@blamejs/core 0.7.18 → 0.7.19

package/lib/mail-dkim.js

@@ -1,369 +1,369 @@
-"use strict";
-/**
- * mail-dkim — DKIM-Signature header generation for outbound mail.
- *
- * RFC 6376 (rsa-sha256) is the default; RFC 8463 (ed25519-sha256) is
- * available as opt-in. The two share the same signer surface so
- * operators flip algorithms by changing the `algorithm` opt and the
- * private key — no code change.
- *
- * Forward-looking: the DKIM-Signature `a=` tag carries an algorithm
- * identifier. When the IETF standardizes a post-quantum DKIM algorithm
- * (an SLH-DSA or ML-DSA variant), this module gains a third allowed
- * value alongside `rsa-sha256` and `ed25519-sha256`. The signer's
- * outer surface stays the same.
- *
- * Public API:
- *
- *   var signer = b.mail.dkim.create({
- *     domain:          "example.com",
- *     selector:        "s1",
- *     privateKey:      pemString | crypto.KeyObject,
- *     algorithm:       "rsa-sha256" (default) | "ed25519-sha256"
- *     headersToSign:   ["from","to","subject","date","message-id"]
- *                       (default — order matters in the signed string)
- *     canonicalization:"relaxed/relaxed" (default) | "simple/simple"
- *                      | "relaxed/simple" | "simple/relaxed"
- *     bodyLength:      number (optional `l=` cap; off by default)
- *     audit:           false (default true)
- *   });
- *
- *   var signedRfc822 = signer.sign(rfc822String);
- *
- * The signer never mutates the message object — it consumes the final
- * RFC 822 wire format produced by `mail._buildRfc822` and returns a
- * new string with the DKIM-Signature header prepended.
- *
- * Validation surface uses DkimError (FrameworkError subclass) with a
- * permanent flag — every problem here is a configuration / shape
- * problem, not a transient one.
- */
-var lazyRequire = require("./lazy-require");
-var audit       = lazyRequire(function () { return require("./audit"); });
-var nodeCrypto  = require("crypto");
-var safeBuffer  = require("./safe-buffer");
-var validateOpts = require("./validate-opts");
-var { FrameworkError } = require("./framework-error");
-
-class DkimError extends FrameworkError {
-  constructor(code, message) {
-    super(message, code);
-    this.name = "DkimError";
-    this.permanent = true;
-    this.isDkimError = true;
-  }
-}
-
-var ALLOWED_ALGORITHMS = ["rsa-sha256", "ed25519-sha256"];
-var ALLOWED_CANON = [
-  "relaxed/relaxed",
-  "simple/simple",
-  "relaxed/simple",
-  "simple/relaxed",
-];
-var DEFAULT_HEADERS = ["from", "to", "subject", "date", "message-id"];
-
-// ---- Canonicalization (RFC 6376 §3.4) ----
-
-function _canonHeaderRelaxed(name, value) {
-  // Lowercase name, unfold continuations, collapse internal WSP runs to
-  // single SP, strip leading/trailing WSP from value.
-  var unfolded = String(value).replace(/\r?\n[ \t]+/g, " ");
-  var trimmed = unfolded.replace(/[ \t]+/g, " ").replace(/^[ \t]+|[ \t]+$/g, "");
-  return name.toLowerCase() + ":" + trimmed + "\r\n";
-}
-
-function _canonHeaderSimple(name, value) {
-  // Preserve as-is. Used rarely in practice but spec-compliant.
-  return name + ":" + value + "\r\n";
-}
-
-function _canonBodyRelaxed(body) {
-  // 1) Reduce internal WSP runs in each line to a single SP, strip
-  //    trailing WSP. 2) Strip empty lines at end of body. 3) Ensure
-  //    a single trailing CRLF. Empty body → just "\r\n".
-  if (!body) return "\r\n";
-  var normalized = body.replace(/\r?\n/g, "\r\n");
-  var lines = normalized.split("\r\n");
-  for (var i = 0; i < lines.length; i++) {
-    lines[i] = safeBuffer.stripTrailingHspace(lines[i].replace(/[ \t]+/g, " "));
-  }
-  // Drop trailing empty lines.
