@blamejs/core 0.7.18 → 0.7.19

package/lib/mtls-ca.js

@@ -1,518 +1,518 @@
-"use strict";
-/**
- * mtls-ca — mTLS Certificate Authority management.
- *
- * Storage, sealed-loading dispatch, generation tagging, atomic commit.
- * Cert issuance (CA generation, client cert signing, PKCS#12 packaging)
- * delegates to a pluggable engine. The framework ships a default
- * pure-JS engine (lib/mtls-engine-default.js, backed by the vendored
- * @peculiar/x509 + pkijs bundle); operators with custom requirements
- * pass their own via opts.engine.
- *
- *   var ca = b.mtlsCa.create({
- *     dataDir:          "./data",
- *     paths: {
- *       caKey:          "ca.key",
- *       caKeySealed:    "ca.key.sealed",
- *       caCert:         "ca.crt",
- *     },
- *     vault:            b.vault,         // optional; required when sealed
- *     caKeySealedMode:  "auto",          // "auto" | "required" | "disabled"
- *     generation:       1,               // current CA generation for OU=CAv{N}
- *     engine:           myCertEngine,    // optional — defaults to b.mtlsEngine
- *   });
- *
- * Files (relative to dataDir):
- *   ca.crt           CA certificate (PEM, plaintext on disk)
- *   ca.key           CA private key (PEM, plaintext on disk)
- *   ca.key.sealed    CA private key (vault.seal of PEM bytes)
- *
- * caKeySealedMode:
- *   "auto"      load whichever exists (sealed if present, else plain)
- *   "required"  sealed file required; refuse plaintext
- *   "disabled"  plaintext required; refuse sealed
- *
- * Generation tagging: every CA cert issued by the framework embeds a
- * "OU=CAv{N}" RDN in its subject DN. Status reads that back so an
- * upgrade flow can detect legacy CAs (a pre-rotation CA whose key
- * parameters are below the current bar) and prompt regeneration
- * without breaking active mTLS clients.
- *
- * Issuance surface (delegates to opts.engine):
- *
- *   ca.initCA()
- *     returns existing { caCertPem, caKeyPem } or generates a fresh
- *     pair via engine.generateCa() and atomically commits it.
- *
- *   ca.generateClientCert({ cn, validityDays })
- *     calls engine.signClientCert with the CA loaded.
- *
- *   ca.generateClientP12({ cn, password, validityDays })
- *     calls engine.packageP12 with the CA loaded.
- *
- * Engine contract (default lib/mtls-engine-default.js, override via
- * opts.engine):
- *
- *   {
- *     async generateCa({ generation })
- *       returns { caCertPem, caKeyPem },
- *     async signClientCert({ cn, validityDays, caCertPem, caKeyPem })
- *       returns { cert, key, ca, issuedAt, expiresAt },
- *     async packageP12({ cn, password, validityDays, caCertPem, caKeyPem })
- *       returns { p12, certPem, issuedAt, expiresAt },
- *   }
- *
- * Note: the engine returns the cert PEM (`certPem`) but does NOT
- * compute a fingerprint — the framework hashes the cert via
- * `b.crypto.sha3Hash(certPem)` for any audit / display purpose,
- * keeping the SHA3-512 posture consistent across the rest of the
- * stack. Operators who want the X.509-conventional SHA-256
- * fingerprint (for browser cert-details panels, openssl interop)
- * compute it separately from the cert PEM.
- */
-
-var fs = require("fs");
-var path = require("path");
-var nodeCrypto = require("node:crypto");
-var atomicFile = require("./atomic-file");
-var C = require("./constants");
-var lazyRequire = require("./lazy-require");
-var { boot } = require("./log");
-var safeBuffer = require("./safe-buffer");
-var safeJson = require("./safe-json");
-var validateOpts = require("./validate-opts");
-var { FrameworkError } = require("./framework-error");
-
-// The default engine carries a 600+ KB vendored bundle (peculiar/x509 +
-// pkijs + reflect-metadata). Lazy-require it so operators wiring a
-// custom engine never pay the cost. The lazyRequire wrapper keeps the
-// require at top-of-file declaration shape — no indented inline calls.
-var mtlsEngineDefault = lazyRequire(function () { return require("./mtls-engine-default"); });
-
-var caLog = boot("mtls-ca");
-
-class MtlsCaError extends FrameworkError {
-  constructor(code, message) {
-    super(message, code);
-    this.name = "MtlsCaError";
-    this.permanent = true;
-    this.isMtlsCaError = true;
-  }
-}
-
-var DEFAULT_PATHS = {
-  caKey:        "ca.key",
-  caKeySealed:  "ca.key.sealed",
-  caCert:       "ca.crt",
-  // Revocation registry — JSON file under dataDir tracking revoked
-  // serial numbers. Operators export this as a CRL via
-  // ca.generateCrl() (engine.generateCrl signs the list with the CA
-  // key). Persisted as JSON rather than a stored CRL because the
-  // signed CRL is a derivative artifact — the registry survives CA
-  // rotation, the CRL doesn't.
-  revocations:  "revocations.json",
-  crl:          "ca.crl",
-};
-
-var VALID_SEAL_MODES = { auto: 1, required: 1, disabled: 1 };
-
-function _resolvePaths(dataDir, paths) {
-  var p = Object.assign({}, DEFAULT_PATHS, paths || {});
-  return {
-    caKey:        path.join(dataDir, p.caKey),
-    caKeySealed:  path.join(dataDir, p.caKeySealed),
-    caCert:       path.join(dataDir, p.caCert),
-    revocations:  path.join(dataDir, p.revocations),
-    crl:          path.join(dataDir, p.crl),
-  };
-}
-
-// Parse "OU=CAv{N}" from a PEM cert's subject DN. Returns the integer
-// N (defaulting to 1 for untagged legacy CAs) or 0 when the cert is
-// unreadable. Untagged returning 1 means the first regen lifts a legacy
-// CA to generation 2 without misidentifying it as fresh.
