@blamejs/core 0.7.18 → 0.7.19

package/lib/auth/jwt.js

@@ -1,311 +1,337 @@
-"use strict";
-/**
- * JWT (RFC 7519) — PQC-signed JSON Web Tokens.
- *
- * Default signing algorithm: SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256f (FIPS 205, hash-only,
- * Cat-5 PQC). Matches the framework's SHAKE-family hash posture and
- * the audit-sign default — long-lived signed claims should sit on the
- * worst-case-PQC side of the choice. ML-DSA-87 (FIPS 204, lattice-
- * based, Cat-5 PQC) is the opt-in for high-throughput JWT issuance
- * paths where the ~80× sign-time penalty of SLH-DSA matters more than
- * the conservative-PQC argument.
- *
- * Caveats on emitting PQC-signed JWTs to the wild:
- *
- *   - Signature size: SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256f signatures are ~50 KB. A
- *     base64url-encoded JWT containing one is ~67 KB on the wire.
- *     Acceptable for stored long-lived tokens (license attestations,
- *     refresh tokens with multi-day validity, signed compliance
- *     receipts) — not for high-frequency request-bearer tokens.
- *     ML-DSA-87 brings this down to ~6 KB encoded.
- *
- *   - Algorithm naming is NOT in the IANA JOSE registry yet. The
- *     framework uses the IETF working-draft names ("SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256f",
- *     "ML-DSA-87") — when those become registered, the header `alg`
- *     value may shift; verify accepts whatever the supported-list
- *     declares. Expect to re-issue tokens at registry-stabilization
- *     time the same way you'd re-issue at any algorithm rotation.
- *
- *   - JWS-RFC-7515-required `crit` header parameter handling is NOT
- *     implemented (no critical extensions defined here). A token
- *     bearing an unknown `crit` is rejected as malformed.
- *
- * Public API (b.auth.jwt.*):
- *
- *   jwt.sign(claims, opts)        → string    (compact JWS, async)
- *   jwt.verify(token, opts)       → claims    (async; throws AuthError)
- *   jwt.decode(token)             → { header, payload, signature }
- *                                   (NO verification — inspection only)
- *
- * Sign opts:
- *   algorithm:    "SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256f" (default) | "ML-DSA-87"
- *   privateKey:   PEM string OR KeyObject from node:crypto.createPrivateKey
- *   kid:          optional key ID embedded in header (rotation hint)
- *   typ:          "JWT" (default) — operators emitting access-tokens may
- *                  want "at+jwt" per RFC 9068
- *   issuer:       claims.iss override (also accepts claims.iss directly)
- *   audience:     claims.aud override (string or string[])
- *   subject:      claims.sub override
- *   expiresInSec: relative exp (claims.exp = now + expiresInSec)
- *   notBeforeSec: relative nbf (claims.nbf = now + notBeforeSec)
- *   jti:          claims.jti override (string; if missing, no jti is added —
- *                  the framework doesn't auto-mint without an operator request
- *                  since jti has uniqueness/replay-tracking semantics that
- *                  belong at the application layer)
- *   now:          test-time clock injection (epoch milliseconds)
- *
- * Verify opts:
- *   publicKey:           PEM string OR KeyObject (required)
- *   algorithms:          [string]   allowed alg list. Default: [DEFAULT_ALGORITHM]
- *                        Pass an explicit list when accepting tokens
- *                        signed with multiple algos (e.g. mid-rotation).
- *   issuer:              expected iss (string OR string[]; matched any-of)
- *   audience:            expected aud (same shape; matches any-of, since
- *                        aud itself can be array per RFC 7519 §4.1.3)
- *   subject:             expected sub (string)
- *   clockToleranceSec:   leeway on exp/nbf comparisons. Default 0.
- *   now:                 test-time clock injection
- *
- * Errors are AuthError(code, message) with permanent=true. Distinct
- * codes per failure class so callers can branch (display "expired"
- * vs "not yet valid" UX, audit "bad-signature" attempts separately).
- */
-var nodeCrypto = require("crypto");
-var C = require("../constants");
-var safeJson = require("../safe-json");
-var { AuthError } = require("../framework-error");
-
-// Algorithm registry. The string keys are the JWT header `alg` values
-// the framework emits + accepts. The values map to Node's
-// generateKeyPairSync / sign / verify identifiers.
-var ALGORITHM_TO_NODE = {
-  "SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256f": "slh-dsa-shake-256f",
-  "ML-DSA-87":          "ml-dsa-87",
-};
-var DEFAULT_ALGORITHM    = "SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256f";
-var SUPPORTED_ALGORITHMS = Object.freeze(Object.keys(ALGORITHM_TO_NODE));
-
-function _b64urlEncode(buf) {
-  if (typeof buf === "string") buf = Buffer.from(buf, "utf8");
-  return buf.toString("base64").replace(/=+$/g, "").replace(/\+/g, "-").replace(/\//g, "_");
-}
-
-function _b64urlDecode(s) {
-  if (typeof s !== "string") throw new AuthError("auth-jwt/malformed", "expected base64url string");
-  var padded = s.replace(/-/g, "+").replace(/_/g, "/");
-  while (padded.length % 4) padded += "=";
-  return Buffer.from(padded, "base64");
-}
-
-function _toKeyObject(pemOrKey, kind) {
-  // kind is 'private' or 'public' — passes through if already a KeyObject;
-  // converts PEM string via createPrivateKey/createPublicKey.
