@blamejs/core 0.7.18 → 0.7.19

package/lib/audit-sign.js

@@ -1,344 +1,344 @@
-"use strict";
-/**
- * Audit signing key — separate PQC keypair for periodic checkpoint
- * signatures over the audit chain.
- *
- * Algorithm: SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256f (FIPS 205) by default. ML-DSA-87
- * (FIPS 204) supported as an opt-in alternative for throughput-
- * sensitive deployments. Both are NIST PQC Category 5 (~256-bit
- * symmetric security). SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256f is hash-only — its
- * security depends solely on the underlying hash function, with no
- * lattice / module-hardness assumptions — and matches the framework's
- * SHAKE256 KDF + SHA3-512 hash family. Audit checkpoints are long-
- * lived integrity attestations (must verify for the data retention
- * period — years for HIPAA / SOX), so the conservative-PQC posture
- * carries more weight here than the smaller ML-DSA-87 signature
- * (~5 KB) and faster sign (0.6 ms vs 76 ms).
- *
- * The algorithm is recorded in the on-disk key file's `algorithm`
- * field. Older key files that predate the algorithm field are loaded
- * as ML-DSA-87 (the previous implicit default) and continue to verify
- * their checkpoint history. Operators who want to migrate rotate
- * their audit-signing key.
- *
- * Design:
- *   - Different keypair from the vault encryption keys. Compromise of the
- *     vault DOES NOT let an attacker forge audit checkpoints.
- *   - Stored at <dataDir>/audit-sign.key.sealed (default 'wrapped' mode)
- *     or <dataDir>/audit-sign.key (opt-out 'plaintext' mode with warning).
- *   - Wrapped under its OWN passphrase, sourced via:
- *       BLAMEJS_AUDIT_SIGNING_PASSPHRASE         (env)
- *       BLAMEJS_AUDIT_SIGNING_PASSPHRASE_FILE    (file)
- *       BLAMEJS_AUDIT_SIGNING_PASSPHRASE_SOURCE  (selector: auto|env|file|stdin)
- *     These are intentionally distinct from BLAMEJS_VAULT_PASSPHRASE so
- *     operator-error reuse of the same passphrase is at least explicit.
- *   - First-run generates the keypair automatically.
- *
- * Threat model:
- *   - Vault key compromised + DB write access:
- *       attacker can read sealed values + rewrite audit_log rows + recompute
- *       per-row chain hashes. They CANNOT forge new audit_checkpoint rows
- *       because each checkpoint requires the audit-signing private key.
- *   - Audit signing key compromised:
- *       attacker can forge new checkpoints but cannot read sealed values.
- *       Existing checkpoints still anchor history that pre-dated the
- *       compromise (operator should rotate signing key on detection).
- *   - Both compromised:
- *       framework cannot defend against this — by design, the operator's
- *       physical / administrative controls (HIPAA §164.310, GDPR Art. 32(1)(d))
- *       cover this case.
- *
- * Public API:
- *   await auditSign.init({ dataDir, mode? })   ← call at db.init()
- *   auditSign.sign(payload)                    ← Buffer/string → Buffer signature
- *   auditSign.verify(payload, signature, publicKey?) ← bool
- *   auditSign.getPublicKey()                   ← PEM string
- *   auditSign.getPublicKeyFingerprint()        ← sha3 hex (stable id)
- *   auditSign.getMode()                        ← 'wrapped' | 'plaintext'
- */
-var fs = require("fs");
-var path = require("path");
-var nodeCrypto = require("crypto");
-var atomicFile = require("./atomic-file");
-var { sha3Hash } = require("./crypto");
-var { defineClass } = require("./framework-error");
-var { boot } = require("./log");
-var safeBuffer = require("./safe-buffer");
-var safeJson = require("./safe-json");
-var vaultPassphraseSource = require("./vault/passphrase-source");
-var vaultWrap = require("./vault/wrap");
-
-// AuditSignError is thrown by init() for fatal boot-time conditions
-// (conflicting on-disk key files, passphrase rejected, schema invalid).
