bcm_status::failure);
+
+  // 7. i = 0.
+  uint32_t i = 0;
+  while (temp_len < sizeof(temp)) {
+    // 9.1 IV = i || 0^(outlen - len(i)).
+    CRYPTO_store_u32_be(iv_plus_s, i);
+
+    // 9.2 temp = temp || BCC (K, (IV || S)).
+    bcc(temp + temp_len, &aes_key, iv_plus_s, kAESOutLen + s_len);
+    temp_len += kAESOutLen;
+
+    // 9.3 i = i + 1.
+    i++;
+  }
+
+  // 10. K = leftmost (temp, keylen).
+  uint8_t *const k = temp;
+
+  // 11. X = select (temp, keylen+1, keylen+outlen).
+  uint8_t *const x = temp + kAESKeyLen;
+
+  // 12. temp = the Null string.
+  temp_len = 0;
+
+  // Create an AES key schedule for the final encryption steps.
+  status = BCM_aes_set_encrypt_key(k, kAESKeyLen * 8, &aes_key);
+  BSSL_CHECK(status != bcm_status::failure);
+
+  // 13. While len (temp) < number_of_bits_to_return, do:
+  while (temp_len < out_len) {
+    // 13.1 X = Block_Encrypt (K, X).
+    BCM_aes_encrypt(x, x, &aes_key);
+
+    // 13.2 temp = temp || X.
+    size_t to_copy = std::min(kAESOutLen, out_len - temp_len);
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(out + temp_len, x, to_copy);
+    temp_len += to_copy;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+CTR_DRBG_STATE *CTR_DRBG_new(const uint8_t entropy[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN],
+                             const uint8_t *personalization,
+                             size_t personalization_len) {
+  CTR_DRBG_STATE *drbg = New<CTR_DRBG_STATE>();
+  if (drbg == nullptr ||
+      !CTR_DRBG_init(drbg, /*df=*/false, entropy, CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN,
+                     /*nonce=*/nullptr, personalization, personalization_len)) {
+    CTR_DRBG_free(drbg);
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  return drbg;
+}
+
+CTR_DRBG_STATE *CTR_DRBG_new_df(const uint8_t *entropy, size_t entropy_len,
+                                const uint8_t nonce[CTR_DRBG_NONCE_LEN],
+                                const uint8_t *personalization,
+                                size_t personalization_len) {
+  CTR_DRBG_STATE *drbg = New<CTR_DRBG_STATE>();
+  if (drbg == nullptr ||
+      !CTR_DRBG_init(drbg, /*df=*/true, entropy, entropy_len, nonce,
+                     personalization, personalization_len)) {
+    CTR_DRBG_free(drbg);
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  return drbg;
+}
+
+void CTR_DRBG_free(CTR_DRBG_STATE *state) { Delete(state); }
+
+int bssl::CTR_DRBG_init(CTR_DRBG_STATE *drbg, int df, const uint8_t *entropy,
+                        size_t entropy_len,
+                        const uint8_t nonce[CTR_DRBG_NONCE_LEN],
+                        const uint8_t *personalization,
+                        size_t personalization_len) {
+  // Section 10.2.1.3.1 and 10.2.1.3.2
+  if (personalization_len > CTR_DRBG_SEED_LEN ||
+      (!df && entropy_len != CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN) ||
+      (df && (entropy_len < CTR_DRBG_MIN_ENTROPY_LEN ||
+              entropy_len > CTR_DRBG_MAX_ENTROPY_LEN)) ||  //
+      (df != (nonce != nullptr))) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  uint8_t seed_material[CTR_DRBG_SEED_LEN];
+  if (df) {
+    uint8_t pre_seed_material[CTR_DRBG_MAX_ENTROPY_LEN + CTR_DRBG_NONCE_LEN +
+                              CTR_DRBG_SEED_LEN];
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(pre_seed_material, entropy, entropy_len);
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(pre_seed_material + entropy_len, nonce, CTR_DRBG_NONCE_LEN);
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(pre_seed_material + entropy_len + CTR_DRBG_NONCE_LEN,
+                   personalization, personalization_len);
+    const size_t pre_seed_material_length =
+        entropy_len + CTR_DRBG_NONCE_LEN + personalization_len;
+
+    if (!block_cipher_df(seed_material, sizeof(seed_material),
+                         pre_seed_material, pre_seed_material_length)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  } else {
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(seed_material, entropy, CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN);
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < personalization_len; i++) {
+      seed_material[i] ^= personalization[i];
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Section 10.2.1.2
+
+  // kInitMask is the result of encrypting blocks with big-endian value 1, 2
+  // and 3 with the all-zero AES-256 key.
