opencode-skills-collection 4.0.52 → 4.0.54

package/bundled-skills/container-security-hardening/SKILL.md

@@ -17,6 +17,10 @@ A production-focused guide for building, scanning, and running containers secure
 
 ---
 
+## Detailed Guide
+
+Read [the detailed guide](references/detailed-guide.md) before executing this skill. It retains the complete procedure and reference material. Treat its safety, prerequisites, and validation requirements as mandatory. For focused work, load the relevant sections; for end-to-end work, read the guide completely.
+
 ## When to Use This Skill
 
 - User mentions Docker security, container hardening, or Dockerfile security review
@@ -37,906 +41,6 @@ A production-focused guide for building, scanning, and running containers secure
 
 ---
 
-## Step 1: Understand Context Before Responding
-
-When invoked, first detect the current state:
-
-```bash
-# Find Dockerfiles in the project
-find . -name "Dockerfile*" -not -path "*/node_modules/*" | head -10
-
-# Check for existing security tooling
-ls .trivyignore .hadolint.yaml .snyk docker-compose*.yml 2>/dev/null
-
-# Inspect base images currently in use
-grep -r "^FROM" $(find . -name "Dockerfile*") 2>/dev/null
-
-# Check if Kubernetes manifests exist
-find . -name "*.yaml" -path "*/k8s/*" -o -name "*.yaml" -path "*/manifests/*" | head -10
-```
-
-Then adapt recommendations to:
-- The tech stack (Node, Python, Go, Java — affects base image choice)
-- Whether this is Docker-only or Kubernetes-deployed
-- The CI platform in use (for scanner integration)
-- The existing base images and how far they are from best practice
-
----
-
-## The Five Layers of Container Security
-
-```
-1. Image Build        → Minimal base, no secrets, non-root, read-only FS
-2. Image Scanning     → CVE scanning, SBOM, secret detection, Dockerfile lint
-3. Runtime Security   → Capabilities, seccomp, AppArmor, resource limits
-4. Supply Chain       → Signed images, pinned digests, trusted registries
-5. Kubernetes Layer   → Pod Security Admission, NetworkPolicy, RBAC, Kyverno
-```
-
-> Work through layers in order — hardening the image first gives the most leverage.
-> See `references/base-image-comparison.md` for a full size/CVE trade-off table.
-
----
-
-## Layer 1: Dockerfile Hardening
-
-### 1.1 Use a Minimal Base Image
-
-```dockerfile
-# ❌ AVOID — massive attack surface (~100–200 CVEs typical)
-FROM ubuntu:latest
-FROM node:20
-
-# ✅ BETTER — slim variants (glibc, smaller apt footprint)
-FROM node:20-slim
-FROM python:3.12-slim
-
-# ✅ BEST — distroless (no shell, no package manager, built-in nonroot user)
-FROM gcr.io/distroless/nodejs20-debian12
-FROM gcr.io/distroless/python3-debian12
-FROM gcr.io/distroless/static-debian12   # Go/Rust fully-static binaries
-
-# ✅ ALSO GREAT — Alpine (musl libc; verify app compatibility first)
-FROM alpine:3.20
-
-# ✅ ZERO ATTACK SURFACE — for fully static binaries only
-FROM scratch
-```
-
-See `references/base-image-comparison.md` for the full trade-off matrix.
-
-### 1.2 Multi-Stage Build — Separate Build from Runtime
-
-Never ship build tools, compilers, or dev dependencies in a production image.
-
-```dockerfile
-# syntax=docker/dockerfile:1
-
-# ── Stage 1: Install & Build ──────────────────────────────
-FROM node:20-slim AS builder
-WORKDIR /build
-COPY package*.json ./
-RUN npm ci                          # Install all deps (including devDeps)
-COPY . .