-// The caller — CLI or app boot — catches and translates to an exit code;
-// lib/ never calls process.exit unilaterally.
-var AuditSignError = defineClass("AuditSignError", { alwaysPermanent: true });
-var _err = AuditSignError.factory;
-
-// Default for newly-generated keys. Operators can override at init
-// via opts.algorithm — e.g. `auditSigning: { algorithm: "ml-dsa-87" }`
-// for throughput-sensitive deployments. Existing key files determine
-// their own algorithm via the on-disk `algorithm` field; legacy key
-// files that predate the algorithm field load as "ml-dsa-87" (the
-// previous implicit default).
-var DEFAULT_SIGNING_ALG = "slh-dsa-shake-256f";
-var LEGACY_DEFAULT_ALG  = "ml-dsa-87";
-var SUPPORTED_SIGNING_ALGS = Object.freeze(["slh-dsa-shake-256f", "ml-dsa-87"]);
-
-var SIGNING_KEY_SCHEMA = {
-  type: "object",
-  required: ["publicKey", "privateKey"],
-  properties: {
-    publicKey:  { type: "string" },
-    privateKey: { type: "string" },
-    algorithm:  { type: "string" },     // optional; missing = legacy ml-dsa-87
-  },
-};
-
-var ENV_VARS = {
-  value:  "BLAMEJS_AUDIT_SIGNING_PASSPHRASE",
-  file:   "BLAMEJS_AUDIT_SIGNING_PASSPHRASE_FILE",
-  source: "BLAMEJS_AUDIT_SIGNING_PASSPHRASE_SOURCE",
-};
-
-var keys = null;            // { publicKey: PEM, privateKey: PEM, fingerprint }
-var initialized = false;
-var currentMode = null;
-var paths = null;
-
-var log = boot("audit-sign");
-
-function resolvePaths(dataDir) {
-  return {
-    dataDir:    dataDir,
-    plaintext:  path.join(dataDir, "audit-sign.key"),
-    sealed:     path.join(dataDir, "audit-sign.key.sealed"),
-  };
-}
-
-function _computeFingerprint(publicKeyPem) {
-  return sha3Hash(publicKeyPem);
-}
-
-// ---- Passphrase sourcing (delegates to lib/passphrase-source.js with
-// audit-signing-specific env var names) ----
-
-function _getPassphrase(promptText) {
-  return vaultPassphraseSource.getPassphrase({
-    envVars: ENV_VARS,
-    prompt:  promptText || "Audit-signing passphrase: ",
-  });
-}
-
-// ---- Init ----
-
-// Algorithm chosen for newly-generated keypairs. Set once per init()
-// call and read by _initPlaintext / _initFirstRunWrapped. Existing key
-// files take their algorithm from the file itself, ignoring this.
-var pendingNewKeyAlg = null;
-
-async function init(opts) {
-  if (initialized) return;
-  if (!opts || !opts.dataDir) {
-    throw new AuditSignError("auditSign/bad-init",
-      "auditSign.init({ dataDir }) is required");
-  }
-
-  var mode = (opts.mode || "wrapped").toLowerCase();
-  if (mode !== "wrapped" && mode !== "plaintext") {
-    throw new AuditSignError("auditSign/bad-mode",
-      "auditSign.init: mode must be 'wrapped' or 'plaintext'");
-  }
-  // Algorithm-on-generate. Validated against the supported list so
-  // typos surface here, not as an opaque "key generation failed"
-  // deeper in nodeCrypto.
