visaljs 0.0.1 → 0.0.3

package/runtime/third_party/boringssl/ssl/internal.h

@@ -0,0 +1,4506 @@
+// Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+// Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
+// Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_HEADER_SSL_INTERNAL_H
+#define OPENSSL_HEADER_SSL_INTERNAL_H
+
+#include <openssl/base.h>
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#include <algorithm>
+#include <atomic>
+#include <bitset>
+#include <cstdint>
+#include <initializer_list>
+#include <optional>
+#include <string_view>
+#include <utility>
+#include <variant>
+
+#include <openssl/aead.h>
+#include <openssl/curve25519.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/hpke.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/span.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#include <openssl/stack.h>
+
+#include "../crypto/err/internal.h"
+#include "../crypto/internal.h"
+#include "../crypto/lhash/internal.h"
+#include "../crypto/mem_internal.h"
+#include "../crypto/spake2plus/internal.h"
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_WINDOWS)
+// Windows defines struct timeval in winsock2.h.
+#include <winsock2.h>
+#else
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+
+
+DECLARE_OPAQUE_STRUCT(ssl_credential_st, SSLCredential)
+DECLARE_OPAQUE_STRUCT(ssl_ctx_st, SSLContext)
+DECLARE_OPAQUE_STRUCT(ssl_st, SSLImpl)
+DECLARE_OPAQUE_STRUCT(ssl_session_st, SSLSession)
+DECLARE_OPAQUE_STRUCT(ssl_ech_keys_st, SSLECHKeys)
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
+
+struct SSL_CONFIG;
+struct SSL_HANDSHAKE;
+struct SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD;
+struct SSL_X509_METHOD;
+
+// C++ utilities.
+
+// An MRUQueue maintains a queue of up to `N` objects of type `T`. If the queue
+// is at capacity, adding to the queue pops the least recently added element.
+template <typename T, size_t N>
+class MRUQueue {
+ public:
+  static constexpr bool kAllowUniquePtr = true;
+
+  MRUQueue() = default;
+
+  // If we ever need to make this type movable, we could. (The defaults almost
+  // work except we need `start_` to be reset when moved-from.)
+  MRUQueue(const MRUQueue &other) = delete;
+  MRUQueue &operator=(const MRUQueue &other) = delete;
+
+  bool empty() const { return size() == 0; }
+  size_t size() const { return storage_.size(); }
+
+  T &operator[](size_t i) {
+    BSSL_CHECK(i < size());
+    return storage_[(start_ + i) % N];
+  }
+  const T &operator[](size_t i) const {
+    return (*const_cast<MRUQueue *>(this))[i];
+  }
+
+  void Clear() {
+    storage_.clear();
+    start_ = 0;
+  }
+
+  void PushBack(T t) {
+    if (storage_.size() < N) {
+      assert(start_ == 0);
+      storage_.PushBack(std::move(t));
+    } else {
+      (*this)[0] = std::move(t);
+      start_ = (start_ + 1) % N;
+    }
+  }
+
+ private:
+  InplaceVector<T, N> storage_;
+  PackedSize<N> start_ = 0;
+};
+
+// GetAllNames helps to implement `*_get_all_*_names` style functions. It
+// writes at most `max_out` string pointers to `out` and returns the number that
+// it would have liked to have written. The strings written consist of
+// `fixed_names_len` strings from `fixed_names` followed by `objects_len`
+// strings taken by projecting `objects` through `name`.
+template <typename T, typename Name, size_t S1, size_t S2>
+inline size_t GetAllNames(const char **out, size_t max_out,
+                          Span<const char *const, S1> fixed_names,
+                          Name(T::*name), Span<const T, S2> objects) {
+  auto span = Span(out, max_out);
+  for (size_t i = 0; !span.empty() && i < fixed_names.size(); i++) {
+    span[0] = fixed_names[i];
+    span = span.subspan(1);
+  }
+  span = span.first(std::min(span.size(), objects.size()));
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < span.size(); i++) {
+    span[i] = objects[i].*name;
+  }
+  return fixed_names.size() + objects.size();
+}
+
+
+// Protocol versions.
+//
+// Due to DTLS's historical wire version differences, we maintain two notions of
+// version.
+//
+// The "version" or "wire version" is the actual 16-bit value that appears on
+// the wire. It uniquely identifies a version and is also used at API
+// boundaries. The set of supported versions differs between TLS and DTLS. Wire
+// versions are opaque values and may not be compared numerically.
+//
+// The "protocol version" identifies the high-level handshake variant being
+// used. DTLS versions map to the corresponding TLS versions. Protocol versions
+// are sequential and may be compared numerically.
+
+// ssl_protocol_version_from_wire sets `*out` to the protocol version
+// corresponding to wire version `version` and returns true. If `version` is not
+// a valid TLS or DTLS version, it returns false.
+//
+// Note this simultaneously handles both DTLS and TLS. Use one of the
+// higher-level functions below for most operations.
+bool ssl_protocol_version_from_wire(uint16_t *out, uint16_t version);
+
+// ssl_get_version_range sets `*out_min_version` and `*out_max_version` to the
+// minimum and maximum enabled protocol versions, respectively.
+bool ssl_get_version_range(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint16_t *out_min_version,
+                           uint16_t *out_max_version);
+
+// ssl_supports_version returns whether `hs` supports `version`.
+bool ssl_supports_version(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint16_t version);
+
+// ssl_method_supports_version returns whether `method` supports `version`.
+bool ssl_method_supports_version(const SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD *method,
+                                 uint16_t version);
+
+// ssl_add_supported_versions writes the supported versions of `hs` to `cbb`, in
+// decreasing preference order. The version list is filtered to those whose
+// protocol version is at least `extra_min_version`.
+bool ssl_add_supported_versions(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *cbb,
+                                uint16_t extra_min_version);
+
+// ssl_negotiate_version negotiates a common version based on `hs`'s preferences
+// and the peer preference list in `peer_versions`. On success, it returns true
+// and sets `*out_version` to the selected version. Otherwise, it returns false
+// and sets `*out_alert` to an alert to send.
+bool ssl_negotiate_version(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                           uint16_t *out_version, const CBS *peer_versions);
+
+// ssl_has_final_version returns whether `ssl` has determined the final version.
+// This may be used to distinguish the predictive 0-RTT version from the final
+// one.
+bool ssl_has_final_version(const SSLImpl *ssl);
+
+// ssl_protocol_version returns `ssl`'s protocol version. It is an error to
+// call this function before the version is determined.
+uint16_t ssl_protocol_version(const SSLImpl *ssl);
+
+// Cipher suites.
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_END
+
+struct ssl_cipher_st {
+  // name is the OpenSSL name for the cipher.
+  const char *name;
+  // standard_name is the IETF name for the cipher.
+  const char *standard_name;
+  // protocol_id is the cipher's two-byte protocol ID.
+  uint16_t protocol_id;
+
+  // algorithm_* determine the cipher suite. See constants below for the values.
+  uint32_t algorithm_mkey;
+  uint32_t algorithm_auth;
+  uint32_t algorithm_enc;
+  uint32_t algorithm_mac;
+  uint32_t algorithm_prf;
+};
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
+
+// Bits for `algorithm_mkey` (key exchange algorithm).
+#define SSL_kRSA 0x00000001u
+#define SSL_kECDHE 0x00000002u
+// SSL_kPSK is only set for plain PSK, not ECDHE_PSK.
+#define SSL_kPSK 0x00000004u
+#define SSL_kGENERIC 0x00000008u
+
+// Bits for `algorithm_auth` (server authentication).
+#define SSL_aRSA_SIGN 0x00000001u
+#define SSL_aRSA_DECRYPT 0x00000002u
+#define SSL_aECDSA 0x00000004u
+// SSL_aPSK is set for both PSK and ECDHE_PSK.
+#define SSL_aPSK 0x00000008u
+#define SSL_aGENERIC 0x00000010u
+
+#define SSL_aCERT (SSL_aRSA_SIGN | SSL_aRSA_DECRYPT | SSL_aECDSA)
+
+// Bits for `algorithm_enc` (symmetric encryption).
+#define SSL_3DES 0x00000001u
+#define SSL_AES128 0x00000002u
+#define SSL_AES256 0x00000004u
+#define SSL_AES128GCM 0x00000008u
+#define SSL_AES256GCM 0x00000010u
+#define SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305 0x00000020u
+
+#define SSL_AES (SSL_AES128 | SSL_AES256 | SSL_AES128GCM | SSL_AES256GCM)
+
+// Bits for `algorithm_mac` (symmetric authentication).
+#define SSL_SHA1 0x00000001u
+#define SSL_SHA256 0x00000002u
+// SSL_AEAD is set for all AEADs.
+#define SSL_AEAD 0x00000004u
+
+// Bits for `algorithm_prf` (handshake digest).
+#define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT 0x1
+#define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 0x2
+#define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 0x4
+
+// SSL_MAX_MD_SIZE is size of the largest hash function used in TLS, SHA-384.
+#define SSL_MAX_MD_SIZE 48
+
+// An SSLCipherPreferenceList contains a list of SSL_CIPHERs with equal-
+// preference groups. For TLS clients, the groups are moot because the server
+// picks the cipher and groups cannot be expressed on the wire. However, for
+// servers, the equal-preference groups allow the client's preferences to be
+// partially respected. (This only has an effect with
+// SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE).
+//
+// The equal-preference groups are expressed by grouping SSL_CIPHERs together.
+// All elements of a group have the same priority: no ordering is expressed
+// within a group.
+//
+// The values in `ciphers` are in one-to-one correspondence with
+// `in_group_flags`. (That is, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) is the number of
+// bytes in `in_group_flags`.) The bytes in `in_group_flags` are either 1, to
+// indicate that the corresponding SSL_CIPHER is not the last element of a
+// group, or 0 to indicate that it is.
+//
+// For example, if `in_group_flags` contains all zeros then that indicates a
+// traditional, fully-ordered preference. Every SSL_CIPHER is the last element
+// of the group (i.e. they are all in a one-element group).
+//
+// For a more complex example, consider:
+//   ciphers:        A  B  C  D  E  F
+//   in_group_flags: 1  1  0  0  1  0
+//
+// That would express the following, order:
+//
+//    A         E
+//    B -> D -> F
+//    C
+class SSLCipherPreferenceList {
+ public:
+  static constexpr bool kAllowUniquePtr = true;
+
+  SSLCipherPreferenceList() = default;
+  ~SSLCipherPreferenceList() = default;
+
+  // Initializes a list with the specified ciphers and flags. Calling Init on a
+  // previously initialized list discards the previous contents.
+  bool Init(UniquePtr<STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)> ciphers,
+            Array<bool> in_group_flags);
+  // Same as above, but takes a list of cipher protocol IDs.
+  bool Init(Span<const uint16_t> cipher_ids, Span<const bool> in_group_flags);
+
+  // Reset clears any contents previously set by `Init`.
+  void Reset();
+
+  // Makes `this` a deep copy of another (already initialized) instance.
+  bool CopyFrom(const SSLCipherPreferenceList &);
+
+  // Removes `cipher` from the preference list.
+  void Remove(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher);
+
+  // Contains returns whether a cipher whose protocol ID is `cipher_id` appears
+  // in the list.
+  bool Contains(uint16_t cipher_id) const;
+
+  // ChooseCipher implements the logic for a server to select the most-preferred
+  // cipher satisfying the constraints that is listed in both `*this` and the
+  // client's preference list in `client_cipher_list`, which contains an ordered
+  // list of 2-byte cipher suite protocol IDs. The returned cipher must be
+  // supported for the SSL protocol `version`, and must match the key exchange
+  // algorithm mask `mask_k` and the server authentication mask `mask_a`. If
+  // `prioritize_client_pref` is true, then the client's preference list is
+  // prioritized over the list in `*this`. Otherwise, the server's preference
+  // list (`*this`) is prioritized. This function returns a pointer to the
+  // most-preferred shared cipher, or nullptr if no shared cipher was found.
+  const SSL_CIPHER *ChooseCipher(const CBS *client_cipher_list,
+                                 bool prioritize_client_pref, uint16_t version,
+                                 uint32_t mask_k, uint32_t mask_a) const;
+
+  size_t size() const { return sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers_.get()); }
+
+  const STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers() const { return ciphers_.get(); }
+  Span<const bool> in_group_flags() const { return in_group_flags_; }
+
+  // TODO(crbug.com/550501994): Remove the non-const overload. This may result
+  // in callers mutating the internal state in an inconsistent way.
+  STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers() { return ciphers_.get(); }
+
+ private:
+  // SSL_CIPHERs are maintained in a stack so they are easily accessible in the
+  // form required for `SSL{_CTX}_get_ciphers`.
+  UniquePtr<STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)> ciphers_;
+  Array<bool> in_group_flags_;
+};
+
+// AllCiphers returns an array of all supported ciphers, sorted by id.
+Span<const SSL_CIPHER> AllCiphers();
+
+// ssl_cipher_get_evp_aead sets `*out_aead` to point to the correct EVP_AEAD
+// object for `cipher` protocol version `version`. It sets `*out_mac_secret_len`
+// and `*out_fixed_iv_len` to the MAC key length and fixed IV length,
+// respectively. The MAC key length is zero except for legacy block and stream
+// ciphers. It returns true on success and false on error.
+bool ssl_cipher_get_evp_aead(const EVP_AEAD **out_aead,
+                             size_t *out_mac_secret_len,
+                             size_t *out_fixed_iv_len, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher,
+                             uint16_t version);
+
+// ssl_get_handshake_digest returns the `EVP_MD` corresponding to `version` and
+// `cipher`.
+const EVP_MD *ssl_get_handshake_digest(uint16_t version,
+                                       const SSL_CIPHER *cipher);
+
+// ssl_create_cipher_list evaluates `rule_str` to create the TLS 1.2 cipher
+// list. It sets `*out_cipher_list` to a newly-allocated
+// `SSLCipherPreferenceList` containing the result. It returns true on success
+// and false on failure. If `strict` is true, nonsense will be rejected. If
+// false, nonsense will be silently ignored. An empty result is considered an
+// error regardless of `strict`. The resulting list will be ordered based on
+// having support for AES in hardware or not.
+bool ssl_create_cipher_list(UniquePtr<SSLCipherPreferenceList> *out_cipher_list,
+                            const char *rule_str, bool strict);
+
+// ssl_create_default_tls13_cipher_list populates the default TLS 1.3 cipher
+// list, clearing any previous contents in `*out_cipher_list` and replacing them
+// with the result. It returns true on success and false on failure. The
+// resulting list will be ordered based on having support for AES in hardware or
+// not.
+bool ssl_create_default_tls13_cipher_list(
+    SSLCipherPreferenceList *out_cipher_list);
+
+// ssl_cipher_auth_mask_for_key returns the mask of cipher `algorithm_auth`
+// values suitable for use with `key` in TLS 1.2 and below. `sign_ok` indicates
+// whether `key` may be used for signing.
+uint32_t ssl_cipher_auth_mask_for_key(const EVP_PKEY *key, bool sign_ok);
+
+// ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth returns whether `cipher` authenticates the
+// server and, optionally, the client with a certificate.
+bool ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher);
+
+// ssl_cipher_requires_server_key_exchange returns whether `cipher` requires a
+// ServerKeyExchange message.
+//
+// This function may return false while still allowing `cipher` an optional
+// ServerKeyExchange. This is the case for plain PSK ciphers.
+bool ssl_cipher_requires_server_key_exchange(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher);
+
+// ssl_cipher_get_record_split_len, for TLS 1.0 CBC mode ciphers, returns the
+// length of an encrypted 1-byte record, for use in record-splitting. Otherwise
+// it returns zero.
+size_t ssl_cipher_get_record_split_len(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher);
+
+// ssl_cipher_is_deprecated returns true if `cipher` is deprecated.
+bool ssl_cipher_is_deprecated(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher);
+
+
+// Transcript layer.
+
+// SSLTranscript maintains the handshake transcript as a combination of a
+// buffer and running hash.
+class SSLTranscript {
+ public:
+  explicit SSLTranscript(bool is_dtls);
+  ~SSLTranscript();
+
+  SSLTranscript(SSLTranscript &&other) = default;
+  SSLTranscript &operator=(SSLTranscript &&other) = default;
+
+  // Init initializes the handshake transcript. If called on an existing
+  // transcript, it resets the transcript and hash. It returns true on success
+  // and false on failure.
+  bool Init();
+
+  // InitHash initializes the handshake hash based on the PRF and contents of
+  // the handshake transcript. Subsequent calls to `Update` will update the
+  // rolling hash. It returns one on success and zero on failure. It is an error
+  // to call this function after the handshake buffer is released. This may be
+  // called multiple times to change the hash function.
+  bool InitHash(uint16_t version, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher);
+
+  // UpdateForHelloRetryRequest resets the rolling hash with the
+  // HelloRetryRequest construction. It returns true on success and false on
+  // failure. It is an error to call this function before the handshake buffer
+  // is released.
+  bool UpdateForHelloRetryRequest();
+
+  // CopyToHashContext initializes `ctx` with `digest` and the data thus far in
+  // the transcript. It returns true on success and false on failure. If the
+  // handshake buffer is still present, `digest` may be any supported digest.
+  // Otherwise, `digest` must match the transcript hash.
+  bool CopyToHashContext(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *digest) const;
+
+  Span<const uint8_t> buffer() const {
+    return Span(reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(buffer_->data),
+                buffer_->length);
+  }
+
+  // FreeBuffer releases the handshake buffer. Subsequent calls to
+  // `Update` will not update the handshake buffer.
+  void FreeBuffer();
+
+  // DigestLen returns the length of the PRF hash.
+  size_t DigestLen() const;
+
+  // Digest returns the PRF hash. For TLS 1.1 and below, this is
+  // `EVP_md5_sha1`.
+  const EVP_MD *Digest() const;
+
+  // Update adds `in` to the handshake buffer and handshake hash, whichever is
+  // enabled. It returns true on success and false on failure.
+  bool Update(Span<const uint8_t> in);
+
+  // GetHash writes the handshake hash to `out` which must have room for at
+  // least `DigestLen` bytes. On success, it returns true and sets `*out_len` to
+  // the number of bytes written. Otherwise, it returns false.
+  bool GetHash(uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len) const;
+
+  // GetFinishedMAC computes the MAC for the Finished message into the bytes
+  // pointed by `out` and writes the number of bytes to `*out_len`. `out` must
+  // have room for `EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE` bytes. It returns true on success and false
+  // on failure.
+  bool GetFinishedMAC(uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, const SSLSession *session,
+                      bool from_server) const;
+
+ private:
+  // HashBuffer initializes `ctx` to use `digest` and writes the contents of
+  // `buffer_` to `ctx`. If this SSLTranscript is for DTLS 1.3, the appropriate
+  // bytes in `buffer_` will be skipped when hashing the buffer.
+  bool HashBuffer(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *digest) const;
+
+  // AddToBufferOrHash directly adds the contents of `in` to `buffer_` and/or
+  // `hash_`.
+  bool AddToBufferOrHash(Span<const uint8_t> in);
+
+  // buffer_, if non-null, contains the handshake transcript.
+  UniquePtr<BUF_MEM> buffer_;
+  // hash, if initialized with an `EVP_MD`, maintains the handshake hash.
+  ScopedEVP_MD_CTX hash_;
+  // is_dtls_ indicates whether this is a transcript for a DTLS connection.
+  bool is_dtls_ : 1;
+  // version_ contains the version for the connection (if known).
+  uint16_t version_ = 0;
+};
+
+// tls1_prf computes the PRF function for `ssl`. It fills `out`, using `secret`
+// as the secret and `label` as the label. `seed1` and `seed2` are concatenated
+// to form the seed parameter. It returns true on success and false on failure.
+bool tls1_prf(const EVP_MD *digest, Span<uint8_t> out,
+              Span<const uint8_t> secret, std::string_view label,
+              Span<const uint8_t> seed1, Span<const uint8_t> seed2);
+
+
+// Encryption layer.
+
+// SSLAEADContext contains information about an AEAD that is being used to
+// encrypt an SSL connection.
+class SSLAEADContext {
+ public:
+  explicit SSLAEADContext(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher);
+  ~SSLAEADContext();
+  static constexpr bool kAllowUniquePtr = true;
+
+  SSLAEADContext(const SSLAEADContext &&) = delete;
+  SSLAEADContext &operator=(const SSLAEADContext &&) = delete;
+
+  // CreateNullCipher creates an `SSLAEADContext` for the null cipher.
+  static UniquePtr<SSLAEADContext> CreateNullCipher();
+
+  // Create creates an `SSLAEADContext` using the supplied key material. It
+  // returns nullptr on error. Only one of `Open` or `Seal` may be used with the
+  // resulting object, depending on `direction`. `version` is the wire version.
+  static UniquePtr<SSLAEADContext> Create(enum evp_aead_direction_t direction,
+                                          uint16_t version,
+                                          const SSL_CIPHER *cipher,
+                                          Span<const uint8_t> enc_key,
+                                          Span<const uint8_t> mac_key,
+                                          Span<const uint8_t> fixed_iv);
+
+  // CreatePlaceholderForQUIC creates a placeholder `SSLAEADContext` for the
+  // given cipher. The resulting object can be queried for various properties
+  // but cannot encrypt or decrypt data.
+  static UniquePtr<SSLAEADContext> CreatePlaceholderForQUIC(
+      const SSL_CIPHER *cipher);
+
+  const SSL_CIPHER *cipher() const { return cipher_; }
+
+  // is_null_cipher returns true if this is the null cipher.
+  bool is_null_cipher() const { return !cipher_; }
+
+  // ExplicitNonceLen returns the length of the explicit nonce.
+  size_t ExplicitNonceLen() const;
+
+  // MaxOverhead returns the maximum overhead of calling `Seal`.
+  size_t MaxOverhead() const;
+
+  // MaxSealInputLen returns the maximum length for `Seal` that can fit in
+  // `max_out` output bytes, or zero if no input may fit.
+  size_t MaxSealInputLen(size_t max_out) const;
+
+  // SuffixLen calculates the suffix length written by `SealScatter` and writes
+  // it to `*out_suffix_len`. It returns true on success and false on error.
+  // `in_len` and `extra_in_len` should equal the argument of the same names
+  // passed to `SealScatter`.
+  bool SuffixLen(size_t *out_suffix_len, size_t in_len,
+                 size_t extra_in_len) const;
+
+  // CiphertextLen calculates the total ciphertext length written by
+  // `SealScatter` and writes it to `*out_len`. It returns true on success and
+  // false on error. `in_len` and `extra_in_len` should equal the argument of
+  // the same names passed to `SealScatter`.
+  bool CiphertextLen(size_t *out_len, size_t in_len, size_t extra_in_len) const;
+
+  // Open authenticates and decrypts `in` in-place. On success, it sets `*out`
+  // to the plaintext in `in` and returns true.  Otherwise, it returns
+  // false. The output will always be `ExplicitNonceLen` bytes ahead of `in`.
+  bool Open(Span<uint8_t> *out, uint8_t type, uint16_t record_version,
+            uint64_t seqnum, Span<const uint8_t> header, Span<uint8_t> in);
+
+  // Seal encrypts and authenticates `in_len` bytes from `in` and writes the
+  // result to `out`. It returns true on success and false on error.
+  //
+  // If `in` and `out` alias then `out` + `ExplicitNonceLen` must be == `in`.
+  bool Seal(uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, size_t max_out, uint8_t type,
+            uint16_t record_version, uint64_t seqnum,
+            Span<const uint8_t> header, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len);
+
+  // SealScatter encrypts and authenticates `in_len` bytes from `in` and splits
+  // the result between `out_prefix`, `out` and `out_suffix`. It returns one on
+  // success and zero on error.
+  //
+  // On successful return, exactly `ExplicitNonceLen` bytes are written to
+  // `out_prefix`, `in_len` bytes to `out`, and `SuffixLen` bytes to
+  // `out_suffix`.
+  //
+  // `extra_in` may point to an additional plaintext buffer. If present,
+  // `extra_in_len` additional bytes are encrypted and authenticated, and the
+  // ciphertext is written to the beginning of `out_suffix`. `SuffixLen` should
+  // be used to size `out_suffix` accordingly.
+  //
+  // If `in` and `out` alias then `out` must be == `in`. Other arguments may not
+  // alias anything.