-  while (lines.length > 0 && lines[lines.length - 1] === "") lines.pop();
-  if (lines.length === 0) return "\r\n";
-  return lines.join("\r\n") + "\r\n";
-}
-
-function _canonBodySimple(body) {
-  // Strip trailing empty lines but otherwise preserve the body. Empty
-  // body → "\r\n".
-  if (!body) return "\r\n";
-  var normalized = body.replace(/\r?\n/g, "\r\n");
-  // Strip trailing empty lines.
-  while (normalized.endsWith("\r\n\r\n")) {
-    normalized = normalized.slice(0, -2);
-  }
-  if (!normalized.endsWith("\r\n")) normalized += "\r\n";
-  return normalized;
-}
-
-// ---- RFC 822 split ----
-
-function _splitHeadersBody(rfc822) {
-  // Headers terminated by the first empty line. Headers may use folded
-  // continuation lines (CRLF + WSP); we keep them folded and let the
-  // canonicalizer unfold relaxed-mode.
-  var sep = rfc822.indexOf("\r\n\r\n");
-  if (sep === -1) {
-    throw new DkimError("dkim/missing-body-separator",
-      "rfc822 input has no header/body separator (CRLF CRLF)");
-  }
-  return {
-    headers: rfc822.slice(0, sep + 2),  // include trailing CRLF after last header
-    body:    rfc822.slice(sep + 4),
-  };
-}
-
-function _parseHeaders(rawHeaders) {
-  // Parse into [{ name, value }, ...] preserving order. Folded
-  // continuation lines (start with WSP) are appended to the prior
-  // header's value verbatim.
-  var lines = rawHeaders.split("\r\n");
-  var out = [];
-  for (var i = 0; i < lines.length; i++) {
-    var line = lines[i];
-    if (!line) continue;
-    if (line[0] === " " || line[0] === "\t") {
-      if (out.length > 0) out[out.length - 1].value += "\r\n" + line;
-      continue;
-    }
-    var colon = line.indexOf(":");
-    if (colon === -1) continue;
-    out.push({
-      name:  line.slice(0, colon),
-      value: line.slice(colon + 1),  // preserve leading SP for simple canon
-    });
-  }
-  return out;
-}
-
-// ---- Hashing + signing ----
-
-function _bodyHashB64(body, algorithm, canonBody) {
-  var canonicalized = canonBody === "simple"
-    ? _canonBodySimple(body)
-    : _canonBodyRelaxed(body);
-  var hashName = "sha256";  // both rsa-sha256 and ed25519-sha256 hash with sha256
-  return nodeCrypto.createHash(hashName)
-    .update(canonicalized).digest("base64");
-}
-
-function _signString(strToSign, privateKey, algorithm) {
-  if (algorithm === "rsa-sha256") {
-    return nodeCrypto.createSign("RSA-SHA256")
-      .update(strToSign).sign(privateKey).toString("base64");
-  }
-  if (algorithm === "ed25519-sha256") {
-    // Ed25519 in node:crypto signs the raw message (it hashes
-    // internally as part of EdDSA). Per RFC 8463 the verifier still
-    // sees `a=ed25519-sha256` because the body hash is sha256.
-    return nodeCrypto.sign(null, Buffer.from(strToSign, "utf8"), privateKey)
-      .toString("base64");
-  }
-  throw new DkimError("dkim/bad-algorithm",
-    "unknown algorithm: " + algorithm);
-}
-
-// ---- Signature header construction ----
-
-function _foldSignatureHeader(unfolded) {
-  // RFC 5322 §2.2.3 line length: 78 preferred, 998 max. The b= value
-  // is long enough that folding helps readability and stays well clear
-  // of the limit.
-  var maxLine = 76;
-  var name = "DKIM-Signature: ";
-  var rest = unfolded;
-  if ((name + rest).length <= maxLine) return name + rest;
-  // Fold on tag boundaries (`; tag=value`). Keep the first chunk on
-  // the header line, subsequent chunks on continuation lines starting
-  // with TAB.