-  var alg = (opts.algorithm || DEFAULT_SIGNING_ALG).toLowerCase();
-  if (SUPPORTED_SIGNING_ALGS.indexOf(alg) === -1) {
-    throw new AuditSignError("auditSign/bad-algorithm",
-      "auditSign.init: algorithm must be one of " +
-      SUPPORTED_SIGNING_ALGS.join(", ") + " (got: " + alg + ")");
-  }
-  pendingNewKeyAlg = alg;
-  currentMode = mode;
-  paths = resolvePaths(opts.dataDir);
-
-  if (!fs.existsSync(paths.dataDir)) fs.mkdirSync(paths.dataDir, { recursive: true });
-  // Sweep tmp files from any prior crashed write
-  atomicFile.cleanOrphans(paths.sealed);
-  atomicFile.cleanOrphans(paths.plaintext);
-
-  var hasPlaintext = fs.existsSync(paths.plaintext);
-  var hasSealed    = fs.existsSync(paths.sealed);
-  if (hasPlaintext && hasSealed) {
-    throw _err("KEY_FILE_CONFLICT",
-      "both audit-sign.key and audit-sign.key.sealed exist; resolve manually");
-  }
-  if (hasSealed && mode === "plaintext") {
-    throw _err("MODE_MISMATCH",
-      "audit-sign.key.sealed exists but mode='plaintext' requested");
-  }
-  if (hasPlaintext && mode === "wrapped") {
-    throw _err("MODE_MISMATCH",
-      "audit-sign.key (plaintext) exists but mode='wrapped' requested");
-  }
-
-  if (mode === "wrapped") {
-    if (hasSealed) await _initWrapped();
-    else await _initFirstRunWrapped();
-  } else {
-    log.warn("WARNING: PLAINTEXT mode — audit-sign.key is unprotected on disk.");
-    log.warn("         Use mode: 'wrapped' (default) for any deployment that holds real data.");
-    _initPlaintext();
-  }
-
-  initialized = true;
-}
-
-function _initPlaintext() {
-  if (fs.existsSync(paths.plaintext)) {
-    var loaded;
-    try { loaded = safeJson.parse(atomicFile.readSync(paths.plaintext), { schema: SIGNING_KEY_SCHEMA }); }
-    catch (e) {
-      throw _err("KEY_FILE_CORRUPT",
-        "audit-sign.key corrupted or schema-invalid at " + paths.plaintext + " - " + e.message);
-    }
-    var loadedAlg = loaded.algorithm || LEGACY_DEFAULT_ALG;
-    keys = {
-      publicKey:  loaded.publicKey,
-      privateKey: loaded.privateKey,
-      algorithm:  loadedAlg,
-      fingerprint: _computeFingerprint(loaded.publicKey),
-    };
-    return;
-  }
-  // First run, plaintext — generate with the operator-selected (or default) alg
-  var alg = pendingNewKeyAlg || DEFAULT_SIGNING_ALG;
-  var pair = nodeCrypto.generateKeyPairSync(alg, {
-    publicKeyEncoding:  { type: "spki",  format: "pem" },
-    privateKeyEncoding: { type: "pkcs8", format: "pem" },
-  });
-  keys = {
-    publicKey:  pair.publicKey,
-    privateKey: pair.privateKey,
-    algorithm:  alg,
-    fingerprint: _computeFingerprint(pair.publicKey),
-  };
-  atomicFile.writeSync(
-    paths.plaintext,
-    JSON.stringify({ algorithm: alg, publicKey: keys.publicKey, privateKey: keys.privateKey }, null, 2),
-    { fileMode: 0o600 }
-  );
-  log("plaintext audit-signing keypair generated at " + paths.plaintext + " (alg=" + alg + ")");
-}
-
-async function _initWrapped() {
-  log("unsealing audit-sign.key.sealed...");
-  var sealedBytes = atomicFile.readSync(paths.sealed);
-  var passphrase = await _getPassphrase("Audit-signing passphrase: ");
-  var plaintextBuf;
-  try {
-    try { plaintextBuf = await vaultWrap.unwrap(sealedBytes, passphrase); }
-    catch (e) {
-      throw _err("PASSPHRASE_REJECTED",
-        "audit-signing passphrase rejected (" + e.message + ")");
-    }
-    var loaded;
-    try { loaded = safeJson.parse(plaintextBuf, { schema: SIGNING_KEY_SCHEMA }); }
-    catch (e) {
-      throw _err("UNWRAPPED_INVALID",
-        "unwrapped audit-sign.key invalid: " + e.message);
-    }
-    var loadedAlg = loaded.algorithm || LEGACY_DEFAULT_ALG;
-    keys = {
-      publicKey:  loaded.publicKey,
-      privateKey: loaded.privateKey,
-      algorithm:  loadedAlg,
-      fingerprint: _computeFingerprint(loaded.publicKey),
-    };
-    log("audit-signing keypair unsealed (alg=" + loadedAlg + ").");
-  } finally {
-    // The audit-signing passphrase is single-use at boot — no re-wrap path
-    // keeps it alive (unlike vault.currentPassphrase). Zero on the way out.