+  bool SealScatter(uint8_t *out_prefix, uint8_t *out, uint8_t *out_suffix,
+                   uint8_t type, uint16_t record_version, uint64_t seqnum,
+                   Span<const uint8_t> header, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
+                   const uint8_t *extra_in, size_t extra_in_len);
+
+  bool GetIV(const uint8_t **out_iv, size_t *out_iv_len) const;
+
+ private:
+  // GetAdditionalData returns the additional data, writing into `storage` if
+  // necessary.
+  Span<const uint8_t> GetAdditionalData(uint8_t storage[13], uint8_t type,
+                                        uint16_t record_version,
+                                        uint64_t seqnum, size_t plaintext_len,
+                                        Span<const uint8_t> header);
+
+  const SSL_CIPHER *cipher_;
+  ScopedEVP_AEAD_CTX ctx_;
+  // fixed_nonce_ contains any bytes of the nonce that are fixed for all
+  // records.
+  InplaceVector<uint8_t, 12> fixed_nonce_;
+  uint8_t variable_nonce_len_ = 0;
+  // variable_nonce_included_in_record_ is true if the variable nonce
+  // for a record is included as a prefix before the ciphertext.
+  bool variable_nonce_included_in_record_ : 1;
+  // random_variable_nonce_ is true if the variable nonce is
+  // randomly generated, rather than derived from the sequence
+  // number.
+  bool random_variable_nonce_ : 1;
+  // xor_fixed_nonce_ is true if the fixed nonce should be XOR'd into the
+  // variable nonce rather than prepended.
+  bool xor_fixed_nonce_ : 1;
+  // omit_length_in_ad_ is true if the length should be omitted in the
+  // AEAD's ad parameter.
+  bool omit_length_in_ad_ : 1;
+  // ad_is_header_ is true if the AEAD's ad parameter is the record header.
+  bool ad_is_header_ : 1;
+};
+
+
+// DTLS replay bitmap.
+
+// DTLSReplayBitmap maintains a sliding window of sequence numbers to detect
+// replayed packets.
+class DTLSReplayBitmap {
+ public:
+  // ShouldDiscard returns true if `seq_num` has been seen in
+  // `bitmap` or is stale. Otherwise it returns false.
+  bool ShouldDiscard(uint64_t seqnum) const;
+
+  // Record updates the bitmap to record receipt of sequence number
+  // `seq_num`. It slides the window forward if needed. It is an error to call
+  // this function on a stale sequence number.
+  void Record(uint64_t seqnum);
+
+  uint64_t max_seq_num() const { return max_seq_num_; }
+
+ private:
+  // map is a bitset of sequence numbers that have been seen. Bit i corresponds
+  // to `max_seq_num_ - i`.
+  std::bitset<256> map_;
+  // max_seq_num_ is the largest sequence number seen so far as a 64-bit
+  // integer, or zero if none have been seen.
+  uint64_t max_seq_num_ = 0;
+};
+
+// reconstruct_seqnum takes the low order bits of a record sequence number from
+// the wire and reconstructs the full sequence number. It does so using the
+// algorithm described in section 4.2.2 of RFC 9147, where `wire_seq` is the
+// low bits of the sequence number as seen on the wire, `seq_mask` is a bitmask
+// of 8 or 16 1 bits corresponding to the length of the sequence number on the
+// wire, and `max_valid_seqnum` is the largest sequence number of a record
+// successfully deprotected in this epoch. This function returns the sequence
+// number that is numerically closest to one plus `max_valid_seqnum` that when
+// bitwise and-ed with `seq_mask` equals `wire_seq`.
+//
+// `max_valid_seqnum` must be most 2^48-1, in which case the output will also be
+// at most 2^48-1.
+uint64_t reconstruct_seqnum(uint16_t wire_seq, uint64_t seq_mask,
+                            uint64_t max_valid_seqnum);
+
+
+// Record layer.
+
+class DTLSRecordNumber {
+ public:
+  static constexpr uint64_t kMaxSequence = (uint64_t{1} << 48) - 1;
+
+  DTLSRecordNumber() = default;
+  DTLSRecordNumber(uint16_t epoch, uint64_t sequence) {
+    BSSL_CHECK(sequence <= kMaxSequence);
+    combined_ = (uint64_t{epoch} << 48) | sequence;
+  }
+
+  static DTLSRecordNumber FromCombined(uint64_t combined) {
+    return DTLSRecordNumber(combined);
+  }
+
+  bool operator==(DTLSRecordNumber r) const {
+    return combined() == r.combined();
+  }
+  bool operator!=(DTLSRecordNumber r) const { return !((*this) == r); }
+  bool operator<(DTLSRecordNumber r) const { return combined() < r.combined(); }
+
+  uint64_t combined() const { return combined_; }
+  uint16_t epoch() const { return combined_ >> 48; }
+  uint64_t sequence() const { return combined_ & kMaxSequence; }
+
+  bool HasNext() const { return sequence() < kMaxSequence; }
+  DTLSRecordNumber Next() const {
+    BSSL_CHECK(HasNext());
+    // This will not overflow into the epoch.
+    return DTLSRecordNumber::FromCombined(combined_ + 1);
+  }
+
+ private:
+  explicit DTLSRecordNumber(uint64_t combined) : combined_(combined) {}
+
+  uint64_t combined_ = 0;
+};
+
+class RecordNumberEncrypter {
+ public:
+  static constexpr bool kAllowUniquePtr = true;
+  static constexpr size_t kMaxKeySize = 32;
+
+  // Create returns a DTLS 1.3 record number encrypter for `traffic_secret`, or
+  // nullptr on error.
+  static UniquePtr<RecordNumberEncrypter> Create(
+      const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, Span<const uint8_t> traffic_secret);
+
+  virtual ~RecordNumberEncrypter() = default;
+  virtual size_t KeySize() = 0;
+  virtual bool SetKey(Span<const uint8_t> key) = 0;
+  virtual bool GenerateMask(Span<uint8_t> out, Span<const uint8_t> sample) = 0;
+};
+
+struct DTLSReadEpoch {
+  static constexpr bool kAllowUniquePtr = true;
+
+  // TODO(davidben): This could be made slightly more compact if `bitmap` stored
+  // a DTLSRecordNumber.
+  uint16_t epoch = 0;
+  UniquePtr<SSLAEADContext> aead;
+  UniquePtr<RecordNumberEncrypter> rn_encrypter;
+  DTLSReplayBitmap bitmap;
+  InplaceVector<uint8_t, SSL_MAX_MD_SIZE> traffic_secret;
+};
+
+struct DTLSWriteEpoch {
+  static constexpr bool kAllowUniquePtr = true;
+
+  uint16_t epoch() const { return next_record.epoch(); }
+
+  DTLSRecordNumber next_record;
+  UniquePtr<SSLAEADContext> aead;
+  UniquePtr<RecordNumberEncrypter> rn_encrypter;
+  InplaceVector<uint8_t, SSL_MAX_MD_SIZE> traffic_secret;
+};
+
+// ssl_record_prefix_len returns the length of the prefix before the ciphertext
+// of a record for `ssl`.
+//
+// TODO(davidben): Expose this as part of public API once the high-level
+// buffer-free APIs are available.
+size_t ssl_record_prefix_len(const SSLImpl *ssl);
+
+enum ssl_open_record_t {
+  ssl_open_record_success,
+  ssl_open_record_discard,
+  ssl_open_record_partial,
+  ssl_open_record_close_notify,
+  ssl_open_record_error,
+};
+
+// tls_open_record decrypts a record from `in` in-place.
+//
+// If the input did not contain a complete record, it returns
+// `ssl_open_record_partial`. It sets `*out_consumed` to the total number of
+// bytes necessary. It is guaranteed that a successful call to `tls_open_record`
+// will consume at least that many bytes.
+//
+// Otherwise, it sets `*out_consumed` to the number of bytes of input
+// consumed. Note that input may be consumed on all return codes if a record was
+// decrypted.
+//
+// On success, it returns `ssl_open_record_success`. It sets `*out_type` to the
+// record type and `*out` to the record body in `in`. Note that `*out` may be
+// empty.
+//
+// If a record was successfully processed but should be discarded, it returns
+// `ssl_open_record_discard`.
+//
+// If a record was successfully processed but is a close_notify, it returns
+// `ssl_open_record_close_notify`.
+//
+// On failure or fatal alert, it returns `ssl_open_record_error` and sets
+// `*out_alert` to an alert to emit, or zero if no alert should be emitted.
+enum ssl_open_record_t tls_open_record(SSLImpl *ssl, uint8_t *out_type,
+                                       Span<uint8_t> *out, size_t *out_consumed,
+                                       uint8_t *out_alert, Span<uint8_t> in);
+
+// dtls_open_record implements `tls_open_record` for DTLS. It only returns
+// `ssl_open_record_partial` if `in` was empty and sets `*out_consumed` to
+// zero. The caller should read one packet and try again. On success,
+// `*out_number` is set to the record number of the record.
+enum ssl_open_record_t dtls_open_record(SSLImpl *ssl, uint8_t *out_type,
+                                        DTLSRecordNumber *out_number,
+                                        Span<uint8_t> *out,
+                                        size_t *out_consumed,
+                                        uint8_t *out_alert, Span<uint8_t> in);
+
+// ssl_needs_record_splitting returns one if `ssl`'s current outgoing cipher
+// state needs record-splitting and zero otherwise.
+bool ssl_needs_record_splitting(const SSLImpl *ssl);
+
+// tls_seal_record seals a new record of type `type` and body `in` and writes it
+// to `out`. At most `max_out` bytes will be written. It returns true on success
+// and false on error. If enabled, `tls_seal_record` implements TLS 1.0 CBC
+// 1/n-1 record splitting and may write two records concatenated.
+//
+// For a large record, the bulk of the ciphertext will begin
+// `tls_seal_align_prefix_len` bytes into out. Aligning `out` appropriately may
+// improve performance. It writes at most `in_len` + `SSL_max_seal_overhead`
+// bytes to `out`.
+//
+// `in` and `out` may not alias.
+bool tls_seal_record(SSLImpl *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
+                     size_t max_out, uint8_t type, const uint8_t *in,
+                     size_t in_len);
+
+// dtls_record_header_write_len returns the length of the record header that
+// will be written at `epoch`.
+size_t dtls_record_header_write_len(const SSLImpl *ssl, uint16_t epoch);
+
+// dtls_max_seal_overhead returns the maximum overhead, in bytes, of sealing a
+// record.
+size_t dtls_max_seal_overhead(const SSLImpl *ssl, uint16_t epoch);
+
+// dtls_seal_prefix_len returns the number of bytes of prefix to reserve in
+// front of the plaintext when sealing a record in-place.
+size_t dtls_seal_prefix_len(const SSLImpl *ssl, uint16_t epoch);
+
+// dtls_seal_max_input_len returns the maximum number of input bytes that can
+// fit in a record of up to `max_out` bytes, or zero if none may fit.
+size_t dtls_seal_max_input_len(const SSLImpl *ssl, uint16_t epoch,
+                               size_t max_out);
+
+// dtls_get_read_epoch and dtls_get_write_epoch return the epoch corresponding
+// to `epoch` or nullptr if there is none.
+DTLSReadEpoch *dtls_get_read_epoch(const SSLImpl *ssl, uint16_t epoch);
+DTLSWriteEpoch *dtls_get_write_epoch(const SSLImpl *ssl, uint16_t epoch);
+
+// dtls_seal_record implements `tls_seal_record` for DTLS. `epoch` selects which
+// epoch's cipher state to use. Unlike `tls_seal_record`, `in` and `out` may
+// alias but, if they do, `in` must be exactly `dtls_seal_prefix_len` bytes
+// ahead of `out`. On success, `*out_number` is set to the record number of the
+// record.
+bool dtls_seal_record(SSLImpl *ssl, DTLSRecordNumber *out_number, uint8_t *out,
+                      size_t *out_len, size_t max_out, uint8_t type,
+                      const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, uint16_t epoch);
+
+// ssl_process_alert processes `in` as an alert and updates `ssl`'s shutdown
+// state. It returns one of `ssl_open_record_discard`, `ssl_open_record_error`,
+// `ssl_open_record_close_notify`, or `ssl_open_record_fatal_alert` as
+// appropriate.
+enum ssl_open_record_t ssl_process_alert(SSLImpl *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                         Span<const uint8_t> in);
+
+
+// Private key operations.
+
+// ssl_private_key_* perform the corresponding operation on
+// `SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD`. If there is a custom private key configured, they
+// call the corresponding function or `complete` depending on whether there is a
+// pending operation. Otherwise, they implement the operation with
+// `EVP_PKEY`.
+
+enum ssl_private_key_result_t ssl_private_key_sign(
+    SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, size_t max_out,
+    uint16_t sigalg, Span<const uint8_t> in);
+
+enum ssl_private_key_result_t ssl_private_key_decrypt(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                                      uint8_t *out,
+                                                      size_t *out_len,
+                                                      size_t max_out,
+                                                      Span<const uint8_t> in);
+
+// ssl_parse_peer_subject_public_key_info decodes a SubjectPublicKeyInfo
+// representing the peer TLS key. It returns a newly-allocated `EVP_PKEY` or
+// nullptr on error.
+UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> ssl_parse_peer_subject_public_key_info(
+    Span<const uint8_t> spki);
+
+// ssl_pkey_supports_algorithm returns whether `pkey` may be used to sign
+// `sigalg`.
+bool ssl_pkey_supports_algorithm(const SSLImpl *ssl, EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                                 uint16_t sigalg, bool is_verify);
+
+// ssl_public_key_verify verifies that the `signature` is valid for the public
+// key `pkey` and input `in`, using the signature algorithm `sigalg`.
+bool ssl_public_key_verify(SSLImpl *ssl, Span<const uint8_t> signature,
+                           uint16_t sigalg, EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                           Span<const uint8_t> in);
+
+
+// Key shares.
+
+// SSLKeyShare abstracts over KEM-like constructions, for use with TLS 1.2 ECDHE
+// cipher suites and the TLS 1.3 key_share extension.
+//
+// TODO(davidben): This class is named SSLKeyShare after the TLS 1.3 key_share
+// extension, but it really implements a KEM abstraction. Additionally, we use
+// the same type for Encap, which is a one-off, stateless operation, as Generate
+// and Decap. Slightly tidier would be for Generate to return a new SSLKEMKey
+// (or we introduce EVP_KEM and EVP_KEM_KEY), with a Decap method, and for Encap
+// to be static function.
+class SSLKeyShare {
+ public:
+  virtual ~SSLKeyShare() {}
+  static constexpr bool kAllowUniquePtr = true;
+
+  // Create returns a SSLKeyShare instance for use with group `group_id` or
+  // nullptr on error.
+  static UniquePtr<SSLKeyShare> Create(uint16_t group_id);
+
+  // GroupID returns the group ID.
+  virtual uint16_t GroupID() const = 0;
+
+  // Generate generates a keypair and writes the public key to `out_public_key`.
+  // It returns true on success and false on error.
+  virtual bool Generate(CBB *out_public_key) = 0;
+
+  // Encap generates an ephemeral, symmetric secret and encapsulates it with
+  // `peer_key`. On success, it returns true, writes the encapsulated secret to
+  // `out_ciphertext`, and sets `*out_secret` to the shared secret. On failure,
+  // it returns false and sets `*out_alert` to an alert to send to the peer.
+  virtual bool Encap(CBB *out_ciphertext, Array<uint8_t> *out_secret,
+                     uint8_t *out_alert, Span<const uint8_t> peer_key) = 0;
+
+  // Decap decapsulates the symmetric secret in `ciphertext`. On success, it
+  // returns true and sets `*out_secret` to the shared secret. On failure, it
+  // returns false and sets `*out_alert` to an alert to send to the peer.
+  virtual bool Decap(Array<uint8_t> *out_secret, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                     Span<const uint8_t> ciphertext) = 0;
+
+  // SerializePrivateKey writes the private key to `out`, returning true if
+  // successful and false otherwise. It should be called after `Generate`.
+  virtual bool SerializePrivateKey(CBB *out) { return false; }
+
+  // DeserializePrivateKey initializes the state of the key exchange from `in`,
+  // returning true if successful and false otherwise.
+  virtual bool DeserializePrivateKey(CBS *in) { return false; }
+};
+
+struct NamedGroup {
+  int nid;
+  uint16_t group_id;
+  const char name[32], alias[32];
+};
+
+// NamedGroups returns all supported groups.
+Span<const NamedGroup> NamedGroups();
+
+// kNumNamedGroups is the number of supported groups.
+constexpr size_t kNumNamedGroups = 6u;
+
+// DefaultSupportedGroupIds returns the list of IDs for the default groups that
+// are supported when the caller hasn't explicitly configured supported groups.
+Span<const uint16_t> DefaultSupportedGroupIds();
+
+// ssl_nid_to_group_id looks up the group corresponding to `nid`. On success, it
+// sets `*out_group_id` to the group ID and returns true. Otherwise, it returns
+// false.
+bool ssl_nid_to_group_id(uint16_t *out_group_id, int nid);
+
+// ssl_name_to_group_id looks up the group corresponding to the `name` string of
+// length `len`. On success, it sets `*out_group_id` to the group ID and returns
+// true. Otherwise, it returns false.
+bool ssl_name_to_group_id(uint16_t *out_group_id, const char *name, size_t len);
+
+// ssl_group_id_to_nid returns the NID corresponding to `group_id` or
+// `NID_undef` if unknown.
+int ssl_group_id_to_nid(uint16_t group_id);
+
+
+// Handshake messages.
+
+struct SSLMessage {
+  bool is_v2_hello;
+  uint8_t type;
+  CBS body;
+  // raw is the entire serialized handshake message, including the TLS or DTLS
+  // message header.
+  CBS raw;
+};
+
+// SSL_MAX_HANDSHAKE_FLIGHT is the number of messages, including
+// ChangeCipherSpec, in the longest handshake flight. Currently this is the
+// client's second leg in a full handshake when client certificates, NPN, and
+// Channel ID, are all enabled.
+#define SSL_MAX_HANDSHAKE_FLIGHT 7
+
+extern const uint8_t kHelloRetryRequest[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE];
+extern const uint8_t kTLS12DowngradeRandom[8];
+extern const uint8_t kTLS13DowngradeRandom[8];
+extern const uint8_t kJDK11DowngradeRandom[8];
+
+// ssl_max_handshake_message_len returns the maximum number of bytes permitted
+// in a handshake message for `ssl`.
+size_t ssl_max_handshake_message_len(const SSLImpl *ssl);
+
+// tls_can_accept_handshake_data returns whether `ssl` is able to accept more
+// data into handshake buffer.
+bool tls_can_accept_handshake_data(const SSLImpl *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert);
+
+// tls_has_unprocessed_handshake_data returns whether there is buffered
+// handshake data that has not been consumed by `get_message`.
+bool tls_has_unprocessed_handshake_data(const SSLImpl *ssl);
+
+// tls_append_handshake_data appends `data` to the handshake buffer. It returns
+// true on success and false on allocation failure.
+bool tls_append_handshake_data(SSLImpl *ssl, Span<const uint8_t> data);
+
+// dtls_has_unprocessed_handshake_data behaves like
+// `tls_has_unprocessed_handshake_data` for DTLS.
+bool dtls_has_unprocessed_handshake_data(const SSLImpl *ssl);
+
+// tls_flush_pending_hs_data flushes any handshake plaintext data.
+bool tls_flush_pending_hs_data(SSLImpl *ssl);
+
+// dtls_clear_outgoing_messages releases all buffered outgoing messages.
+void dtls_clear_outgoing_messages(SSLImpl *ssl);
+
+// dtls_clear_unused_write_epochs releases any write epochs that are no longer
+// needed.
+void dtls_clear_unused_write_epochs(SSLImpl *ssl);
+
+
+// Callbacks.
+
+// ssl_do_info_callback calls `ssl`'s info callback, if set.
+void ssl_do_info_callback(const SSLImpl *ssl, int type, int value);
+
+// ssl_do_msg_callback calls `ssl`'s message callback, if set.
+void ssl_do_msg_callback(const SSLImpl *ssl, int is_write, int content_type,
+                         Span<const uint8_t> in);
+
+
+// Transport buffers.
+
+class SSLBuffer {
+ public:
+  SSLBuffer() {}
+  ~SSLBuffer() { Clear(); }
+
+  SSLBuffer(const SSLBuffer &) = delete;
+  SSLBuffer &operator=(const SSLBuffer &) = delete;
+
+  uint8_t *data() { return buf_ + offset_; }
+  size_t size() const { return size_; }
+  bool empty() const { return size_ == 0; }
+  size_t cap() const { return cap_; }
+
+  Span<uint8_t> span() { return Span(data(), size()); }
+
+  Span<uint8_t> remaining() { return Span(data() + size(), cap() - size()); }
+
+  // Clear releases the buffer.
+  void Clear();
+
+  // EnsureCap ensures the buffer has capacity at least `new_cap`, aligned such
+  // that data written after `header_len` is aligned to a
+  // `SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD`-byte boundary. It returns true on success and false
+  // on error.
+  bool EnsureCap(size_t header_len, size_t new_cap);
+
+  // DidWrite extends the buffer by `len`. The caller must have filled in to
+  // this point.
+  void DidWrite(size_t len);
+
+  // Consume consumes `len` bytes from the front of the buffer.  The memory
+  // consumed will remain valid until the next call to `DiscardConsumed` or
+  // `Clear`.
+  void Consume(size_t len);
+
+  // DiscardConsumed discards the consumed bytes from the buffer. If the buffer
+  // is now empty, it releases memory used by it.
+  void DiscardConsumed();
+
+ private:
+  // buf_ is the memory allocated for this buffer.
+  uint8_t *buf_ = nullptr;
+  // offset_ is the offset into `buf_` which the buffer contents start at.
+  uint16_t offset_ = 0;
+  // size_ is the size of the buffer contents from `buf_` + `offset_`.
+  uint16_t size_ = 0;
+  // cap_ is how much memory beyond `buf_` + `offset_` is available.
+  uint16_t cap_ = 0;
+  // inline_buf_ is a static buffer for short reads.
+  uint8_t inline_buf_[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH];
+};
+
+// ssl_read_buffer_extend_to extends the read buffer to the desired length. For
+// TLS, it reads to the end of the buffer until the buffer is `len` bytes
+// long. For DTLS, it reads a new packet and ignores `len`. It returns one on
+// success, zero on EOF, and a negative number on error.
+//
+// It is an error to call `ssl_read_buffer_extend_to` in DTLS when the buffer is
+// non-empty.
+int ssl_read_buffer_extend_to(SSLImpl *ssl, size_t len);
+
+// ssl_handle_open_record handles the result of passing `ssl->s3->read_buffer`
+// to a record-processing function. If `ret` is a success or if the caller
+// should retry, it returns one and sets `*out_retry`. Otherwise, it returns <=
+// 0.
+int ssl_handle_open_record(SSLImpl *ssl, bool *out_retry, ssl_open_record_t ret,
+                           size_t consumed, uint8_t alert);
+
+// ssl_write_buffer_flush flushes the write buffer to the transport. It returns
+// one on success and <= 0 on error. For DTLS, whether or not the write
+// succeeds, the write buffer will be cleared.
+int ssl_write_buffer_flush(SSLImpl *ssl);
+
+
+// Certificate functions.
+
+// ssl_parse_cert_chain parses a certificate list from `cbs` in the format used
+// by a TLS Certificate message. On success, it advances `cbs` and returns
+// true. Otherwise, it returns false and sets `*out_alert` to an alert to send
+// to the peer.
+//
+// If the list is non-empty then `*out_chain` and `*out_pubkey` will be set to
+// the certificate chain and the leaf certificate's public key
+// respectively. Otherwise, both will be set to nullptr.
+//
+// If the list is non-empty and `out_leaf_sha256` is non-NULL, it writes the
+// SHA-256 hash of the leaf to `out_leaf_sha256`.