-function parseGeneration(certPem) {
-  if (typeof certPem !== "string" && !Buffer.isBuffer(certPem)) return 0;
-  try {
-    var cert = new nodeCrypto.X509Certificate(certPem);
-    var subj = cert.subject || "";
-    var m = /OU=CAv(\d+)/.exec(subj);
-    return m ? parseInt(m[1], 10) : 1;
-  } catch (_e) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-}
-
-function create(opts) {
-  opts = opts || {};
-  validateOpts(opts, [
-    "dataDir", "paths", "vault",
-    "caKeySealedMode", "generation", "engine",
-  ], "b.mtlsCa");
-  validateOpts.requireNonEmptyString(opts.dataDir, "mtlsCa.create: opts.dataDir", MtlsCaError, "mtls-ca/no-datadir");
-  // Auto-create the dataDir with restrictive perms (CA keys live here).
-  // Matches the behaviour of other framework primitives that own a
-  // dataDir — log-stream-local, backup, restore-bundle. Without this
-  // the first initCA() / generateClientCert() call fails with ENOENT
-  // on `ca.key.tmp` because the atomic-file write expects the parent
-  // dir to exist.
-  if (!fs.existsSync(opts.dataDir)) {
-    fs.mkdirSync(opts.dataDir, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
-  }
-  var paths = _resolvePaths(opts.dataDir, opts.paths);
-  var vault = opts.vault || null;
-  var caKeySealedMode = (opts.caKeySealedMode || "auto").toLowerCase();
-  if (!VALID_SEAL_MODES[caKeySealedMode]) {
-    throw new MtlsCaError("mtls-ca/bad-mode",
-      "caKeySealedMode must be 'auto', 'required', or 'disabled'");
-  }
-  var generation = typeof opts.generation === "number" && opts.generation >= 1
-    ? Math.floor(opts.generation) : 1;
-  // The default engine is lazy-loaded at top-of-file; resolve it only
-  // when no custom engine was passed.
-  var engine = opts.engine || mtlsEngineDefault();
-
-  function _requireVault(reason) {
-    if (!vault || typeof vault.seal !== "function" || typeof vault.unseal !== "function") {
-      throw new MtlsCaError("mtls-ca/no-vault",
-        reason + " requires opts.vault (with seal/unseal). Pass b.vault " +
-        "or use caKeySealedMode='disabled' to keep the CA key on disk in plaintext.");
-    }
-  }
-
-  function keyExists() {
-    return fs.existsSync(paths.caKey) || fs.existsSync(paths.caKeySealed);
-  }
-  function exists() {
-    return keyExists() && fs.existsSync(paths.caCert);
-  }
-
-  function status() {
-    if (!exists()) {
-      return {
-        exists:     false,
-        generation: 0,
-        isLegacy:   false,
-        current:    generation,
-      };
-    }
-    var pem = fs.readFileSync(paths.caCert);
-    var gen = parseGeneration(pem);
-    return {
-      exists:     true,
-      generation: gen,
-      isLegacy:   gen < generation,
-      current:    generation,
-    };
-  }
-
-  // Load the CA key in whichever form is on disk, applying the
-  // caKeySealedMode dispatch. Returns Buffer of PEM bytes, or throws
-  // with a precise reason when the mode rejects the on-disk form.
-  function loadKey() {
-    var hasPlain  = fs.existsSync(paths.caKey);
-    var hasSealed = fs.existsSync(paths.caKeySealed);
-    if (!hasPlain && !hasSealed) {
-      throw new MtlsCaError("mtls-ca/missing-key",
-        "no CA key on disk at " + paths.caKey + " or " + paths.caKeySealed);
-    }
-    if (caKeySealedMode === "required") {
-      if (!hasSealed) {
-        throw new MtlsCaError("mtls-ca/sealed-required",
-          "CA_KEY_SEALED='required' but " + paths.caKeySealed + " does not exist");
-      }
-      _requireVault("sealed CA key load");
-      var sealedBytes = fs.readFileSync(paths.caKeySealed, "utf8").trim();
-      var pem = vault.unseal(sealedBytes);
-      if (!pem) {
-        throw new MtlsCaError("mtls-ca/unseal-failed",
-          "vault.unseal of " + paths.caKeySealed + " returned empty — vault key mismatch?");
-      }
-      return Buffer.from(pem, "utf8");
-    }
-    if (caKeySealedMode === "disabled") {
-      if (!hasPlain) {
-        throw new MtlsCaError("mtls-ca/plain-required",
-          "CA_KEY_SEALED='disabled' but " + paths.caKey + " does not exist");
-      }
-      return fs.readFileSync(paths.caKey);
-    }
-    // auto: prefer sealed if it exists (defense-in-depth default)
-    if (hasSealed) {
-      _requireVault("sealed CA key load");
-      var sealedBytesA = fs.readFileSync(paths.caKeySealed, "utf8").trim();
-      var pemA = vault.unseal(sealedBytesA);
-      if (!pemA) {
-        throw new MtlsCaError("mtls-ca/unseal-failed",
-          "vault.unseal of " + paths.caKeySealed + " returned empty");
-      }
-      return Buffer.from(pemA, "utf8");
-    }
-    return fs.readFileSync(paths.caKey);
-  }
-
-  function loadCert() {
-    if (!fs.existsSync(paths.caCert)) {
-      throw new MtlsCaError("mtls-ca/missing-cert",
-        "no CA cert on disk at " + paths.caCert);
-    }
-    return fs.readFileSync(paths.caCert);
-  }
-
-  // Atomic commit: write .tmp + atomic rename for both key and cert.