-    safeBuffer.secureZero(passphrase);
-    if (plaintextBuf) safeBuffer.secureZero(plaintextBuf);
-  }
-}
-
-async function _initFirstRunWrapped() {
-  var alg = pendingNewKeyAlg || DEFAULT_SIGNING_ALG;
-  log("first-run wrapped — generating audit-signing keypair (alg=" + alg + ")...");
-  var passphrase = await _getPassphrase("Choose an audit-signing passphrase: ");
-  try {
-    var pair = nodeCrypto.generateKeyPairSync(alg, {
-      publicKeyEncoding:  { type: "spki",  format: "pem" },
-      privateKeyEncoding: { type: "pkcs8", format: "pem" },
-    });
-    keys = {
-      publicKey:  pair.publicKey,
-      privateKey: pair.privateKey,
-      algorithm:  alg,
-      fingerprint: _computeFingerprint(pair.publicKey),
-    };
-
-    var sealed = await vaultWrap.wrap(
-      JSON.stringify({ algorithm: alg, publicKey: keys.publicKey, privateKey: keys.privateKey }, null, 2),
-      passphrase
-    );
-    atomicFile.writeSync(paths.sealed, sealed, { fileMode: 0o600 });
-    log("generated and sealed audit-signing keypair (alg=" + alg + ")");
-  } finally {
-    safeBuffer.secureZero(passphrase);
-  }
-}
-
-// ---- Public API ----
-
-function _requireInit() {
-  if (!initialized) {
-    throw new AuditSignError("auditSign/not-initialized",
-      "auditSign.init() must be awaited before sign/verify");
-  }
-}
-
-function sign(payload) {
-  _requireInit();
-  var buf = Buffer.isBuffer(payload) ? payload : Buffer.from(String(payload), "utf8");
-  return nodeCrypto.sign(null, buf, keys.privateKey);
-}
-
-function verify(payload, signature, publicKeyPem) {
-  _requireInit();
-  var buf = Buffer.isBuffer(payload) ? payload : Buffer.from(String(payload), "utf8");
-  var sigBuf = Buffer.isBuffer(signature) ? signature : Buffer.from(signature);
-  var pub = publicKeyPem || keys.publicKey;
-  return nodeCrypto.verify(null, buf, pub, sigBuf);
-}
-
-function getPublicKey() { _requireInit(); return keys.publicKey; }
-function getPublicKeyFingerprint() { _requireInit(); return keys.fingerprint; }
-function getMode() { return currentMode; }
-function getAlgorithm() { _requireInit(); return keys.algorithm; }
-
-function _resetForTest() {
-  keys = null;
-  initialized = false;
-  currentMode = null;
-  paths = null;
-  pendingNewKeyAlg = null;
-}
-
-module.exports = {
-  init:                     init,
-  sign:                     sign,
-  verify:                   verify,
-  getPublicKey:             getPublicKey,
-  getPublicKeyFingerprint:  getPublicKeyFingerprint,
-  getMode:                  getMode,
-  getAlgorithm:             getAlgorithm,
-  DEFAULT_SIGNING_ALG:      DEFAULT_SIGNING_ALG,
-  SUPPORTED_SIGNING_ALGS:   SUPPORTED_SIGNING_ALGS,
-  ENV_PASSPHRASE:           ENV_VARS.value,
-  ENV_PASSPHRASE_FILE:      ENV_VARS.file,
-  ENV_PASSPHRASE_SRC:       ENV_VARS.source,
-  _resetForTest:            _resetForTest,
-};
+"use strict";
+/**
+ * Audit signing key — separate PQC keypair for periodic checkpoint
+ * signatures over the audit chain.