-RUN npm run build && npm prune --production
-
-# ── Stage 2: Runtime — minimal, no build tools ────────────
-FROM gcr.io/distroless/nodejs20-debian12@sha256:<digest>
-LABEL org.opencontainers.image.source="https://github.com/org/repo"
-LABEL org.opencontainers.image.revision="${BUILD_SHA}"
-LABEL org.opencontainers.image.licenses="MIT"
-WORKDIR /app
-COPY --from=builder --chown=nonroot:nonroot /build/dist        ./dist
-COPY --from=builder --chown=nonroot:nonroot /build/node_modules ./node_modules
-USER nonroot:nonroot                # UID 65532 — built into distroless
-EXPOSE 3000
-CMD ["dist/server.js"]
-```
-
-**Go / Rust static binary pattern:**
-```dockerfile
-FROM golang:1.22-alpine AS builder
-WORKDIR /build
-COPY go.* ./
-RUN go mod download
-COPY . .
-RUN CGO_ENABLED=0 GOOS=linux go build -ldflags="-s -w" -o app .
-
-FROM scratch                        # Zero attack surface
-COPY --from=builder /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt /etc/ssl/certs/
-COPY --from=builder /build/app /app
-USER 65532:65532
-ENTRYPOINT ["/app"]
-```
-
-### 1.3 Run as Non-Root User
-
-```dockerfile
-# For debian/ubuntu-based images — create dedicated user
-RUN groupadd -r appgroup --gid 10001 && \
-    useradd -r -g appgroup --uid 10001 --no-log-init appuser
-
-COPY --chown=appuser:appgroup . /app
-
-USER appuser    # Switch before CMD/ENTRYPOINT — never run as root
-
-# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-# For Alpine-based images
-RUN addgroup -g 10001 -S appgroup && \
-    adduser -u 10001 -S appuser -G appgroup
-
-# For distroless — nonroot (UID 65532) is already built in
-USER nonroot:nonroot
-```
-
-### 1.4 Pin Base Images to Digest
-
-```dockerfile
-# ❌ UNSAFE — tags are mutable; image can be silently overwritten (supply chain attack)
-FROM node:20-slim
-
-# ✅ SAFE — SHA256 digest is cryptographically immutable
-FROM node:20-slim@sha256:a1b2c3d4e5f6789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789ab
-```
-
-**Get the current digest:**
-```bash
-docker pull node:20-slim
-docker inspect node:20-slim --format='{{index .RepoDigests 0}}'
-```
-
-**Automate digest pinning** with Renovate or Dependabot:
-```json
-// .renovaterc.json
-{
-  "extends": ["config:base"],
-  "dockerfile": { "enabled": true },
-  "pinDigests": true
-}
-```
-
-### 1.5 Never Bake Secrets into Images
-
-```dockerfile
-# ❌ NEVER — secret in ENV or RUN; visible in `docker history` and layer cache
-ENV AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=supersecret
-RUN curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" https://api.example.com > config.json
-ARG API_KEY                         # Also unsafe — visible in build args history
-
-# ✅ CORRECT — BuildKit secret mount (never persisted in any layer)
-# syntax=docker/dockerfile:1
-RUN --mount=type=secret,id=api_token \
-    curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $(cat /run/secrets/api_token)" \
-    https://api.example.com/config > config.json
-```
-
-Build with: `docker build --secret id=api_token,src=./token.txt .`
-
-**Check your image for leaked secrets:**
-```bash
-docker history --no-trunc myapp:latest | grep -iE "secret|key|password|token"
-trivy image --scanners secret myapp:latest
-```
-
-### 1.6 Read-Only Filesystem & No New Privileges
-
-```dockerfile
-# In the Dockerfile — use exec form (no shell interpretation)
-ENTRYPOINT ["node", "server.js"]    # ✅ exec form
-# ENTRYPOINT /bin/sh -c "node..."  # ❌ shell form — spawns extra process
-
-# Define a HEALTHCHECK
-HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=5s --start-period=10s --retries=3 \
-  CMD ["node", "-e", "require('http').get('http://localhost:3000/health', r => process.exit(r.statusCode === 200 ? 0 : 1))"]
-```
-
-Enforce read-only at runtime (see Layer 3).
