@blamejs/core 0.7.18 → 0.7.19

package/lib/auth/jwt-external.js

@@ -0,0 +1,365 @@
+"use strict";
+/**
+ * jwt-external — verify JWTs signed by an external IdP using classical
+ * algorithms (RS256 / RS384 / RS512 / PS256 / PS384 / PS512 / ES256 /
+ * ES384 / ES512 / EdDSA).
+ *
+ * Distinct from `b.auth.jwt.verify` which is PQC-only (ML-DSA-65 etc.).
+ * Operators integrating with Auth0 / Okta / Keycloak / AWS Cognito /
+ * Azure AD / Google IdP / Apple-sign-in use this primitive — those IdPs
+ * sign with classical algorithms and the framework's PQC verifier
+ * cannot accept their tokens.
+ *
+ *   var rv = await b.auth.jwt.verifyExternal(token, {
+ *     algorithms: ["RS256", "ES256"],          // REQUIRED — no defaults
+ *     jwks:       jwksKeysArray,                // pre-fetched RFC 7517 keys
+ *     // OR
+ *     jwksUri:    "https://example.auth0.com/.well-known/jwks.json",
+ *     jwksCacheMs: C.TIME.minutes(10),         // default 10m
+ *     // OR
+ *     keyResolver: async function (header) { return jwkOrKeyObject; },
+ *
+ *     audience:    "api://my-api",             // optional but recommended
+ *     issuer:      "https://example.auth0.com/", // optional but recommended
+ *     subject:     "user@example.com",         // optional sub-equality check
+ *     clockSkewMs: 30 * 1000,                  // default 30s tolerance
+ *   });
+ *   // → { header, claims }   (throws AuthError on any failure)
+ *
+ * Defenses against the well-known JWT pitfalls:
+ *
+ *   - alg confusion (CVE-2024-54150 / CVE-2025-30144 / CVE-2026-22817
+ *     Hono class) — `algorithms` is REQUIRED with no default; `none`,
+ *     `HS256` cannot be accepted unless the operator explicitly listed
+ *     them, and even then the verifier refuses HS* algs in
+ *     verifyExternal because HMAC + a public-key JWKS is the canonical
+ *     alg-confusion shape. Operators with HMAC need a different path.
+ *   - kid spoofing — the resolved key MUST come from the operator's
+ *     trust source (the JWKS array or operator's keyResolver). The
+ *     header's `kid` only selects WHICH key from that source.
+ *   - exp/nbf/iat — checked against now (with clockSkewMs tolerance).
+ *   - aud / iss / sub — checked when the operator passes the expected
+ *     value. iss MUST match exactly (not substring).
+ *   - JWKS endpoint trust — `jwksUri` resolves through the framework's
+ *     `b.httpClient` (SSRF gate, TLS-required by default, response-size
+ *     cap). The jwksCache is per-process and TTL-bounded.
+ *
+ * Returns { header, claims } on success. Every failure surfaces as
+ * AuthError with a code in `auth-jwt-external/<reason>` so operators
+ * can route alerts on a single class.
+ */
+
+var nodeCrypto = require("crypto");
+var safeJson = require("../safe-json");
+var safeUrl = require("../safe-url");
+var lazyRequire = require("../lazy-require");
+var validateOpts = require("../validate-opts");
+var C = require("../constants");
+var { AuthError } = require("../framework-error");
+
+var httpClient = lazyRequire(function () { return require("../http-client"); });
+var cache      = lazyRequire(function () { return require("../cache"); });
+
+// ---- constants ----
+
+var DEFAULT_CLOCK_SKEW_MS = C.TIME.seconds(30);
+var DEFAULT_JWKS_CACHE_MS = C.TIME.minutes(10);
+var MAX_JWKS_BYTES        = C.BYTES.kib(64);
+var MAX_TOKEN_BYTES       = C.BYTES.kib(16);
+
+// HMAC-shaped algs (HS256/384/512) and "none" are NEVER accepted by
+// this primitive. HMAC + a JWKS-shaped public-key trust source is the
+// canonical alg-confusion vector; "none" is the canonical alg-bypass.
+var REFUSED_ALGS = ["HS256", "HS384", "HS512", "none"];
+
+// PSS salt lengths per RFC 7518 §3.5.