+ *
+ * Algorithm: SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256f (FIPS 205) by default. ML-DSA-87
+ * (FIPS 204) supported as an opt-in alternative for throughput-
+ * sensitive deployments. Both are NIST PQC Category 5 (~256-bit
+ * symmetric security). SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256f is hash-only — its
+ * security depends solely on the underlying hash function, with no
+ * lattice / module-hardness assumptions — and matches the framework's
+ * SHAKE256 KDF + SHA3-512 hash family. Audit checkpoints are long-
+ * lived integrity attestations (must verify for the data retention
+ * period — years for HIPAA / SOX), so the conservative-PQC posture
+ * carries more weight here than the smaller ML-DSA-87 signature
+ * (~5 KB) and faster sign (0.6 ms vs 76 ms).
+ *
+ * The algorithm is recorded in the on-disk key file's `algorithm`
+ * field. Older key files that predate the algorithm field are loaded
+ * as ML-DSA-87 (the previous implicit default) and continue to verify
+ * their checkpoint history. Operators who want to migrate rotate
+ * their audit-signing key.
+ *
+ * Design:
+ *   - Different keypair from the vault encryption keys. Compromise of the
+ *     vault DOES NOT let an attacker forge audit checkpoints.
+ *   - Stored at <dataDir>/audit-sign.key.sealed (default 'wrapped' mode)
+ *     or <dataDir>/audit-sign.key (opt-out 'plaintext' mode with warning).
+ *   - Wrapped under its OWN passphrase, sourced via:
+ *       BLAMEJS_AUDIT_SIGNING_PASSPHRASE         (env)
+ *       BLAMEJS_AUDIT_SIGNING_PASSPHRASE_FILE    (file)
+ *       BLAMEJS_AUDIT_SIGNING_PASSPHRASE_SOURCE  (selector: auto|env|file|stdin)
+ *     These are intentionally distinct from BLAMEJS_VAULT_PASSPHRASE so
+ *     operator-error reuse of the same passphrase is at least explicit.
+ *   - First-run generates the keypair automatically.
+ *
+ * Threat model:
+ *   - Vault key compromised + DB write access:
+ *       attacker can read sealed values + rewrite audit_log rows + recompute
+ *       per-row chain hashes. They CANNOT forge new audit_checkpoint rows
+ *       because each checkpoint requires the audit-signing private key.
+ *   - Audit signing key compromised:
+ *       attacker can forge new checkpoints but cannot read sealed values.
+ *       Existing checkpoints still anchor history that pre-dated the
+ *       compromise (operator should rotate signing key on detection).
+ *   - Both compromised:
+ *       framework cannot defend against this — by design, the operator's
+ *       physical / administrative controls (HIPAA §164.310, GDPR Art. 32(1)(d))
+ *       cover this case.
+ *
+ * Public API:
+ *   await auditSign.init({ dataDir, mode? })   ← call at db.init()
+ *   auditSign.sign(payload)                    ← Buffer/string → Buffer signature
+ *   auditSign.verify(payload, signature, publicKey?) ← bool
+ *   auditSign.getPublicKey()                   ← PEM string
+ *   auditSign.getPublicKeyFingerprint()        ← sha3 hex (stable id)
+ *   auditSign.getMode()                        ← 'wrapped' | 'plaintext'
+ */
+var fs = require("fs");
+var path = require("path");
+var nodeCrypto = require("crypto");
+var atomicFile = require("./atomic-file");
+var { sha3Hash } = require("./crypto");
+var { defineClass } = require("./framework-error");
+var { boot } = require("./log");
+var safeBuffer = require("./safe-buffer");
+var safeJson = require("./safe-json");
+var vaultPassphraseSource = require("./vault/passphrase-source");
+var vaultWrap = require("./vault/wrap");
+
+// AuditSignError is thrown by init() for fatal boot-time conditions
+// (conflicting on-disk key files, passphrase rejected, schema invalid).