-  var parts = rest.split("; ");
-  var lines = [name + parts[0]];
-  for (var i = 1; i < parts.length; i++) {
-    lines.push("\t" + parts[i] + (i < parts.length - 1 ? ";" : ""));
-  }
-  return lines.join("\r\n");
-}
-
-// ---- Public surface ----
-
-function create(opts) {
-  opts = opts || {};
-  validateOpts(opts, [
-    "domain", "selector", "privateKey", "algorithm",
-    "headersToSign", "canonicalization", "bodyLength", "audit",
-  ], "mail.dkim.create");
-
-  if (typeof opts.domain !== "string" || !/^[a-z0-9.-]+\.[a-z]{2,}$/i.test(opts.domain)) {
-    throw new DkimError("dkim/bad-domain",
-      "domain must be a valid DNS name (e.g. 'example.com')");
-  }
-  if (typeof opts.selector !== "string" || !/^[a-z0-9_-]+$/i.test(opts.selector)) {
-    throw new DkimError("dkim/bad-selector",
-      "selector must be a non-empty token of [A-Za-z0-9_-]");
-  }
-  if (!opts.privateKey || (typeof opts.privateKey !== "string" &&
-      typeof opts.privateKey !== "object")) {
-    throw new DkimError("dkim/missing-private-key",
-      "privateKey is required (PEM string or crypto.KeyObject)");
-  }
-  var algorithm = opts.algorithm || "rsa-sha256";
-  if (ALLOWED_ALGORITHMS.indexOf(algorithm) === -1) {
-    throw new DkimError("dkim/bad-algorithm",
-      "algorithm must be one of: " + ALLOWED_ALGORITHMS.join(", "));
-  }
-  var canonicalization = opts.canonicalization || "relaxed/relaxed";
-  if (ALLOWED_CANON.indexOf(canonicalization) === -1) {
-    throw new DkimError("dkim/bad-canonicalization",
-      "canonicalization must be one of: " + ALLOWED_CANON.join(", "));
-  }
-  var canonHeader = canonicalization.split("/")[0];
-  var canonBody   = canonicalization.split("/")[1];
-
-  var headersToSign = opts.headersToSign || DEFAULT_HEADERS;
-  if (!Array.isArray(headersToSign) || headersToSign.length === 0) {
-    throw new DkimError("dkim/bad-headers",
-      "headersToSign must be a non-empty array of header names");
-  }
-  for (var i = 0; i < headersToSign.length; i++) {
-    if (typeof headersToSign[i] !== "string" || headersToSign[i].length === 0) {
-      throw new DkimError("dkim/bad-headers",
-        "headersToSign[" + i + "] must be a non-empty string");
-    }
-  }
-  // The DKIM `l=` body-length tag is intentionally NOT supported.
-  // M³AAWG, Gmail, and Microsoft 365 guidance is "never use l=" — it
-  // enables append-after-signature attacks where an attacker appends
-  // arbitrary content past the signed length and the DKIM signature
-  // still validates against the original prefix. Throw at create-time
-  // so the misconfiguration surfaces at boot, not at first send().
-  if (opts.bodyLength !== undefined) {
-    throw new DkimError("dkim/l-tag-forbidden",
-      "DKIM `l=` body-length tag is forbidden — append-after-signature " +
-      "attack vector. Remove opts.bodyLength.");
-  }
-
-  var auditOn = opts.audit !== false;
-  // Try to parse the private key once at create time so misconfigured
-  // operators see the failure at boot rather than at first send().