-  // Honors caKeySealedMode — when 'required', the key is vault-sealed
-  // before the on-disk write so plaintext PEM never touches the
-  // filesystem; when 'disabled', it goes to disk as PEM. 'auto'
-  // defaults to plaintext-on-disk.
-  function commit(opts2) {
-    if (!opts2 || typeof opts2.caKeyPem !== "string" || typeof opts2.caCertPem !== "string") {
-      throw new MtlsCaError("mtls-ca/bad-commit",
-        "commit requires opts.caKeyPem and opts.caCertPem (PEM strings)");
-    }
-    var sealed = caKeySealedMode === "required";
-    var keyDest = sealed ? paths.caKeySealed : paths.caKey;
-    var keyTmp = keyDest + ".tmp";
-    var certTmp = paths.caCert + ".tmp";
-
-    try {
-      if (sealed) {
-        _requireVault("sealed CA key commit");
-        fs.writeFileSync(keyTmp, vault.seal(opts2.caKeyPem), { mode: 0o600 });
-      } else {
-        fs.writeFileSync(keyTmp, opts2.caKeyPem, { mode: 0o600 });
-      }
-      fs.writeFileSync(certTmp, opts2.caCertPem, { mode: 0o644 });
-      fs.renameSync(keyTmp, keyDest);
-      fs.renameSync(certTmp, paths.caCert);
-    } catch (e) {
-      // Best-effort cleanup of half-written tmp files; the original
-      // commit error is what we re-raise. Log cleanup failures at debug
-      // so a genuinely-broken filesystem state surfaces in operator logs
-      // rather than getting silently swallowed.
-      try { if (fs.existsSync(keyTmp))  fs.unlinkSync(keyTmp); }
-      catch (cleanupErr) { caLog.debug("cleanup-failed", { op: "fs.unlinkSync", path: keyTmp, error: cleanupErr.message }); }
-      try { if (fs.existsSync(certTmp)) fs.unlinkSync(certTmp); }
-      catch (cleanupErr) { caLog.debug("cleanup-failed", { op: "fs.unlinkSync", path: certTmp, error: cleanupErr.message }); }
-      throw new MtlsCaError("mtls-ca/commit-failed",
-        "atomic CA commit failed: " + ((e && e.message) || String(e)));
-    }
-    return {
-      keyPath:  keyDest,
-      certPath: paths.caCert,
-      sealed:   sealed,
-    };
-  }
-
-  async function initCA() {
-    if (exists()) {
-      return { caCertPem: loadCert().toString("utf8"), caKeyPem: loadKey().toString("utf8") };
-    }
-    var fresh = await engine.generateCa({ generation: generation });
-    if (!fresh || typeof fresh.caCertPem !== "string" || typeof fresh.caKeyPem !== "string") {
-      throw new MtlsCaError("mtls-ca/bad-engine-output",
-        "engine.generateCa must return { caCertPem, caKeyPem }");
-    }
-    commit(fresh);
-    return fresh;
-  }
-
-  async function generateClientCert(opts2) {
-    opts2 = opts2 || {};
-    var ca = await initCA();
-    var args = Object.assign({}, opts2, { caCertPem: ca.caCertPem, caKeyPem: ca.caKeyPem });
-    var result = await engine.signClientCert(args);
-    if (!result || typeof result.cert !== "string" || typeof result.key !== "string") {
-      throw new MtlsCaError("mtls-ca/bad-engine-output",
-        "engine.signClientCert must return { cert, key, ca?, issuedAt?, expiresAt? }");
-    }
-    return result;
-  }
-
-  async function generateClientP12(opts2) {
-    opts2 = opts2 || {};
-    if (!opts2.password || typeof opts2.password !== "string") {
-      throw new MtlsCaError("mtls-ca/no-password",
-        "generateClientP12 requires opts.password (the PKCS#12 encryption password)");
-    }
-    var ca = await initCA();
-    var args = Object.assign({}, opts2, { caCertPem: ca.caCertPem, caKeyPem: ca.caKeyPem });
-    var result = await engine.packageP12(args);
-    if (!result || !Buffer.isBuffer(result.p12)) {
-      throw new MtlsCaError("mtls-ca/bad-engine-output",
-        "engine.packageP12 must return { p12: Buffer, certPem, issuedAt, expiresAt }");
-    }
-    return result;
-  }
-
-  // ---- Revocation registry + CRL ----
-
-  function _loadRevocations() {
-    if (!fs.existsSync(paths.revocations)) return { revocations: [] };
-    try {
-      // safeJson.parse caps depth + size + protects against
-      // proto-pollution; the revocation file is under the operator's
-      // dataDir but a tampered or truncated file shouldn't be able to
-      // corrupt the rotator process.
-      var json = safeJson.parse(fs.readFileSync(paths.revocations, "utf8"),
-        { maxBytes: C.BYTES.mib(16) });
-      if (!json || !Array.isArray(json.revocations)) return { revocations: [] };
-      return json;
-    } catch (e) {
-      throw new MtlsCaError("mtls-ca/revocation-corrupt",
-        "could not parse " + paths.revocations + ": " +
-        ((e && e.message) || String(e)));
-    }
-  }
-
-  function _saveRevocations(state) {
-    atomicFile.writeSync(paths.revocations,
-      JSON.stringify(state, null, 2) + "\n", { mode: 0o600 });
-  }
-
-  function _normalizeSerial(s) {
-    if (!s || typeof s !== "string") {
-      throw new MtlsCaError("mtls-ca/bad-serial",
-        "serial number must be a non-empty string");
-    }
-    // Strip the optional leading `0x` and any common separators
-    // (`:` or `-` or whitespace). What remains MUST be hex — otherwise
-    // we silently accept gibberish like "xyz-not-hex" (which previously
-    // normalised to a single "e" because the strip-non-hex regex left
-    // exactly one valid char). Operators pasting an openssl-printed
-    // serial use any of: "0xABC123", "AB:C1:23", "AB-C1-23", "abc 123";
-    // a typo or non-serial string fails fast instead of registering a
-    // phantom revocation row.