+// The caller — CLI or app boot — catches and translates to an exit code;
+// lib/ never calls process.exit unilaterally.
+var AuditSignError = defineClass("AuditSignError", { alwaysPermanent: true });
+var _err = AuditSignError.factory;
+
+// Default for newly-generated keys. Operators can override at init
+// via opts.algorithm — e.g. `auditSigning: { algorithm: "ml-dsa-87" }`
+// for throughput-sensitive deployments. Existing key files determine
+// their own algorithm via the on-disk `algorithm` field; legacy key
+// files that predate the algorithm field load as "ml-dsa-87" (the
+// previous implicit default).
+var DEFAULT_SIGNING_ALG = "slh-dsa-shake-256f";
+var LEGACY_DEFAULT_ALG  = "ml-dsa-87";
+var SUPPORTED_SIGNING_ALGS = Object.freeze(["slh-dsa-shake-256f", "ml-dsa-87"]);
+
+var SIGNING_KEY_SCHEMA = {
+  type: "object",
+  required: ["publicKey", "privateKey"],
+  properties: {
+    publicKey:  { type: "string" },
+    privateKey: { type: "string" },
+    algorithm:  { type: "string" },     // optional; missing = legacy ml-dsa-87
+  },
+};
+
+var ENV_VARS = {
+  value:  "BLAMEJS_AUDIT_SIGNING_PASSPHRASE",
+  file:   "BLAMEJS_AUDIT_SIGNING_PASSPHRASE_FILE",
+  source: "BLAMEJS_AUDIT_SIGNING_PASSPHRASE_SOURCE",
+};
+
+var keys = null;            // { publicKey: PEM, privateKey: PEM, fingerprint }
+var initialized = false;
+var currentMode = null;
+var paths = null;
+
+var log = boot("audit-sign");
+
+function resolvePaths(dataDir) {
+  return {
+    dataDir:    dataDir,
+    plaintext:  path.join(dataDir, "audit-sign.key"),
+    sealed:     path.join(dataDir, "audit-sign.key.sealed"),
+  };
+}
+
+function _computeFingerprint(publicKeyPem) {
+  return sha3Hash(publicKeyPem);
+}
+
+// ---- Passphrase sourcing (delegates to lib/passphrase-source.js with
+// audit-signing-specific env var names) ----
+
+function _getPassphrase(promptText) {
+  return vaultPassphraseSource.getPassphrase({
+    envVars: ENV_VARS,
+    prompt:  promptText || "Audit-signing passphrase: ",
+  });
+}
+
+// ---- Init ----
+
+// Algorithm chosen for newly-generated keypairs. Set once per init()
+// call and read by _initPlaintext / _initFirstRunWrapped. Existing key
+// files take their algorithm from the file itself, ignoring this.
+var pendingNewKeyAlg = null;
+
+async function init(opts) {
+  if (initialized) return;
+  if (!opts || !opts.dataDir) {
+    throw new AuditSignError("auditSign/bad-init",
+      "auditSign.init({ dataDir }) is required");
+  }
+
+  var mode = (opts.mode || "wrapped").toLowerCase();
+  if (mode !== "wrapped" && mode !== "plaintext") {
+    throw new AuditSignError("auditSign/bad-mode",
+      "auditSign.init: mode must be 'wrapped' or 'plaintext'");
+  }
+  // Algorithm-on-generate. Validated against the supported list so
+  // typos surface here, not as an opaque "key generation failed"
+  // deeper in nodeCrypto.