-  var keyObject;
-  try {
-    keyObject = typeof opts.privateKey === "string" || Buffer.isBuffer(opts.privateKey)
-      ? nodeCrypto.createPrivateKey({ key: opts.privateKey, format: "pem" })
-      : opts.privateKey;
-  } catch (e) {
-    throw new DkimError("dkim/bad-private-key",
-      "privateKey could not be parsed: " + ((e && e.message) || String(e)));
-  }
-
-  function _emit(action, info) {
-    if (!auditOn) return;
-    audit().safeEmit({
-      action:   action,
-      outcome:  info.outcome || "success",
-      actor:    info.actor || {},
-      metadata: {
-        domain:     opts.domain,
-        selector:   opts.selector,
-        algorithm:  algorithm,
-        bodyLength: info.bodyLength,
-        durationMs: info.durationMs,
-      },
-      reason: info.reason || null,
-    });
-  }
-
-  function sign(rfc822) {
-    if (typeof rfc822 !== "string" || rfc822.length === 0) {
-      throw new DkimError("dkim/bad-input",
-        "sign() requires the rfc822 wire format as a non-empty string");
-    }
-    var t0 = Date.now();
-    var split = _splitHeadersBody(rfc822);
-    var parsedHeaders = _parseHeaders(split.headers);
-
-    // Body hash. The `l=` body-length tag is forbidden at create-time
-    // (above), so the body is always hashed in full.
-    var body = split.body;
-    var bh = _bodyHashB64(body, algorithm, canonBody);
-
-    // Build the unsigned DKIM-Signature header (b= empty).
-    // Tag order follows RFC 6376 examples: v, a, c, d, s, h, bh, b.
-    var sigTags = [
-      "v=1",
-      "a=" + algorithm,
-      "c=" + canonicalization,
-      "d=" + opts.domain,
-      "s=" + opts.selector,
-      "h=" + headersToSign.join(":"),
-      "bh=" + bh,
-    ];
-    sigTags.push("b=");
-    var unsignedSigValue = sigTags.join("; ");
-
-    // Canonicalize the header set: each header in headersToSign (in
-    // order, picking the LAST occurrence per RFC 6376 §5.4.2), then
-    // the DKIM-Signature header itself with empty b=. The result is
-    // what gets signed.
-    var headerNamesLc = parsedHeaders.map(function (h) { return h.name.toLowerCase(); });
-    var canonicalizedHeaders = "";
-    for (var j = 0; j < headersToSign.length; j++) {
-      var wantLc = headersToSign[j].toLowerCase();
-      var idx = -1;
-      for (var k = 0; k < headerNamesLc.length; k++) {
-        if (headerNamesLc[k] === wantLc) idx = k;
-      }
-      if (idx === -1) continue;  // missing headers are skipped (signer's choice)
-      var h = parsedHeaders[idx];
-      canonicalizedHeaders += canonHeader === "simple"
-        ? _canonHeaderSimple(h.name, h.value)
-        : _canonHeaderRelaxed(h.name, h.value);
-    }
-    // Append the unsigned DKIM-Signature header without trailing CRLF
-    // per RFC 6376 §3.7.
-    var dkimHeaderForSigning = canonHeader === "simple"
-      ? _canonHeaderSimple("DKIM-Signature", " " + unsignedSigValue)
-      : _canonHeaderRelaxed("DKIM-Signature", unsignedSigValue);
-    canonicalizedHeaders += dkimHeaderForSigning.replace(/\r\n$/, "");
-
-    var signature = _signString(canonicalizedHeaders, keyObject, algorithm);
-    // Replace the empty `b=` placeholder with the actual base64 signature.
-    var finalSigValue = sigTags.slice(0, -1).concat(["b=" + signature]).join("; ");
-
-    var dkimHeaderLine = _foldSignatureHeader(finalSigValue) + "\r\n";
-
-    _emit("dkim.sign.success", {
-      bodyLength: body.length,
-      durationMs: Date.now() - t0,
-    });
-
-    return dkimHeaderLine + rfc822;
-  }
-
-  return {
-    sign: sign,
-    domain:    opts.domain,
-    selector:  opts.selector,
-    algorithm: algorithm,
-  };
-}
-
-// Test-only exports for unit testing the canonicalization primitives
-// directly without going through a full sign() round.
-module.exports = {
-  create:    create,
-  DkimError: DkimError,
-  _canonHeaderRelaxedForTest: _canonHeaderRelaxed,
-  _canonBodyRelaxedForTest:   _canonBodyRelaxed,
-  _canonBodySimpleForTest:    _canonBodySimple,
-};
+"use strict";
+/**
+ * mail-dkim — DKIM-Signature header generation for outbound mail.