-
-### 1.7 Minimal .dockerignore
-
-```dockerignore
-# Always exclude these from build context
-.git
-.github
-.env
-.env.*
-*.pem
-*.key
-node_modules
-__pycache__
-.pytest_cache
-coverage/
-dist/
-*.log
-.DS_Store
-Dockerfile*
-docker-compose*
-README.md
-docs/
-tests/
-```
-
-### 1.8 Full Hardened Dockerfile Example
-
-```dockerfile
-# syntax=docker/dockerfile:1
-
-# ── Build stage ───────────────────────────────────────────
-FROM node:20-slim AS builder
-WORKDIR /build
-COPY package*.json ./
-RUN --mount=type=cache,target=/root/.npm \
-    npm ci
-COPY . .
-RUN npm run build && npm prune --production
-
-# ── Runtime stage ─────────────────────────────────────────
-FROM gcr.io/distroless/nodejs20-debian12@sha256:<pin-digest-here>
-
-LABEL org.opencontainers.image.source="https://github.com/org/repo"
-LABEL org.opencontainers.image.revision="${BUILD_SHA}"
-LABEL org.opencontainers.image.licenses="MIT"
-
-WORKDIR /app
-COPY --from=builder --chown=nonroot:nonroot /build/dist        ./dist
-COPY --from=builder --chown=nonroot:nonroot /build/node_modules ./node_modules
-
-USER nonroot:nonroot
-EXPOSE 3000
-
-HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=5s --start-period=10s --retries=3 \
-  CMD ["node", "-e", "require('http').get('http://localhost:3000/health', r => process.exit(r.statusCode===200?0:1))"]
-
-CMD ["dist/server.js"]
-```
-
----
-
-## Layer 2: Image Scanning
-
-### 2.1 Trivy (Recommended — Fast, Comprehensive)
-
-```bash
-# Install
-brew install trivy                              # macOS
-apt install trivy                               # Debian/Ubuntu
-tmpdir="$(mktemp -d)"
-trap 'rm -rf "$tmpdir"' EXIT
-curl -sfL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/aquasecurity/trivy/main/contrib/install.sh \
-  -o "$tmpdir/trivy-install.sh"
-sed -n '1,160p' "$tmpdir/trivy-install.sh"
-sh "$tmpdir/trivy-install.sh"
-
-# Scan an image for CVEs
-trivy image myapp:latest
-
-# Fail CI on HIGH/CRITICAL severity
-trivy image --exit-code 1 --severity HIGH,CRITICAL myapp:latest
-
-# Scan Dockerfile for misconfigurations
-trivy config ./Dockerfile
-
-# Scan entire repo (vulnerabilities + secrets + misconfigs)
-trivy fs --scanners vuln,secret,misconfig .