+bool ssl_parse_cert_chain(uint8_t *out_alert,
+                          UniquePtr<STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER)> *out_chain,
+                          UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> *out_pubkey,
+                          uint8_t *out_leaf_sha256, CBS *cbs,
+                          CRYPTO_BUFFER_POOL *pool);
+
+// ssl_parse_rpk_cert parses a RawPublicKey certificate from `cbs` in the format
+// used by a TLS 1.2 Certificate message (RFC 7250). On success, it advances
+// `cbs` and returns true, and sets `*out_raw_public_key` to the parsed key, and
+// sets `*out_pubkey` to the same key by incrementing the reference count, and
+// if `out_rpk_sha256` is non-NULL, it writes the SHA-256 hash of the RPK to
+// `out_rpk_sha256`. Otherwise, it returns false and sets `*out_alert` to an
+// alert to send to the peer.
+bool ssl_parse_rpk_cert(uint8_t *out_alert,
+                        UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> *out_raw_public_key,
+                        UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> *out_pubkey,
+                        uint8_t *out_rpk_sha256, CBS *cbs);
+
+enum ssl_key_usage_t {
+  key_usage_digital_signature = 0,
+  key_usage_encipherment = 2,
+};
+
+// ssl_cert_check_key_usage parses the DER-encoded, X.509 certificate in `in`
+// and returns true if doesn't specify a key usage or, if it does, if it
+// includes `bit`. Otherwise it pushes to the error queue and returns false.
+bool ssl_cert_check_key_usage(const CBS *in, enum ssl_key_usage_t bit);
+
+// ssl_cert_extract_issuer parses the DER-encoded, X.509 certificate in `in`
+// and extracts the issuer. On success it returns true and the DER encoded
+// issuer is in `out_dn`, otherwise it returns false.
+bool ssl_cert_extract_issuer(const CBS *in, CBS *out_dn);
+
+// ssl_cert_matches_issuer parses the DER-encoded, X.509 certificate in `in`
+// and returns true if its issuer is an exact match for the DER encoded
+// distinguished name in `dn`
+bool ssl_cert_matches_issuer(const CBS *in, const CBS *dn);
+
+// ssl_cert_parse_pubkey extracts the public key from the DER-encoded, X.509
+// certificate in `in`. It returns an allocated `EVP_PKEY` or else returns
+// nullptr and pushes to the error queue.
+UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> ssl_cert_parse_pubkey(const CBS *in);
+
+// SSL_parse_CA_list parses a CA list from `cbs` in the format used by a TLS
+// CertificateRequest message and Certificate Authorities extension. On success,
+// it returns a newly-allocated `CRYPTO_BUFFER` list and advances
+// `cbs`. Otherwise, it returns nullptr and sets `*out_alert` to an alert to
+// send to the peer.
+UniquePtr<STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER)> SSL_parse_CA_list(SSLImpl *ssl,
+                                                     uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                                     CBS *cbs);
+
+// ssl_has_client_CAs returns whether there are configured CAs.
+bool ssl_has_client_CAs(const SSL_CONFIG *cfg);
+
+// ssl_add_client_CA_list adds the configured CA list to `cbb` in the format
+// used by a TLS CertificateRequest message. It returns true on success and
+// false on error.
+bool ssl_add_client_CA_list(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *cbb);
+
+// ssl_has_CA_names returns whether there are configured CA names.
+bool ssl_has_CA_names(const SSL_CONFIG *cfg);
+
+// ssl_add_CA_names adds the configured CA_names list to `cbb` in the format
+// used by a TLS Certificate Authorities extension. It returns true on success
+// and false on error.
+bool ssl_add_CA_names(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *cbb);
+
+// ssl_check_leaf_certificate returns one if `pkey` and `leaf` are suitable as
+// a server's leaf certificate for `hs`. Otherwise, it returns zero and pushes
+// an error on the error queue.
+bool ssl_check_leaf_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                                const CRYPTO_BUFFER *leaf);
+
+
+// TLS 1.3 key derivation.
+
+// tls13_init_key_schedule initializes the handshake hash and key derivation
+// state, and incorporates the PSK. The cipher suite and PRF hash must have been
+// selected at this point. It returns true on success and false on error.
+bool tls13_init_key_schedule(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, Span<const uint8_t> psk);
+
+// tls13_init_early_key_schedule initializes the handshake hash and key
+// derivation state from `session` for use with 0-RTT. It returns one on success
+// and zero on error.
+bool tls13_init_early_key_schedule(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                   const SSLSession *session);
+
+// tls13_advance_key_schedule incorporates `in` into the key schedule with
+// HKDF-Extract. It returns true on success and false on error.
+bool tls13_advance_key_schedule(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, Span<const uint8_t> in);
+
+// tls13_set_traffic_key sets the read or write traffic keys to
+// `traffic_secret`. The version and cipher suite are determined from `session`.
+// It returns true on success and false on error.
+bool tls13_set_traffic_key(SSLImpl *ssl, enum ssl_encryption_level_t level,
+                           enum evp_aead_direction_t direction,
+                           const SSLSession *session,
+                           Span<const uint8_t> traffic_secret);
+
+// tls13_derive_early_secret derives the early traffic secret. It returns true
+// on success and false on error.
+bool tls13_derive_early_secret(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+
+// tls13_derive_handshake_secrets derives the handshake traffic secret. It
+// returns true on success and false on error.
+bool tls13_derive_handshake_secrets(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+
+// tls13_rotate_traffic_key derives the next read or write traffic secret. It
+// returns true on success and false on error.
+bool tls13_rotate_traffic_key(SSLImpl *ssl,
+                              enum evp_aead_direction_t direction);
+
+// tls13_derive_application_secrets derives the initial application data traffic
+// and exporter secrets based on the handshake transcripts and `master_secret`.
+// It returns true on success and false on error.
+bool tls13_derive_application_secrets(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+
+// tls13_derive_resumption_secret derives the `resumption_secret`.
+bool tls13_derive_resumption_secret(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+
+// tls13_export_keying_material provides an exporter interface to use the
+// `exporter_secret`.
+bool tls13_export_keying_material(const SSLImpl *ssl, Span<uint8_t> out,
+                                  Span<const uint8_t> secret,
+                                  std::string_view label,
+                                  Span<const uint8_t> context);
+
+// tls13_finished_mac calculates the MAC of the handshake transcript to verify
+// the integrity of the Finished message, and stores the result in `out` and
+// length in `out_len`. `is_server` is true if this is for the Server Finished
+// and false for the Client Finished.
+bool tls13_finished_mac(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
+                        bool is_server);
+
+// tls13_derive_session_psk calculates the PSK for this session based on the
+// resumption master secret and `nonce`. It returns true on success, and false
+// on failure.
+bool tls13_derive_session_psk(SSLSession *session, Span<const uint8_t> nonce,
+                              bool is_dtls);
+
+struct SSLImportedPSK {
+  static constexpr bool kAllowUniquePtr = true;
+  UniquePtr<SSLCredential> credential;
+  Array<uint8_t> imported_identity;
+  InplaceVector<uint8_t, SSL_MAX_MD_SIZE> ipskx;
+  uint16_t protocol = 0;
+  const EVP_MD *md = nullptr;
+};
+
+// tls13_derive_imported_psk computes the imported PSK value for `cred`, which
+// must be an PSK credential, for use with a target KDF of HKDF with `hkdf_md`.
+// `protocol` should be the wire version (i.e. `TLS1_3_VERSION` or
+// `DTLS1_3_VERSION`) of the target protocol. It returns the imported PSK on
+// success and std::nullopt on error.
+std::optional<SSLImportedPSK> tls13_derive_imported_psk(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                                        SSLCredential *cred,
+                                                        uint16_t protocol,
+                                                        const EVP_MD *hkdf_md);
+
+// tls13_compare_imported_psk_identity returns whether `id` is equal to `cred`'s
+// imported identity for the specified target protocol and target KDF. This
+// allows matching against PSK identities without deriving imported PSK keys.
+bool tls13_compare_imported_psk_identity(Span<const uint8_t> id,
+                                         const SSLCredential *cred,
+                                         uint16_t protocol,
+                                         const EVP_MD *hkdf_md);
+
+using SSLPreSharedKey = std::variant<SSLImportedPSK, UniquePtr<SSLSession>>;
+BORINGSSL_MAKE_DELETER(SSLPreSharedKey, Delete)
+
+// ssl_pre_shared_key_hash return's `psk`'s hash.
+const EVP_MD *ssl_pre_shared_key_hash(const SSLPreSharedKey &psk);
+
+// ssl_pre_shared_key_identity return's `psk`'s identity.
+Span<const uint8_t> ssl_pre_shared_key_identity(const SSLPreSharedKey &psk);
+
+// ssl_pre_shared_key_secret return's `psk`'s secret.
+Span<const uint8_t> ssl_pre_shared_key_secret(const SSLPreSharedKey &psk);
+
+// tls13_psk_binder calculates the PSK binder value for `psk` over `transcript`
+// and `client_hello`. On success, it writes the result to `out`, sets
+// `*out_len` to the length, and returns true. Otherwise, it returns false.
+// `binders_len` must be the length of the binders field, covering all binders
+// and the overall length prefix, in `client_hello`.
+bool tls13_psk_binder(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, Span<uint8_t> out,
+                      size_t *out_len, const SSLPreSharedKey &psk,
+                      const SSLTranscript &transcript,
+                      Span<const uint8_t> client_hello, size_t binders_len);
+
+
+// Encrypted ClientHello.
+
+struct ECHConfig {
+  static constexpr bool kAllowUniquePtr = true;
+  // raw contains the serialized ECHConfig.
+  Array<uint8_t> raw;
+  // The following fields alias into `raw`.
+  Span<const uint8_t> public_key;
+  Span<const uint8_t> public_name;
+  Span<const uint8_t> cipher_suites;
+  uint16_t kem_id = 0;
+  uint8_t maximum_name_length = 0;
+  uint8_t config_id = 0;
+};
+
+class ECHServerConfig {
+ public:
+  static constexpr bool kAllowUniquePtr = true;
+  ECHServerConfig() = default;
+  ECHServerConfig(const ECHServerConfig &other) = delete;
+  ECHServerConfig &operator=(ECHServerConfig &&) = delete;
+
+  // Init parses `ech_config` as an ECHConfig and saves a copy of `key`.
+  // It returns true on success and false on error.
+  bool Init(Span<const uint8_t> ech_config, const EVP_HPKE_KEY *key,
+            bool is_retry_config);
+
+  // SetupContext sets up `ctx` for a new connection, given the specified
+  // HPKE ciphersuite and encapsulated KEM key. It returns true on success and
+  // false on error. This function may only be called on an initialized object.
+  bool SetupContext(EVP_HPKE_CTX *ctx, uint16_t kdf_id, uint16_t aead_id,
+                    Span<const uint8_t> enc) const;
+
+  const ECHConfig &ech_config() const { return ech_config_; }
+  bool is_retry_config() const { return is_retry_config_; }
+
+ private:
+  ECHConfig ech_config_;
+  ScopedEVP_HPKE_KEY key_;
+  bool is_retry_config_ = false;
+};
+
+class SSLECHKeys : public ssl_ech_keys_st, public bssl::RefCounted<SSLECHKeys> {
+ public:
+  SSLECHKeys() : RefCounted(CheckSubClass()) {}
+
+  Vector<UniquePtr<ECHServerConfig>> configs;
+
+ private:
+  friend RefCounted;
+  ~SSLECHKeys() = default;
+};
+
+enum ssl_client_hello_type_t {
+  ssl_client_hello_unencrypted,
+  ssl_client_hello_inner,
+  ssl_client_hello_outer,
+};
+
+// ECH_CLIENT_* are types for the ClientHello encrypted_client_hello extension.
+#define ECH_CLIENT_OUTER 0
+#define ECH_CLIENT_INNER 1
+
+// ssl_decode_client_hello_inner recovers the full ClientHelloInner from the
+// EncodedClientHelloInner `encoded_client_hello_inner` by replacing its
+// outer_extensions extension with the referenced extensions from the
+// ClientHelloOuter `client_hello_outer`. If successful, it writes the recovered
+// ClientHelloInner to `out_client_hello_inner`. It returns true on success and
+// false on failure.
+//
+// This function is exported for fuzzing.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bool ssl_decode_client_hello_inner(
+    SSLImpl *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, Array<uint8_t> *out_client_hello_inner,
+    Span<const uint8_t> encoded_client_hello_inner,
+    const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello_outer);
+
+// ssl_client_hello_decrypt attempts to decrypt and decode the `payload`. It
+// writes the result to `*out`. `payload` must point into `client_hello_outer`.
+// It returns true on success and false on error. On error, it sets
+// `*out_is_decrypt_error` to whether the failure was due to a bad ciphertext.
+bool ssl_client_hello_decrypt(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                              bool *out_is_decrypt_error, Array<uint8_t> *out,
+                              const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello_outer,
+                              Span<const uint8_t> payload);
+
+#define ECH_CONFIRMATION_SIGNAL_LEN 8
+
+// ssl_ech_confirmation_signal_hello_offset returns the offset of the ECH
+// confirmation signal in a ServerHello message, including the handshake header.
+size_t ssl_ech_confirmation_signal_hello_offset(const SSLImpl *ssl);
+
+// ssl_ech_accept_confirmation computes the server's ECH acceptance signal,
+// writing it to `out`. The transcript portion is the concatenation of
+// `transcript` with `msg`. The `ECH_CONFIRMATION_SIGNAL_LEN` bytes from
+// `offset` in `msg` are replaced with zeros before hashing. This function
+// returns true on success, and false on failure.
+bool ssl_ech_accept_confirmation(
+    const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, Span<uint8_t, ECH_CONFIRMATION_SIGNAL_LEN> out,
+    Span<const uint8_t, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE> client_random,
+    const SSLTranscript &transcript, bool is_hrr, Span<const uint8_t> msg,
+    size_t offset);
+
+// ssl_is_valid_ech_public_name returns true if `public_name` is a valid ECH
+// public name and false otherwise. It is exported for testing.
+bool ssl_is_valid_ech_public_name(Span<const uint8_t> public_name);
+
+// ssl_is_valid_ech_config_list returns true if `ech_config_list` is a valid
+// ECHConfigList structure and false otherwise.
+bool ssl_is_valid_ech_config_list(Span<const uint8_t> ech_config_list);
+
+// ssl_select_ech_config selects an ECHConfig and associated parameters to offer
+// on the client and updates `hs`. It returns true on success, whether an
+// ECHConfig was found or not, and false on internal error. On success, the
+// encapsulated key is written to `out_enc` and `*out_enc_len` is set to the
+// number of bytes written. If the function did not select an ECHConfig, the
+// encapsulated key is the empty string.
+bool ssl_select_ech_config(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, Span<uint8_t> out_enc,
+                           size_t *out_enc_len);
+
+// ssl_ech_extension_body_length returns the length of the body of a ClientHello
+// ECH extension that encrypts `in_len` bytes with `aead` and an 'enc' value of
+// length `enc_len`. The result does not include the four-byte extension header.
+size_t ssl_ech_extension_body_length(const EVP_HPKE_AEAD *aead, size_t enc_len,
+                                     size_t in_len);
+
+// ssl_encrypt_client_hello constructs a new ClientHelloInner, adds it to the
+// inner transcript, and encrypts for inclusion in the ClientHelloOuter. `enc`
+// is the encapsulated key to include in the extension. It returns true on
+// success and false on error. If not offering ECH, `enc` is ignored and the
+// function will compute a GREASE ECH extension if necessary, and otherwise
+// return success while doing nothing.
+//
+// Encrypting the ClientHelloInner incorporates all extensions in the
+// ClientHelloOuter, so all other state necessary for `ssl_add_client_hello`
+// must already be computed.
+bool ssl_encrypt_client_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, Span<const uint8_t> enc);
+
+
+// Credentials.
+
+enum class SSLCredentialType {
+  kX509,
+  kDelegated,
+  kSPAKE2PlusV1Client,
+  kSPAKE2PlusV1Server,
+  kPreSharedKey,
+  kRawPublicKey,
+};
+
+class SSLCredential : public ssl_credential_st,
+                      public RefCounted<SSLCredential> {
+ public:
+  explicit SSLCredential(SSLCredentialType type);
+  SSLCredential(const SSLCredential &) = delete;
+  SSLCredential &operator=(const SSLCredential &) = delete;
+
+  // Dup returns a copy of the credential, or nullptr on error. The `ex_data`
+  // values are not copied. This is only used on the legacy credential, whose
+  // `ex_data` is inaccessible.
+  UniquePtr<SSLCredential> Dup() const;
+
+  // ClearCertAndKey erases any certificate and private key on the credential.
+  void ClearCertAndKey();
+
+  // UsesX509 returns true if the credential type uses an X.509 certificate.
+  bool UsesX509() const;
+
+  // UsesPrivateKey returns true if the credential type uses an asymmetric
+  // private and public keypair.
+  bool UsesPrivateKey() const;
+
+  // IsComplete returns whether all required fields in the credential have been
+  // filled in.
+  bool IsComplete() const;
+
+  // SetLeafCert sets the leaf certificate to `leaf`, leaving the remaining
+  // certificates unmodified. It returns true on success and false on error. If
+  // `discard_key_on_mismatch` is true and the private key is inconsistent with
+  // the new leaf certificate, it is silently discarded.
+  bool SetLeafCert(UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> leaf, bool discard_key_on_mismatch);
+
+  // ClearIntermediateCerts clears intermediate certificates in the certificate
+  // chain, while preserving the leaf.
+  void ClearIntermediateCerts();
+
+  // AppendIntermediateCert appends `cert` to the certificate chain. If there is
+  // no leaf certificate configured, it leaves a placeholder null in `chain`. It
+  // returns one on success and zero on error.
+  bool AppendIntermediateCert(UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> cert);
+
+  // ChainContainsIssuer returns true if `dn` is a byte for byte match with the
+  // issuer of any certificate in `chain`, false otherwise.
+  bool ChainContainsIssuer(Span<const uint8_t> dn) const;
+
+  // type is the credential type and determines which other fields apply.
+  SSLCredentialType type;
+
+  // pubkey is the cached public key of the credential. Unlike `privkey`, it is
+  // always present and is extracted from the certificate, delegated credential,
+  // etc.
+  UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> pubkey;
+
+  // privkey is the private key of the credential. It may be omitted in favor of
+  // `key_method`.
+  UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> privkey;
+
+  // key_method, if non-null, is a set of callbacks to call for private key
+  // operations.
+  const SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD *key_method = nullptr;
+
+  // sigalgs, if non-empty, is the set of signature algorithms supported by the
+  // private key in decreasing order of preference. If empty, the default list
+  // is used.
+  //
+  // In delegated credentials, this field is not configurable and is instead
+  // computed from the dc_cert_verify_algorithm field.
+  Array<uint16_t> sigalgs;
+
+  // chain contains the certificate chain, with the leaf at the beginning. The
+  // first element of `chain` may be nullptr to indicate that the leaf
+  // certificate has not yet been set.
+  //   If `chain` != nullptr -> len(chain) >= 1
+  //   If `chain[0]` == nullptr -> len(chain) >= 2.
+  //   `chain[1..]` != nullptr
+  UniquePtr<STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER)> chain;
+
+  // dc is the DelegatedCredential structure, if this is a delegated credential.
+  UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> dc;
+
+  // dc_algorithm is the signature scheme of the signature over the delegated
+  // credential itself, made by the end-entity certificate's public key.
+  uint16_t dc_algorithm = 0;
+
+  // Signed certificate timestamp list to be sent to the client, if requested
+  UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> signed_cert_timestamp_list;
+
+  // OCSP response to be sent to the client, if requested.
+  UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> ocsp_response;
+
+  // sid_ctx partitions the session space within a shared session cache or
+  // ticket key. If empty, the session ID context in `SSL` will be used.
+  InplaceVector<uint8_t, SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH> sid_ctx;
+
+  // SPAKE2+-specific information.
+  Array<uint8_t> pake_context;
+  Array<uint8_t> client_identity;
+  Array<uint8_t> server_identity;
+  Array<uint8_t> password_verifier_w0;
+  Array<uint8_t> password_verifier_w1;  // server-only
+  Array<uint8_t> registration_record;   // client-only
+  mutable std::atomic<uint32_t> pake_limit;
+
+  // External-PSK-specific information. epskx is the HKDF-Extract-ed value, from
+  // Section 5.1 of RFC 9258.
+  Array<uint8_t> epskx;
+  Array<uint8_t> epsk_id;
+  const EVP_MD *epsk_md = nullptr;
+  Array<uint8_t> epsk_context;
+
+  // Checks whether there are still permitted PAKE attempts remaining, without
+  // changing the counter.
+  bool HasPAKEAttempts() const;
+
+  // Atomically decrement `pake_limit`. Return true if successful and false if
+  // `pake_limit` is already zero.
+  bool ClaimPAKEAttempt() const;
+
+  // Atomically increment `pake_limit`. This must be paired with a
+  // `ClaimPAKEAttempt` call.
+  void RestorePAKEAttempt() const;
+
+  // trust_anchor_id, if non-empty, is the trust anchor ID for the root of the
+  // chain in `chain`.
+  Array<uint8_t> trust_anchor_id;
+
+  // trust_anchor_group_patterns describes trust anchor groups that also match
+  // this credential.
+  Vector<Array<uint8_t>> trust_anchor_group_patterns;
+
+  CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;
+
+  // must_match_issuer is a flag indicating that this credential should be
+  // considered only when it matches a peer request for a particular issuer via
+  // a negotiation mechanism (such as the certificate_authorities extension).
+  // This also implies that chain is a certificate path ending in a certificate
+  // issued by the certificate with that trust anchor identifier.
+  bool must_match_issuer = false;
+
+ private:
+  friend RefCounted;
+  ~SSLCredential();
+};
+
+// ssl_trust_anchor_pattern_matches_id returns whether `pattern`, a trust anchor
+// ID pattern, matches `id`, a trust anchor ID.
+bool ssl_trust_anchor_pattern_matches_id(Span<const uint8_t> pattern,
+                                         Span<const uint8_t> id);
+
+// ssl_get_full_credential_list computes `hs`'s full credential list, including
+// the legacy credential. On success, it writes it to `*out` and returns true.
+// Otherwise, it returns false. The credential list may be empty, in which case
+// this function will successfully output an empty array.
+//
+// This function should be called at most once during the handshake and is
+// intended to be used for certificate-based credentials. It runs the
+// auto-chaining logic as part of finishing the legacy credential. Other uses of
+// the credential list (e.g. PAKE credentials) should iterate over
+// `hs->config->cert->credentials`.
+//
+// The pointers in the result are only valid until `hs` is next mutated.
+bool ssl_get_full_credential_list(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                  Array<SSLCredential *> *out);
+
+// ssl_credential_matches_requested_issuers returns true if `cred` is a
+// usable match for any requested issuers in `hs`, and false with an error
+// otherwise.
+bool ssl_credential_matches_requested_issuers(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                              const SSLCredential *cred);
+
+// ssl_check_tls13_credential_ignoring_issuer returns true if `cred` is usable
+// as the certificate in a TLS 1.3 handshake, ignoring the issuer check.
+// `allowed_cert_types` is a nonempty set of cert types (`TLSEXT_cert_type_*`
+// values) that are usable; `cred` must match one of these types.
+// `out_sigalg` will be set to a matching signature algorithm if true is
+// returned.
+bool ssl_check_tls13_credential_ignoring_issuer(
+    SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, Span<const uint8_t> allowed_cert_types,
+    const SSLCredential *cred, uint16_t *out_sigalg);
+
+
+// Client certificate type & Server certificate type.
+
+inline constexpr uint8_t kAllCertTypes[] = {
+    TLSEXT_cert_type_x509,
+    TLSEXT_cert_type_rpk,
+};
+inline constexpr size_t kNumCertTypes = std::size(kAllCertTypes);
+inline constexpr uint8_t kDefaultCertType = TLSEXT_cert_type_x509;
+
+// ssl_credential_type_to_cert_type returns the certificate type value
+// (`TLSEXT_cert_type_*` value) corresponding to `cred_type`, or else
+// std::nullopt.
+std::optional<uint8_t> ssl_credential_type_to_cert_type(
+    SSLCredentialType cred_type);
+
+// ssl_setup_client_certificate_type computes the client cert types to offer, as
+// a client, and saves them in `hs`. The values are used later when checking
+// that the server responded with a valid value.