+ *
+ * RFC 6376 (rsa-sha256) is the default; RFC 8463 (ed25519-sha256) is
+ * available as opt-in. The two share the same signer surface so
+ * operators flip algorithms by changing the `algorithm` opt and the
+ * private key — no code change.
+ *
+ * Forward-looking: the DKIM-Signature `a=` tag carries an algorithm
+ * identifier. When the IETF standardizes a post-quantum DKIM algorithm
+ * (an SLH-DSA or ML-DSA variant), this module gains a third allowed
+ * value alongside `rsa-sha256` and `ed25519-sha256`. The signer's
+ * outer surface stays the same.
+ *
+ * Public API:
+ *
+ *   var signer = b.mail.dkim.create({
+ *     domain:          "example.com",
+ *     selector:        "s1",
+ *     privateKey:      pemString | crypto.KeyObject,
+ *     algorithm:       "rsa-sha256" (default) | "ed25519-sha256"
+ *     headersToSign:   ["from","to","subject","date","message-id"]
+ *                       (default — order matters in the signed string)
+ *     canonicalization:"relaxed/relaxed" (default) | "simple/simple"
+ *                      | "relaxed/simple" | "simple/relaxed"
+ *     bodyLength:      number (optional `l=` cap; off by default)
+ *     audit:           false (default true)
+ *   });
+ *
+ *   var signedRfc822 = signer.sign(rfc822String);
+ *
+ * The signer never mutates the message object — it consumes the final
+ * RFC 822 wire format produced by `mail._buildRfc822` and returns a
+ * new string with the DKIM-Signature header prepended.
+ *
+ * Validation surface uses DkimError (FrameworkError subclass) with a
+ * permanent flag — every problem here is a configuration / shape
+ * problem, not a transient one.
+ */
+var lazyRequire = require("./lazy-require");
+var audit       = lazyRequire(function () { return require("./audit"); });
+var nodeCrypto  = require("crypto");
+var safeBuffer  = require("./safe-buffer");
+var validateOpts = require("./validate-opts");
+var { FrameworkError } = require("./framework-error");
+
+class DkimError extends FrameworkError {
+  constructor(code, message) {
+    super(message, code);
+    this.name = "DkimError";
+    this.permanent = true;
+    this.isDkimError = true;
+  }
+}
+
+var ALLOWED_ALGORITHMS = ["rsa-sha256", "ed25519-sha256"];
+var ALLOWED_CANON = [
+  "relaxed/relaxed",
+  "simple/simple",
+  "relaxed/simple",
+  "simple/relaxed",
+];
+var DEFAULT_HEADERS = ["from", "to", "subject", "date", "message-id"];
+
+// ---- Canonicalization (RFC 6376 §3.4) ----
+
+function _canonHeaderRelaxed(name, value) {
+  // Lowercase name, unfold continuations, collapse internal WSP runs to
+  // single SP, strip leading/trailing WSP from value.
+  var unfolded = String(value).replace(/\r?\n[ \t]+/g, " ");
+  var trimmed = unfolded.replace(/[ \t]+/g, " ").replace(/^[ \t]+|[ \t]+$/g, "");
+  return name.toLowerCase() + ":" + trimmed + "\r\n";
+}
+
+function _canonHeaderSimple(name, value) {
+  // Preserve as-is. Used rarely in practice but spec-compliant.
+  return name + ":" + value + "\r\n";
+}
+
+function _canonBodyRelaxed(body) {
+  // 1) Reduce internal WSP runs in each line to a single SP, strip
+  //    trailing WSP. 2) Strip empty lines at end of body. 3) Ensure
+  //    a single trailing CRLF. Empty body → just "\r\n".
+  if (!body) return "\r\n";
+  var normalized = body.replace(/\r?\n/g, "\r\n");
+  var lines = normalized.split("\r\n");
+  for (var i = 0; i < lines.length; i++) {
+    lines[i] = safeBuffer.stripTrailingHspace(lines[i].replace(/[ \t]+/g, " "));
+  }
+  // Drop trailing empty lines.