+  static const uint8_t kInitMask[CTR_DRBG_SEED_LEN] = {
+      0x53, 0x0f, 0x8a, 0xfb, 0xc7, 0x45, 0x36, 0xb9, 0xa9, 0x63, 0xb4, 0xf1,
+      0xc4, 0xcb, 0x73, 0x8b, 0xce, 0xa7, 0x40, 0x3d, 0x4d, 0x60, 0x6b, 0x6e,
+      0x07, 0x4e, 0xc5, 0xd3, 0xba, 0xf3, 0x9d, 0x18, 0x72, 0x60, 0x03, 0xca,
+      0x37, 0xa6, 0x2a, 0x74, 0xd1, 0xa2, 0xf5, 0x8e, 0x75, 0x06, 0x35, 0x8e,
+  };
+
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < sizeof(kInitMask); i++) {
+    seed_material[i] ^= kInitMask[i];
+  }
+
+  drbg->df = df;
+  drbg->ctr =
+      aes_ctr_set_key(&drbg->ks, nullptr, &drbg->block, seed_material, 32);
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(drbg->counter, seed_material + 32, 16);
+  drbg->reseed_counter = 1;
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static_assert(CTR_DRBG_SEED_LEN % AES_BLOCK_SIZE == 0,
+              "not a multiple of AES block size");
+
+// ctr_inc adds `n` to the last four bytes of `drbg->counter`, treated as a
+// big-endian number.
+static void ctr32_add(CTR_DRBG_STATE *drbg, uint32_t n) {
+  uint32_t ctr = CRYPTO_load_u32_be(drbg->counter + 12);
+  CRYPTO_store_u32_be(drbg->counter + 12, ctr + n);
+}
+
+static int ctr_drbg_update(CTR_DRBG_STATE *drbg,
+                           const uint8_t data[CTR_DRBG_SEED_LEN]) {
+  uint8_t temp[CTR_DRBG_SEED_LEN];
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < CTR_DRBG_SEED_LEN; i += AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+    ctr32_add(drbg, 1);
+    drbg->block(drbg->counter, temp + i, &drbg->ks);
+  }
+
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < CTR_DRBG_SEED_LEN; i++) {
+    temp[i] ^= data[i];
+  }
+
+  drbg->ctr = aes_ctr_set_key(&drbg->ks, nullptr, &drbg->block, temp, 32);
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(drbg->counter, temp + 32, 16);
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int CTR_DRBG_reseed(CTR_DRBG_STATE *drbg,
+                    const uint8_t entropy[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN],
+                    const uint8_t *additional_data,
+                    size_t additional_data_len) {
+  return CTR_DRBG_reseed_ex(drbg, entropy, CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN,
+                            additional_data, additional_data_len);
+}
+
+int CTR_DRBG_reseed_ex(CTR_DRBG_STATE *drbg, const uint8_t *entropy,
+                       size_t entropy_len, const uint8_t *additional_data,
+                       size_t additional_data_len) {
+  if (additional_data_len > CTR_DRBG_SEED_LEN ||
+      (drbg->df && (entropy_len > CTR_DRBG_MAX_ENTROPY_LEN ||
+                    entropy_len < CTR_DRBG_MIN_ENTROPY_LEN)) ||
+      (!drbg->df && entropy_len != CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  uint8_t seed_material[CTR_DRBG_SEED_LEN];
+  if (drbg->df) {
+    // Section 10.2.1.4.2
+    uint8_t pre_seed_material[CTR_DRBG_MAX_ENTROPY_LEN + CTR_DRBG_SEED_LEN];
+    static_assert(CTR_DRBG_MAX_ENTROPY_LEN <= sizeof(pre_seed_material));
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(pre_seed_material, entropy, entropy_len);
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(pre_seed_material + entropy_len, additional_data,
+                   additional_data_len);
+    const size_t pre_seed_material_len = entropy_len + additional_data_len;
+
+    if (!block_cipher_df(seed_material, sizeof(seed_material),
+                         pre_seed_material, pre_seed_material_len)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  } else {
+    // Section 10.2.1.4
+    static_assert(CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN == sizeof(seed_material));
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(seed_material, entropy, CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN);