-
-# Generate SBOM (CycloneDX or SPDX)
-trivy image --format cyclonedx --output sbom.json myapp:latest
-trivy image --format spdx-json  --output sbom.spdx.json myapp:latest
-
-# Ignore specific CVEs (add justification comments)
-trivy image --ignorefile .trivyignore myapp:latest
-```
-
-**.trivyignore example:**
-```
-# CVE-2023-1234 — only exploitable via X feature, not used in this app
-CVE-2023-1234
-
-# CVE-2023-5678 — fix not yet available; tracked in issue #42
-CVE-2023-5678
-```
-
-### 2.2 Grype (Anchore Alternative)
-
-```bash
-# Install
-tmpdir="$(mktemp -d)"
-trap 'rm -rf "$tmpdir"' EXIT
-curl -sSfL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/anchore/grype/main/install.sh \
-  -o "$tmpdir/grype-install.sh"
-sed -n '1,160p' "$tmpdir/grype-install.sh"
-sh "$tmpdir/grype-install.sh"
-
-# Scan image
-grype myapp:latest
-
-# Fail on critical
-grype myapp:latest --fail-on critical
-
-# Output SARIF for GitHub Security tab
-grype myapp:latest -o sarif > results.sarif
-
-# Pair with Syft for SBOM generation
-syft myapp:latest -o cyclonedx-json > sbom.json
-grype sbom:sbom.json                            # Scan the SBOM directly
-```
-
-### 2.3 Hadolint — Dockerfile Linting
-
-```bash
-# Run directly
-docker run --rm -i hadolint/hadolint < Dockerfile
-
-# With config file
-hadolint --config .hadolint.yaml --failure-threshold warning Dockerfile
-```
-
-**.hadolint.yaml:**
-```yaml
-failure-threshold: warning
-ignore:
-  - DL3008   # Pin versions in apt-get (allow floating for base layer)
-trustedRegistries:
-  - gcr.io
-  - ghcr.io
-  - public.ecr.aws
-```
-
-### 2.4 Secret Scanning in Images
-
-```bash
-# Trivy covers secrets too
-trivy image --scanners secret myapp:latest
-
-# Dedicated: TruffleHog
-trufflehog docker --image myapp:latest
-
-# git-secrets to prevent committing secrets
-git secrets --scan
-```
-
-### 2.5 CI Integration (GitHub Actions — SHA-Pinned)
-
-```yaml
-permissions:
-  contents: read
-  security-events: write      # Required for uploading SARIF
-
-jobs:
-  security-scan:
-    runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
-    timeout-minutes: 20
-    steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683  # v4.2.2
-
-      - name: Build image
-        run: docker build -t myapp:${{ github.sha }} .
-
-      - name: Lint Dockerfile
-        uses: hadolint/hadolint-action@54c9adbab1582c2ef04b2016b760714a4bfde3cf  # v3.1.0
-        with:
-          dockerfile: Dockerfile
-          failure-threshold: warning
-
-      - name: Scan with Trivy
-        uses: aquasecurity/trivy-action@6e7b7d1fd3e4fef0c5fa8cce1229c54b2c9bd0d8  # v0.28.0
-        with:
-          image-ref: myapp:${{ github.sha }}
-          format: sarif
-          output: trivy-results.sarif
-          severity: HIGH,CRITICAL
-          exit-code: '1'
-
-      - name: Upload results to GitHub Security tab
-        uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@4f3212b61783c3c68e8309a0f18a699764811cda  # v3.27.1
-        if: always()          # Upload even if scan found issues
-        with:
-          sarif_file: trivy-results.sarif
-```
-
----
-
-## Layer 3: Runtime Security
-
-### 3.1 docker run Hardening Flags
-
-```bash
-docker run \
-  --read-only \                              # Read-only root filesystem
-  --tmpfs /tmp:noexec,nosuid,size=100m \     # Writable tmpfs for /tmp only
-  --tmpfs /var/run \                         # For PID files if needed
-  --user 10001:10001 \                       # Non-root UID:GID
-  --cap-drop ALL \                           # Drop ALL Linux capabilities
-  --cap-add NET_BIND_SERVICE \               # Re-add only what's truly needed
-  --security-opt no-new-privileges:true \    # Prevent privilege escalation via setuid
-  --security-opt seccomp=seccomp.json \      # Custom seccomp profile
-  --security-opt apparmor=docker-default \   # AppArmor profile
-  --pids-limit 100 \                         # Prevent runaway process spawning
-  --memory 512m \                            # OOM protection
-  --memory-swap 512m \                       # Disable swap
-  --cpus 1.0 \                               # CPU limit
-  --network none \                           # No network (if not needed)
-  --health-cmd "curl -f http://localhost:3000/health || exit 1" \
-  --health-interval 30s \
-  myapp:latest
-```
-
-### 3.2 Linux Capabilities — What to Drop and Keep
-
-Drop ALL, then explicitly add only what your app requires:
-
-| Capability | Purpose | Keep? |
-|---|---|---|
-| `NET_BIND_SERVICE` | Bind ports < 1024 | Only if binding a privileged port |
-| `CHOWN` | Change file ownership | No — set ownership at build time |
-| `SETUID` / `SETGID` | Switch user identity | No — drop always |
-| `SYS_ADMIN` | Broad privileged operations | No — most dangerous capability |
-| `NET_ADMIN` | Configure network interfaces | No (only network tools) |
-| `SYS_PTRACE` | Debug/trace processes | No (only debugger containers) |
-| `DAC_OVERRIDE` | Override file permissions | No — runs as correct user |
-| `NET_RAW` | Raw sockets (ping) | No (blocked by default seccomp anyway) |
-
-> **Most web apps need zero capabilities.** `--cap-drop ALL` alone is often sufficient.