+  while (lines.length > 0 && lines[lines.length - 1] === "") lines.pop();
+  if (lines.length === 0) return "\r\n";
+  return lines.join("\r\n") + "\r\n";
+}
+
+function _canonBodySimple(body) {
+  // Strip trailing empty lines but otherwise preserve the body. Empty
+  // body → "\r\n".
+  if (!body) return "\r\n";
+  var normalized = body.replace(/\r?\n/g, "\r\n");
+  // Strip trailing empty lines.
+  while (normalized.endsWith("\r\n\r\n")) {
+    normalized = normalized.slice(0, -2);
+  }
+  if (!normalized.endsWith("\r\n")) normalized += "\r\n";
+  return normalized;
+}
+
+// ---- RFC 822 split ----
+
+function _splitHeadersBody(rfc822) {
+  // Headers terminated by the first empty line. Headers may use folded
+  // continuation lines (CRLF + WSP); we keep them folded and let the
+  // canonicalizer unfold relaxed-mode.
+  var sep = rfc822.indexOf("\r\n\r\n");
+  if (sep === -1) {
+    throw new DkimError("dkim/missing-body-separator",
+      "rfc822 input has no header/body separator (CRLF CRLF)");
+  }
+  return {
+    headers: rfc822.slice(0, sep + 2),  // include trailing CRLF after last header
+    body:    rfc822.slice(sep + 4),
+  };
+}
+
+function _parseHeaders(rawHeaders) {
+  // Parse into [{ name, value }, ...] preserving order. Folded
+  // continuation lines (start with WSP) are appended to the prior
+  // header's value verbatim.
+  var lines = rawHeaders.split("\r\n");
+  var out = [];
+  for (var i = 0; i < lines.length; i++) {
+    var line = lines[i];
+    if (!line) continue;
+    if (line[0] === " " || line[0] === "\t") {
+      if (out.length > 0) out[out.length - 1].value += "\r\n" + line;
+      continue;
+    }
+    var colon = line.indexOf(":");
+    if (colon === -1) continue;
+    out.push({
+      name:  line.slice(0, colon),
+      value: line.slice(colon + 1),  // preserve leading SP for simple canon
+    });
+  }
+  return out;
+}
+
+// ---- Hashing + signing ----
+
+function _bodyHashB64(body, algorithm, canonBody) {
+  var canonicalized = canonBody === "simple"
+    ? _canonBodySimple(body)
+    : _canonBodyRelaxed(body);
+  var hashName = "sha256";  // both rsa-sha256 and ed25519-sha256 hash with sha256
+  return nodeCrypto.createHash(hashName)
+    .update(canonicalized).digest("base64");
+}
+
+function _signString(strToSign, privateKey, algorithm) {
+  if (algorithm === "rsa-sha256") {
+    return nodeCrypto.createSign("RSA-SHA256")
+      .update(strToSign).sign(privateKey).toString("base64");
+  }
+  if (algorithm === "ed25519-sha256") {
+    // Ed25519 in node:crypto signs the raw message (it hashes
+    // internally as part of EdDSA). Per RFC 8463 the verifier still
+    // sees `a=ed25519-sha256` because the body hash is sha256.
+    return nodeCrypto.sign(null, Buffer.from(strToSign, "utf8"), privateKey)
+      .toString("base64");
+  }
+  throw new DkimError("dkim/bad-algorithm",
+    "unknown algorithm: " + algorithm);
+}
+
+// ---- Signature header construction ----
+
+function _foldSignatureHeader(unfolded) {
+  // RFC 5322 §2.2.3 line length: 78 preferred, 998 max. The b= value
+  // is long enough that folding helps readability and stays well clear
+  // of the limit.
+  var maxLine = 76;
+  var name = "DKIM-Signature: ";
+  var rest = unfolded;
+  if ((name + rest).length <= maxLine) return name + rest;
+  // Fold on tag boundaries (`; tag=value`). Keep the first chunk on
+  // the header line, subsequent chunks on continuation lines starting
+  // with TAB.