-    var stripped = s.replace(/^0x/i, "").replace(/[:\-\s]/g, "");
-    if (!safeBuffer.isHex(stripped)) {
-      throw new MtlsCaError("mtls-ca/bad-serial",
-        "serial number contains non-hex characters " +
-        "(allowed shapes: hex with optional 0x prefix, ':', '-', or whitespace " +
-        "as separators): " + JSON.stringify(s));
-    }
-    return stripped.toLowerCase();
-  }
-
-  // Map operator-friendly reason codes to RFC 5280 numeric codes used
-  // by X.509 CRLs. Default "unspecified" (0) when omitted. removeFromCRL
-  // uses hex 0x08 to express RFC 5280's reason code 8 — the literal is a
-  // protocol identifier, not a byte quantity.
-  var CRL_REASON_BY_NAME = {
-    "unspecified":          0,
-    "keyCompromise":        1,
-    "key-compromise":       1,
-    "caCompromise":         2,
-    "ca-compromise":        2,
-    "affiliationChanged":   3,
-    "superseded":           4,
-    "cessationOfOperation": 5,
-    "cessation-of-operation": 5,
-    "certificateHold":      6,
-    "removeFromCRL":        0x08,
-    "privilegeWithdrawn":   9,
-    "aACompromise":         10,
-  };
-
-  function revoke(serialNumber, opts3) {
-    var serial = _normalizeSerial(serialNumber);
-    opts3 = opts3 || {};
-    var reasonName = opts3.reason || "unspecified";
-    var reasonCode = CRL_REASON_BY_NAME[reasonName];
-    if (reasonCode === undefined) {
-      throw new MtlsCaError("mtls-ca/bad-reason",
-        "revoke: unknown reason '" + reasonName + "' (valid: " +
-        Object.keys(CRL_REASON_BY_NAME).join(", ") + ")");
-    }
-    var state = _loadRevocations();
-    var existing = state.revocations.find(function (r) {
-      return r.serialNumber === serial;
-    });
-    if (existing) {
-      // Idempotent — repeated revoke() of the same serial doesn't
-      // shift the revokedAt timestamp.
-      return existing;
-    }
-    var entry = {
-      serialNumber: serial,
-      reason:       reasonName,
-      reasonCode:   reasonCode,
-      revokedAt:    Date.now(),
-    };
-    state.revocations.push(entry);
-    _saveRevocations(state);
-    return entry;
-  }
-
-  function isRevoked(serialNumber) {
-    var serial = _normalizeSerial(serialNumber);
-    var state = _loadRevocations();
-    return state.revocations.some(function (r) {
-      return r.serialNumber === serial;
-    });
-  }
-
-  function getRevocations() {
-    return _loadRevocations().revocations.slice();
-  }
-
-  // Generate a signed X.509 CRL covering every entry in the registry.
-  // RFC 5280 — issuer = CA subject, signed by the CA private key.
-  // Operators publish the resulting PEM at a CRL distribution point
-  // referenced from issued certs (cert extension support is on the
-  // engine roadmap; for now operators set up the URL externally).
-  async function generateCrl(opts3) {
-    opts3 = opts3 || {};
-    if (typeof engine.generateCrl !== "function") {
-      throw new MtlsCaError("mtls-ca/engine-no-crl",
-        "configured engine does not implement generateCrl(); the bundled " +
-        "engine ships in v0.6.45+");
-    }
-    var ca = await initCA();
-    var revocations = _loadRevocations().revocations;
-    var nowMs = Date.now();
-    var thisUpdate = opts3.thisUpdate || new Date(nowMs);
-    var nextUpdate = opts3.nextUpdate ||
-                     new Date(nowMs + C.TIME.days(7));   // 7d default
-    var crlPem = await engine.generateCrl({
-      caCertPem:   ca.caCertPem,
-      caKeyPem:    ca.caKeyPem,
-      revocations: revocations,
-      thisUpdate:  thisUpdate,
-      nextUpdate:  nextUpdate,
-    });
-    if (typeof crlPem !== "string" || crlPem.length === 0) {
-      throw new MtlsCaError("mtls-ca/bad-engine-output",
-        "engine.generateCrl must return a non-empty PEM string");
-    }
-    if (opts3.persist !== false) {
-      atomicFile.writeSync(paths.crl, crlPem, { mode: 0o644 });
-    }
-    return { crlPem: crlPem, thisUpdate: thisUpdate, nextUpdate: nextUpdate,
-             entryCount: revocations.length, path: paths.crl };
-  }
-
-  return {
-    exists:               exists,
-    keyExists:            keyExists,
-    status:               status,
-    loadKey:              loadKey,
-    loadCert:             loadCert,
-    commit:               commit,
-    initCA:               initCA,
-    generateClientCert:   generateClientCert,
-    generateClientP12:    generateClientP12,
-    revoke:               revoke,
-    isRevoked:            isRevoked,
-    getRevocations:       getRevocations,
-    generateCrl:          generateCrl,
-    paths:                paths,
-    generation:           generation,
-    caKeySealedMode:      caKeySealedMode,
-  };
-}
-
-module.exports = {
-  create:           create,
-  parseGeneration:  parseGeneration,
-  MtlsCaError:      MtlsCaError,
-  DEFAULT_PATHS:    DEFAULT_PATHS,
-};
+"use strict";
+/**
+ * mtls-ca — mTLS Certificate Authority management.