+    if (additional_data_len > 0) {
+      for (size_t i = 0; i < additional_data_len; i++) {
+        seed_material[i] ^= additional_data[i];
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (!ctr_drbg_update(drbg, seed_material)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  drbg->reseed_counter = 1;
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int CTR_DRBG_generate(CTR_DRBG_STATE *drbg, uint8_t *out, size_t out_len,
+                      const uint8_t *additional_data,
+                      size_t additional_data_len) {
+  // See 9.3.1
+  if (out_len > CTR_DRBG_MAX_GENERATE_LENGTH) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // See 10.2.1.5.1
+  if (drbg->reseed_counter > kMaxReseedCount) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  uint8_t processed_additional_data[CTR_DRBG_SEED_LEN];
+  OPENSSL_memset(processed_additional_data, 0,
+                 sizeof(processed_additional_data));
+  if (additional_data_len != 0) {
+    if (drbg->df) {
+      if (!block_cipher_df(processed_additional_data,
+                           sizeof(processed_additional_data), additional_data,
+                           additional_data_len)) {
+        return 0;
+      }
+    } else {
+      if (additional_data_len > sizeof(processed_additional_data)) {
+        return 0;
+      }
+      OPENSSL_memcpy(processed_additional_data, additional_data,
+                     additional_data_len);
+    }
+    if (!ctr_drbg_update(drbg, processed_additional_data)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // kChunkSize is used to interact better with the cache. Since the AES-CTR
+  // code assumes that it's encrypting rather than just writing keystream, the
+  // buffer has to be zeroed first. Without chunking, large reads would zero
+  // the whole buffer, flushing the L1 cache, and then do another pass (missing
+  // the cache every time) to “encrypt” it. The code can avoid this by
+  // chunking.
+  constexpr size_t kChunkSize = 8 * 1024;
+
+  while (out_len >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+    size_t todo = kChunkSize;
+    if (todo > out_len) {
+      todo = out_len;
+    }
+
+    todo &= ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
+    const size_t num_blocks = todo / AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+
+    OPENSSL_memset(out, 0, todo);
+    ctr32_add(drbg, 1);
+    drbg->ctr(out, out, num_blocks, &drbg->ks, drbg->counter);
+    ctr32_add(drbg, (uint32_t)(num_blocks - 1));
+
+    out += todo;
+    out_len -= todo;
+  }
+
+  if (out_len > 0) {
+    uint8_t block[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+    ctr32_add(drbg, 1);
+    drbg->block(drbg->counter, block, &drbg->ks);
+
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(out, block, out_len);
+  }
+
+  if (!ctr_drbg_update(drbg, processed_additional_data)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  drbg->reseed_counter++;
+  FIPS_service_indicator_update_state();
+  return 1;
+}
+
+void CTR_DRBG_clear(CTR_DRBG_STATE *drbg) {
+  OPENSSL_cleanse(drbg, sizeof(CTR_DRBG_STATE));
+}

package/runtime/third_party/boringssl/crypto/fipsmodule/rand/internal.h

@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+// Copyright 2015 The BoringSSL Authors
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_HEADER_CRYPTO_FIPSMODULE_RAND_INTERNAL_H
+#define OPENSSL_HEADER_CRYPTO_FIPSMODULE_RAND_INTERNAL_H
+
+#include <openssl/aes.h>
+#include <openssl/ctrdrbg.h>
+
+#include "../../bcm_support.h"
+#include "../aes/internal.h"
+
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
+
+// rand_fork_unsafe_buffering_enabled returns whether fork-unsafe buffering has
+// been enabled via `RAND_enable_fork_unsafe_buffering`.