-
-### 3.3 Docker Compose Hardening
-
-```yaml
-services:
-  app:
-    image: myapp:latest
-    read_only: true
-    user: "10001:10001"
-    tmpfs:
-      - /tmp:noexec,nosuid,size=100m
-      - /var/run:noexec,nosuid,size=10m
-    cap_drop:
-      - ALL
-    cap_add:
-      - NET_BIND_SERVICE    # Only if binding port < 1024
-    security_opt:
-      - no-new-privileges:true
-      - seccomp:./references/seccomp-profile-template.json
-    pids_limit: 100
-    mem_limit: 512m
-    memswap_limit: 512m
-    cpus: 1.0
-    healthcheck:
-      test: ["CMD", "curl", "-f", "http://localhost:3000/health"]
-      interval: 30s
-      timeout: 5s
-      retries: 3
-      start_period: 10s
-    networks:
-      - backend
-    # Only expose externally if truly required
-    # ports: ["8080:8080"]
-    restart: unless-stopped
-    logging:
-      driver: json-file
-      options:
-        max-size: "10m"
-        max-file: "3"
-
-networks:
-  backend:
-    driver: bridge
-    internal: true    # No external connectivity unless needed
-```
-
-### 3.4 Seccomp Profiles
-
-The Docker default seccomp profile blocks ~44 dangerous syscalls. For stricter control:
-
-```bash
-# Step 1: Audit syscalls your app actually makes
-docker run --security-opt seccomp=unconfined \
-  --name audit-run myapp:latest &
-
-# Capture with strace
-strace -c -p $(docker inspect --format '{{.State.Pid}}' audit-run)
-
-# Or with sysdig (more container-friendly)
-sysdig -p "%syscall.type" container.name=audit-run | sort -u
-
-# Step 2: Build a custom profile from references/seccomp-profile-template.json
-# Step 3: Apply it
-docker run --security-opt seccomp=references/seccomp-profile-template.json myapp:latest
-```
-
-See `references/seccomp-profile-template.json` for a minimal starting allowlist for typical web servers.