+var PSS_SALT_SHA256 = 32;                                                        // allow:raw-byte-literal — RFC 7518 SHA-256 salt length
+var PSS_SALT_SHA384 = 48;                                                        // allow:raw-byte-literal — RFC 7518 SHA-384 salt length
+var PSS_SALT_SHA512 = 64;                                                        // allow:raw-byte-literal — RFC 7518 SHA-512 salt length
+
+var SUPPORTED_CLASSICAL_ALGS = [
+  "RS256", "RS384", "RS512",
+  "PS256", "PS384", "PS512",
+  "ES256", "ES384", "ES512",
+  "EdDSA",
+];
+
+// ---- per-instance JWKS cache shared across calls ----
+
+var _sharedJwksCache = null;
+function _getJwksCache() {
+  if (_sharedJwksCache) return _sharedJwksCache;
+  _sharedJwksCache = cache().create({
+    namespace: "auth-jwt-external.jwks",
+    ttlMs:     DEFAULT_JWKS_CACHE_MS,
+  });
+  return _sharedJwksCache;
+}
+
+// ---- helpers ----
+
+function _b64urlDecode(s) {
+  if (typeof s !== "string") {
+    throw new AuthError("auth-jwt-external/bad-base64", "expected base64url string");
+  }
+  var padded = s.replace(/-/g, "+").replace(/_/g, "/");
+  while (padded.length % 4) padded += "=";                                       // allow:raw-byte-literal — base64 quartet padding
+  return Buffer.from(padded, "base64");
+}
+
+function _verifyParamsForAlg(alg) {
+  if (alg === "RS256") return { hash: "sha256", padding: nodeCrypto.constants.RSA_PKCS1_PADDING };
+  if (alg === "RS384") return { hash: "sha384", padding: nodeCrypto.constants.RSA_PKCS1_PADDING };
+  if (alg === "RS512") return { hash: "sha512", padding: nodeCrypto.constants.RSA_PKCS1_PADDING };
+  if (alg === "PS256") return { hash: "sha256", padding: nodeCrypto.constants.RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING, saltLength: PSS_SALT_SHA256 };
+  if (alg === "PS384") return { hash: "sha384", padding: nodeCrypto.constants.RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING, saltLength: PSS_SALT_SHA384 };
+  if (alg === "PS512") return { hash: "sha512", padding: nodeCrypto.constants.RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING, saltLength: PSS_SALT_SHA512 };
+  if (alg === "ES256") return { hash: "sha256", dsaEncoding: "ieee-p1363" };
+  if (alg === "ES384") return { hash: "sha384", dsaEncoding: "ieee-p1363" };
+  if (alg === "ES512") return { hash: "sha512", dsaEncoding: "ieee-p1363" };
+  if (alg === "EdDSA") return { hash: null };
+  throw new AuthError("auth-jwt-external/unsupported-alg",
+    "alg '" + alg + "' is not supported by verifyExternal");
+}
+
+function _jwkToKey(jwk) {
+  try { return nodeCrypto.createPublicKey({ key: jwk, format: "jwk" }); }
+  catch (e) {
+    throw new AuthError("auth-jwt-external/bad-jwk",
+      "could not import JWK (kid=" + (jwk && jwk.kid) + "): " + ((e && e.message) || String(e)));
+  }
+}
+
+function _toKey(value) {
+  if (!value) {
+    throw new AuthError("auth-jwt-external/no-key",
+      "key resolution returned no value");
+  }
+  if (value instanceof nodeCrypto.KeyObject) return value;
+  if (typeof value === "object" && value.kty) return _jwkToKey(value);
+  if (typeof value === "string") {
+    try { return nodeCrypto.createPublicKey({ key: value, format: "pem" }); }
+    catch (e) {
+      throw new AuthError("auth-jwt-external/bad-pem",
+        "PEM parse failed: " + ((e && e.message) || String(e)));
+    }
+  }
+  if (Buffer.isBuffer(value)) {
+    try { return nodeCrypto.createPublicKey({ key: value, format: "pem" }); }
+    catch (e) {
+      throw new AuthError("auth-jwt-external/bad-pem",
+        "PEM parse failed: " + ((e && e.message) || String(e)));
+    }
+  }
+  throw new AuthError("auth-jwt-external/bad-key-shape",
+    "key must be a JWK object, PEM string/Buffer, or KeyObject");
+}
+
+async function _fetchJwks(uri, cacheMs) {
+  // Validate the URI and fetch via http-client (SSRF gate, response-
+  // size cap, TLS-required by default).