+void ssl_setup_client_certificate_type(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+
+// ssl_negotiate_client_certificate_type, for a server, negotiates the
+// client_certificate_type extension, if applicable. It updates
+// `hs->peer_cert_type` appropriately and returns true if negotiation was
+// successful or not necessary (i.e. if we are not requesting a cert from the
+// client), or it returns false and sets `*out_alert` to an alert on error.
+bool ssl_negotiate_client_certificate_type(
+    SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
+    const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello);
+
+// ssl_get_allowed_server_cert_types, for a server, returns the cert types that
+// may be used based on the server_certificate_type extension in the
+// ClientHello. It returns a nonempty list of allowable certificate types. By
+// default, if the client did not send the extension, X.509 certificates are
+// allowed. The returned cert types may include unrecognized values. Returns
+// nullopt and sets `out_alert` on failure.
+std::optional<Span<const uint8_t>> ssl_get_allowed_server_cert_types(
+    const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello,
+    uint8_t *out_alert);
+
+
+// Handshake functions.
+
+enum ssl_hs_wait_t {
+  ssl_hs_error,
+  ssl_hs_ok,
+  ssl_hs_read_server_hello,
+  ssl_hs_read_message,
+  ssl_hs_flush,
+  ssl_hs_certificate_selection_pending,
+  ssl_hs_x509_lookup,
+  ssl_hs_private_key_operation,
+  ssl_hs_pending_session,
+  ssl_hs_pending_ticket,
+  ssl_hs_early_return,
+  ssl_hs_early_data_rejected,
+  ssl_hs_read_end_of_early_data,
+  ssl_hs_read_change_cipher_spec,
+  ssl_hs_certificate_verify,
+  ssl_hs_hints_ready,
+};
+
+enum ssl_grease_index_t {
+  ssl_grease_cipher = 0,
+  ssl_grease_group,
+  ssl_grease_extension1,
+  ssl_grease_extension2,
+  ssl_grease_version,
+  ssl_grease_ticket_extension,
+  ssl_grease_ech_config_id,
+  ssl_grease_signature_algorithm,
+  ssl_grease_last_index = ssl_grease_signature_algorithm,
+};
+
+// SSL_HANDSHAKE_HINTS contains handshake hints for a connection. See
+// `SSL_request_handshake_hints` and related functions.
+struct SSL_HANDSHAKE_HINTS {
+  static constexpr bool kAllowUniquePtr = true;
+
+  Array<uint8_t> server_random_tls12;
+  Array<uint8_t> server_random_tls13;
+
+  uint16_t key_share_group_id = 0;
+  Array<uint8_t> key_share_ciphertext;
+  Array<uint8_t> key_share_secret;
+
+  uint16_t signature_algorithm = 0;
+  Array<uint8_t> signature_input;
+  Array<uint8_t> signature_spki;
+  Array<uint8_t> signature;
+
+  Array<uint8_t> decrypted_psk;
+  bool ignore_psk = false;
+
+  uint16_t cert_compression_alg_id = 0;
+  Array<uint8_t> cert_compression_input;
+  Array<uint8_t> cert_compression_output;
+
+  uint16_t ecdhe_group_id = 0;
+  Array<uint8_t> ecdhe_public_key;
+  Array<uint8_t> ecdhe_private_key;
+
+  Array<uint8_t> decrypted_ticket;
+  bool renew_ticket = false;
+  bool ignore_ticket = false;
+};
+
+struct SSLPAKEShare {
+  static constexpr bool kAllowUniquePtr = true;
+  uint16_t named_pake;
+  Array<uint8_t> client_identity;
+  Array<uint8_t> server_identity;
+  Array<uint8_t> pake_message;
+};
+
+struct SSL_HANDSHAKE {
+  explicit SSL_HANDSHAKE(SSLImpl *ssl);
+  ~SSL_HANDSHAKE();
+  static constexpr bool kAllowUniquePtr = true;
+
+  // ssl is a non-owning pointer to the parent `SSL` object.
+  SSLImpl *ssl;
+
+  // config is a non-owning pointer to the handshake configuration.
+  SSL_CONFIG *config;
+
+  // wait contains the operation the handshake is currently blocking on or
+  // `ssl_hs_ok` if none.
+  enum ssl_hs_wait_t wait = ssl_hs_ok;
+
+  // state is the internal state for the TLS 1.2 and below handshake. Its
+  // values depend on `do_handshake` but the starting state is always zero.
+  int state = 0;
+
+  // tls13_state is the internal state for the TLS 1.3 handshake. Its values
+  // depend on `do_handshake` but the starting state is always zero.
+  int tls13_state = 0;
+
+  // min_version is the minimum accepted protocol version, taking account both
+  // `SSL_OP_NO_*` and `SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version` APIs.
+  uint16_t min_version = 0;
+
+  // max_version is the maximum accepted protocol version, taking account both
+  // `SSL_OP_NO_*` and `SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version` APIs.
+  uint16_t max_version = 0;
+
+  InplaceVector<uint8_t, SSL_MAX_MD_SIZE> secret;
+  InplaceVector<uint8_t, SSL_MAX_MD_SIZE> early_traffic_secret;
+  InplaceVector<uint8_t, SSL_MAX_MD_SIZE> client_handshake_secret;
+  InplaceVector<uint8_t, SSL_MAX_MD_SIZE> server_handshake_secret;
+  InplaceVector<uint8_t, SSL_MAX_MD_SIZE> client_traffic_secret_0;
+  InplaceVector<uint8_t, SSL_MAX_MD_SIZE> server_traffic_secret_0;
+  InplaceVector<uint8_t, SSL_MAX_MD_SIZE> expected_client_finished;
+
+  // GetClientHello, on the server, returns either the normal ClientHello
+  // message or the ClientHelloInner if it has been serialized to
+  // `ech_client_hello_buf`. This function should only be called when the
+  // current message is a ClientHello. It returns true on success and false on
+  // error.
+  //
+  // Note that fields of the returned `out_msg` and `out_client_hello` point
+  // into a handshake-owned buffer, so their lifetimes should not exceed this
+  // SSL_HANDSHAKE.
+  bool GetClientHello(SSLMessage *out_msg, SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *out_client_hello);
+
+  union {
+    // sent is a bitset where the bits correspond to elements of kExtensions
+    // in extensions.cc. Each bit is set if that extension was sent in a
+    // ClientHello. It's not used by servers.
+    uint32_t sent = 0;
+    // received is a bitset, like `sent`, but is used by servers to record
+    // which extensions were received from a client.
+    uint32_t received;
+  } extensions;
+
+  // inner_extensions_sent, on clients that offer ECH, is `extensions.sent` for
+  // the ClientHelloInner.
+  uint32_t inner_extensions_sent = 0;
+
+  // early_data_written is the amount of early data that has been written by the
+  // record layer.
+  uint32_t early_data_written = 0;
+
+  // error, if `wait` is `ssl_hs_error`, is the error the handshake failed on.
+  UniquePtr<ERR_SAVE_STATE> error;
+
+  // key_shares are the current key exchange instances, in preference order. Any
+  // members of this vector must be non-null.
+  InplaceVector<UniquePtr<SSLKeyShare>, kNumNamedGroups> key_shares;
+
+  // pre_shared_keys are the pre-shared keys to be offered by the client.
+  Vector<SSLPreSharedKey> pre_shared_keys;
+
+  // pre_shared_key is the selected pre-shared key on the server.
+  UniquePtr<SSLPreSharedKey> pre_shared_key;
+
+  // selected_psk_index is the index of the selected pre-shared key on the
+  // server.
+  std::optional<uint16_t> selected_psk_index;
+
+  // transcript is the current handshake transcript.
+  SSLTranscript transcript;
+
+  // inner_transcript, on the client, is the handshake transcript for the
+  // ClientHelloInner handshake. It is moved to `transcript` if the server
+  // accepts ECH.
+  SSLTranscript inner_transcript;
+
+  // inner_client_random is the ClientHello random value used with
+  // ClientHelloInner.
+  uint8_t inner_client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE] = {0};
+
+  // cookie is the value of the cookie in HelloRetryRequest, or empty if none
+  // was received.
+  Array<uint8_t> cookie;
+
+  // dtls_cookie is the value of the cookie in DTLS HelloVerifyRequest. If
+  // empty, either none was received or HelloVerifyRequest contained an empty
+  // cookie. Check the received_hello_verify_request field to distinguish an
+  // empty cookie from no HelloVerifyRequest message being received.
+  Array<uint8_t> dtls_cookie;
+
+  // ech_client_outer contains the outer ECH extension to send in the
+  // ClientHello, excluding the header and type byte.
+  Array<uint8_t> ech_client_outer;
+
+  // ech_retry_configs, on the client, contains the retry configs from the
+  // server as a serialized ECHConfigList.
+  Array<uint8_t> ech_retry_configs;
+
+  // ech_client_hello_buf, on the server, contains the bytes of the
+  // reconstructed ClientHelloInner message.
+  Array<uint8_t> ech_client_hello_buf;
+
+  // key_share_bytes is the key_share extension that the client should send.
+  Array<uint8_t> key_share_bytes;
+
+  // key_share_ciphertext, for servers, is encapsulated shared secret to be sent
+  // to the client in the TLS 1.3 key_share extension.
+  Array<uint8_t> key_share_ciphertext;
+
+  // peer_sigalgs are the signature algorithms that the peer supports. These are
+  // taken from the contents of the signature algorithms extension for a server
+  // or from the CertificateRequest for a client.
+  Array<uint16_t> peer_sigalgs;
+
+  // peer_supported_group_list contains the supported group IDs advertised by
+  // the peer. This is only set on the server's end. The server does not
+  // advertise this extension to the client.
+  Array<uint16_t> peer_supported_group_list;
+
+  // peer_delegated_credential_sigalgs are the signature algorithms the peer
+  // supports with delegated credentials, or empty if the peer does not support
+  // delegated credentials.
+  Array<uint16_t> peer_delegated_credential_sigalgs;
+
+  // peer_key is the peer's ECDH key for a TLS 1.2 client.
+  Array<uint8_t> peer_key;
+
+  // extension_permutation is the permutation to apply to ClientHello
+  // extensions. It maps indices into the `kExtensions` table into other
+  // indices.
+  Array<uint8_t> extension_permutation;
+
+  // cert_compression_alg_id, for a server, contains the negotiated certificate
+  // compression algorithm for this client. It is only valid if
+  // `cert_compression_negotiated` is true.
+  uint16_t cert_compression_alg_id;
+
+  // ech_hpke_ctx is the HPKE context used in ECH. On the server, it is
+  // initialized if `ech_status` is `ssl_ech_accepted`. On the client, it is
+  // initialized if `selected_ech_config` is not nullptr.
+  ScopedEVP_HPKE_CTX ech_hpke_ctx;
+
+  // server_params, in a TLS 1.2 server, stores the ServerKeyExchange
+  // parameters. It has client and server randoms prepended for signing
+  // convenience.
+  Array<uint8_t> server_params;
+
+  // peer_psk_identity_hint, on the client, is the psk_identity_hint sent by the
+  // server when using a TLS 1.2 PSK key exchange.
+  UniquePtr<char> peer_psk_identity_hint;
+
+  // ca_names contains the list of CAs received via the Certificate Authorities
+  // extension in our peer's CertificateRequest or ClientHello message
+  UniquePtr<STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER)> ca_names;
+
+  // peer_requested_trust_anchors, if not nullopt, contains the trust anchor IDs
+  // (possibly none) the peer requested in ClientHello or CertificateRequest. If
+  // nullopt, the peer did not send the extension.
+  std::optional<Array<uint8_t>> peer_requested_trust_anchors;
+
+  // peer_available_trust_anchors, if not empty, is the list of trust anchor IDs
+  // the peer reported as available in EncryptedExtensions. This is only sent by
+  // servers to clients.
+  Array<uint8_t> peer_available_trust_anchors;
+
+  // cached_x509_ca_names contains a cache of parsed versions of the elements of
+  // `ca_names`. This pointer is left non-owning so only
+  // `ssl_crypto_x509_method` needs to link against crypto/x509.
+  STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *cached_x509_ca_names = nullptr;
+
+  // certificate_types, on the client, contains the set of certificate types
+  // received in a CertificateRequest message.
+  Array<uint8_t> certificate_types;
+
+  // credential is the credential we are using for the handshake.
+  UniquePtr<SSLCredential> credential;
+
+  // peer_pubkey is the public key parsed from the peer's leaf certificate.
+  UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> peer_pubkey;
+
+  // new_session is the new mutable session being established by the current
+  // handshake. It should not be cached.
+  UniquePtr<SSLSession> new_session;
+
+  // early_session is the session corresponding to the current 0-RTT state on
+  // the client if `in_early_data` is true.
+  UniquePtr<SSLSession> early_session;
+
+  // ssl_ech_keys, for servers, is the set of ECH keys to use with this
+  // handshake. This is copied from `SSL_CTX` to ensure consistent behavior as
+  // `SSL_CTX` rotates keys.
+  UniquePtr<SSLECHKeys> ech_keys;
+
+  // selected_ech_config, for clients, is the ECHConfig the client uses to offer
+  // ECH, or nullptr if ECH is not being offered. If non-NULL, `ech_hpke_ctx`
+  // will be initialized.
+  UniquePtr<ECHConfig> selected_ech_config;
+
+  // new_cipher is the cipher being negotiated in this handshake.
+  const SSL_CIPHER *new_cipher = nullptr;
+
+  // key_block is the record-layer key block for TLS 1.2 and earlier.
+  Array<uint8_t> key_block;
+
+  // pending_hints, if non-null, contains the pending hints to filled as the
+  // predicted handshake progresses. If non-null, only the first round-trip of
+  // the handshake will complete, after which the `pending_hints` structure can
+  // be serialized.
+  UniquePtr<SSL_HANDSHAKE_HINTS> pending_hints;
+
+  // provided_hints, if non-null, contains hints configured by the caller
+  // and will influence the (real or predicted) handshake on match.
+  UniquePtr<SSL_HANDSHAKE_HINTS> provided_hints;
+
+  // ech_is_inner, on the server, indicates whether the ClientHello contained an
+  // inner ECH extension.
+  bool ech_is_inner : 1;
+
+  // ech_authenticated_reject, on the client, indicates whether an ECH rejection
+  // handshake has been authenticated.
+  bool ech_authenticated_reject : 1;
+
+  // scts_requested is true if the SCT extension is in the ClientHello.
+  bool scts_requested : 1;
+
+  // handshake_finalized is true once the handshake has completed, at which
+  // point accessors should use the established state.
+  bool handshake_finalized : 1;
+
+  // accept_psk_mode stores whether the client's PSK mode is compatible with our
+  // preferences.
+  bool accept_psk_mode : 1;
+
+  // cert_request is true if a client certificate was requested.
+  bool cert_request : 1;
+
+  // certificate_status_expected is true if OCSP stapling was negotiated and the
+  // server is expected to send a CertificateStatus message. (This is used on
+  // both the client and server sides.)
+  bool certificate_status_expected : 1;
+
+  // ocsp_stapling_requested is true if a client requested OCSP stapling.
+  bool ocsp_stapling_requested : 1;
+
+  // should_ack_sni is used by a server and indicates that the SNI extension
+  // should be echoed in the ServerHello.
+  bool should_ack_sni : 1;
+
+  // in_false_start is true if there is a pending client handshake in False
+  // Start. The client may write data at this point.
+  bool in_false_start : 1;
+
+  // in_early_data is true if there is a pending handshake that has progressed
+  // enough to send and receive early data.
+  bool in_early_data : 1;
+
+  // early_data_offered is true if the client sent the early_data extension.
+  bool early_data_offered : 1;
+
+  // can_early_read is true if application data may be read at this point in the
+  // handshake.
+  bool can_early_read : 1;
+
+  // can_early_write is true if application data may be written at this point in
+  // the handshake.
+  bool can_early_write : 1;
+
+  // is_early_version is true if the protocol version configured is not
+  // necessarily the final version and is just the predicted 0-RTT version.
+  bool is_early_version : 1;
+
+  // next_proto_neg_seen is one of NPN was negotiated.
+  bool next_proto_neg_seen : 1;
+
+  // ticket_expected is true if a TLS 1.2 NewSessionTicket message is to be sent
+  // or received.
+  bool ticket_expected : 1;
+
+  // extended_master_secret is true if the extended master secret extension is
+  // negotiated in this handshake.
+  bool extended_master_secret : 1;
+
+  // pending_private_key_op is true if there is a pending private key operation
+  // in progress.
+  bool pending_private_key_op : 1;
+
+  // cert_compression_negotiated is true iff `cert_compression_alg_id` is valid.
+  bool cert_compression_negotiated : 1;
+
+  // apply_jdk11_workaround is true if the peer is probably a JDK 11 client
+  // which implemented TLS 1.3 incorrectly.
+  bool apply_jdk11_workaround : 1;
+
+  // can_release_private_key is true if the private key will no longer be used
+  // in this handshake.
+  bool can_release_private_key : 1;
+
+  // channel_id_negotiated is true if Channel ID should be used in this
+  // handshake.
+  bool channel_id_negotiated : 1;
+
+  // received_hello_verify_request is true if we received a HelloVerifyRequest
+  // message from the server.
+  bool received_hello_verify_request : 1;
+
+  // matched_peer_trust_anchor indicates that we have matched a trust anchor
+  // the peer requested in the trust anchors extension.
+  bool matched_peer_trust_anchor : 1;
+
+  // peer_matched_trust_anchor is true if the peer indicated a match with one of
+  // our requested trust anchors.
+  bool peer_matched_trust_anchor : 1;
+
+  // client_version is the value sent or received in the ClientHello version.
+  uint16_t client_version = 0;
+
+  // early_data_read is the amount of early data that has been read by the
+  // record layer.
+  uint16_t early_data_read = 0;
+
+  // signature_algorithm is the signature algorithm to be used in signing with
+  // the selected credential, or zero if not applicable or not yet selected.
+  uint16_t signature_algorithm = 0;
+
+  // ech_config_id is the ECH config sent by the client.
+  uint8_t ech_config_id = 0;
+
+  // session_id is the session ID in the ClientHello.
+  InplaceVector<uint8_t, SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH> session_id;
+
+  // grease_seed is the entropy for GREASE values.
+  uint8_t grease_seed[ssl_grease_last_index + 1] = {0};
+
+  // pake_share is the PAKE message received over the wire, if any.
+  UniquePtr<SSLPAKEShare> pake_share;
+
+  // pake_share_bytes are the bytes of the PAKEShare to send, if any.
+  Array<uint8_t> pake_share_bytes;
+
+  // pake_prover is the PAKE context for a client.
+  UniquePtr<spake2plus::Prover> pake_prover;
+
+  // pake_verifier is the PAKE context for a server.
+  UniquePtr<spake2plus::Verifier> pake_verifier;
+
+  // offered_client_cert_types, for a client, is a list of client certificate
+  // types (`TLSEXT_cert_type_*` values) that were sent in the
+  // client_certificate_type extension in the ClientHello.
+  InplaceVector<uint8_t, kNumCertTypes> offered_client_cert_types;
+
+  // peer_cert_type, is the cert type expected from the peer in this handshake,
+  // negotiated based on server_certificate_type extensions (for a client) or
+  // client_certificate_type extensions (for a server), or set to X.509
+  // certificates by default (if the peer didn't send the extension).
+  // This is not used in resumption.
+  uint8_t peer_cert_type = kDefaultCertType;
+
+  // client_cert_type, for a client, is the cert type for this side of the
+  // handshake to present to the peer (server) in a Certificate message,
+  // negotiated based on client_certificate_type extensions.
+  // This is not used in resumption.
+  uint8_t client_cert_type = kDefaultCertType;
+
+  // client_requested_server_cert_padding_size, for a server, is the number of
+  // bytes that the client requested we send, or nullopt if the client did not
+  // request any padding.
+  std::optional<uint16_t> client_requested_server_padding_size;
+};
+
+// kMaxTickets is the maximum number of tickets to send immediately after the
+// handshake. We use a one-byte ticket nonce, and there is no point in sending
+// so many tickets.
+constexpr size_t kMaxTickets = 16;
+
+UniquePtr<SSL_HANDSHAKE> ssl_handshake_new(SSLImpl *ssl);
+
+// ssl_check_message_type checks if `msg` has type `type`. If so it returns
+// one. Otherwise, it sends an alert and returns zero.
+bool ssl_check_message_type(SSLImpl *ssl, const SSLMessage &msg, int type);
+
+// ssl_run_handshake runs the TLS handshake. It returns one on success and <= 0
+// on error. It sets `out_early_return` to one if we've completed the handshake
+// early.
+int ssl_run_handshake(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, bool *out_early_return);
+
+// The following are implementations of `do_handshake` for the client and
+// server.
+enum ssl_hs_wait_t ssl_client_handshake(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+enum ssl_hs_wait_t ssl_server_handshake(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+enum ssl_hs_wait_t tls13_client_handshake(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+enum ssl_hs_wait_t tls13_server_handshake(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+
+// The following functions return human-readable representations of the TLS
+// handshake states for debugging.
+const char *ssl_client_handshake_state(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+const char *ssl_server_handshake_state(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+const char *tls13_client_handshake_state(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+const char *tls13_server_handshake_state(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+
+// tls13_add_key_update queues a KeyUpdate message on `ssl`. `request_type` must
+// be one of `SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED` or `SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED`.
+bool tls13_add_key_update(SSLImpl *ssl, int request_type);
+
+// tls13_post_handshake processes a post-handshake message. It returns true on
+// success and false on failure.
+bool tls13_post_handshake(SSLImpl *ssl, const SSLMessage &msg);
+
+bool tls13_process_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const SSLMessage &msg,
+                               bool allow_anonymous);
+bool tls13_process_certificate_verify(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const SSLMessage &msg);
+
+// tls13_process_finished processes `msg` as a Finished message from the
+// peer. If `use_saved_value` is true, the verify_data is compared against
+// `hs->expected_client_finished` rather than computed fresh.
+bool tls13_process_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const SSLMessage &msg,
+                            bool use_saved_value);
+
+bool tls13_add_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+
+// tls13_add_certificate_verify adds a TLS 1.3 CertificateVerify message to the
+// handshake. If it returns `ssl_private_key_retry`, it should be called again
+// to retry when the signing operation is completed.
+enum ssl_private_key_result_t tls13_add_certificate_verify(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+
+bool tls13_add_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+bool tls13_process_new_session_ticket(SSLImpl *ssl, const SSLMessage &msg);
+UniquePtr<SSLSession> tls13_create_session_with_ticket(SSLImpl *ssl, CBS *body);
+
+// ssl_setup_extension_permutation computes a ClientHello extension permutation
+// for `hs`, if applicable. It returns true on success and false on error.
+bool ssl_setup_extension_permutation(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+
+// ssl_setup_pre_shared_keys computes the offered client PSKs and saves them in
+// `hs`. It returns true on success and false on failure.
+bool ssl_setup_pre_shared_keys(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+
+// ssl_setup_key_shares computes client key shares and saves them in `hs`. It
+// returns true on success and false on failure. In order of precedence:
+//
+// - If `override_group_id` is non-zero, it offers a single key share of the
+//   specified group.
+//
+// - If a group can be predicted on the basis of a server hint set via
+//   `SSL_set1_server_supported_groups_hint`, a single key share of that group
+//   is sent.
+//
+// - If any number of key shares (including zero) were previously specified by
+//   the caller via `SSL_set1_client_key_shares`, those are used.
+//
+// - Otherwise, it selects the first supported group and may select a second if
+//   at most one of the two is a post-quantum group.
+//
+// GREASE will be included if enabled, when `override_group_id` is zero.
+bool ssl_setup_key_shares(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint16_t override_group_id);
+
+// ssl_setup_pake_shares computes the client PAKE shares and saves them in `hs`.
+// It returns true on success and false on failure.