-
-### 3.5 AppArmor Profile (Linux hosts)
-
-```bash
-# Load Docker's default AppArmor profile
-sudo apparmor_parser -r /etc/apparmor.d/docker-default
-
-# Apply at runtime
-docker run --security-opt apparmor=docker-default myapp:latest
-
-# Generate a custom profile
-aa-genprof myapp   # Interactive — run app under aa-complain mode first
-```
-
----
-
-## Layer 4: Supply Chain Security
-
-### 4.1 Sign Images with Cosign (Sigstore — Keyless)
-
-```bash
-# Install cosign
-brew install cosign    # macOS
-# or: https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/releases
-
-# Sign after push — keyless via OIDC (no long-lived keys)
-cosign sign ghcr.io/org/myapp:latest
-
-# Verify before deploy
-cosign verify ghcr.io/org/myapp:latest \
-  --certificate-identity-regexp="https://github.com/org/repo" \
-  --certificate-oidc-issuer="https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com"
-```
-
-**GitHub Actions — Sign & Verify Pipeline:**
-```yaml
-permissions:
-  id-token: write     # Required for OIDC keyless signing
-  packages: write
-
-steps:
-  - uses: sigstore/cosign-installer@dc72c7d5c4d10cd6bcb8cf6e3fd625a9e5e537da  # v3.7.0
-
-  - name: Sign image (keyless via OIDC)
-    run: |
-      cosign sign --yes \
-        ghcr.io/${{ github.repository }}:${{ github.sha }}
-    env:
-      COSIGN_EXPERIMENTAL: "true"
-
-  - name: Attach SBOM attestation
-    run: |
-      cosign attest --yes \
-        --predicate sbom.json \
-        --type cyclonedx \
-        ghcr.io/${{ github.repository }}:${{ github.sha }}
-```
-
-### 4.2 SBOM Generation & Attestation
-
-```bash
-# Generate SBOM with Syft
-syft myapp:latest -o cyclonedx-json > sbom.json
-syft myapp:latest -o spdx-json > sbom.spdx.json
-
-# Attach to image as attestation
-cosign attest --predicate sbom.json --type cyclonedx ghcr.io/org/myapp:latest
-
-# Verify SBOM attestation before deployment
-cosign verify-attestation \
-  --type cyclonedx \
-  --certificate-identity-regexp="https://github.com/org/repo" \
-  --certificate-oidc-issuer="https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com" \
-  ghcr.io/org/myapp:latest
-```
-
-### 4.3 Use Trusted Registries & Enable Registry Scanning
-
-| Registry | Built-in Scanning | Notes |
-|---|---|---|
-| GHCR (GitHub Container Registry) | No (use Trivy in CI) | Best for OSS, OIDC auth |
-| AWS ECR | Yes (enhanced scanning via Inspector) | Enable per-repo |
-| GCP Artifact Registry | Yes (Container Analysis) | Enabled by default |
-| Azure ACR | Yes (Defender for Containers) | Premium tier |
-| Docker Hub | Yes (limited on free tier) | Avoid for private images |
-
-```bash
-# Enable ECR enhanced scanning
-aws ecr put-registry-scanning-configuration \
-  --scan-type ENHANCED \
-  --rules '[{"repositoryFilters":[{"filter":"*","filterType":"WILDCARD"}],"scanFrequency":"CONTINUOUS_SCAN"}]'
-```
-
-### 4.4 Admission Control — Block Unsigned/Unscanned Images
-
-```yaml
-# Kyverno policy — require signed images before admission
-apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
-kind: ClusterPolicy
-metadata:
-  name: require-signed-images
-spec:
-  validationFailureAction: Enforce
-  rules:
-    - name: verify-image-signature
-      match:
-        resources:
-          kinds: [Pod]
-      verifyImages:
-        - imageReferences:
-            - "ghcr.io/org/*"
-          attestors:
-            - entries:
-                - keyless:
-                    subject: "https://github.com/org/repo/.github/workflows/*"
-                    issuer: "https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com"
-```
-
----
-
-## Layer 5: Kubernetes Pod Security
-
-> Full reference: `references/kubernetes-pod-security.md`
-
-### 5.1 Pod Security Context
-
-```yaml
-apiVersion: apps/v1
-kind: Deployment
-metadata:
-  name: myapp
-  namespace: production
-spec:
-  replicas: 3
-  template:
-    spec:
-      # ── Pod-level security context ─────────────────────
-      securityContext:
-        runAsNonRoot: true
-        runAsUser: 10001
-        runAsGroup: 10001
-        fsGroup: 10001
-        fsGroupChangePolicy: OnRootMismatch
-        seccompProfile:
-          type: RuntimeDefault    # Use containerd/runc default seccomp