+  safeUrl.parse(uri, { allowedProtocols: safeUrl.ALLOW_HTTP_TLS });
+  var jc = _getJwksCache();
+  var key = "jwks:" + uri;
+  return await jc.wrap(key, async function () {
+    var res = await httpClient().request({
+      method:        "GET",
+      url:           uri,
+      maxBytes:      MAX_JWKS_BYTES,
+      timeoutMs:     C.TIME.seconds(10),
+    });
+    if (res.statusCode < 200 || res.statusCode >= 300) {                         // allow:raw-byte-literal — HTTP 2xx range
+      throw new AuthError("auth-jwt-external/jwks-fetch-failed",
+        "JWKS endpoint " + uri + " returned " + res.statusCode);
+    }
+    var jwks;
+    try { jwks = safeJson.parse(res.body.toString("utf8"), { maxBytes: MAX_JWKS_BYTES }); }
+    catch (e) {
+      throw new AuthError("auth-jwt-external/jwks-parse-failed",
+        "JWKS parse failed: " + ((e && e.message) || String(e)));
+    }
+    if (!jwks || !Array.isArray(jwks.keys)) {
+      throw new AuthError("auth-jwt-external/bad-jwks",
+        "JWKS response missing 'keys' array");
+    }
+    return jwks.keys;
+  }, cacheMs || DEFAULT_JWKS_CACHE_MS);
+}
+
+function _selectKey(keys, header) {
+  if (!Array.isArray(keys) || keys.length === 0) {
+    throw new AuthError("auth-jwt-external/no-jwks-keys",
+      "JWKS source has no keys");
+  }
+  if (header.kid) {
+    for (var i = 0; i < keys.length; i += 1) {
+      if (keys[i].kid === header.kid) return keys[i];
+    }
+    throw new AuthError("auth-jwt-external/no-matching-kid",
+      "no JWKS key matches header.kid='" + header.kid + "'");
+  }
+  if (keys.length === 1) return keys[0];
+  throw new AuthError("auth-jwt-external/kid-required",
+    "JWKS has " + keys.length + " keys but token header has no kid");
+}
+
+// ---- public surface ----
+
+async function verifyExternal(token, opts) {
+  if (typeof token !== "string" || token.length === 0) {
+    throw new AuthError("auth-jwt-external/no-token", "token must be a non-empty string");
+  }
+  if (token.length > MAX_TOKEN_BYTES) {
+    throw new AuthError("auth-jwt-external/token-too-large",
+      "token exceeds " + MAX_TOKEN_BYTES + " bytes");
+  }
+  opts = opts || {};
+  validateOpts(opts, [
+    "algorithms", "jwks", "jwksUri", "jwksCacheMs", "keyResolver",
+    "audience", "issuer", "subject", "clockSkewMs",
+  ], "auth.jwt.verifyExternal");
+
+  if (!Array.isArray(opts.algorithms) || opts.algorithms.length === 0) {
+    throw new AuthError("auth-jwt-external/algorithms-required",
+      "verifyExternal: opts.algorithms is required (no defaults — operator MUST " +
+      "name accepted algorithms to defend against alg-confusion)");
+  }
+  for (var ai = 0; ai < opts.algorithms.length; ai += 1) {
+    var listed = opts.algorithms[ai];
+    if (REFUSED_ALGS.indexOf(listed) !== -1) {
+      throw new AuthError("auth-jwt-external/refused-alg",
+        "verifyExternal refuses '" + listed + "' (HMAC/none is the alg-confusion vector " +
+        "against JWKS-shaped public-key trust sources)");
+    }
+    if (SUPPORTED_CLASSICAL_ALGS.indexOf(listed) === -1) {
+      throw new AuthError("auth-jwt-external/unsupported-alg",
+        "alg '" + listed + "' is not supported (supported: " +
+        SUPPORTED_CLASSICAL_ALGS.join(", ") + ")");
+    }
+  }
+  var sourcesGiven = (opts.jwks ? 1 : 0) + (opts.jwksUri ? 1 : 0) +
+                     (typeof opts.keyResolver === "function" ? 1 : 0);
+  if (sourcesGiven === 0) {
+    throw new AuthError("auth-jwt-external/no-key-source",
+      "verifyExternal: pass exactly one of jwks, jwksUri, keyResolver");
+  }
+  if (sourcesGiven > 1) {
+    throw new AuthError("auth-jwt-external/conflicting-key-source",
+      "verifyExternal: pass exactly one of jwks, jwksUri, keyResolver");
+  }
+
+  // Decode header + payload.
+  var parts = token.split(".");
+  if (parts.length !== 3) {
+    throw new AuthError("auth-jwt-external/malformed-jwt",
+      "token does not have 3 parts");
+  }
+  var header, payload;
+  try {
+    header  = safeJson.parse(_b64urlDecode(parts[0]).toString("utf8"), { maxBytes: MAX_JWKS_BYTES });
+    payload = safeJson.parse(_b64urlDecode(parts[1]).toString("utf8"), { maxBytes: MAX_JWKS_BYTES });
+  } catch (e) {
+    throw new AuthError("auth-jwt-external/malformed-jwt",
+      "header/payload decode failed: " + ((e && e.message) || String(e)));
+  }
+  if (!header || typeof header.alg !== "string") {
+    throw new AuthError("auth-jwt-external/malformed-jwt", "header missing 'alg'");
+  }
+  if (header.crit !== undefined) {
+    throw new AuthError("auth-jwt-external/unknown-crit",
+      "token declares 'crit' header — verifyExternal does not support critical extensions");
+  }
+  if (opts.algorithms.indexOf(header.alg) === -1) {
+    throw new AuthError("auth-jwt-external/alg-not-allowed",
+      "token alg='" + header.alg + "' not in allowed list [" + opts.algorithms.join(", ") + "]");
+  }
+
+  // Resolve key.