+ *
+ * Storage, sealed-loading dispatch, generation tagging, atomic commit.
+ * Cert issuance (CA generation, client cert signing, PKCS#12 packaging)
+ * delegates to a pluggable engine. The framework ships a default
+ * pure-JS engine (lib/mtls-engine-default.js, backed by the vendored
+ * @peculiar/x509 + pkijs bundle); operators with custom requirements
+ * pass their own via opts.engine.
+ *
+ *   var ca = b.mtlsCa.create({
+ *     dataDir:          "./data",
+ *     paths: {
+ *       caKey:          "ca.key",
+ *       caKeySealed:    "ca.key.sealed",
+ *       caCert:         "ca.crt",
+ *     },
+ *     vault:            b.vault,         // optional; required when sealed
+ *     caKeySealedMode:  "auto",          // "auto" | "required" | "disabled"
+ *     generation:       1,               // current CA generation for OU=CAv{N}
+ *     engine:           myCertEngine,    // optional — defaults to b.mtlsEngine
+ *   });
+ *
+ * Files (relative to dataDir):
+ *   ca.crt           CA certificate (PEM, plaintext on disk)
+ *   ca.key           CA private key (PEM, plaintext on disk)
+ *   ca.key.sealed    CA private key (vault.seal of PEM bytes)
+ *
+ * caKeySealedMode:
+ *   "auto"      load whichever exists (sealed if present, else plain)
+ *   "required"  sealed file required; refuse plaintext
+ *   "disabled"  plaintext required; refuse sealed
+ *
+ * Generation tagging: every CA cert issued by the framework embeds a
+ * "OU=CAv{N}" RDN in its subject DN. Status reads that back so an
+ * upgrade flow can detect legacy CAs (a pre-rotation CA whose key
+ * parameters are below the current bar) and prompt regeneration
+ * without breaking active mTLS clients.
+ *
+ * Issuance surface (delegates to opts.engine):
+ *
+ *   ca.initCA()
+ *     returns existing { caCertPem, caKeyPem } or generates a fresh
+ *     pair via engine.generateCa() and atomically commits it.
+ *
+ *   ca.generateClientCert({ cn, validityDays })
+ *     calls engine.signClientCert with the CA loaded.
+ *
+ *   ca.generateClientP12({ cn, password, validityDays })
+ *     calls engine.packageP12 with the CA loaded.
+ *
+ * Engine contract (default lib/mtls-engine-default.js, override via
+ * opts.engine):
+ *
+ *   {
+ *     async generateCa({ generation })
+ *       returns { caCertPem, caKeyPem },
+ *     async signClientCert({ cn, validityDays, caCertPem, caKeyPem })
+ *       returns { cert, key, ca, issuedAt, expiresAt },
+ *     async packageP12({ cn, password, validityDays, caCertPem, caKeyPem })
+ *       returns { p12, certPem, issuedAt, expiresAt },
+ *   }
+ *
+ * Note: the engine returns the cert PEM (`certPem`) but does NOT
+ * compute a fingerprint — the framework hashes the cert via
+ * `b.crypto.sha3Hash(certPem)` for any audit / display purpose,
+ * keeping the SHA3-512 posture consistent across the rest of the
+ * stack. Operators who want the X.509-conventional SHA-256
+ * fingerprint (for browser cert-details panels, openssl interop)
+ * compute it separately from the cert PEM.
+ */
+
+var fs = require("fs");
+var path = require("path");
+var nodeCrypto = require("node:crypto");
+var atomicFile = require("./atomic-file");
+var C = require("./constants");
+var lazyRequire = require("./lazy-require");
+var { boot } = require("./log");
+var safeBuffer = require("./safe-buffer");
+var safeJson = require("./safe-json");
+var validateOpts = require("./validate-opts");
+var { FrameworkError } = require("./framework-error");
+
+// The default engine carries a 600+ KB vendored bundle (peculiar/x509 +
+// pkijs + reflect-metadata). Lazy-require it so operators wiring a
+// custom engine never pay the cost. The lazyRequire wrapper keeps the
+// require at top-of-file declaration shape — no indented inline calls.
+var mtlsEngineDefault = lazyRequire(function () { return require("./mtls-engine-default"); });
+
+var caLog = boot("mtls-ca");
+
+class MtlsCaError extends FrameworkError {
+  constructor(code, message) {
+    super(message, code);
+    this.name = "MtlsCaError";
+    this.permanent = true;
+    this.isMtlsCaError = true;
+  }
+}
+
+var DEFAULT_PATHS = {
+  caKey:        "ca.key",
+  caKeySealed:  "ca.key.sealed",
+  caCert:       "ca.crt",
+  // Revocation registry — JSON file under dataDir tracking revoked
+  // serial numbers. Operators export this as a CRL via
+  // ca.generateCrl() (engine.generateCrl signs the list with the CA
+  // key). Persisted as JSON rather than a stored CRL because the
+  // signed CRL is a derivative artifact — the registry survives CA
+  // rotation, the CRL doesn't.
+  revocations:  "revocations.json",
+  crl:          "ca.crl",
+};
+
+var VALID_SEAL_MODES = { auto: 1, required: 1, disabled: 1 };
+
+function _resolvePaths(dataDir, paths) {
+  var p = Object.assign({}, DEFAULT_PATHS, paths || {});
+  return {
+    caKey:        path.join(dataDir, p.caKey),
+    caKeySealed:  path.join(dataDir, p.caKeySealed),
+    caCert:       path.join(dataDir, p.caCert),
+    revocations:  path.join(dataDir, p.revocations),
+    crl:          path.join(dataDir, p.crl),
+  };
+}
+
+// Parse "OU=CAv{N}" from a PEM cert's subject DN. Returns the integer
+// N (defaulting to 1 for untagged legacy CAs) or 0 when the cert is
+// unreadable. Untagged returning 1 means the first regen lifts a legacy
+// CA to generation 2 without misidentifying it as fresh.