+int rand_fork_unsafe_buffering_enabled();
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_END
+
+// CTR_DRBG_STATE contains the state of a CTR_DRBG based on AES-256. See SP
+// 800-90Ar1.
+struct ctr_drbg_state_st {
+  AES_KEY ks;
+  bssl::block128_f block;
+  bssl::ctr128_f ctr;
+  uint8_t counter[16];
+  uint64_t reseed_counter;
+  int df;
+};
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
+
+// CTR_DRBG_init initialises `*drbg` given `entropy_len` bytes of entropy in
+// `entropy` and, optionally, a personalization string up to
+// `CTR_DRBG_SEED_LEN` bytes in length. It returns one on success and zero on
+// error.
+//
+// If `df` is false then `entropy_len` must be `CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN` and
+// `nonce` must be nullptr.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT int CTR_DRBG_init(CTR_DRBG_STATE *drbg, int df,
+                                 const uint8_t *entropy, size_t entropy_len,
+                                 const uint8_t nonce[CTR_DRBG_NONCE_LEN],
+                                 const uint8_t *personalization,
+                                 size_t personalization_len);
+
+// BSSL_ENTROPY_DAEMON_RESPONSE_LEN is the number of bytes that the Android
+// entropy daemon replies with.
+#define BSSL_ENTROPY_DAEMON_RESPONSE_LEN (48 * 10 + 16)
+
+// bssl_get_seed_from_daemon fetches up to `*inout_entropy_len` bytes of
+// entropy from the Android entropy daemon, writing them to `*out_entropy`.
+// On successful exit, `*inout_entropy_len` contains the number of bytes
+// written. Returns one on success and zero on error.
+int bssl_get_seed_from_daemon(uint8_t *out_entropy, size_t *inout_entropy_len);
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_X86_64) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM)
+
+inline int have_rdrand() { return CRYPTO_is_RDRAND_capable(); }
+
+// have_fast_rdrand returns true if RDRAND is supported and it's reasonably
+// fast. Concretely the latter is defined by whether the chip is Intel (fast) or
+// not (assumed slow).
+inline int have_fast_rdrand() {
+  return CRYPTO_is_RDRAND_capable() && CRYPTO_is_intel_cpu();
+}
+
+// CRYPTO_rdrand writes eight bytes of random data from the hardware RNG to
+// `out`. It returns one on success or zero on hardware failure.
+extern "C" int CRYPTO_rdrand(uint8_t out[8]);
+
+// CRYPTO_rdrand_multiple8_buf fills `len` bytes at `buf` with random data from
+// the hardware RNG. The `len` argument must be a multiple of eight. It returns
+// one on success and zero on hardware failure.
+extern "C" int CRYPTO_rdrand_multiple8_buf(uint8_t *buf, size_t len);
+
+#else  // OPENSSL_X86_64 && !OPENSSL_NO_ASM
+
+inline int have_rdrand() { return 0; }
+
+inline int have_fast_rdrand() { return 0; }
+
+#endif  // OPENSSL_X86_64 && !OPENSSL_NO_ASM
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_END
+
+#endif  // OPENSSL_HEADER_CRYPTO_FIPSMODULE_RAND_INTERNAL_H