+bool ssl_setup_pake_shares(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+
+bool ssl_ext_key_share_parse_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                         Array<uint8_t> *out_secret,
+                                         uint8_t *out_alert, CBS *contents);
+bool ssl_ext_key_share_parse_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, bool *out_found,
+                                         Span<const uint8_t> *out_peer_key,
+                                         uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                         const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello);
+bool ssl_ext_pake_add_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out);
+bool ssl_ext_key_share_add_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out);
+
+bool ssl_ext_pake_parse_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                    Array<uint8_t> *out_secret,
+                                    uint8_t *out_alert, CBS *contents);
+
+struct SSLOfferedPSK {
+  CBS identity, binder;
+  uint32_t obfuscated_ticket_age;
+};
+
+struct SSLOfferedPSKs {
+  CBS identities, binders;
+  std::optional<SSLOfferedPSK> Next();
+};
+
+const SSLPreSharedKey *ssl_ext_pre_shared_key_parse_serverhello(
+    SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert, CBS *contents);
+std::optional<SSLOfferedPSKs> ssl_ext_pre_shared_key_parse_clienthello(
+    SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert, const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello,
+    CBS *contents);
+
+// ssl_verify_psk_binder verifies `client_hello` has a valid binder for `psk`.
+// The binder is computed with `client_hello` and `hs`'s transcript, which
+// should not have `client_hello` in it. On success, it returns true. Otherwise,
+// it returns false and sets `*out_alert` to an alert to send.
+//
+// This function additionally saves the index where `psk` was found in `hs`. It
+// must be called before `ssl_ext_pre_shared_key_add_serverhello`.
+bool ssl_verify_psk_binder(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                           const SSLPreSharedKey &psk,
+                           const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO &client_hello);
+
+bool ssl_ext_pre_shared_key_add_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out);
+
+
+// ssl_is_sct_list_valid does a shallow parse of the SCT list in `contents` and
+// returns whether it's valid.
+bool ssl_is_sct_list_valid(const CBS *contents);
+
+// ssl_write_client_hello_without_extensions writes a ClientHello to `out`,
+// up to the extensions field. `type` determines the type of ClientHello to
+// write. If `omit_session_id` is true, the session ID is empty.
+bool ssl_write_client_hello_without_extensions(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                               CBB *cbb,
+                                               ssl_client_hello_type_t type,
+                                               bool empty_session_id);
+
+// ssl_add_client_hello constructs a ClientHello and adds it to the outgoing
+// flight. It returns true on success and false on error.
+bool ssl_add_client_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+
+struct ParsedServerHello {
+  CBS raw;
+  uint16_t legacy_version = 0;
+  CBS random;
+  CBS session_id;
+  uint16_t cipher_suite = 0;
+  uint8_t compression_method = 0;
+  CBS extensions;
+};
+
+// ssl_parse_server_hello parses `msg` as a ServerHello. On success, it writes
+// the result to `*out` and returns true. Otherwise, it returns false and sets
+// `*out_alert` to an alert to send to the peer.
+bool ssl_parse_server_hello(ParsedServerHello *out, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                            const SSLMessage &msg);
+
+enum ssl_cert_verify_context_t {
+  ssl_cert_verify_server,
+  ssl_cert_verify_client,
+  ssl_cert_verify_channel_id,
+};
+
+// tls13_get_cert_verify_signature_input generates the message to be signed for
+// TLS 1.3's CertificateVerify message. `cert_verify_context` determines the
+// type of signature. It sets `*out` to a newly allocated buffer containing the
+// result. This function returns true on success and false on failure.
+bool tls13_get_cert_verify_signature_input(
+    SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, Array<uint8_t> *out,
+    enum ssl_cert_verify_context_t cert_verify_context);
+
+// ssl_is_valid_alpn_list returns whether `in` is a valid ALPN protocol list.
+bool ssl_is_valid_alpn_list(Span<const uint8_t> in);
+
+// ssl_is_alpn_protocol_allowed returns whether `protocol` is a valid server
+// selection for `hs->ssl`'s client preferences.
+bool ssl_is_alpn_protocol_allowed(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                  Span<const uint8_t> protocol);
+
+// ssl_alpn_list_contains_protocol returns whether `list`, a serialized ALPN
+// protocol list, contains `protocol`.
+bool ssl_alpn_list_contains_protocol(Span<const uint8_t> list,
+                                     Span<const uint8_t> protocol);
+
+// ssl_negotiate_alpn negotiates the ALPN extension, if applicable. It returns
+// true on successful negotiation or if nothing was negotiated. It returns false
+// and sets `*out_alert` to an alert on error.
+bool ssl_negotiate_alpn(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                        const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello);
+
+// ssl_get_local_application_settings looks up the configured ALPS value for
+// `protocol`. If found, it sets `*out_settings` to the value and returns true.
+// Otherwise, it returns false.
+bool ssl_get_local_application_settings(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                        Span<const uint8_t> *out_settings,
+                                        Span<const uint8_t> protocol);
+
+// ssl_negotiate_alps negotiates the ALPS extension, if applicable. It returns
+// true on successful negotiation or if nothing was negotiated. It returns false
+// and sets `*out_alert` to an alert on error.
+bool ssl_negotiate_alps(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                        const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello);
+
+// ssl_is_valid_trust_anchor_id returns whether `in` is a valid trust anchor ID.
+bool ssl_is_valid_trust_anchor_id(Span<const uint8_t> id);
+
+// ssl_is_valid_trust_anchor_list returns whether `in` is a valid trust anchor
+// ID list.
+bool ssl_is_valid_trust_anchor_list(Span<const uint8_t> in);
+
+struct SSLExtension {
+  SSLExtension(uint16_t type_arg, bool allowed_arg = true)
+      : type(type_arg), allowed(allowed_arg), present(false) {
+    CBS_init(&data, nullptr, 0);
+  }
+
+  uint16_t type;
+  bool allowed;
+  bool present;
+  CBS data;
+};
+
+// ssl_parse_extensions parses a TLS extensions block out of `cbs` and advances
+// it. It writes the parsed extensions to pointers in `extensions`. On success,
+// it fills in the `present` and `data` fields and returns true. Otherwise, it
+// sets `*out_alert` to an alert to send and returns false. Unknown extensions
+// are rejected unless `ignore_unknown` is true.
+bool ssl_parse_extensions(const CBS *cbs, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                          std::initializer_list<SSLExtension *> extensions,
+                          bool ignore_unknown);
+
+// ssl_verify_peer_cert verifies the peer certificate for `hs`.
+enum ssl_verify_result_t ssl_verify_peer_cert(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+// ssl_reverify_peer_cert verifies the peer certificate for `hs` when resuming a
+// session.
+enum ssl_verify_result_t ssl_reverify_peer_cert(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                                bool send_alert);
+
+enum ssl_hs_wait_t ssl_get_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+
+// ssl_send_finished adds a Finished message to the current flight of messages.
+// It returns true on success and false on error.
+bool ssl_send_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+
+// ssl_send_tls12_certificate adds a TLS 1.2 Certificate message to the current
+// flight of messages. It returns true on success and false on error.
+bool ssl_send_tls12_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+
+// ssl_handshake_session returns the `SSL_SESSION` corresponding to the current
+// handshake. Note, in TLS 1.2 resumptions, this session is immutable.
+const SSLSession *ssl_handshake_session(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+
+// ssl_done_writing_client_hello is called after the last ClientHello is written
+// by `hs`. It releases some memory that is no longer needed.
+void ssl_done_writing_client_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+
+// ssl_accepts_server_certificate_auth returns whether `hs`, which must be a
+// client, accepts certificate-based authentication. If it returns false, the
+// client should not send certificate-related extensions, and should not accept
+// server responses that result in a certificate-based flow.
+bool ssl_accepts_server_certificate_auth(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+
+
+// Flags.
+
+// SSLFlags is a bitmask of flags that can be encoded with the TLS flags
+// extension, draft-ietf-tls-tlsflags-14. For now, our in-memory representation
+// matches the wire representation, and we only support flags up to 32. If
+// higher values are needed, we can increase the size of the bitmask, or only
+// store the flags we implement in the bitmask.
+using SSLFlags = uint32_t;
+inline constexpr SSLFlags kSSLFlagResumptionAcrossNames = 1 << 8;
+
+// ssl_add_flags_extension encodes a tls_flags extension (including the header)
+// containing the flags in `flags`. It returns true on success and false on
+// error. If `flags` is zero (no flags set), it returns true without adding
+// anything to `cbb`.
+bool ssl_add_flags_extension(CBB *cbb, SSLFlags flags);
+
+// ssl_parse_flags_extension_request parses tls_flags extension value (excluding
+// the header) from `cbs`, for a request message (ClientHello,
+// CertificateRequest, or NewSessionTicket). Unrecognized flags will be ignored.
+//
+// On success, it sets `*out` to the parsed flags and returns true. On error, it
+// sets `*out_alert` to a TLS alert and returns false.
+bool ssl_parse_flags_extension_request(const CBS *cbs, SSLFlags *out,
+                                       uint8_t *out_alert);
+
+// ssl_parse_flags_extension_response parses tls_flags extension value
+// (excluding the header) from `cbs`, for a response message (HelloRetryRequest,
+// ServerHello, EncryptedExtensions, or Certificate). Only the flags in
+// `allowed_flags` may be present.
+//
+// On success, it sets `*out` to the parsed flags and returns true. On error, it
+// sets `*out_alert` to a TLS alert and returns false.
+bool ssl_parse_flags_extension_response(const CBS *cbs, SSLFlags *out,
+                                        uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                        SSLFlags allowed_flags);
+
+
+// SSLKEYLOGFILE functions.
+
+// ssl_log_secret logs `secret` with label `label`, if logging is enabled for
+// `ssl`. It returns true on success and false on failure.
+bool ssl_log_secret(const SSLImpl *ssl, const char *label,
+                    Span<const uint8_t> secret);
+
+
+// ClientHello functions.
+
+bool ssl_parse_client_hello_with_trailing_data(const SSLImpl *ssl, CBS *cbs,
+                                               SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *out);
+
+bool ssl_client_hello_get_extension(const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello,
+                                    CBS *out, uint16_t extension_type);
+
+bool ssl_client_cipher_list_contains_cipher(
+    const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello, uint16_t id);
+
+
+// GREASE.
+
+// ssl_get_grease_value returns a GREASE value for `hs`. For a given
+// connection, the values for each index will be deterministic. This allows the
+// same ClientHello be sent twice for a HelloRetryRequest or the same group be
+// advertised in both supported_groups and key_shares.
+uint16_t ssl_get_grease_value(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                              enum ssl_grease_index_t index);
+
+
+// Signature algorithms.
+
+// tls1_parse_peer_sigalgs parses `sigalgs` as the list of peer signature
+// algorithms and saves them on `hs`. It returns true on success and false on
+// error.
+bool tls1_parse_peer_sigalgs(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const CBS *sigalgs);
+
+// tls1_get_legacy_signature_algorithm sets `*out` to the signature algorithm
+// that should be used with `pkey` in TLS 1.1 and earlier. It returns true on
+// success and false if `pkey` may not be used at those versions.
+bool tls1_get_legacy_signature_algorithm(uint16_t *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+
+// tls1_choose_signature_algorithm sets `*out` to a signature algorithm for use
+// with `cred` based on the peer's preferences and the algorithms supported. It
+// returns true on success and false on error.
+bool tls1_choose_signature_algorithm(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                     const SSLCredential *cred, uint16_t *out);
+
+// tls12_add_verify_sigalgs adds the signature algorithms acceptable for the
+// peer signature to `out`. It returns true on success and false on error.
+bool tls12_add_verify_sigalgs(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out);
+
+// tls12_check_peer_sigalg checks if `sigalg` is acceptable for the peer
+// signature from `pkey`. It returns true on success and false on error, setting
+// `*out_alert` to an alert to send.
+bool tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                             uint16_t sigalg, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+
+
+// Underdocumented functions.
+//
+// Functions below here haven't been touched up and may be underdocumented.
+
+#define TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE 128
+
+// From RFC 4492, used in encoding the curve type in ECParameters
+#define NAMED_CURVE_TYPE 3
+
+struct CertCb {
+  using OldCallback = int (*)(SSL *ssl, void *arg);
+  using NewCallback = int (*)(SSL *ssl, void *arg, uint8_t *out_alert);
+
+  std::variant<std::monostate, OldCallback, NewCallback> cb;
+
+  explicit operator bool() const {
+    return !std::holds_alternative<std::monostate>(cb);
+  }
+
+  int operator()(SSL *ssl, void *arg, uint8_t *out_alert) const {
+    switch (cb.index()) {
+      default:
+      case 0:
+        return 0;
+      case 1:
+        return std::get<1>(cb)(ssl, arg);
+      case 2:
+        return std::get<2>(cb)(ssl, arg, out_alert);
+    }
+  }
+};
+
+struct CERT {
+  static constexpr bool kAllowUniquePtr = true;
+
+  explicit CERT(const SSL_X509_METHOD *x509_method);
+  ~CERT();
+
+  bool is_valid() const { return legacy_credential != nullptr; }
+
+  // credentials is the list of credentials to select between. Elements of this
+  // array immutable.
+  Vector<UniquePtr<SSLCredential>> credentials;
+
+  // legacy_credential is the credential configured by the legacy
+  // non-credential-based APIs. If IsComplete() returns true, it is appended to
+  // the list of credentials.
+  UniquePtr<SSLCredential> legacy_credential;
+
+  // available_trust_anchors, if not empty, overrides the default list of
+  // available trust anchors to send in EncryptedExtensions.
+  Array<uint8_t> available_trust_anchors;
+
+  // x509_method contains pointers to functions that might deal with `X509`
+  // compatibility, or might be a no-op, depending on the application.
+  const SSL_X509_METHOD *x509_method = nullptr;
+
+  // x509_chain may contain a parsed copy of `chain[1..]` from the legacy
+  // credential. This is only used as a cache in order to implement “get0”
+  // functions that return a non-owning pointer to the certificate chain.
+  STACK_OF(X509) *x509_chain = nullptr;
+
+  // x509_leaf may contain a parsed copy of the first element of `chain` from
+  // the legacy credential. This is only used as a cache in order to implement
+  // “get0” functions that return a non-owning pointer to the certificate chain.
+  X509 *x509_leaf = nullptr;
+
+  // x509_stash contains the last `X509` object append to the legacy
+  // credential's chain. This is a workaround for some third-party code that
+  // continue to use an `X509` object even after passing ownership with an
+  // “add0” function.
+  X509 *x509_stash = nullptr;
+
+  // Certificate setup callback: if set is called whenever a
+  // certificate may be required (client or server). the callback
+  // can then examine any appropriate parameters and setup any
+  // certificates required. This allows advanced applications
+  // to select certificates on the fly: for example based on
+  // supported signature algorithms or curves.
+  CertCb cert_cb = {};
+  void *cert_cb_arg = nullptr;
+
+  // Optional X509_STORE for certificate validation. If NULL the parent SSL_CTX
+  // store is used instead.
+  X509_STORE *verify_store = nullptr;
+
+  // sid_ctx partitions the session space within a shared session cache or
+  // ticket key. Only sessions with a matching value will be accepted.
+  InplaceVector<uint8_t, SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH> sid_ctx;
+};
+
+// `SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD` abstracts between TLS and DTLS.
+struct SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD {
+  bool is_dtls;
+  bool (*ssl_new)(SSLImpl *ssl);
+  void (*ssl_free)(SSLImpl *ssl);
+  // get_message sets `*out` to the current handshake message and returns true
+  // if one has been received. It returns false if more input is needed.
+  bool (*get_message)(const SSLImpl *ssl, SSLMessage *out);
+  // next_message is called to release the current handshake message.
+  void (*next_message)(SSLImpl *ssl);
+  // has_unprocessed_handshake_data returns whether there is buffered
+  // handshake data that has not been consumed by `get_message`.
+  bool (*has_unprocessed_handshake_data)(const SSLImpl *ssl);
+  // Use the `ssl_open_handshake` wrapper.
+  ssl_open_record_t (*open_handshake)(SSLImpl *ssl, size_t *out_consumed,
+                                      uint8_t *out_alert, Span<uint8_t> in);
+  // Use the `ssl_open_change_cipher_spec` wrapper.
+  ssl_open_record_t (*open_change_cipher_spec)(SSLImpl *ssl,
+                                               size_t *out_consumed,
+                                               uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                               Span<uint8_t> in);
+  // Use the `ssl_open_app_data` wrapper.
+  ssl_open_record_t (*open_app_data)(SSLImpl *ssl, Span<uint8_t> *out,
+                                     size_t *out_consumed, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                     Span<uint8_t> in);
+  // write_app_data encrypts and writes `in` as application data. On success, it
+  // returns one and sets `*out_bytes_written` to the number of bytes of `in`
+  // written. Otherwise, it returns <= 0 and sets `*out_needs_handshake` to
+  // whether the operation failed because the caller needs to drive the
+  // handshake.
+  int (*write_app_data)(SSLImpl *ssl, bool *out_needs_handshake,
+                        size_t *out_bytes_written, Span<const uint8_t> in);
+  int (*dispatch_alert)(SSLImpl *ssl);
+  // init_message begins a new handshake message of type `type`. `cbb` is the
+  // root CBB to be passed into `finish_message`. `*body` is set to a child CBB
+  // the caller should write to. It returns true on success and false on error.
+  bool (*init_message)(const SSLImpl *ssl, CBB *cbb, CBB *body, uint8_t type);
+  // finish_message finishes a handshake message. It sets `*out_msg` to the
+  // serialized message. It returns true on success and false on error.
+  bool (*finish_message)(const SSLImpl *ssl, CBB *cbb, Array<uint8_t> *out_msg);
+  // add_message adds a handshake message to the pending flight. It returns
+  // true on success and false on error.
+  bool (*add_message)(SSLImpl *ssl, Array<uint8_t> msg);
+  // add_change_cipher_spec adds a ChangeCipherSpec record to the pending
+  // flight. It returns true on success and false on error.
+  bool (*add_change_cipher_spec)(SSLImpl *ssl);
+  // finish_flight marks the pending flight as finished and ready to send.
+  // `flush` must be called to write it.
+  void (*finish_flight)(SSLImpl *ssl);
+  // schedule_ack schedules a DTLS 1.3 ACK to be sent, without an ACK delay.
+  // `flush` must be called to write it.
+  void (*schedule_ack)(SSLImpl *ssl);
+  // flush writes any scheduled data to the transport. It returns one on success
+  // and <= 0 on error.
+  int (*flush)(SSLImpl *ssl);
+  // on_handshake_complete is called when the handshake is complete.
+  void (*on_handshake_complete)(SSLImpl *ssl);
+  // set_read_state sets `ssl`'s read cipher state and level to `aead_ctx` and
+  // `level`. In QUIC, `aead_ctx` is a placeholder object. In TLS 1.3,
+  // `traffic_secret` is the original traffic secret. This function returns true
+  // on success and false on error.
+  //
+  // TODO(crbug.com/371998381): Take the traffic secrets as input and let the
+  // function create the SSLAEADContext.
+  bool (*set_read_state)(SSLImpl *ssl, ssl_encryption_level_t level,
+                         UniquePtr<SSLAEADContext> aead_ctx,
+                         Span<const uint8_t> traffic_secret);
+  // set_write_state sets `ssl`'s write cipher state and level to `aead_ctx` and
+  // `level`. In QUIC, `aead_ctx` is a placeholder object In TLS 1.3,
+  // `traffic_secret` is the original traffic secret. This function returns true
+  // on success and false on error.
+  //
+  // TODO(crbug.com/371998381): Take the traffic secrets as input and let the
+  // function create the SSLAEADContext.
+  bool (*set_write_state)(SSLImpl *ssl, ssl_encryption_level_t level,
+                          UniquePtr<SSLAEADContext> aead_ctx,
+                          Span<const uint8_t> traffic_secret);
+};
+
+// The following wrappers call `open_*` but handle `read_shutdown` correctly.
+
+// ssl_open_handshake processes a record from `in` for reading a handshake
+// message.
+ssl_open_record_t ssl_open_handshake(SSLImpl *ssl, size_t *out_consumed,
+                                     uint8_t *out_alert, Span<uint8_t> in);
+
+// ssl_open_change_cipher_spec processes a record from `in` for reading a
+// ChangeCipherSpec.
+ssl_open_record_t ssl_open_change_cipher_spec(SSLImpl *ssl,
+                                              size_t *out_consumed,
+                                              uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                              Span<uint8_t> in);
+
+// ssl_open_app_data processes a record from `in` for reading application data.
+// On success, it returns `ssl_open_record_success` and sets `*out` to the
+// input. If it encounters a post-handshake message, it returns
+// `ssl_open_record_discard`. The caller should then retry, after processing any
+// messages received with `get_message`.
+ssl_open_record_t ssl_open_app_data(SSLImpl *ssl, Span<uint8_t> *out,
+                                    size_t *out_consumed, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                    Span<uint8_t> in);
+
+struct SSL_X509_METHOD {
+  // check_CA_list returns one if `names` is a good list of X.509 distinguished
+  // names and zero otherwise. This is used to ensure that we can reject
+  // unparsable values at handshake time when using crypto/x509.
+  bool (*check_CA_list)(STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) *names);
+
+  // cert_clear frees and NULLs all X509 certificate-related state.
+  void (*cert_clear)(CERT *cert);
+  // cert_free frees all X509-related state.
+  void (*cert_free)(CERT *cert);
+  // cert_flush_cached_chain drops any cached `X509`-based certificate chain
+  // from `cert`.
+  // cert_dup duplicates any needed fields from `cert` to `new_cert`.
+  void (*cert_dup)(CERT *new_cert, const CERT *cert);
+  void (*cert_flush_cached_chain)(CERT *cert);
+  // cert_flush_cached_chain drops any cached `X509`-based leaf certificate
+  // from `cert`.
+  void (*cert_flush_cached_leaf)(CERT *cert);
+
+  // session_cache_objects fills out `sess->x509_peer` and `sess->x509_chain`
+  // from `sess->certs` and erases `sess->x509_chain_without_leaf`. It returns
+  // true on success or false on error.
+  bool (*session_cache_objects)(SSLSession *session);
+  // session_dup duplicates any needed fields from `session` to `new_session`.
+  // It returns true on success or false on error.
+  bool (*session_dup)(SSLSession *new_session, const SSLSession *session);
+  // session_clear frees any X509-related state from `session`.
+  void (*session_clear)(SSLSession *session);
+  // session_verify_cert_chain verifies the certificate chain in `session`,
+  // sets `session->verify_result` and returns true on success or false on
+  // error.
+  bool (*session_verify_cert_chain)(SSLSession *session, SSL_HANDSHAKE *ssl,
+                                    uint8_t *out_alert);
+
+  // hs_flush_cached_ca_names drops any cached `X509_NAME`s from `hs`.
+  void (*hs_flush_cached_ca_names)(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+  // ssl_new does any necessary initialisation of `hs`. It returns true on
+  // success or false on error.
+  bool (*ssl_new)(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+  // ssl_free frees anything created by `ssl_new`.
+  void (*ssl_config_free)(SSL_CONFIG *cfg);
+  // ssl_flush_cached_client_CA drops any cached `X509_NAME`s from `ssl`.
+  void (*ssl_flush_cached_client_CA)(SSL_CONFIG *cfg);
+  // ssl_auto_chain_if_needed runs the deprecated auto-chaining logic if
+  // necessary. On success, it updates `ssl`'s certificate configuration as
+  // needed and returns true. Otherwise, it returns false.
+  bool (*ssl_auto_chain_if_needed)(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+  // ssl_ctx_new does any necessary initialisation of `ctx`. It returns true on
+  // success or false on error.
+  bool (*ssl_ctx_new)(SSLContext *ctx);
+  // ssl_ctx_free frees anything created by `ssl_ctx_new`.
+  void (*ssl_ctx_free)(SSLContext *ctx);
+  // ssl_ctx_flush_cached_client_CA drops any cached `X509_NAME`s from `ctx`.
+  void (*ssl_ctx_flush_cached_client_CA)(SSLContext *ssl);
+};
+
+// ssl_crypto_x509_method provides the `SSL_X509_METHOD` functions using
+// crypto/x509.
+extern const SSL_X509_METHOD ssl_crypto_x509_method;
+
+// ssl_noop_x509_method provides the `SSL_X509_METHOD` functions that avoid
+// crypto/x509.
+extern const SSL_X509_METHOD ssl_noop_x509_method;
+
+struct TicketKey {
+  static constexpr bool kAllowUniquePtr = true;
+
+  uint8_t name[SSL_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN] = {0};
+  uint8_t hmac_key[16] = {0};
+  uint8_t aes_key[16] = {0};
+  // next_rotation_tv_sec is the time (in seconds from the epoch) when the
+  // current key should be superseded by a new key, or the time when a previous
+  // key should be dropped. If zero, then the key should not be automatically
+  // rotated.