+function parseGeneration(certPem) {
+  if (typeof certPem !== "string" && !Buffer.isBuffer(certPem)) return 0;
+  try {
+    var cert = new nodeCrypto.X509Certificate(certPem);
+    var subj = cert.subject || "";
+    var m = /OU=CAv(\d+)/.exec(subj);
+    return m ? parseInt(m[1], 10) : 1;
+  } catch (_e) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+}
+
+function create(opts) {
+  opts = opts || {};
+  validateOpts(opts, [
+    "dataDir", "paths", "vault",
+    "caKeySealedMode", "generation", "engine",
+  ], "b.mtlsCa");
+  validateOpts.requireNonEmptyString(opts.dataDir, "mtlsCa.create: opts.dataDir", MtlsCaError, "mtls-ca/no-datadir");
+  // Auto-create the dataDir with restrictive perms (CA keys live here).
+  // Matches the behaviour of other framework primitives that own a
+  // dataDir — log-stream-local, backup, restore-bundle. Without this
+  // the first initCA() / generateClientCert() call fails with ENOENT
+  // on `ca.key.tmp` because the atomic-file write expects the parent
+  // dir to exist.
+  if (!fs.existsSync(opts.dataDir)) {
+    fs.mkdirSync(opts.dataDir, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
+  }
+  var paths = _resolvePaths(opts.dataDir, opts.paths);
+  var vault = opts.vault || null;
+  var caKeySealedMode = (opts.caKeySealedMode || "auto").toLowerCase();
+  if (!VALID_SEAL_MODES[caKeySealedMode]) {
+    throw new MtlsCaError("mtls-ca/bad-mode",
+      "caKeySealedMode must be 'auto', 'required', or 'disabled'");
+  }
+  var generation = typeof opts.generation === "number" && opts.generation >= 1
+    ? Math.floor(opts.generation) : 1;
+  // The default engine is lazy-loaded at top-of-file; resolve it only
+  // when no custom engine was passed.
+  var engine = opts.engine || mtlsEngineDefault();
+
+  function _requireVault(reason) {
+    if (!vault || typeof vault.seal !== "function" || typeof vault.unseal !== "function") {
+      throw new MtlsCaError("mtls-ca/no-vault",
+        reason + " requires opts.vault (with seal/unseal). Pass b.vault " +
+        "or use caKeySealedMode='disabled' to keep the CA key on disk in plaintext.");
+    }
+  }
+
+  function keyExists() {
+    return fs.existsSync(paths.caKey) || fs.existsSync(paths.caKeySealed);
+  }
+  function exists() {
+    return keyExists() && fs.existsSync(paths.caCert);
+  }
+
+  function status() {
+    if (!exists()) {
+      return {
+        exists:     false,
+        generation: 0,
+        isLegacy:   false,
+        current:    generation,
+      };
+    }
+    var pem = fs.readFileSync(paths.caCert);
+    var gen = parseGeneration(pem);
+    return {
+      exists:     true,
+      generation: gen,
+      isLegacy:   gen < generation,
+      current:    generation,
+    };
+  }
+
+  // Load the CA key in whichever form is on disk, applying the
+  // caKeySealedMode dispatch. Returns Buffer of PEM bytes, or throws
+  // with a precise reason when the mode rejects the on-disk form.
+  function loadKey() {
+    var hasPlain  = fs.existsSync(paths.caKey);
+    var hasSealed = fs.existsSync(paths.caKeySealed);
+    if (!hasPlain && !hasSealed) {
+      throw new MtlsCaError("mtls-ca/missing-key",
+        "no CA key on disk at " + paths.caKey + " or " + paths.caKeySealed);
+    }
+    if (caKeySealedMode === "required") {
+      if (!hasSealed) {
+        throw new MtlsCaError("mtls-ca/sealed-required",
+          "CA_KEY_SEALED='required' but " + paths.caKeySealed + " does not exist");
+      }
+      _requireVault("sealed CA key load");
+      var sealedBytes = fs.readFileSync(paths.caKeySealed, "utf8").trim();
+      var pem = vault.unseal(sealedBytes);
+      if (!pem) {
+        throw new MtlsCaError("mtls-ca/unseal-failed",
+          "vault.unseal of " + paths.caKeySealed + " returned empty — vault key mismatch?");
+      }
+      return Buffer.from(pem, "utf8");
+    }
+    if (caKeySealedMode === "disabled") {
+      if (!hasPlain) {
+        throw new MtlsCaError("mtls-ca/plain-required",
+          "CA_KEY_SEALED='disabled' but " + paths.caKey + " does not exist");
+      }
+      return fs.readFileSync(paths.caKey);
+    }
+    // auto: prefer sealed if it exists (defense-in-depth default)
+    if (hasSealed) {
+      _requireVault("sealed CA key load");
+      var sealedBytesA = fs.readFileSync(paths.caKeySealed, "utf8").trim();
+      var pemA = vault.unseal(sealedBytesA);
+      if (!pemA) {
+        throw new MtlsCaError("mtls-ca/unseal-failed",
+          "vault.unseal of " + paths.caKeySealed + " returned empty");
+      }
+      return Buffer.from(pemA, "utf8");
+    }
+    return fs.readFileSync(paths.caKey);
+  }
+
+  function loadCert() {
+    if (!fs.existsSync(paths.caCert)) {
+      throw new MtlsCaError("mtls-ca/missing-cert",
+        "no CA cert on disk at " + paths.caCert);
+    }
+    return fs.readFileSync(paths.caCert);
+  }
+
+  // Atomic commit: write .tmp + atomic rename for both key and cert.