-        supplementalGroups: []
-
-      automountServiceAccountToken: false   # Disable unless needed
-
-      # ── Container-level security context ──────────────
-      containers:
-        - name: app
-          image: ghcr.io/org/myapp@sha256:<digest>   # Always use digest
-          securityContext:
-            allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
-            readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
-            capabilities:
-              drop: ["ALL"]
-              add: []              # Add nothing unless absolutely required
-            runAsNonRoot: true
-            runAsUser: 10001
-            seccompProfile:
-              type: RuntimeDefault
-
-          # ── Resource limits (required for restricted PSA) ──
-          resources:
-            requests:
-              memory: "128Mi"
-              cpu: "100m"
-            limits:
-              memory: "512Mi"
-              cpu: "500m"
-
-          # ── Writable tmpfs mounts ──────────────────────
-          volumeMounts:
-            - name: tmp
-              mountPath: /tmp
-            - name: varrun
-              mountPath: /var/run
-
-      volumes:
-        - name: tmp
-          emptyDir:
-            medium: Memory
-            sizeLimit: 100Mi
-        - name: varrun
-          emptyDir:
-            medium: Memory
-            sizeLimit: 10Mi
-```
-
-### 5.2 Pod Security Admission (K8s 1.25+)
-
-```bash
-# Audit existing workloads before enforcing
-kubectl label namespace production \
-  pod-security.kubernetes.io/audit=restricted \
-  pod-security.kubernetes.io/audit-version=latest
-
-# Warn in staging, enforce in production
-kubectl label namespace staging \
-  pod-security.kubernetes.io/warn=restricted
-
-kubectl label namespace production \
-  pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce=restricted \
-  pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce-version=latest
-```
-
-| PSA Level | What It Blocks |
-|---|---|
-| `privileged` | No restrictions |
-| `baseline` | Blocks hostNetwork, hostPID, privileged containers, hostPath |
-| `restricted` | Also requires non-root, read-only FS, drops capabilities, seccomp |
-
-### 5.3 NetworkPolicy — Zero-Trust Networking
-
-```yaml
-# Step 1: Deny all ingress and egress by default in the namespace
-apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
-kind: NetworkPolicy
-metadata:
-  name: default-deny-all
-  namespace: production
-spec:
-  podSelector: {}
-  policyTypes: [Ingress, Egress]
-
----
-# Step 2: Selectively allow only required traffic
-apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
-kind: NetworkPolicy
-metadata:
-  name: allow-app
-  namespace: production
-spec:
-  podSelector:
-    matchLabels:
-      app: myapp
-  policyTypes: [Ingress, Egress]
-  ingress:
-    - from:
-        - namespaceSelector:
-            matchLabels:
-              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: ingress-nginx
-          podSelector:
-            matchLabels:
-              app.kubernetes.io/name: ingress-nginx
-      ports:
-        - port: 3000
-  egress:
-    - to:
-        - podSelector:
-            matchLabels:
-              app: postgres
-      ports:
-        - port: 5432
-    - to:                 # Allow only cluster DNS
-        - namespaceSelector:
-            matchLabels:
-              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: kube-system
-          podSelector:
-            matchLabels:
-              k8s-app: kube-dns
-      ports:
-        - port: 53
-          protocol: UDP
-        - port: 53
-          protocol: TCP
-```
-
-### 5.4 RBAC — Least Privilege
-
-```yaml
-# Create minimal role — never use wildcards
-apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
-kind: Role
-metadata:
-  name: app-reader
-  namespace: production
-rules:
-  - apiGroups: [""]
-    resources: ["configmaps", "secrets"]
-    resourceNames: ["myapp-config"]    # Lock to specific resource names
-    verbs: ["get"]                     # Never ["*"]
-
----
-apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
-kind: RoleBinding
-metadata:
-  name: app-reader-binding
-  namespace: production
-subjects:
-  - kind: ServiceAccount
-    name: myapp-sa
-    namespace: production
-roleRef:
-  kind: Role
-  name: app-reader
-  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
-```
-
-```bash
-# Audit what permissions a service account has
-kubectl auth can-i --list --as=system:serviceaccount:production:myapp-sa
-
-# Find overly-permissive cluster roles
-kubectl get clusterrolebindings -o json | \
-  jq '.items[] | select(.roleRef.name == "cluster-admin") | .subjects'
-```
-
-### 5.5 Kyverno Policy Examples
-
-```yaml
-# Require non-root containers
-apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
-kind: ClusterPolicy
-metadata:
-  name: require-non-root
-spec:
-  validationFailureAction: Enforce
-  rules:
-    - name: check-run-as-non-root
-      match:
-        resources:
-          kinds: [Pod]
-      validate:
-        message: "Containers must not run as root (runAsNonRoot: true required)"
-        pattern:
-          spec:
-            containers:
-              - securityContext:
-                  runAsNonRoot: true
-
----
-# Require image digest pinning
-apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
-kind: ClusterPolicy
-metadata:
-  name: require-image-digest
-spec:
-  validationFailureAction: Enforce
-  rules:
-    - name: check-digest
-      match:
-        resources:
-          kinds: [Pod]
-      validate:
-        message: "Images must be pinned to a SHA256 digest, not just a tag"
-        pattern:
-          spec:
-            containers:
-              - image: "*@sha256:*"
-
----
-# Block privileged containers
-apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
-kind: ClusterPolicy
-metadata:
-  name: disallow-privileged
-spec:
-  validationFailureAction: Enforce
-  rules:
-    - name: check-privileged
-      match:
-        resources:
-          kinds: [Pod]
-      validate:
-        message: "Privileged containers are not allowed"
-        pattern:
-          spec:
-            containers:
-              - =(securityContext):
-                  =(privileged): "false"
-```
-
----
-
-## Common Pitfalls & Fixes
-
-| Problem | Root Cause | Fix |
-|---|---|---|
-| Image runs as root | No `USER` directive | Add `RUN useradd ...` and `USER appuser` |
-| Secret in `docker history` | `ENV` or `RUN curl -H "Bearer $TOKEN"` | Use `RUN --mount=type=secret` |
-| Large image with many CVEs | Full base image (`node:20`, `ubuntu`) | Switch to `node:20-slim` or `distroless` |
-| App crashes with `--read-only` | Writes to `/tmp` or app directory | Add `--tmpfs /tmp` for writable temp space |
-| Trivy scan blocks CI on unfixable CVEs | No ignore file | Add `.trivyignore` with justified entries |
-| Container needs `SYS_ADMIN` | Missing `--cap-drop` context | Investigate why — almost always avoidable |
-| Tag-based images drift over time | Mutable tags | Pin to `@sha256:` digest; use Renovate to update |
-| K8s pod rejected by PSA | Missing security context fields | Add `runAsNonRoot`, `readOnlyRootFilesystem`, `allowPrivilegeEscalation: false` |
-| App can't write to filesystem | `readOnlyRootFilesystem: true` | Mount `emptyDir` volumes for writable paths |
-
----
-
 ## Security Checklist
 
 ### Dockerfile
@@ -978,21 +82,6 @@ spec:
 
 ---
 
-## Reference Files
-
-- `references/base-image-comparison.md` — Size, CVE count, shell/pkg-manager trade-offs: distroless vs alpine vs slim vs scratch
-- `references/seccomp-profile-template.json` — Minimal syscall allowlist for typical web servers; start here and extend
-- `references/kubernetes-pod-security.md` — NetworkPolicy, RBAC, OPA/Kyverno policies, service account hardening, PSA
-
-## Related Skills
-
-- `docker-expert` — General Docker usage, Compose orchestration, image optimization
-- `gha-security-review` — Security audit of GitHub Actions workflows
-- `github-actions-advanced` — CI pipeline patterns including scanner integration
-- `kubernetes-architect` — Full Kubernetes architecture, not just security
-- `api-security-best-practices` — Application-level security (injection, auth, OWASP)
-- `k8s-security-policies` — Extended Kubernetes security policies
-
 ## Limitations
 
 - Use this skill only when the task clearly matches the scope described above.