+  uint64_t next_rotation_tv_sec = 0;
+};
+
+struct CertCompressionAlg {
+  static constexpr bool kAllowUniquePtr = true;
+
+  ssl_cert_compression_func_t compress = nullptr;
+  ssl_cert_decompression_func_t decompress = nullptr;
+  uint16_t alg_id = 0;
+};
+
+// TODO(crbug.com/565766495): Switch this to `SSLSession`. bssl_shim calls
+// `lh_SSL_SESSION_*` directly, so this is still defined on the public type.
+DEFINE_LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION)
+
+// An ssl_shutdown_t describes the shutdown state of one end of the connection,
+// whether it is alive or has been shutdown via close_notify or fatal alert.
+enum ssl_shutdown_t {
+  ssl_shutdown_none = 0,
+  ssl_shutdown_close_notify = 1,
+  ssl_shutdown_error = 2,
+};
+
+enum ssl_ech_status_t {
+  // ssl_ech_none indicates ECH was not offered, or we have not gotten far
+  // enough in the handshake to determine the status.
+  ssl_ech_none,
+  // ssl_ech_accepted indicates the server accepted ECH.
+  ssl_ech_accepted,
+  // ssl_ech_rejected indicates the server was offered ECH but rejected it.
+  ssl_ech_rejected,
+};
+
+struct SSL3_STATE {
+  static constexpr bool kAllowUniquePtr = true;
+
+  SSL3_STATE();
+  ~SSL3_STATE();
+
+  uint64_t read_sequence = 0;
+  uint64_t write_sequence = 0;
+
+  uint8_t server_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE] = {0};
+  uint8_t client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE] = {0};
+
+  // read_buffer holds data from the transport to be processed.
+  SSLBuffer read_buffer;
+  // write_buffer holds data to be written to the transport.
+  SSLBuffer write_buffer;
+
+  // pending_app_data is the unconsumed application data. It points into
+  // `read_buffer`.
+  Span<uint8_t> pending_app_data;
+
+  // unreported_bytes_written is the number of bytes successfully written to the
+  // transport, but not yet reported to the caller. The next `SSL_write` will
+  // skip this many bytes from the input. This is used if
+  // `SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE` is disabled, in which case `SSL_write` only
+  // reports bytes written when the full caller input is written.
+  size_t unreported_bytes_written = 0;
+
+  // pending_write, if `has_pending_write` is true, is the caller-supplied data
+  // corresponding to the current pending write. This is used to check the
+  // caller retried with a compatible buffer.
+  Span<const uint8_t> pending_write;
+
+  // pending_write_type, if `has_pending_write` is true, is the record type
+  // for the current pending write.
+  //
+  // TODO(davidben): Remove this when alerts are moved out of this write path.
+  uint8_t pending_write_type = 0;
+
+  // read_shutdown is the shutdown state for the read half of the connection.
+  enum ssl_shutdown_t read_shutdown = ssl_shutdown_none;
+
+  // write_shutdown is the shutdown state for the write half of the connection.
+  enum ssl_shutdown_t write_shutdown = ssl_shutdown_none;
+
+  // read_error, if `read_shutdown` is `ssl_shutdown_error`, is the error for
+  // the receive half of the connection.
+  UniquePtr<ERR_SAVE_STATE> read_error;
+
+  int total_renegotiations = 0;
+
+  // This holds a variable that indicates what we were doing when a 0 or -1 is
+  // returned.  This is needed for non-blocking IO so we know what request
+  // needs re-doing when in SSL_accept or SSL_connect
+  int rwstate = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
+
+  enum ssl_encryption_level_t quic_read_level = ssl_encryption_initial;
+  enum ssl_encryption_level_t quic_write_level = ssl_encryption_initial;
+
+  // version is the protocol version, or zero if the version has not yet been
+  // set. In clients offering 0-RTT, this version will initially be set to the
+  // early version, then switched to the final version. To distinguish these
+  // cases, use `ssl_has_final_version`.
+  uint16_t version = 0;
+
+  // early_data_skipped is the amount of early data that has been skipped by the
+  // record layer.
+  uint16_t early_data_skipped = 0;
+
+  // empty_record_count is the number of consecutive empty records received.
+  uint8_t empty_record_count = 0;
+
+  // warning_alert_count is the number of consecutive warning alerts
+  // received.
+  uint8_t warning_alert_count = 0;
+
+  // key_update_count is the number of consecutive KeyUpdates received.
+  uint8_t key_update_count = 0;
+
+  // ech_status indicates whether ECH was accepted by the server.
+  ssl_ech_status_t ech_status = ssl_ech_none;
+
+  // skip_early_data instructs the record layer to skip unexpected early data
+  // messages when 0RTT is rejected.
+  bool skip_early_data : 1;
+
+  // v2_hello_done is true if the peer's V2ClientHello, if any, has been handled
+  // and future messages should use the record layer.
+  bool v2_hello_done : 1;
+
+  // is_v2_hello is true if the current handshake message was derived from a
+  // V2ClientHello rather than received from the peer directly.
+  bool is_v2_hello : 1;
+
+  // has_message is true if the current handshake message has been returned
+  // at least once by `get_message` and false otherwise.
+  bool has_message : 1;
+
+  // initial_handshake_complete is true if the initial handshake has
+  // completed.
+  bool initial_handshake_complete : 1;
+
+  // session_reused indicates whether a session was resumed.
+  bool session_reused : 1;
+
+  bool send_connection_binding : 1;
+
+  // channel_id_valid is true if, on the server, the client has negotiated a
+  // Channel ID and the `channel_id` field is filled in.
+  bool channel_id_valid : 1;
+
+  // key_update_pending is true if we are in the process of sending a KeyUpdate
+  // message. As a DoS mitigation (and a requirement in DTLS), we never send
+  // more than one KeyUpdate at once. In DTLS, this tracks whether there is an
+  // unACKed KeyUpdate.
+  bool key_update_pending : 1;
+
+  // early_data_accepted is true if early data was accepted by the server.
+  bool early_data_accepted : 1;
+
+  // alert_dispatch is true there is an alert in `send_alert` to be sent.
+  bool alert_dispatch : 1;
+
+  // renegotiate_pending is whether the read half of the channel is blocked on a
+  // HelloRequest.
+  bool renegotiate_pending : 1;
+
+  // used_hello_retry_request is whether the handshake used a TLS 1.3
+  // HelloRetryRequest message.
+  bool used_hello_retry_request : 1;
+
+  // server_sent_requested_padding is true iff a client requested padding
+  // through the server padding extension, and the server sent back the
+  // requested amount of padding.
+  bool server_sent_requested_padding : 1;
+
+  // hs_buf is the buffer of handshake data to process.
+  UniquePtr<BUF_MEM> hs_buf;
+
+  // pending_hs_data contains the pending handshake data that has not yet
+  // been encrypted to `pending_flight`. This allows packing the handshake into
+  // fewer records.
+  UniquePtr<BUF_MEM> pending_hs_data;
+
+  // pending_flight is the pending outgoing flight. This is used to flush each
+  // handshake flight in a single write. `write_buffer` must be written out
+  // before this data.
+  UniquePtr<BUF_MEM> pending_flight;
+
+  // pending_flight_offset is the number of bytes of `pending_flight` which have
+  // been successfully written.
+  uint32_t pending_flight_offset = 0;
+
+  // ticket_age_skew is the difference, in seconds, between the client-sent
+  // ticket age and the server-computed value in TLS 1.3 server connections
+  // which resumed a session.
+  int32_t ticket_age_skew = 0;
+
+  // ssl_early_data_reason stores details on why 0-RTT was accepted or rejected.
+  enum ssl_early_data_reason_t early_data_reason = ssl_early_data_unknown;
+
+  // aead_read_ctx is the current read cipher state.
+  UniquePtr<SSLAEADContext> aead_read_ctx;
+
+  // aead_write_ctx is the current write cipher state.
+  UniquePtr<SSLAEADContext> aead_write_ctx;
+
+  // hs is the handshake state for the current handshake or NULL if there isn't
+  // one.
+  UniquePtr<SSL_HANDSHAKE> hs;
+
+  InplaceVector<uint8_t, SSL_MAX_MD_SIZE> write_traffic_secret;
+  InplaceVector<uint8_t, SSL_MAX_MD_SIZE> read_traffic_secret;
+  InplaceVector<uint8_t, SSL_MAX_MD_SIZE> exporter_secret;
+
+  // Connection binding to prevent renegotiation attacks
+  InplaceVector<uint8_t, 12> previous_client_finished;
+  InplaceVector<uint8_t, 12> previous_server_finished;
+
+  uint8_t send_alert[2] = {0};
+
+  // established_session is the session established by the connection. This
+  // session is only filled upon the completion of the handshake and is
+  // immutable.
+  UniquePtr<SSLSession> established_session;
+
+  // Next protocol negotiation. For the client, this is the protocol that we
+  // sent in NextProtocol and is set when handling ServerHello extensions.
+  //
+  // For a server, this is the client's selected_protocol from NextProtocol and
+  // is set when handling the NextProtocol message, before the Finished
+  // message.
+  Array<uint8_t> next_proto_negotiated;
+
+  // ALPN information
+  // (we are in the process of transitioning from NPN to ALPN.)
+
+  // In a server these point to the selected ALPN protocol after the
+  // ClientHello has been processed. In a client these contain the protocol
+  // that the server selected once the ServerHello has been processed.
+  Array<uint8_t> alpn_selected;
+
+  // hostname, on the server, is the value of the SNI extension.
+  UniquePtr<char> hostname;
+
+  // For a server:
+  //     If `channel_id_valid` is true, then this contains the
+  //     verified Channel ID from the client: a P256 point, (x,y), where
+  //     each are big-endian values.
+  uint8_t channel_id[64] = {0};
+
+  // Contains the QUIC transport params received by the peer.
+  Array<uint8_t> peer_quic_transport_params;
+
+  // srtp_profile is the selected SRTP protection profile for
+  // DTLS-SRTP.
+  const SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *srtp_profile = nullptr;
+};
+
+// lengths of messages
+#define DTLS1_RT_MAX_HEADER_LENGTH 13
+
+// DTLS_PLAINTEXT_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH is the length of the DTLS record header
+// for plaintext records (in DTLS 1.3) or DTLS versions <= 1.2.
+#define DTLS_PLAINTEXT_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH 13
+
+// DTLS1_3_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH is the length of the DTLS 1.3 record header
+// sent by BoringSSL for encrypted records. Note that received encrypted DTLS
+// 1.3 records might have a different length header.
+#define DTLS1_3_RECORD_HEADER_WRITE_LENGTH 5
+
+static_assert(DTLS1_RT_MAX_HEADER_LENGTH >= DTLS_PLAINTEXT_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH,
+              "DTLS1_RT_MAX_HEADER_LENGTH must not be smaller than defined "
+              "record header lengths");
+static_assert(DTLS1_RT_MAX_HEADER_LENGTH >= DTLS1_3_RECORD_HEADER_WRITE_LENGTH,
+              "DTLS1_RT_MAX_HEADER_LENGTH must not be smaller than defined "
+              "record header lengths");
+
+#define DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH 12
+
+// A DTLSMessageBitmap maintains a list of bits which may be marked to indicate
+// a portion of a message was received or ACKed.
+class DTLSMessageBitmap {
+ public:
+  // A Range represents a range of bits from `start`, inclusive, to `end`,
+  // exclusive.
+  struct Range {
+    size_t start = 0;
+    size_t end = 0;
+
+    bool empty() const { return start == end; }
+    size_t size() const { return end - start; }
+    bool operator==(const Range &r) const {
+      return start == r.start && end == r.end;
+    }
+    bool operator!=(const Range &r) const { return !(*this == r); }
+  };
+
+  // Init initializes the structure with `num_bits` unmarked bits, from zero
+  // to `num_bits - 1`.
+  bool Init(size_t num_bits);
+
+  // MarkRange marks the bits from `start`, inclusive, to `end`, exclusive.
+  void MarkRange(size_t start, size_t end);
+
+  // NextUnmarkedRange returns the next range of unmarked bits, starting from
+  // `start`, inclusive. If all bits after `start` are marked, it returns an
+  // empty range.
+  Range NextUnmarkedRange(size_t start) const;
+
+  // IsComplete returns whether every bit in the bitmask has been marked.
+  bool IsComplete() const { return bytes_.empty(); }
+
+ private:
+  // bytes_ contains the unmarked bits. We maintain an invariant: if `bytes_` is
+  // not empty, some bit is unset.
+  Array<uint8_t> bytes_;
+  // first_unmarked_byte_ is the index of first byte in `bytes_` that is not
+  // 0xff. This is maintained to amortize checking if the message is complete.
+  size_t first_unmarked_byte_ = 0;
+};
+
+struct DTLSHandshakeHeader {
+  uint8_t type;
+  uint32_t msg_len;
+  uint16_t seq;
+  uint32_t frag_off;
+  uint32_t frag_len;
+};
+
+// An DTLSIncomingMessage is an incoming DTLS message, possibly not yet
+// assembled.
+class DTLSIncomingMessage {
+ public:
+  static constexpr bool kAllowUniquePtr = true;
+
+  explicit DTLSIncomingMessage(const DTLSHandshakeHeader &hdr);
+
+  uint8_t type() const { return type_; }
+  uint16_t seq() const { return seq_; }
+  size_t msg_len() const {
+    return std::holds_alternative<FragmentList>(msg_)
+               ? std::get<FragmentList>(msg_).msg_len
+               : std::get<ReassemblyBuffer>(msg_).msg.size() -
+                     DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+  }
+
+  // AddFragment adds the fragment to the incoming message. It returns true on
+  // success and false on error. The caller must have checked that `offset` and
+  // `data` fit in the message body.
+  bool AddFragment(uint32_t offset, Span<const uint8_t> data);
+
+  // IsComplete returns whether the incoming message is complete.
+  bool IsComplete() const;
+
+  // GetMessage returns the message as an SSLMessage if complete, and
+  // std::nullopt otherwise.
+  std::optional<SSLMessage> GetMessage() const;
+
+ private:
+  struct FragmentList {
+    // fragments contains fragment data in order of 24-bit offset, 24-bit
+    // length, data.
+    Vector<uint8_t> fragments;
+    // msg_len contains the length of the handshake message.
+    uint32_t msg_len;
+  };
+
+  struct ReassemblyBuffer {
+    void AddFragment(uint32_t offset, Span<const uint8_t> data);
+
+    // msg holds the message data, including `DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH` bytes
+    // of reconstructed header.
+    Array<uint8_t> msg;
+    // reassembly tracks which parts of the message have been received.
+    DTLSMessageBitmap reassembly;
+  };
+
+  uint8_t type_;
+  uint16_t seq_;
+  // msg_ holds the message data. Before enough data has been received for the
+  // message to be complete, it stores a FragmentList, which is proportional to
+  // total data received. Once the message might be complete, it switches to
+  // ReassemblyBuffer, which is proportional to the final amount.
+  std::variant<FragmentList, ReassemblyBuffer> msg_;
+};
+
+struct DTLSOutgoingMessage {
+  size_t msg_len() const {
+    assert(!is_ccs);
+    assert(data.size() >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
+    return data.size() - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+  }
+
+  bool IsFullyAcked() const {
+    // ACKs only exist in DTLS 1.3, which does not send ChangeCipherSpec.
+    return !is_ccs && acked.IsComplete();
+  }
+
+  Array<uint8_t> data;
+  uint16_t epoch = 0;
+  bool is_ccs = false;
+  // acked tracks which bits of the message have been ACKed by the peer. If
+  // `msg_len` is zero, it tracks one bit for whether the header has been
+  // received.
+  DTLSMessageBitmap acked;
+};
+
+struct OPENSSL_timeval {
+  uint64_t tv_sec;
+  uint32_t tv_usec;
+};
+
+struct DTLSTimer {
+ public:
+  static constexpr uint64_t kNever = UINT64_MAX;
+
+  // StartMicroseconds schedules the timer to expire the specified number of
+  // microseconds from `now`.
+  void StartMicroseconds(OPENSSL_timeval now, uint64_t microseconds);
+
+  // Stop disables the timer.
+  void Stop();
+
+  // IsExpired returns true if the timer was set and is expired at time `now`.
+  bool IsExpired(OPENSSL_timeval now) const;
+
+  // IsSet returns true if the timer is scheduled or expired, and false if it is
+  // stopped.
+  bool IsSet() const;
+
+  void UpdateDuration(uint64_t microseconds) { duration_ = microseconds; }
+
+  // MicrosecondsRemaining returns the time remaining, in microseconds, at
+  // `now`, or `kNever` if the timer is unset.
+  uint64_t MicrosecondsRemaining(OPENSSL_timeval now) const;
+
+ private:
+  uint64_t start_time_;
+  uint64_t duration_ = kNever;  // If set to kNever then this timer is unset.
+};
+
+// DTLS_MAX_EXTRA_WRITE_EPOCHS is the maximum number of additional write epochs
+// that DTLS may need to retain.
+//
+// The maximum is, as a DTLS 1.3 server, immediately after sending Finished. At
+// this point, the current epoch is the application write keys (epoch 3), but we
+// may have ServerHello (epoch 0) and EncryptedExtensions (epoch 1) to
+// retransmit. KeyUpdate does not increase this count. If the server were to
+// initiate KeyUpdate from this state, it would not apply the new epoch until
+// the client's ACKs have caught up. At that point, epochs 0 and 1 can be
+// discarded.
+#define DTLS_MAX_EXTRA_WRITE_EPOCHS 2
+
+// DTLS_MAX_ACK_BUFFER is the maximum number of records worth of data we'll keep
+// track of with DTLS 1.3 ACKs. When we exceed this value, information about
+// stale records will be dropped. This will not break the connection but may
+// cause ACKs to perform worse and retransmit unnecessary information.
+#define DTLS_MAX_ACK_BUFFER 32
+
+// A DTLSSentRecord records information about a record we sent. Each record
+// covers all bytes from `first_msg_start` (inclusive) of `first_msg` to
+// `last_msg_end` (exclusive) of `last_msg`. Messages are referenced by index
+// into `outgoing_messages`. `last_msg_end` may be `outgoing_messages.size()` if
+// `last_msg_end` is zero.
+//
+// When the message is empty, `first_msg_start` and `last_msg_end` are
+// maintained as if there is a single bit in the message representing the
+// header. See `acked` in DTLSOutgoingMessage.
+struct DTLSSentRecord {
+  DTLSRecordNumber number;
+  PackedSize<SSL_MAX_HANDSHAKE_FLIGHT> first_msg = 0;
+  PackedSize<SSL_MAX_HANDSHAKE_FLIGHT> last_msg = 0;
+  uint32_t first_msg_start = 0;
+  uint32_t last_msg_end = 0;
+};
+
+enum class QueuedKeyUpdate {
+  kNone,
+  kUpdateNotRequested,
+  kUpdateRequested,
+};
+
+// DTLS_PREV_READ_EPOCH_EXPIRE_SECONDS is how long to retain the previous read
+// epoch in DTLS 1.3. This value is set based on the following:
+//
+// - Section 4.2.1 of RFC 9147 recommends retaining past read epochs for the
+//   default TCP MSL. This accommodates packet reordering with KeyUpdate.
+//
+// - Section 5.8.1 of RFC 9147 requires being capable of ACKing the client's
+//   final flight for at least twice the default MSL. That requires retaining
+//   epoch 2 after the handshake.
+//
+// - Section 4 of RFC 9293 defines the MSL to be two minutes.
+#define DTLS_PREV_READ_EPOCH_EXPIRE_SECONDS (4 * 60)
+
+struct DTLSPrevReadEpoch {
+  static constexpr bool kAllowUniquePtr = true;
+  DTLSReadEpoch epoch;
+  // expire is the expiration time of the read epoch, expressed as a POSIX
+  // timestamp in seconds.
+  uint64_t expire;
+};
+
+struct DTLS1_STATE {
+  static constexpr bool kAllowUniquePtr = true;
+
+  DTLS1_STATE();
+  ~DTLS1_STATE();
+
+  bool Init();
+
+  // has_change_cipher_spec is true if we have received a ChangeCipherSpec from
+  // the peer in this epoch.
+  bool has_change_cipher_spec : 1;
+
+  // outgoing_messages_complete is true if `outgoing_messages` has been
+  // completed by an attempt to flush it. Future calls to `add_message` and
+  // `add_change_cipher_spec` will start a new flight.
+  bool outgoing_messages_complete : 1;
+
+  // flight_has_reply is true if the current outgoing flight is complete and has
+  // processed at least one message. This is used to detect whether we or the
+  // peer sent the final flight.
+  bool flight_has_reply : 1;
+
+  // handshake_write_overflow and handshake_read_overflow are true if
+  // handshake_write_seq and handshake_read_seq, respectively have overflowed.
+  bool handshake_write_overflow : 1;
+  bool handshake_read_overflow : 1;
+
+  // sending_flight and sending_ack are true if we are in the process of sending
+  // a handshake flight and ACK, respectively.
+  bool sending_flight : 1;
+  bool sending_ack : 1;
+  // pending_flush is whether we have a pending flush on the transport.
+  bool pending_flush : 1;
+
+  // queued_key_update, if not kNone, indicates we've queued a KeyUpdate message
+  // to send after the current flight is ACKed.
+  QueuedKeyUpdate queued_key_update : 2;
+
+  uint16_t handshake_write_seq = 0;
+  uint16_t handshake_read_seq = 0;
+
+  // read_epoch is the current read epoch.
+  DTLSReadEpoch read_epoch;
+
+  // next_read_epoch is the next read epoch in DTLS 1.3. It will become
+  // current once a record is received from it.
+  UniquePtr<DTLSReadEpoch> next_read_epoch;
+
+  // prev_read_epoch is the previous read epoch in DTLS 1.3.
+  UniquePtr<DTLSPrevReadEpoch> prev_read_epoch;
+
+  // write_epoch is the current DTLS write epoch. Non-retransmit records will
+  // generally use this epoch.
+  // TODO(crbug.com/381113363): 0-RTT will be the exception, when implemented.
+  DTLSWriteEpoch write_epoch;
+
+  // extra_write_epochs is the collection available write epochs.
+  InplaceVector<UniquePtr<DTLSWriteEpoch>, DTLS_MAX_EXTRA_WRITE_EPOCHS>
+      extra_write_epochs;
+
+  // incoming_messages is a ring buffer of incoming handshake messages that have
+  // yet to be processed. The front of the ring buffer is message number
+  // `handshake_read_seq`, at position `handshake_read_seq` %
+  // `SSL_MAX_HANDSHAKE_FLIGHT`.
+  UniquePtr<DTLSIncomingMessage> incoming_messages[SSL_MAX_HANDSHAKE_FLIGHT];
+
+  // outgoing_messages is the queue of outgoing messages from the last handshake
+  // flight.
+  InplaceVector<DTLSOutgoingMessage, SSL_MAX_HANDSHAKE_FLIGHT>
+      outgoing_messages;
+
+  // sent_records is a queue of records we sent, for processing ACKs. To save
+  // memory in the steady state, the structure is stored on the heap and dropped
+  // when empty.
+  UniquePtr<MRUQueue<DTLSSentRecord, DTLS_MAX_ACK_BUFFER>> sent_records;
+
+  // records_to_ack is a queue of received records that we should ACK. This is
+  // not stored on the heap because, in the steady state, DTLS 1.3 does not
+  // necessarily empty this list. (We probably could drop records from here once
+  // they are sufficiently old.)
+  MRUQueue<DTLSRecordNumber, DTLS_MAX_ACK_BUFFER> records_to_ack;
+
+  // outgoing_written is the number of outgoing messages that have been
+  // written.
+  uint8_t outgoing_written = 0;
+  // outgoing_offset is the number of bytes of the next outgoing message have
+  // been written.
+  uint32_t outgoing_offset = 0;
+
+  unsigned mtu = 0;  // max DTLS packet size
+
+  // num_timeouts is the number of times the retransmit timer has fired since
+  // the last time it was reset.
+  unsigned num_timeouts = 0;
+
+  // retransmit_timer tracks when to schedule the next DTLS retransmit if we do
+  // not hear from the peer.
+  DTLSTimer retransmit_timer;
+
+  // ack_timer tracks when to send an ACK.