+  var parts = rest.split("; ");
+  var lines = [name + parts[0]];
+  for (var i = 1; i < parts.length; i++) {
+    lines.push("\t" + parts[i] + (i < parts.length - 1 ? ";" : ""));
+  }
+  return lines.join("\r\n");
+}
+
+// ---- Public surface ----
+
+function create(opts) {
+  opts = opts || {};
+  validateOpts(opts, [
+    "domain", "selector", "privateKey", "algorithm",
+    "headersToSign", "canonicalization", "bodyLength", "audit",
+  ], "mail.dkim.create");
+
+  if (typeof opts.domain !== "string" || !/^[a-z0-9.-]+\.[a-z]{2,}$/i.test(opts.domain)) {
+    throw new DkimError("dkim/bad-domain",
+      "domain must be a valid DNS name (e.g. 'example.com')");
+  }
+  if (typeof opts.selector !== "string" || !/^[a-z0-9_-]+$/i.test(opts.selector)) {
+    throw new DkimError("dkim/bad-selector",
+      "selector must be a non-empty token of [A-Za-z0-9_-]");
+  }
+  if (!opts.privateKey || (typeof opts.privateKey !== "string" &&
+      typeof opts.privateKey !== "object")) {
+    throw new DkimError("dkim/missing-private-key",
+      "privateKey is required (PEM string or crypto.KeyObject)");
+  }
+  var algorithm = opts.algorithm || "rsa-sha256";
+  if (ALLOWED_ALGORITHMS.indexOf(algorithm) === -1) {
+    throw new DkimError("dkim/bad-algorithm",
+      "algorithm must be one of: " + ALLOWED_ALGORITHMS.join(", "));
+  }
+  var canonicalization = opts.canonicalization || "relaxed/relaxed";
+  if (ALLOWED_CANON.indexOf(canonicalization) === -1) {
+    throw new DkimError("dkim/bad-canonicalization",
+      "canonicalization must be one of: " + ALLOWED_CANON.join(", "));
+  }
+  var canonHeader = canonicalization.split("/")[0];
+  var canonBody   = canonicalization.split("/")[1];
+
+  var headersToSign = opts.headersToSign || DEFAULT_HEADERS;
+  if (!Array.isArray(headersToSign) || headersToSign.length === 0) {
+    throw new DkimError("dkim/bad-headers",
+      "headersToSign must be a non-empty array of header names");
+  }
+  for (var i = 0; i < headersToSign.length; i++) {
+    if (typeof headersToSign[i] !== "string" || headersToSign[i].length === 0) {
+      throw new DkimError("dkim/bad-headers",
+        "headersToSign[" + i + "] must be a non-empty string");
+    }
+  }
+  // The DKIM `l=` body-length tag is intentionally NOT supported.
+  // M³AAWG, Gmail, and Microsoft 365 guidance is "never use l=" — it
+  // enables append-after-signature attacks where an attacker appends
+  // arbitrary content past the signed length and the DKIM signature
+  // still validates against the original prefix. Throw at create-time
+  // so the misconfiguration surfaces at boot, not at first send().
+  if (opts.bodyLength !== undefined) {
+    throw new DkimError("dkim/l-tag-forbidden",
+      "DKIM `l=` body-length tag is forbidden — append-after-signature " +
+      "attack vector. Remove opts.bodyLength.");
+  }
+
+  var auditOn = opts.audit !== false;
+  // Try to parse the private key once at create time so misconfigured
+  // operators see the failure at boot rather than at first send().