+  var key;
+  if (typeof opts.keyResolver === "function") {
+    var resolved;
+    try { resolved = await opts.keyResolver(header); }
+    catch (e) {
+      throw new AuthError("auth-jwt-external/key-resolver-failed",
+        "keyResolver threw: " + ((e && e.message) || String(e)));
+    }
+    key = _toKey(resolved);
+  } else {
+    var keys = opts.jwks ? opts.jwks
+                         : await _fetchJwks(opts.jwksUri, opts.jwksCacheMs);
+    var jwk = _selectKey(keys, header);
+    key = _jwkToKey(jwk);
+  }
+
+  // Verify signature.
+  var params = _verifyParamsForAlg(header.alg);
+  var signingInput = parts[0] + "." + parts[1];
+  var sig = _b64urlDecode(parts[2]);
+  var verifyOpts = { key: key };
+  if (params.padding !== undefined)     verifyOpts.padding     = params.padding;
+  if (params.saltLength !== undefined)  verifyOpts.saltLength  = params.saltLength;
+  if (params.dsaEncoding !== undefined) verifyOpts.dsaEncoding = params.dsaEncoding;
+  var verified;
+  try {
+    verified = nodeCrypto.verify(params.hash, Buffer.from(signingInput, "ascii"), verifyOpts, sig);
+  } catch (e) {
+    throw new AuthError("auth-jwt-external/invalid-signature",
+      "signature verification failed: " + ((e && e.message) || String(e)));
+  }
+  if (!verified) {
+    throw new AuthError("auth-jwt-external/invalid-signature",
+      "signature verification failed");
+  }
+
+  // Claim validation.
+  var clockSkewMs = typeof opts.clockSkewMs === "number" ? opts.clockSkewMs : DEFAULT_CLOCK_SKEW_MS;
+  var nowSec   = Math.floor(Date.now() / C.TIME.seconds(1));
+  var skewSec  = Math.floor(clockSkewMs / C.TIME.seconds(1));
+
+  if (typeof payload.exp !== "number") {
+    throw new AuthError("auth-jwt-external/missing-exp", "claim 'exp' missing");
+  }
+  if (payload.exp + skewSec < nowSec) {
+    throw new AuthError("auth-jwt-external/expired",
+      "token expired (exp=" + payload.exp + ", now=" + nowSec + ")");
+  }
+  if (typeof payload.nbf === "number" && payload.nbf - skewSec > nowSec) {
+    throw new AuthError("auth-jwt-external/nbf-future",
+      "token not-yet-valid (nbf=" + payload.nbf + ", now=" + nowSec + ")");
+  }
+  if (typeof payload.iat === "number" && payload.iat - skewSec > nowSec) {
+    throw new AuthError("auth-jwt-external/iat-future",
+      "token iat is in the future");
+  }
+
+  if (opts.audience) {
+    var aud = payload.aud;
+    var expectedAud = Array.isArray(opts.audience) ? opts.audience : [opts.audience];
+    var actualAud = Array.isArray(aud) ? aud : (typeof aud === "string" ? [aud] : []);
+    var audMatch = false;
+    for (var ej = 0; ej < expectedAud.length; ej += 1) {
+      if (actualAud.indexOf(expectedAud[ej]) !== -1) { audMatch = true; break; }
+    }
+    if (!audMatch) {
+      throw new AuthError("auth-jwt-external/aud-mismatch",
+        "token aud '" + JSON.stringify(aud) + "' does not match expected '" +
+        JSON.stringify(opts.audience) + "'");
+    }
+  }
+  if (opts.issuer && payload.iss !== opts.issuer) {
+    throw new AuthError("auth-jwt-external/iss-mismatch",
+      "token iss '" + payload.iss + "' does not match expected '" + opts.issuer + "'");
+  }
+  if (opts.subject && payload.sub !== opts.subject) {
+    throw new AuthError("auth-jwt-external/sub-mismatch",
+      "token sub '" + payload.sub + "' does not match expected '" + opts.subject + "'");
+  }
+
+  return { header: header, claims: payload };
+}
+
+module.exports = {
+  verifyExternal:           verifyExternal,
+  SUPPORTED_CLASSICAL_ALGS: SUPPORTED_CLASSICAL_ALGS,
+  REFUSED_ALGS:             REFUSED_ALGS,
+};