+  // Honors caKeySealedMode — when 'required', the key is vault-sealed
+  // before the on-disk write so plaintext PEM never touches the
+  // filesystem; when 'disabled', it goes to disk as PEM. 'auto'
+  // defaults to plaintext-on-disk.
+  function commit(opts2) {
+    if (!opts2 || typeof opts2.caKeyPem !== "string" || typeof opts2.caCertPem !== "string") {
+      throw new MtlsCaError("mtls-ca/bad-commit",
+        "commit requires opts.caKeyPem and opts.caCertPem (PEM strings)");
+    }
+    var sealed = caKeySealedMode === "required";
+    var keyDest = sealed ? paths.caKeySealed : paths.caKey;
+    var keyTmp = keyDest + ".tmp";
+    var certTmp = paths.caCert + ".tmp";
+
+    try {
+      if (sealed) {
+        _requireVault("sealed CA key commit");
+        fs.writeFileSync(keyTmp, vault.seal(opts2.caKeyPem), { mode: 0o600 });
+      } else {
+        fs.writeFileSync(keyTmp, opts2.caKeyPem, { mode: 0o600 });
+      }
+      fs.writeFileSync(certTmp, opts2.caCertPem, { mode: 0o644 });
+      fs.renameSync(keyTmp, keyDest);
+      fs.renameSync(certTmp, paths.caCert);
+    } catch (e) {
+      // Best-effort cleanup of half-written tmp files; the original
+      // commit error is what we re-raise. Log cleanup failures at debug
+      // so a genuinely-broken filesystem state surfaces in operator logs
+      // rather than getting silently swallowed.
+      try { if (fs.existsSync(keyTmp))  fs.unlinkSync(keyTmp); }
+      catch (cleanupErr) { caLog.debug("cleanup-failed", { op: "fs.unlinkSync", path: keyTmp, error: cleanupErr.message }); }
+      try { if (fs.existsSync(certTmp)) fs.unlinkSync(certTmp); }
+      catch (cleanupErr) { caLog.debug("cleanup-failed", { op: "fs.unlinkSync", path: certTmp, error: cleanupErr.message }); }
+      throw new MtlsCaError("mtls-ca/commit-failed",
+        "atomic CA commit failed: " + ((e && e.message) || String(e)));
+    }
+    return {
+      keyPath:  keyDest,
+      certPath: paths.caCert,
+      sealed:   sealed,
+    };
+  }
+
+  async function initCA() {
+    if (exists()) {
+      return { caCertPem: loadCert().toString("utf8"), caKeyPem: loadKey().toString("utf8") };
+    }
+    var fresh = await engine.generateCa({ generation: generation });
+    if (!fresh || typeof fresh.caCertPem !== "string" || typeof fresh.caKeyPem !== "string") {
+      throw new MtlsCaError("mtls-ca/bad-engine-output",
+        "engine.generateCa must return { caCertPem, caKeyPem }");
+    }
+    commit(fresh);
+    return fresh;
+  }
+
+  async function generateClientCert(opts2) {
+    opts2 = opts2 || {};
+    var ca = await initCA();
+    var args = Object.assign({}, opts2, { caCertPem: ca.caCertPem, caKeyPem: ca.caKeyPem });
+    var result = await engine.signClientCert(args);
+    if (!result || typeof result.cert !== "string" || typeof result.key !== "string") {
+      throw new MtlsCaError("mtls-ca/bad-engine-output",
+        "engine.signClientCert must return { cert, key, ca?, issuedAt?, expiresAt? }");
+    }
+    return result;
+  }
+
+  async function generateClientP12(opts2) {
+    opts2 = opts2 || {};
+    if (!opts2.password || typeof opts2.password !== "string") {
+      throw new MtlsCaError("mtls-ca/no-password",
+        "generateClientP12 requires opts.password (the PKCS#12 encryption password)");
+    }
+    var ca = await initCA();
+    var args = Object.assign({}, opts2, { caCertPem: ca.caCertPem, caKeyPem: ca.caKeyPem });
+    var result = await engine.packageP12(args);
+    if (!result || !Buffer.isBuffer(result.p12)) {
+      throw new MtlsCaError("mtls-ca/bad-engine-output",
+        "engine.packageP12 must return { p12: Buffer, certPem, issuedAt, expiresAt }");
+    }
+    return result;
+  }
+
+  // ---- Revocation registry + CRL ----
+
+  function _loadRevocations() {
+    if (!fs.existsSync(paths.revocations)) return { revocations: [] };
+    try {
+      // safeJson.parse caps depth + size + protects against
+      // proto-pollution; the revocation file is under the operator's
+      // dataDir but a tampered or truncated file shouldn't be able to
+      // corrupt the rotator process.
+      var json = safeJson.parse(fs.readFileSync(paths.revocations, "utf8"),
+        { maxBytes: C.BYTES.mib(16) });
+      if (!json || !Array.isArray(json.revocations)) return { revocations: [] };
+      return json;
+    } catch (e) {
+      throw new MtlsCaError("mtls-ca/revocation-corrupt",
+        "could not parse " + paths.revocations + ": " +
+        ((e && e.message) || String(e)));
+    }
+  }
+
+  function _saveRevocations(state) {
+    atomicFile.writeSync(paths.revocations,
+      JSON.stringify(state, null, 2) + "\n", { mode: 0o600 });
+  }
+
+  function _normalizeSerial(s) {
+    if (!s || typeof s !== "string") {
+      throw new MtlsCaError("mtls-ca/bad-serial",
+        "serial number must be a non-empty string");
+    }
+    // Strip the optional leading `0x` and any common separators
+    // (`:` or `-` or whitespace). What remains MUST be hex — otherwise
+    // we silently accept gibberish like "xyz-not-hex" (which previously
+    // normalised to a single "e" because the strip-non-hex regex left
+    // exactly one valid char). Operators pasting an openssl-printed
+    // serial use any of: "0xABC123", "AB:C1:23", "AB-C1-23", "abc 123";
+    // a typo or non-serial string fails fast instead of registering a
+    // phantom revocation row.