+  var keyObject;
+  try {
+    keyObject = typeof opts.privateKey === "string" || Buffer.isBuffer(opts.privateKey)
+      ? nodeCrypto.createPrivateKey({ key: opts.privateKey, format: "pem" })
+      : opts.privateKey;
+  } catch (e) {
+    throw new DkimError("dkim/bad-private-key",
+      "privateKey could not be parsed: " + ((e && e.message) || String(e)));
+  }
+
+  function _emit(action, info) {
+    if (!auditOn) return;
+    audit().safeEmit({
+      action:   action,
+      outcome:  info.outcome || "success",
+      actor:    info.actor || {},
+      metadata: {
+        domain:     opts.domain,
+        selector:   opts.selector,
+        algorithm:  algorithm,
+        bodyLength: info.bodyLength,
+        durationMs: info.durationMs,
+      },
+      reason: info.reason || null,
+    });
+  }
+
+  function sign(rfc822) {
+    if (typeof rfc822 !== "string" || rfc822.length === 0) {
+      throw new DkimError("dkim/bad-input",
+        "sign() requires the rfc822 wire format as a non-empty string");
+    }
+    var t0 = Date.now();
+    var split = _splitHeadersBody(rfc822);
+    var parsedHeaders = _parseHeaders(split.headers);
+
+    // Body hash. The `l=` body-length tag is forbidden at create-time
+    // (above), so the body is always hashed in full.
+    var body = split.body;
+    var bh = _bodyHashB64(body, algorithm, canonBody);
+
+    // Build the unsigned DKIM-Signature header (b= empty).
+    // Tag order follows RFC 6376 examples: v, a, c, d, s, h, bh, b.
+    var sigTags = [
+      "v=1",
+      "a=" + algorithm,
+      "c=" + canonicalization,
+      "d=" + opts.domain,
+      "s=" + opts.selector,
+      "h=" + headersToSign.join(":"),
+      "bh=" + bh,
+    ];
+    sigTags.push("b=");
+    var unsignedSigValue = sigTags.join("; ");
+
+    // Canonicalize the header set: each header in headersToSign (in
+    // order, picking the LAST occurrence per RFC 6376 §5.4.2), then
+    // the DKIM-Signature header itself with empty b=. The result is
+    // what gets signed.
+    var headerNamesLc = parsedHeaders.map(function (h) { return h.name.toLowerCase(); });
+    var canonicalizedHeaders = "";
+    for (var j = 0; j < headersToSign.length; j++) {
+      var wantLc = headersToSign[j].toLowerCase();
+      var idx = -1;
+      for (var k = 0; k < headerNamesLc.length; k++) {
+        if (headerNamesLc[k] === wantLc) idx = k;
+      }
+      if (idx === -1) continue;  // missing headers are skipped (signer's choice)
+      var h = parsedHeaders[idx];
+      canonicalizedHeaders += canonHeader === "simple"
+        ? _canonHeaderSimple(h.name, h.value)
+        : _canonHeaderRelaxed(h.name, h.value);
+    }
+    // Append the unsigned DKIM-Signature header without trailing CRLF
+    // per RFC 6376 §3.7.
+    var dkimHeaderForSigning = canonHeader === "simple"
+      ? _canonHeaderSimple("DKIM-Signature", " " + unsignedSigValue)
+      : _canonHeaderRelaxed("DKIM-Signature", unsignedSigValue);
+    canonicalizedHeaders += dkimHeaderForSigning.replace(/\r\n$/, "");
+
+    var signature = _signString(canonicalizedHeaders, keyObject, algorithm);
+    // Replace the empty `b=` placeholder with the actual base64 signature.
+    var finalSigValue = sigTags.slice(0, -1).concat(["b=" + signature]).join("; ");
+
+    var dkimHeaderLine = _foldSignatureHeader(finalSigValue) + "\r\n";
+
+    _emit("dkim.sign.success", {
+      bodyLength: body.length,
+      durationMs: Date.now() - t0,
+    });
+
+    return dkimHeaderLine + rfc822;
+  }
+
+  return {
+    sign: sign,
+    domain:    opts.domain,
+    selector:  opts.selector,
+    algorithm: algorithm,
+  };
+}
+
+// Test-only exports for unit testing the canonicalization primitives
+// directly without going through a full sign() round.
+module.exports = {
+  create:    create,
+  DkimError: DkimError,
+  _canonHeaderRelaxedForTest: _canonHeaderRelaxed,
+  _canonBodyRelaxedForTest:   _canonBodyRelaxed,
+  _canonBodySimpleForTest:    _canonBodySimple,
+};