+  DTLSTimer ack_timer;
+
+  // timeout_duration_ms is the timeout duration in milliseconds.
+  uint32_t timeout_duration_ms = 0;
+};
+
+// An ALPSConfig is a pair of ALPN protocol and settings value to use with ALPS.
+struct ALPSConfig {
+  Array<uint8_t> protocol;
+  Array<uint8_t> settings;
+};
+
+// SSL_CONFIG contains configuration bits that can be shed after the handshake
+// completes.  Objects of this type are not shared; they are unique to a
+// particular `SSL`.
+//
+// See SSL_shed_handshake_config() for more about the conditions under which
+// configuration can be shed.
+struct SSL_CONFIG {
+  static constexpr bool kAllowUniquePtr = true;
+
+  explicit SSL_CONFIG(SSLImpl *ssl_arg);
+  ~SSL_CONFIG();
+
+  // ssl is a non-owning pointer to the parent `SSL` object.
+  SSLImpl *const ssl = nullptr;
+
+  // conf_max_version is the maximum acceptable version configured by
+  // `SSL_set_max_proto_version`. Note this version is not normalized in DTLS
+  // and is further constrained by `SSL_OP_NO_*`.
+  uint16_t conf_max_version = 0;
+
+  // conf_min_version is the minimum acceptable version configured by
+  // `SSL_set_min_proto_version`. Note this version is not normalized in DTLS
+  // and is further constrained by `SSL_OP_NO_*`.
+  uint16_t conf_min_version = 0;
+
+  X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = nullptr;
+
+  // crypto
+  UniquePtr<SSLCipherPreferenceList> cipher_list;  // for TLS 1.2 ciphers.
+
+  // Inherited from `SSL_CTX`.
+  SSLCipherPreferenceList tls13_cipher_list;
+
+  // This is used to hold the local certificate used (i.e. the server
+  // certificate for a server or the client certificate for a client).
+  UniquePtr<CERT> cert;
+
+  int (*verify_callback)(int ok,
+                         X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) =
+      nullptr;  // fail if callback returns 0
+
+  enum ssl_verify_result_t (*custom_verify_callback)(
+      SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert) = nullptr;
+  // Server-only: psk_identity_hint is the identity hint to send in
+  // PSK-based key exchanges.
+  UniquePtr<char> psk_identity_hint;
+
+  unsigned (*psk_client_callback)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity,
+                                  unsigned max_identity_len, uint8_t *psk,
+                                  unsigned max_psk_len) = nullptr;
+  unsigned (*psk_server_callback)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity, uint8_t *psk,
+                                  unsigned max_psk_len) = nullptr;
+
+  // for server side, keep the list of CA_dn we can use
+  UniquePtr<STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER)> client_CA;
+
+  // cached_x509_client_CA is a cache of parsed versions of the elements of
+  // `client_CA`.
+  STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *cached_x509_client_CA = nullptr;
+
+  // For client side, keep the list of CA distinguished names we can use
+  // for the Certificate Authorities extension.
+  // TODO(bbe) having this separate from the client side (above) is mildly
+  // silly, but OpenSSL has *_client_CA API's for this exposed, and for the
+  // moment we are not crossing those streams.
+  UniquePtr<STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER)> CA_names;
+
+  // Trust anchor IDs to be requested in the trust_anchors extension.
+  std::optional<Array<uint8_t>> requested_trust_anchors;
+
+  // Our list of supported groups. If this list is modified, for a client,
+  // `client_key_share_selections` must be reset if the key shares are no longer
+  // a valid subsequence of the supported group list.
+  Array<uint16_t> supported_group_list;
+
+  // Contains flags corresponding to `supported_group_list`, which are
+  // SSL_GROUP_FLAG_* values ORed together.
+  Array<uint32_t> supported_group_list_flags;
+
+  // For a client, this may contain a subsequence of the group IDs in
+  // `suppported_group_list`, which gives the groups for which key shares should
+  // be sent in the client's key_share extension. This is non-nullopt iff
+  // `SSL_set1_client_key_shares` was successfully called to configure key
+  // shares. If non-nullopt, these groups are in the same order as they appear
+  // in `supported_group_list`, and may not contain duplicates.
+  std::optional<InplaceVector<uint16_t, kNumNamedGroups>>
+      client_key_share_selections;
+
+  // For a client, this contains a list of groups believed to be supported by
+  // the server, in server preference order.
+  Array<uint16_t> server_supported_groups_hint;
+
+  // channel_id_private is the client's Channel ID private key, or null if
+  // Channel ID should not be offered on this connection.
+  UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> channel_id_private;
+
+  // For a client, this contains the list of supported protocols in wire
+  // format.
+  Array<uint8_t> alpn_client_proto_list;
+
+  // alps_configs contains the list of supported protocols to use with ALPS,
+  // along with their corresponding ALPS values.
+  Vector<ALPSConfig> alps_configs;
+
+  // Contains the QUIC transport params that this endpoint will send.
+  Array<uint8_t> quic_transport_params;
+
+  // Contains the context used to decide whether to accept early data in QUIC.
+  Array<uint8_t> quic_early_data_context;
+
+  // verify_sigalgs, if not empty, is the set of signature algorithms
+  // accepted from the peer in decreasing order of preference.
+  Array<uint16_t> verify_sigalgs;
+
+  // srtp_profiles is the list of configured SRTP protection profiles for
+  // DTLS-SRTP.
+  UniquePtr<STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE)> srtp_profiles;
+
+  // client_ech_config_list, if not empty, is a serialized ECHConfigList
+  // structure for the client to use when negotiating ECH.
+  Array<uint8_t> client_ech_config_list;
+
+  // compliance_policy limits the set of ciphers that can be selected when
+  // negotiating a TLS 1.3 connection.
+  enum ssl_compliance_policy_t compliance_policy = ssl_compliance_policy_none;
+
+  // server_padding_request, if set by the client, indicates that the client
+  // will ask the server to include additional padding in the
+  // EncryptedExtensions message of a TLS 1.3 connection.
+  std::optional<uint16_t> server_padding_request;
+
+  // verify_mode is a bitmask of `SSL_VERIFY_*` values.
+  uint8_t verify_mode = SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
+
+  // accepted_peer_cert_types contains a list of `TLSEXT_cert_type_*` values in
+  // preference order indicating the types of certificates to accept from the
+  // peer. This list should always be non-empty. If the caller did not configure
+  // a valid list, only X.509 certificates are accepted by default.
+  InplaceVector<uint8_t, kNumCertTypes> accepted_peer_cert_types;
+
+  // available_client_cert_types, if not empty, contains a list of
+  // `TLSEXT_cert_type_*` values in preference order indicating the types of
+  // client certificates that the caller, as a client, explicitly configured and
+  // wishes to advertise, instead of the automatically inferred client cert
+  // types from the configured credential list.
+  InplaceVector<uint8_t, kNumCertTypes> available_client_cert_types;
+
+  // ech_grease_enabled controls whether ECH GREASE may be sent in the
+  // ClientHello.
+  bool ech_grease_enabled : 1;
+
+  // reject_unusable_ech_config controls whether the client will fail the
+  // handshake if ECH cannot be offered.
+  bool reject_unusable_ech_config : 1;
+
+  // Enable signed certificate time stamps. Currently client only.
+  bool signed_cert_timestamps_enabled : 1;
+
+  // ocsp_stapling_enabled is only used by client connections and indicates
+  // whether OCSP stapling will be requested.
+  bool ocsp_stapling_enabled : 1;
+
+  // channel_id_enabled is copied from the `SSL_CTX`. For a server, it means
+  // that we'll accept Channel IDs from clients. It is ignored on the client.
+  bool channel_id_enabled : 1;
+
+  // retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs is true if we should compute the SHA256
+  // hash of the peer's certificate and then discard it to save memory and
+  // session space. Only effective on the server side.
+  bool retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs : 1;
+
+  // shed_handshake_config indicates that the handshake config (this object!)
+  // should be freed after the handshake completes.
+  bool shed_handshake_config : 1;
+
+  // jdk11_workaround is whether to disable TLS 1.3 for JDK 11 clients, as a
+  // workaround for https://bugs.openjdk.java.net/browse/JDK-8211806.
+  bool jdk11_workaround : 1;
+
+  // QUIC drafts up to and including 32 used a different TLS extension
+  // codepoint to convey QUIC's transport parameters.
+  bool quic_use_legacy_codepoint : 1;
+
+  // permute_extensions is whether to permute extensions when sending messages.
+  bool permute_extensions : 1;
+
+  // alps_use_new_codepoint if set indicates we use new ALPS extension codepoint
+  // to negotiate and convey application settings.
+  bool alps_use_new_codepoint : 1;
+
+  // server_padding_enabled is true iff the server is willing to send additional
+  // padding to clients that request it through the server padding extension.
+  bool server_padding_enabled : 1;
+};
+
+// From RFC 8446, used in determining PSK modes.
+#define SSL_PSK_DHE_KE 0x1
+
+// kMaxEarlyDataAccepted is the advertised number of plaintext bytes of early
+// data that will be accepted. This value should be slightly below
+// kMaxEarlyDataSkipped in tls_record.c, which is measured in ciphertext.
+static const size_t kMaxEarlyDataAccepted = 14336;
+
+UniquePtr<CERT> ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert);
+bool ssl_set_cert(CERT *cert, UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> buffer);
+bool ssl_is_key_type_supported(int key_type);
+// ssl_compare_public_and_private_key returns true if `pubkey` is the public
+// counterpart to `privkey`. Otherwise it returns false and pushes a helpful
+// message on the error queue.
+bool ssl_compare_public_and_private_key(const EVP_PKEY *pubkey,
+                                        const EVP_PKEY *privkey);
+bool ssl_get_new_session(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+
+// ssl_encrypt_ticket encrypt a ticket for `session` and writes the result to
+// `out`. It returns true on success and false on error. If, on success, nothing
+// was written to `out`, the caller should skip sending a ticket.
+bool ssl_encrypt_ticket(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out, const SSLSession *session);
+
+bool ssl_ctx_rotate_ticket_encryption_key(SSLContext *ctx);
+
+// ssl_session_new returns a newly-allocated blank `SSL_SESSION` or nullptr on
+// error.
+UniquePtr<SSLSession> ssl_session_new(const SSL_X509_METHOD *x509_method);
+
+// ssl_hash_session_id returns a hash of `session_id`, suitable for a hash table
+// keyed on session IDs.
+uint32_t ssl_hash_session_id(Span<const uint8_t> session_id);
+
+// SSL_SESSION_parse parses an `SSL_SESSION` from `cbs` and advances `cbs` over
+// the parsed data.
+UniquePtr<SSLSession> SSL_SESSION_parse(CBS *cbs,
+                                        const SSL_X509_METHOD *x509_method,
+                                        CRYPTO_BUFFER_POOL *pool);
+
+// ssl_session_serialize writes `in` to `cbb` as if it were serialising a
+// session for Session-ID resumption. It returns true on success and false on
+// error.
+bool ssl_session_serialize(const SSLSession *in, CBB *cbb);
+
+enum class SSLSessionType {
+  // The session is not resumable.
+  kNotResumable,
+  // The session uses a TLS 1.2 session ID.
+  kID,
+  // The session uses a TLS 1.2 ticket.
+  kTicket,
+  // The session uses a TLS 1.3 pre-shared key.
+  kPreSharedKey,
+};
+
+// ssl_session_get_type returns the type of `session`.
+SSLSessionType ssl_session_get_type(const SSLSession *session);
+
+// ssl_session_is_context_valid returns whether `session`'s session ID context
+// matches the one set on `hs`.
+bool ssl_session_is_context_valid(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                  const SSLSession *session);
+
+// ssl_session_is_time_valid returns true if `session` is still valid and false
+// if it has expired.
+bool ssl_session_is_time_valid(const SSLImpl *ssl, const SSLSession *session);
+
+// ssl_session_is_resumable returns whether `session` is resumable for `hs`.
+bool ssl_session_is_resumable(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                              const SSLSession *session);
+
+// ssl_session_protocol_version returns the protocol version associated with
+// `session`. Note that despite the name, this is not the same as
+// `SSL_SESSION_get_protocol_version`. The latter is based on upstream's name.
+uint16_t ssl_session_protocol_version(const SSLSession *session);
+
+// ssl_session_get_digest returns the digest used in `session`.
+const EVP_MD *ssl_session_get_digest(const SSLSession *session);
+
+// ssl_session_has_peer_cred returns whether `session` contains the peer's
+// (non-PSK) credentials (either X.509 cert chain or raw public key, depending
+// on the peer's certificate type) or a valid SHA-256 hash thereof.
+bool ssl_session_has_peer_cred(const SSLSession *session);
+
+void ssl_set_session(SSLImpl *ssl, SSLSession *session);
+
+// ssl_get_session implements `SSL_get_session`.
+SSLSession *ssl_get_session(const SSLImpl *ssl);
+
+// ssl_get_prev_session looks up the previous session based on `client_hello`.
+// On success, it sets `*out_session` to the session or nullptr if none was
+// found. If the session could not be looked up synchronously, it returns
+// `ssl_hs_pending_session` and should be called again. If a ticket could not be
+// decrypted immediately it returns `ssl_hs_pending_ticket` and should also
+// be called again. Otherwise, it returns `ssl_hs_error`.
+enum ssl_hs_wait_t ssl_get_prev_session(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                        UniquePtr<SSLSession> *out_session,
+                                        bool *out_tickets_supported,
+                                        bool *out_renew_ticket,
+                                        const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello);
+
+// The following flags determine which parts of the session are duplicated.
+#define SSL_SESSION_DUP_AUTH_ONLY 0x0
+#define SSL_SESSION_INCLUDE_TICKET 0x1
+#define SSL_SESSION_INCLUDE_NONAUTH 0x2
+#define SSL_SESSION_DUP_ALL \
+  (SSL_SESSION_INCLUDE_TICKET | SSL_SESSION_INCLUDE_NONAUTH)
+
+// SSL_SESSION_dup returns a newly-allocated `SSL_SESSION` with a copy of the
+// fields in `session` or nullptr on error. The new session is non-resumable and
+// must be explicitly marked resumable once it has been filled in.
+UniquePtr<SSLSession> SSL_SESSION_dup(const SSLSession *session, int dup_flags);
+
+// ssl_session_rebase_time updates `session`'s start time to the current time,
+// adjusting the timeout so the expiration time is unchanged.
+void ssl_session_rebase_time(SSLImpl *ssl, SSLSession *session);
+
+// ssl_session_renew_timeout calls `ssl_session_rebase_time` and renews
+// `session`'s timeout to `timeout` (measured from the current time). The
+// renewal is clamped to the session's auth_timeout.
+void ssl_session_renew_timeout(SSLImpl *ssl, SSLSession *session,
+                               uint32_t timeout);
+
+void ssl_update_cache(SSLImpl *ssl);
+
+void ssl_send_alert(SSLImpl *ssl, int level, int desc);
+int ssl_send_alert_impl(SSLImpl *ssl, int level, int desc);
+bool tls_get_message(const SSLImpl *ssl, SSLMessage *out);
+ssl_open_record_t tls_open_handshake(SSLImpl *ssl, size_t *out_consumed,
+                                     uint8_t *out_alert, Span<uint8_t> in);
+void tls_next_message(SSLImpl *ssl);
+
+int tls_dispatch_alert(SSLImpl *ssl);
+ssl_open_record_t tls_open_app_data(SSLImpl *ssl, Span<uint8_t> *out,
+                                    size_t *out_consumed, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                    Span<uint8_t> in);
+ssl_open_record_t tls_open_change_cipher_spec(SSLImpl *ssl,
+                                              size_t *out_consumed,
+                                              uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                              Span<uint8_t> in);
+int tls_write_app_data(SSLImpl *ssl, bool *out_needs_handshake,
+                       size_t *out_bytes_written, Span<const uint8_t> in);
+
+bool tls_new(SSLImpl *ssl);
+void tls_free(SSLImpl *ssl);
+
+bool tls_init_message(const SSLImpl *ssl, CBB *cbb, CBB *body, uint8_t type);
+bool tls_finish_message(const SSLImpl *ssl, CBB *cbb, Array<uint8_t> *out_msg);
+bool tls_add_message(SSLImpl *ssl, Array<uint8_t> msg);
+bool tls_add_change_cipher_spec(SSLImpl *ssl);
+int tls_flush(SSLImpl *ssl);
+
+bool dtls1_init_message(const SSLImpl *ssl, CBB *cbb, CBB *body, uint8_t type);
+bool dtls1_finish_message(const SSLImpl *ssl, CBB *cbb,
+                          Array<uint8_t> *out_msg);
+bool dtls1_add_message(SSLImpl *ssl, Array<uint8_t> msg);
+bool dtls1_add_change_cipher_spec(SSLImpl *ssl);
+void dtls1_finish_flight(SSLImpl *ssl);
+void dtls1_schedule_ack(SSLImpl *ssl);
+int dtls1_flush(SSLImpl *ssl);
+
+// ssl_add_message_cbb finishes the handshake message in `cbb` and adds it to
+// the pending flight. It returns true on success and false on error.
+bool ssl_add_message_cbb(SSLImpl *ssl, CBB *cbb);
+
+// ssl_hash_message incorporates `msg` into the handshake hash. It returns true
+// on success and false on allocation failure.
+bool ssl_hash_message(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const SSLMessage &msg);
+
+ssl_open_record_t dtls1_process_ack(SSLImpl *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                    DTLSRecordNumber ack_record_number,
+                                    Span<const uint8_t> data);
+ssl_open_record_t dtls1_open_app_data(SSLImpl *ssl, Span<uint8_t> *out,
+                                      size_t *out_consumed, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                      Span<uint8_t> in);
+ssl_open_record_t dtls1_open_change_cipher_spec(SSLImpl *ssl,
+                                                size_t *out_consumed,
+                                                uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                                Span<uint8_t> in);
+
+int dtls1_write_app_data(SSLImpl *ssl, bool *out_needs_handshake,
+                         size_t *out_bytes_written, Span<const uint8_t> in);
+
+// dtls1_write_record sends a record. It returns one on success and <= 0 on
+// error.
+int dtls1_write_record(SSLImpl *ssl, int type, Span<const uint8_t> in,
+                       uint16_t epoch);
+
+bool dtls1_parse_fragment(CBS *cbs, DTLSHandshakeHeader *out_hdr,
+                          CBS *out_body);
+
+// DTLS1_MTU_TIMEOUTS is the maximum number of retransmit timeouts to expire
+// before starting to decrease the MTU.
+#define DTLS1_MTU_TIMEOUTS 2
+
+// DTLS1_MAX_TIMEOUTS is the maximum number of retransmit timeouts to expire
+// before failing the DTLS handshake.
+#define DTLS1_MAX_TIMEOUTS 12
+
+void dtls1_stop_timer(SSLImpl *ssl);
+
+unsigned int dtls1_min_mtu();
+
+bool dtls1_new(SSLImpl *ssl);
+void dtls1_free(SSLImpl *ssl);
+
+bool dtls1_process_handshake_fragments(SSLImpl *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                       DTLSRecordNumber record_number,
+                                       Span<const uint8_t> record);
+bool dtls1_get_message(const SSLImpl *ssl, SSLMessage *out);
+ssl_open_record_t dtls1_open_handshake(SSLImpl *ssl, size_t *out_consumed,
+                                       uint8_t *out_alert, Span<uint8_t> in);
+void dtls1_next_message(SSLImpl *ssl);
+int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSLImpl *ssl);
+
+// tls1_configure_aead configures either the read or write direction AEAD (as
+// determined by `direction`) using the keys generated by the TLS KDF. The
+// `key_block_cache` argument is used to store the generated key block, if
+// empty. Otherwise it's assumed that the key block is already contained within
+// it. It returns true on success or false on error.
+bool tls1_configure_aead(SSLImpl *ssl, evp_aead_direction_t direction,
+                         Array<uint8_t> *key_block_cache,
+                         const SSLSession *session,
+                         Span<const uint8_t> iv_override);
+
+bool tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                              evp_aead_direction_t direction);
+
+// tls1_generate_master_secret computes the master secret from `premaster` and
+// writes it to `out`. `out` must have size `SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE`.
+bool tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, Span<uint8_t> out,
+                                 Span<const uint8_t> premaster);
+
+// tls1_check_group_id returns whether `group_id` is consistent with locally-
+// configured group preferences.
+bool tls1_check_group_id(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *ssl, uint16_t group_id);
+
+// tls1_get_shared_group sets `*out_group_id` to the first preferred shared
+// group between client and server preferences and returns true. If none may be
+// found, it returns false.
+bool tls1_get_shared_group(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint16_t *out_group_id);
+
+// ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext writes ClientHello extensions to `out` for `type`.
+// It returns true on success and false on failure. `out` must currently contain
+// a ClientHello message, not including the message and record header. (Its
+// contents will be used to compute padding and PSK binders.)
+//
+// If `type` is `ssl_client_hello_inner`, this function also writes the
+// compressed extensions to `out_encoded`. Otherwise, `out_encoded` should be
+// nullptr.
+bool ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out, CBB *out_encoded,
+                                ssl_client_hello_type_t type);
+
+bool ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out);
+bool ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                  const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello);
+bool ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const CBS *extensions);
+
+#define tlsext_tick_md EVP_sha256
+
+// ssl_process_ticket processes a session ticket from the client. It returns
+// one of:
+//   `ssl_ticket_aead_success`: `*out_session` is set to the parsed session and
+//       `*out_renew_ticket` is set to whether the ticket should be renewed.
+//   `ssl_ticket_aead_ignore_ticket`: `*out_renew_ticket` is set to whether a
+//       fresh ticket should be sent, but the given ticket cannot be used.
+//   `ssl_ticket_aead_retry`: the ticket could not be immediately decrypted.
+//       Retry later.
+//   `ssl_ticket_aead_error`: an error occurred that is fatal to the connection.
+//
+// If `save_ticket` is true, `*out_session` will have a copy of the ticket saved
+// in its `ticket` field.
+enum ssl_ticket_aead_result_t ssl_process_ticket(
+    SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, UniquePtr<SSLSession> *out_session,
+    bool *out_renew_ticket, Span<const uint8_t> ticket,
+    Span<const uint8_t> session_id, bool save_ticket);
+
+// tls1_verify_channel_id processes `msg` as a Channel ID message, and verifies
+// the signature. If the key is valid, it saves the Channel ID and returns true.
+// Otherwise, it returns false.
+bool tls1_verify_channel_id(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const SSLMessage &msg);
+
+// tls1_write_channel_id generates a Channel ID message and puts the output in
+// `cbb`. `ssl->channel_id_private` must already be set before calling.  This
+// function returns true on success and false on error.
+bool tls1_write_channel_id(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *cbb);
+
+// tls1_channel_id_hash computes the hash to be signed by Channel ID and writes
+// it to `out`, which must contain at least `EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE` bytes. It returns
+// true on success and false on failure.
+bool tls1_channel_id_hash(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len);
+
+// tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id records the current handshake
+// hashes in `hs->new_session` so that Channel ID resumptions can sign that
+// data.
+bool tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+
+// ssl_can_write returns whether `ssl` is allowed to write.
+bool ssl_can_write(const SSLImpl *ssl);
+
+// ssl_can_read returns whether `ssl` is allowed to read.
+bool ssl_can_read(const SSLImpl *ssl);
+
+OPENSSL_timeval ssl_ctx_get_current_time(const SSLContext *ctx);
+
+// ssl_reset_error_state resets state for `SSL_get_error`.
+void ssl_reset_error_state(SSLImpl *ssl);
+
+// ssl_set_read_error sets `ssl`'s read half into an error state, saving the
+// current state of the error queue.
+void ssl_set_read_error(SSLImpl *ssl);
+
+class SSLContext : public ssl_ctx_st, public RefCounted<SSLContext> {
+ public:
+  explicit SSLContext(const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method);
+  SSLContext(const SSLContext &) = delete;
+  SSLContext &operator=(const SSLContext &) = delete;
+
+  const SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD *method = nullptr;
+  const SSL_X509_METHOD *x509_method = nullptr;
+
+  // lock is used to protect various operations on this object.
+  mutable Mutex lock;
+
+  // conf_max_version is the maximum acceptable protocol version configured by
+  // `SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version`. Note this version is normalized in DTLS
+  // and is further constrained by `SSL_OP_NO_*`.