+  var alg = (opts.algorithm || DEFAULT_SIGNING_ALG).toLowerCase();
+  if (SUPPORTED_SIGNING_ALGS.indexOf(alg) === -1) {
+    throw new AuditSignError("auditSign/bad-algorithm",
+      "auditSign.init: algorithm must be one of " +
+      SUPPORTED_SIGNING_ALGS.join(", ") + " (got: " + alg + ")");
+  }
+  pendingNewKeyAlg = alg;
+  currentMode = mode;
+  paths = resolvePaths(opts.dataDir);
+
+  if (!fs.existsSync(paths.dataDir)) fs.mkdirSync(paths.dataDir, { recursive: true });
+  // Sweep tmp files from any prior crashed write
+  atomicFile.cleanOrphans(paths.sealed);
+  atomicFile.cleanOrphans(paths.plaintext);
+
+  var hasPlaintext = fs.existsSync(paths.plaintext);
+  var hasSealed    = fs.existsSync(paths.sealed);
+  if (hasPlaintext && hasSealed) {
+    throw _err("KEY_FILE_CONFLICT",
+      "both audit-sign.key and audit-sign.key.sealed exist; resolve manually");
+  }
+  if (hasSealed && mode === "plaintext") {
+    throw _err("MODE_MISMATCH",
+      "audit-sign.key.sealed exists but mode='plaintext' requested");
+  }
+  if (hasPlaintext && mode === "wrapped") {
+    throw _err("MODE_MISMATCH",
+      "audit-sign.key (plaintext) exists but mode='wrapped' requested");
+  }
+
+  if (mode === "wrapped") {
+    if (hasSealed) await _initWrapped();
+    else await _initFirstRunWrapped();
+  } else {
+    log.warn("WARNING: PLAINTEXT mode — audit-sign.key is unprotected on disk.");
+    log.warn("         Use mode: 'wrapped' (default) for any deployment that holds real data.");
+    _initPlaintext();
+  }
+
+  initialized = true;
+}
+
+function _initPlaintext() {
+  if (fs.existsSync(paths.plaintext)) {
+    var loaded;
+    try { loaded = safeJson.parse(atomicFile.readSync(paths.plaintext), { schema: SIGNING_KEY_SCHEMA }); }
+    catch (e) {
+      throw _err("KEY_FILE_CORRUPT",
+        "audit-sign.key corrupted or schema-invalid at " + paths.plaintext + " - " + e.message);
+    }
+    var loadedAlg = loaded.algorithm || LEGACY_DEFAULT_ALG;
+    keys = {
+      publicKey:  loaded.publicKey,
+      privateKey: loaded.privateKey,
+      algorithm:  loadedAlg,
+      fingerprint: _computeFingerprint(loaded.publicKey),
+    };
+    return;
+  }
+  // First run, plaintext — generate with the operator-selected (or default) alg
+  var alg = pendingNewKeyAlg || DEFAULT_SIGNING_ALG;
+  var pair = nodeCrypto.generateKeyPairSync(alg, {
+    publicKeyEncoding:  { type: "spki",  format: "pem" },
+    privateKeyEncoding: { type: "pkcs8", format: "pem" },
+  });
+  keys = {
+    publicKey:  pair.publicKey,
+    privateKey: pair.privateKey,
+    algorithm:  alg,
+    fingerprint: _computeFingerprint(pair.publicKey),
+  };
+  atomicFile.writeSync(
+    paths.plaintext,
+    JSON.stringify({ algorithm: alg, publicKey: keys.publicKey, privateKey: keys.privateKey }, null, 2),
+    { fileMode: 0o600 }
+  );
+  log("plaintext audit-signing keypair generated at " + paths.plaintext + " (alg=" + alg + ")");
+}
+
+async function _initWrapped() {
+  log("unsealing audit-sign.key.sealed...");
+  var sealedBytes = atomicFile.readSync(paths.sealed);
+  var passphrase = await _getPassphrase("Audit-signing passphrase: ");
+  var plaintextBuf;
+  try {
+    try { plaintextBuf = await vaultWrap.unwrap(sealedBytes, passphrase); }
+    catch (e) {
+      throw _err("PASSPHRASE_REJECTED",
+        "audit-signing passphrase rejected (" + e.message + ")");
+    }
+    var loaded;
+    try { loaded = safeJson.parse(plaintextBuf, { schema: SIGNING_KEY_SCHEMA }); }
+    catch (e) {
+      throw _err("UNWRAPPED_INVALID",
+        "unwrapped audit-sign.key invalid: " + e.message);
+    }
+    var loadedAlg = loaded.algorithm || LEGACY_DEFAULT_ALG;
+    keys = {
+      publicKey:  loaded.publicKey,
+      privateKey: loaded.privateKey,
+      algorithm:  loadedAlg,
+      fingerprint: _computeFingerprint(loaded.publicKey),
+    };
+    log("audit-signing keypair unsealed (alg=" + loadedAlg + ").");
+  } finally {
+    // The audit-signing passphrase is single-use at boot — no re-wrap path
+    // keeps it alive (unlike vault.currentPassphrase). Zero on the way out.