+    var stripped = s.replace(/^0x/i, "").replace(/[:\-\s]/g, "");
+    if (!safeBuffer.isHex(stripped)) {
+      throw new MtlsCaError("mtls-ca/bad-serial",
+        "serial number contains non-hex characters " +
+        "(allowed shapes: hex with optional 0x prefix, ':', '-', or whitespace " +
+        "as separators): " + JSON.stringify(s));
+    }
+    return stripped.toLowerCase();
+  }
+
+  // Map operator-friendly reason codes to RFC 5280 numeric codes used
+  // by X.509 CRLs. Default "unspecified" (0) when omitted. removeFromCRL
+  // uses hex 0x08 to express RFC 5280's reason code 8 — the literal is a
+  // protocol identifier, not a byte quantity.
+  var CRL_REASON_BY_NAME = {
+    "unspecified":          0,
+    "keyCompromise":        1,
+    "key-compromise":       1,
+    "caCompromise":         2,
+    "ca-compromise":        2,
+    "affiliationChanged":   3,
+    "superseded":           4,
+    "cessationOfOperation": 5,
+    "cessation-of-operation": 5,
+    "certificateHold":      6,
+    "removeFromCRL":        0x08,
+    "privilegeWithdrawn":   9,
+    "aACompromise":         10,
+  };
+
+  function revoke(serialNumber, opts3) {
+    var serial = _normalizeSerial(serialNumber);
+    opts3 = opts3 || {};
+    var reasonName = opts3.reason || "unspecified";
+    var reasonCode = CRL_REASON_BY_NAME[reasonName];
+    if (reasonCode === undefined) {
+      throw new MtlsCaError("mtls-ca/bad-reason",
+        "revoke: unknown reason '" + reasonName + "' (valid: " +
+        Object.keys(CRL_REASON_BY_NAME).join(", ") + ")");
+    }
+    var state = _loadRevocations();
+    var existing = state.revocations.find(function (r) {
+      return r.serialNumber === serial;
+    });
+    if (existing) {
+      // Idempotent — repeated revoke() of the same serial doesn't
+      // shift the revokedAt timestamp.
+      return existing;
+    }
+    var entry = {
+      serialNumber: serial,
+      reason:       reasonName,
+      reasonCode:   reasonCode,
+      revokedAt:    Date.now(),
+    };
+    state.revocations.push(entry);
+    _saveRevocations(state);
+    return entry;
+  }
+
+  function isRevoked(serialNumber) {
+    var serial = _normalizeSerial(serialNumber);
+    var state = _loadRevocations();
+    return state.revocations.some(function (r) {
+      return r.serialNumber === serial;
+    });
+  }
+
+  function getRevocations() {
+    return _loadRevocations().revocations.slice();
+  }
+
+  // Generate a signed X.509 CRL covering every entry in the registry.
+  // RFC 5280 — issuer = CA subject, signed by the CA private key.
+  // Operators publish the resulting PEM at a CRL distribution point
+  // referenced from issued certs (cert extension support is on the
+  // engine roadmap; for now operators set up the URL externally).
+  async function generateCrl(opts3) {
+    opts3 = opts3 || {};
+    if (typeof engine.generateCrl !== "function") {
+      throw new MtlsCaError("mtls-ca/engine-no-crl",
+        "configured engine does not implement generateCrl(); the bundled " +
+        "engine ships in v0.6.45+");
+    }
+    var ca = await initCA();
+    var revocations = _loadRevocations().revocations;
+    var nowMs = Date.now();
+    var thisUpdate = opts3.thisUpdate || new Date(nowMs);
+    var nextUpdate = opts3.nextUpdate ||
+                     new Date(nowMs + C.TIME.days(7));   // 7d default
+    var crlPem = await engine.generateCrl({
+      caCertPem:   ca.caCertPem,
+      caKeyPem:    ca.caKeyPem,
+      revocations: revocations,
+      thisUpdate:  thisUpdate,
+      nextUpdate:  nextUpdate,
+    });
+    if (typeof crlPem !== "string" || crlPem.length === 0) {
+      throw new MtlsCaError("mtls-ca/bad-engine-output",
+        "engine.generateCrl must return a non-empty PEM string");
+    }
+    if (opts3.persist !== false) {
+      atomicFile.writeSync(paths.crl, crlPem, { mode: 0o644 });
+    }
+    return { crlPem: crlPem, thisUpdate: thisUpdate, nextUpdate: nextUpdate,
+             entryCount: revocations.length, path: paths.crl };
+  }
+
+  return {
+    exists:               exists,
+    keyExists:            keyExists,
+    status:               status,
+    loadKey:              loadKey,
+    loadCert:             loadCert,
+    commit:               commit,
+    initCA:               initCA,
+    generateClientCert:   generateClientCert,
+    generateClientP12:    generateClientP12,
+    revoke:               revoke,
+    isRevoked:            isRevoked,
+    getRevocations:       getRevocations,
+    generateCrl:          generateCrl,
+    paths:                paths,
+    generation:           generation,
+    caKeySealedMode:      caKeySealedMode,
+  };
+}
+
+module.exports = {
+  create:           create,
+  parseGeneration:  parseGeneration,
+  MtlsCaError:      MtlsCaError,
+  DEFAULT_PATHS:    DEFAULT_PATHS,
+};