+  uint16_t conf_max_version = 0;
+
+  // conf_min_version is the minimum acceptable protocol version configured by
+  // `SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version`. Note this version is normalized in DTLS
+  // and is further constrained by `SSL_OP_NO_*`.
+  uint16_t conf_min_version = 0;
+
+  // num_tickets is the number of tickets to send immediately after the TLS 1.3
+  // handshake. TLS 1.3 recommends single-use tickets so, by default, issue two
+  /// in case the client makes several connections before getting a renewal.
+  uint8_t num_tickets = 2;
+
+  // quic_method is the method table corresponding to the QUIC hooks.
+  const SSL_QUIC_METHOD *quic_method = nullptr;
+
+  UniquePtr<SSLCipherPreferenceList> cipher_list;  // for TLS 1.2 ciphers.
+  SSLCipherPreferenceList tls13_cipher_list;
+
+  X509_STORE *cert_store = nullptr;
+  // TODO(crbug.com/565766495): Switch this to `SSLSession`.
+  LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *sessions = nullptr;
+  // Most session-ids that will be cached, default is
+  // SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT. 0 is unlimited.
+  unsigned long session_cache_size = SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT;
+  SSLSession *session_cache_head = nullptr;
+  SSLSession *session_cache_tail = nullptr;
+
+  // handshakes_since_cache_flush is the number of successful handshakes since
+  // the last cache flush.
+  int handshakes_since_cache_flush = 0;
+
+  // This can have one of 2 values, ored together,
+  // SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT,
+  // SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER,
+  // Default is SSL_SESSION_CACHE_SERVER, which means only
+  // SSL_accept which cache SSL_SESSIONS.
+  int session_cache_mode = SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER;
+
+  // session_timeout is the default lifetime for new sessions in TLS 1.2 and
+  // earlier, in seconds.
+  uint32_t session_timeout = SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_TIMEOUT;
+
+  // session_psk_dhe_timeout is the default lifetime for new sessions in TLS
+  // 1.3, in seconds.
+  uint32_t session_psk_dhe_timeout = SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_PSK_DHE_TIMEOUT;
+
+  // If this callback is not null, it will be called each time a session id is
+  // added to the cache.  If this function returns 1, it means that the
+  // callback will do a SSL_SESSION_free() when it has finished using it.
+  // Otherwise, on 0, it means the callback has finished with it. If
+  // remove_session_cb is not null, it will be called when a session-id is
+  // removed from the cache.  After the call, OpenSSL will SSL_SESSION_free()
+  // it.
+  int (*new_session_cb)(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess) = nullptr;
+  void (*remove_session_cb)(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess) = nullptr;
+  SSL_SESSION *(*get_session_cb)(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *data, int len,
+                                 int *copy) = nullptr;
+
+  // if defined, these override the X509_verify_cert() calls
+  int (*app_verify_callback)(X509_STORE_CTX *store_ctx, void *arg) = nullptr;
+  void *app_verify_arg = nullptr;
+
+  ssl_verify_result_t (*custom_verify_callback)(SSL *ssl,
+                                                uint8_t *out_alert) = nullptr;
+
+  // Default password callback.
+  pem_password_cb *default_passwd_callback = nullptr;
+
+  // Default password callback user data.
+  void *default_passwd_callback_userdata = nullptr;
+
+  // get client cert callback
+  int (*client_cert_cb)(SSL *ssl, X509 **out_x509,
+                        EVP_PKEY **out_pkey) = nullptr;
+
+  CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;
+
+  // Default values used when no per-SSL value is defined follow
+
+  void (*info_callback)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int value) = nullptr;
+
+  // what we put in client cert requests
+  UniquePtr<STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER)> client_CA;
+
+  // cached_x509_client_CA is a cache of parsed versions of the elements of
+  // `client_CA`.
+  STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *cached_x509_client_CA = nullptr;
+
+  // What we put in client hello in the CA extension.
+  UniquePtr<STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER)> CA_names;
+
+  // What we request in the trust_anchors extension.
+  std::optional<Array<uint8_t>> requested_trust_anchors;
+
+  // Default values to use in SSL structures follow (these are copied by
+  // SSL_new)
+
+  uint32_t options = SSL_OP_ALL;
+  // Disable the auto-chaining feature by default. wpa_supplicant relies on this
+  // feature, but require callers opt into it.
+  uint32_t mode = SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN;
+  uint32_t max_cert_list = SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT;
+
+  UniquePtr<CERT> cert;
+
+  // callback that allows applications to peek at protocol messages
+  void (*msg_callback)(int is_write, int version, int content_type,
+                       const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl,
+                       void *arg) = nullptr;
+  void *msg_callback_arg = nullptr;
+
+  int verify_mode = SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
+  int (*default_verify_callback)(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) =
+      nullptr;  // called 'verify_callback' in the SSL
+
+  X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = nullptr;
+
+  // select_certificate_cb is called before most ClientHello processing and
+  // before the decision whether to resume a session is made. See
+  // `ssl_select_cert_result_t` for details of the return values.
+  ssl_select_cert_result_t (*select_certificate_cb)(const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *) =
+      nullptr;
+
+  // dos_protection_cb is called once the resumption decision for a ClientHello
+  // has been made. It returns one to continue the handshake or zero to
+  // abort.
+  int (*dos_protection_cb)(const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *) = nullptr;
+
+  // Controls whether to verify certificates when resuming connections. They
+  // were already verified when the connection was first made, so the default is
+  // false. For now, this is only respected on clients, not servers.
+  bool reverify_on_resume = false;
+
+  // Maximum amount of data to send in one fragment. actual record size can be
+  // more than this due to padding and MAC overheads.
+  uint16_t max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
+
+  // TLS extensions servername callback
+  int (*servername_callback)(SSL *, int *, void *) = nullptr;
+  void *servername_arg = nullptr;
+
+  // RFC 4507 session ticket keys. `ticket_key_current` may be NULL before the
+  // first handshake and `ticket_key_prev` may be NULL at any time.
+  // Automatically generated ticket keys are rotated as needed at handshake
+  // time. Hence, all access must be synchronized through `lock`.
+  UniquePtr<TicketKey> ticket_key_current;
+  UniquePtr<TicketKey> ticket_key_prev;
+
+  // Callback to support customisation of ticket key setting
+  int (*ticket_key_cb)(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *name, uint8_t *iv,
+                       EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ectx, HMAC_CTX *hctx, int enc) = nullptr;
+
+  // Server-only: psk_identity_hint is the default identity hint to send in
+  // PSK-based key exchanges.
+  UniquePtr<char> psk_identity_hint;
+
+  unsigned (*psk_client_callback)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity,
+                                  unsigned max_identity_len, uint8_t *psk,
+                                  unsigned max_psk_len) = nullptr;
+  unsigned (*psk_server_callback)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity, uint8_t *psk,
+                                  unsigned max_psk_len) = nullptr;
+
+
+  // Next protocol negotiation information
+  // (for experimental NPN extension).
+
+  // For a server, this contains a callback function by which the set of
+  // advertised protocols can be provided.
+  int (*next_protos_advertised_cb)(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out,
+                                   unsigned *out_len, void *arg) = nullptr;
+  void *next_protos_advertised_cb_arg = nullptr;
+  // For a client, this contains a callback function that selects the
+  // next protocol from the list provided by the server.
+  int (*next_proto_select_cb)(SSL *ssl, uint8_t **out, uint8_t *out_len,
+                              const uint8_t *in, unsigned in_len,
+                              void *arg) = nullptr;
+  void *next_proto_select_cb_arg = nullptr;
+
+  // ALPN information
+  // (we are in the process of transitioning from NPN to ALPN.)
+
+  // For a server, this contains a callback function that allows the
+  // server to select the protocol for the connection.
+  //   out: on successful return, this must point to the raw protocol
+  //        name (without the length prefix).
+  //   outlen: on successful return, this contains the length of `*out`.
+  //   in: points to the client's list of supported protocols in
+  //       wire-format.
+  //   inlen: the length of `in`.
+  int (*alpn_select_cb)(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out, uint8_t *out_len,
+                        const uint8_t *in, unsigned in_len,
+                        void *arg) = nullptr;
+  void *alpn_select_cb_arg = nullptr;
+
+  // For a client, this contains the list of supported protocols in wire
+  // format.
+  Array<uint8_t> alpn_client_proto_list;
+
+  // SRTP profiles we are willing to do from RFC 5764
+  UniquePtr<STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE)> srtp_profiles;
+
+  // Defined compression algorithms for certificates.
+  Vector<CertCompressionAlg> cert_compression_algs;
+
+  // Supported group values and flags inherited by SSL structure
+  Array<uint16_t> supported_group_list;
+  Array<uint32_t> supported_group_list_flags;
+
+  // channel_id_private is the client's Channel ID private key, or null if
+  // Channel ID should not be offered on this connection.
+  UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> channel_id_private;
+
+  // ech_keys contains the server's list of ECHConfig values and associated
+  // private keys. This list may be swapped out at any time, so all access must
+  // be synchronized through `lock`.
+  UniquePtr<SSLECHKeys> ech_keys;
+
+  // keylog_callback, if not NULL, is the key logging callback. See
+  // `SSL_CTX_set_keylog_callback`.
+  void (*keylog_callback)(const SSL *ssl, const char *line) = nullptr;
+
+  // current_time_cb, if not NULL, is the function to use to get the current
+  // time. It sets `*out_clock` to the current time. The `ssl` argument is
+  // always NULL. See `SSL_CTX_set_current_time_cb`.
+  void (*current_time_cb)(const SSL *ssl, struct timeval *out_clock) = nullptr;
+
+  // pool is used for all `CRYPTO_BUFFER`s in case we wish to share certificate
+  // memory.
+  UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER_POOL> pool;
+
+  // ticket_aead_method contains function pointers for opening and sealing
+  // session tickets.
+  const SSL_TICKET_AEAD_METHOD *ticket_aead_method = nullptr;
+
+  // legacy_ocsp_callback implements an OCSP-related callback for OpenSSL
+  // compatibility.
+  int (*legacy_ocsp_callback)(SSL *ssl, void *arg) = nullptr;
+  void *legacy_ocsp_callback_arg = nullptr;
+
+  // compliance_policy limits the set of ciphers that can be selected when
+  // negotiating a TLS 1.3 connection.
+  enum ssl_compliance_policy_t compliance_policy = ssl_compliance_policy_none;
+
+  // verify_sigalgs, if not empty, is the set of signature algorithms
+  // accepted from the peer in decreasing order of preference.
+  Array<uint16_t> verify_sigalgs;
+
+  // accepted_peer_cert_types inherited by SSL struct.
+  InplaceVector<uint8_t, kNumCertTypes> accepted_peer_cert_types;
+
+  // available_client_cert_types inherited by SSL struct.
+  InplaceVector<uint8_t, kNumCertTypes> available_client_cert_types;
+
+  // retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs is true if we should compute the SHA256
+  // hash of the peer's certificate and then discard it to save memory and
+  // session space. Only effective on the server side.
+  bool retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs : 1;
+
+  // quiet_shutdown is true if the connection should not send a close_notify on
+  // shutdown.
+  bool quiet_shutdown : 1;
+
+  // ocsp_stapling_enabled is only used by client connections and indicates
+  // whether OCSP stapling will be requested.
+  bool ocsp_stapling_enabled : 1;
+
+  // If true, a client will request certificate timestamps.
+  bool signed_cert_timestamps_enabled : 1;
+
+  // channel_id_enabled is whether Channel ID is enabled. For a server, means
+  // that we'll accept Channel IDs from clients.  For a client, means that we'll
+  // advertise support.
+  bool channel_id_enabled : 1;
+
+  // grease_enabled is whether GREASE (RFC 8701) is enabled.
+  bool grease_enabled : 1;
+
+  // grease_sigalgs_enabled controls whether GREASE signature algorithms may be
+  // sent.
+  // TODO(crbug.com/526597789): Fold into `grease_enabled` once deployed safely.
+  bool grease_sigalgs_enabled : 1;
+
+  // permute_extensions is whether to permute extensions when sending messages.
+  bool permute_extensions : 1;
+
+  // allow_unknown_alpn_protos is whether the client allows unsolicited ALPN
+  // protocols from the peer.
+  bool allow_unknown_alpn_protos : 1;
+
+  // false_start_allowed_without_alpn is whether False Start (if
+  // `SSL_MODE_ENABLE_FALSE_START` is enabled) is allowed without ALPN.
+  bool false_start_allowed_without_alpn : 1;
+
+  // If enable_early_data is true, early data can be sent and accepted.
+  bool enable_early_data : 1;
+
+  // resumption_across_names_enabled indicates whether a TLS 1.3 server should
+  // signal its sessions may be resumed across names in the server certificate.
+  bool resumption_across_names_enabled : 1;
+
+ private:
+  friend RefCounted;
+  ~SSLContext();
+};
+
+class SSLImpl : public ssl_st {
+ public:
+  static constexpr bool kAllowUniquePtr = true;
+
+  explicit SSLImpl(SSLContext *ctx_arg);
+  SSLImpl(const SSLImpl &) = delete;
+  SSLImpl &operator=(const SSLImpl &) = delete;
+  ~SSLImpl();
+
+  // method is the method table corresponding to the current protocol (DTLS or
+  // TLS).
+  const SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD *method = nullptr;
+
+  // config is a container for handshake configuration.  Accesses to this field
+  // should check for nullptr, since configuration may be shed after the
+  // handshake completes.  (If you have the `SSL_HANDSHAKE` object at hand, use
+  // that instead, and skip the null check.)
+  UniquePtr<SSL_CONFIG> config;
+
+  uint16_t max_send_fragment = 0;
+
+  // There are 2 BIO's even though they are normally both the same. This is so
+  // data can be read and written to different handlers
+
+  UniquePtr<BIO> rbio;  // used by SSL_read
+  UniquePtr<BIO> wbio;  // used by SSL_write
+
+  // do_handshake runs the handshake. On completion, it returns `ssl_hs_ok`.
+  // Otherwise, it returns a value corresponding to what operation is needed to
+  // progress.
+  ssl_hs_wait_t (*do_handshake)(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) = nullptr;
+
+  SSL3_STATE *s3 = nullptr;   // TLS variables
+  DTLS1_STATE *d1 = nullptr;  // DTLS variables
+
+  // callback that allows applications to peek at protocol messages
+  void (*msg_callback)(int write_p, int version, int content_type,
+                       const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl,
+                       void *arg) = nullptr;
+  void *msg_callback_arg = nullptr;
+
+  // session info
+
+  // initial_timeout_duration_ms is the default DTLS timeout duration in
+  // milliseconds. It's used to initialize the timer any time it's restarted. We
+  // default to RFC 9147's recommendation for real-time applications, 400ms.
+  uint32_t initial_timeout_duration_ms = 400;
+
+  // session is the configured session to be offered by the client. This session
+  // is immutable.
+  UniquePtr<SSLSession> session;
+
+  void (*info_callback)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int value) = nullptr;
+
+  UniquePtr<SSLContext> ctx;
+
+  // session_ctx is the `SSLContext` used for the session cache and related
+  // settings.
+  UniquePtr<SSLContext> session_ctx;
+
+  // extra application data
+  CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;
+
+  uint32_t options = 0;  // protocol behaviour
+  uint32_t mode = 0;     // API behaviour
+  uint32_t max_cert_list = 0;
+  UniquePtr<char> hostname;
+
+  // quic_method is the method table corresponding to the QUIC hooks.
+  const SSL_QUIC_METHOD *quic_method = nullptr;
+
+  // renegotiate_mode controls how peer renegotiation attempts are handled.
+  ssl_renegotiate_mode_t renegotiate_mode = ssl_renegotiate_never;
+
+  // server is true iff this SSL* is the server half. Note: before the SSL*
+  // is initialized by either SSL_set_accept_state or SSL_set_connect_state,
+  // the side is not determined. In this state, server is always false.
+  bool server : 1;
+
+  // quiet_shutdown is true if the connection should not send a close_notify on
+  // shutdown.
+  bool quiet_shutdown : 1;
+
+  // If enable_early_data is true, early data can be sent and accepted.
+  bool enable_early_data : 1;
+
+  // resumption_across_names_enabled indicates whether a TLS 1.3 server should
+  // signal its sessions may be resumed across names in the server certificate.
+  bool resumption_across_names_enabled : 1;
+};
+
+class SSLSession : public ssl_session_st, public RefCounted<SSLSession> {
+ public:
+  explicit SSLSession(const SSL_X509_METHOD *method);
+  SSLSession(const SSLSession &) = delete;
+  SSLSession &operator=(const SSLSession &) = delete;
+
+  // ssl_version is the (D)TLS version that established the session.
+  uint16_t ssl_version = 0;
+
+  // group_id is the ID of the ECDH group used to establish this session or zero
+  // if not applicable or unknown.
+  uint16_t group_id = 0;
+
+  // peer_signature_algorithm is the signature algorithm used to authenticate
+  // the peer, or zero if not applicable or unknown.
+  uint16_t peer_signature_algorithm = 0;
+
+  // secret, in TLS 1.2 and below, is the master secret associated with the
+  // session. In TLS 1.3 and up, it is the resumption PSK for sessions handed to
+  // the caller, but it stores the resumption secret when stored on `SSL`
+  // objects.
+  InplaceVector<uint8_t, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH> secret;
+
+  InplaceVector<uint8_t, SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH> session_id;
+
+  // this is used to determine whether the session is being reused in
+  // the appropriate context. It is up to the application to set this,
+  // via SSL_new
+  InplaceVector<uint8_t, SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH> sid_ctx;
+
+  UniquePtr<char> psk_identity;
+
+  // certs contains the certificate chain from the peer, starting with the leaf
+  // certificate. This must be null if `peer_raw_public_key` is non-null.
+  UniquePtr<STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER)> certs;
+
+  const SSL_X509_METHOD *x509_method = nullptr;
+
+  // x509_peer is the peer's certificate. This must be null if
+  // `peer_raw_public_key` is non-null.
+  X509 *x509_peer = nullptr;
+
+  // x509_chain is the certificate chain sent by the peer. NOTE: for historical
+  // reasons, when a client (so the peer is a server), the chain includes
+  // `peer`, but when a server it does not. This must be null if
+  // `peer_raw_public_key` is non-null.
+  STACK_OF(X509) *x509_chain = nullptr;
+
+  // x509_chain_without_leaf is a lazily constructed copy of `x509_chain` that
+  // omits the leaf certificate. This exists because OpenSSL, historically,
+  // didn't include the leaf certificate in the chain for a server, but did for
+  // a client. The `x509_chain` always includes it and, if an API call requires
+  // a chain without, it is stored here. This must be null if
+  // `peer_raw_public_key` is non-null.
+  STACK_OF(X509) *x509_chain_without_leaf = nullptr;
+
+  // verify_result is the result of certificate verification in the case of
+  // non-fatal certificate errors.
+  long verify_result = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
+
+  // timeout is the lifetime of the session in seconds, measured from `time`.
+  // This is renewable up to `auth_timeout`.
+  uint32_t timeout = SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_TIMEOUT;
+
+  // auth_timeout is the non-renewable lifetime of the session in seconds,
+  // measured from `time`.
+  uint32_t auth_timeout = SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_TIMEOUT;
+
+  // time is the time the session was issued, measured in seconds from the UNIX
+  // epoch.
+  uint64_t time = 0;
+
+  const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = nullptr;
+
+  CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;  // application specific data
+
+  // These are used to make removal of session-ids more efficient and to
+  // implement a maximum cache size.
+  //
+  // TODO(crbug.com/527997772): At the ends of the list, `prev` and `next` point
+  // to `session_cache_head` and `session_cache_tail` on `SSLContext`. These
+  // sentinel values are not real sessions, so they must never be dereferenced
+  // or converted to `SSL_SESSION`.
+  SSLSession *prev = nullptr, *next = nullptr;
+
+  Array<uint8_t> ticket;
+
+  UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> signed_cert_timestamp_list;
+
+  // The OCSP response that came with the session.
+  UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> ocsp_response;
+
+  // peer_sha256 contains the SHA-256 hash of the peer's X.509 certificate or
+  // raw public key if `peer_sha256_valid` is true. (`peer_cert_type` indicates
+  // which type of credential is hashed here.)
+  uint8_t peer_sha256[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH] = {0};
+
+  // original_handshake_hash contains the handshake hash (either SHA-1+MD5 or
+  // SHA-2, depending on TLS version) for the original, full handshake that
+  // created a session. This is used by Channel IDs during resumption.
+  InplaceVector<uint8_t, SSL_MAX_MD_SIZE> original_handshake_hash;
+
+  uint32_t ticket_lifetime_hint = 0;  // Session lifetime hint in seconds
+
+  uint32_t ticket_age_add = 0;
+
+  // ticket_max_early_data is the maximum amount of data allowed to be sent as
+  // early data. If zero, 0-RTT is disallowed.
+  uint32_t ticket_max_early_data = 0;
+
+  // early_alpn is the ALPN protocol from the initial handshake. This is only
+  // stored for TLS 1.3 and above in order to enforce ALPN matching for 0-RTT
+  // resumptions. For the current connection's ALPN protocol, see
+  // `alpn_selected` on `SSL3_STATE`.
+  Array<uint8_t> early_alpn;
+
+  // local_application_settings, if `has_application_settings` is true, is the
+  // local ALPS value for this connection.
+  Array<uint8_t> local_application_settings;
+
+  // peer_application_settings, if `has_application_settings` is true, is the
+  // peer ALPS value for this connection.
+  Array<uint8_t> peer_application_settings;
+
+  // extended_master_secret is whether the master secret in this session was
+  // generated using EMS and thus isn't vulnerable to the Triple Handshake
+  // attack.
+  bool extended_master_secret : 1;
+
+  // peer_sha256_valid is whether `peer_sha256` is valid.
+  bool peer_sha256_valid : 1;  // Non-zero if peer_sha256 is valid
+
+  // not_resumable is used to indicate that session resumption is disallowed.
+  bool not_resumable : 1;
+
+  // ticket_age_add_valid is whether `ticket_age_add` is valid.
+  bool ticket_age_add_valid : 1;
+
+  // is_server is whether this session was created by a server.
+  bool is_server : 1;
+
+  // is_quic indicates whether this session was created using QUIC.
+  bool is_quic : 1;
+
+  // has_application_settings indicates whether ALPS was negotiated in this
+  // session.
+  bool has_application_settings : 1;
+
+  // is_resumable_across_names indicates whether the session may be resumed for
+  // any of the identities presented in the certificate.
+  bool is_resumable_across_names : 1;
+
+  // quic_early_data_context is used to determine whether early data must be
+  // rejected when performing a QUIC handshake.
+  Array<uint8_t> quic_early_data_context;
+
+  // peer_cert_type is the peer's cert type (`TLSEXT_cert_type_*` value), which
+  // determines the type of Certificate the peer used for this session: which of
+  // `certs` xor `peer_raw_public_key` is populated for an authenticated
+  // session.
+  uint8_t peer_cert_type = kDefaultCertType;
+
+  // peer_raw_public_key, if non-null, is the raw public key received from the
+  // peer. This must be null if `certs` is non-null.
+  UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> peer_raw_public_key;
+
+ private:
+  friend RefCounted;
+  ~SSLSession();
+};
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_END
+
+
+// Opaque C types.
+//
+// `SSL_METHOD` is exported to C code as public typedefs, so it must be defined
+// outside of the namespace. We can switch it to `DECLARE_OPAQUE_STRUCT` if
+// becomes more complex than a plain struct.
+
+// ssl_method_st backs the public `SSL_METHOD` type. It is a compatibility
+// structure to support the legacy version-locked methods.
+struct ssl_method_st {
+  // version, if non-zero, is the only protocol version acceptable to an
+  // SSL_CTX initialized from this method.
+  uint16_t version;
+  // method is the underlying SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD that initializes the
+  // SSL_CTX.
+  const bssl::SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD *method;
+  // x509_method contains pointers to functions that might deal with `X509`
+  // compatibility, or might be a no-op, depending on the application.
+  const bssl::SSL_X509_METHOD *x509_method;
+};
+
+
+#endif  // OPENSSL_HEADER_SSL_INTERNAL_H