+    safeBuffer.secureZero(passphrase);
+    if (plaintextBuf) safeBuffer.secureZero(plaintextBuf);
+  }
+}
+
+async function _initFirstRunWrapped() {
+  var alg = pendingNewKeyAlg || DEFAULT_SIGNING_ALG;
+  log("first-run wrapped — generating audit-signing keypair (alg=" + alg + ")...");
+  var passphrase = await _getPassphrase("Choose an audit-signing passphrase: ");
+  try {
+    var pair = nodeCrypto.generateKeyPairSync(alg, {
+      publicKeyEncoding:  { type: "spki",  format: "pem" },
+      privateKeyEncoding: { type: "pkcs8", format: "pem" },
+    });
+    keys = {
+      publicKey:  pair.publicKey,
+      privateKey: pair.privateKey,
+      algorithm:  alg,
+      fingerprint: _computeFingerprint(pair.publicKey),
+    };
+
+    var sealed = await vaultWrap.wrap(
+      JSON.stringify({ algorithm: alg, publicKey: keys.publicKey, privateKey: keys.privateKey }, null, 2),
+      passphrase
+    );
+    atomicFile.writeSync(paths.sealed, sealed, { fileMode: 0o600 });
+    log("generated and sealed audit-signing keypair (alg=" + alg + ")");
+  } finally {
+    safeBuffer.secureZero(passphrase);
+  }
+}
+
+// ---- Public API ----
+
+function _requireInit() {
+  if (!initialized) {
+    throw new AuditSignError("auditSign/not-initialized",
+      "auditSign.init() must be awaited before sign/verify");
+  }
+}
+
+function sign(payload) {
+  _requireInit();
+  var buf = Buffer.isBuffer(payload) ? payload : Buffer.from(String(payload), "utf8");
+  return nodeCrypto.sign(null, buf, keys.privateKey);
+}
+
+function verify(payload, signature, publicKeyPem) {
+  _requireInit();
+  var buf = Buffer.isBuffer(payload) ? payload : Buffer.from(String(payload), "utf8");
+  var sigBuf = Buffer.isBuffer(signature) ? signature : Buffer.from(signature);
+  var pub = publicKeyPem || keys.publicKey;
+  return nodeCrypto.verify(null, buf, pub, sigBuf);
+}
+
+function getPublicKey() { _requireInit(); return keys.publicKey; }
+function getPublicKeyFingerprint() { _requireInit(); return keys.fingerprint; }
+function getMode() { return currentMode; }
+function getAlgorithm() { _requireInit(); return keys.algorithm; }
+
+function _resetForTest() {
+  keys = null;
+  initialized = false;
+  currentMode = null;
+  paths = null;
+  pendingNewKeyAlg = null;
+}
+
+module.exports = {
+  init:                     init,
+  sign:                     sign,
+  verify:                   verify,
+  getPublicKey:             getPublicKey,
+  getPublicKeyFingerprint:  getPublicKeyFingerprint,
+  getMode:                  getMode,
+  getAlgorithm:             getAlgorithm,
+  DEFAULT_SIGNING_ALG:      DEFAULT_SIGNING_ALG,
+  SUPPORTED_SIGNING_ALGS:   SUPPORTED_SIGNING_ALGS,
+  ENV_PASSPHRASE:           ENV_VARS.value,
+  ENV_PASSPHRASE_FILE:      ENV_VARS.file,
+  ENV_PASSPHRASE_SRC:       ENV_VARS.source,
+  _resetForTest:            _resetForTest,
+};