-  if (pemOrKey == null) {
-    throw new AuthError("auth-jwt/missing-key", kind + "Key is required");
-  }
-  if (typeof pemOrKey === "object" && typeof pemOrKey.asymmetricKeyType === "string") {
-    return pemOrKey;
-  }
-  if (typeof pemOrKey === "string") {
-    if (kind === "private") return nodeCrypto.createPrivateKey({ key: pemOrKey, format: "pem" });
-    return nodeCrypto.createPublicKey({ key: pemOrKey, format: "pem" });
-  }
-  throw new AuthError("auth-jwt/bad-key", kind + "Key must be PEM string or KeyObject");
-}
-
-function _resolveAlgorithm(alg) {
-  if (typeof alg !== "string" || !ALGORITHM_TO_NODE[alg]) {
-    throw new AuthError("auth-jwt/unsupported-algorithm",
-      "algorithm must be one of " + SUPPORTED_ALGORITHMS.join(", ") + " (got: " + alg + ")");
-  }
-  return ALGORITHM_TO_NODE[alg];
-}
-
-// ---- sign ----
-
-async function sign(claims, opts) {
-  if (typeof claims !== "object" || claims === null) {
-    throw new AuthError("auth-jwt/bad-claims", "claims must be an object");
-  }
-  opts = opts || {};
-  var alg = opts.algorithm || DEFAULT_ALGORITHM;
-  _resolveAlgorithm(alg);
-  var key = _toKeyObject(opts.privateKey, "private");
-
-  var nowMs = opts.now || Date.now();
-  var nowSec = Math.floor(nowMs / C.TIME.seconds(1));
-
-  // Build the claims object. Operator-provided claim values take
-  // precedence over opts shorthand to avoid surprising overrides.
-  var payload = Object.assign({}, claims);
-  if (payload.iat === undefined) payload.iat = nowSec;
-  if (opts.issuer !== undefined && payload.iss === undefined)   payload.iss = opts.issuer;
-  if (opts.audience !== undefined && payload.aud === undefined) payload.aud = opts.audience;
-  if (opts.subject !== undefined && payload.sub === undefined)  payload.sub = opts.subject;
-  if (opts.jti !== undefined && payload.jti === undefined)      payload.jti = opts.jti;
-  if (typeof opts.expiresInSec === "number" && payload.exp === undefined) {
-    payload.exp = nowSec + opts.expiresInSec;
-  }
-  if (typeof opts.notBeforeSec === "number" && payload.nbf === undefined) {
-    payload.nbf = nowSec + opts.notBeforeSec;
-  }
-
-  var header = { alg: alg, typ: opts.typ || "JWT" };
-  if (opts.kid) header.kid = String(opts.kid);
-
-  var headerB64  = _b64urlEncode(JSON.stringify(header));
-  var payloadB64 = _b64urlEncode(JSON.stringify(payload));
-  var signingInput = headerB64 + "." + payloadB64;
-
-  // node:crypto.sign with null algorithm — KeyObject knows its own alg.
-  var sig = nodeCrypto.sign(null, Buffer.from(signingInput, "ascii"), key);
-  return signingInput + "." + _b64urlEncode(sig);
-}
-
-// ---- decode (no verify — for inspection) ----
-
-function decode(token) {
-  if (typeof token !== "string" || token.length === 0) {
-    throw new AuthError("auth-jwt/malformed", "token must be a non-empty string");
-  }
-  var parts = token.split(".");
-  if (parts.length !== 3) {
-    throw new AuthError("auth-jwt/malformed", "token must have three dot-separated parts");
-  }
-  var header, payload;
-  try { header  = safeJson.parse(_b64urlDecode(parts[0])); }
-  catch (_e) { throw new AuthError("auth-jwt/malformed", "header is not valid base64url-JSON"); }
-  try { payload = safeJson.parse(_b64urlDecode(parts[1])); }
-  catch (_e) { throw new AuthError("auth-jwt/malformed", "payload is not valid base64url-JSON"); }
-  var signature;
-  try { signature = _b64urlDecode(parts[2]); }
-  catch (_e) { throw new AuthError("auth-jwt/malformed", "signature is not valid base64url"); }
-  return { header: header, payload: payload, signature: signature, signingInput: parts[0] + "." + parts[1] };
-}
-
-// ---- verify ----
-
-function _matchClaim(actual, expected, claimName) {
-  // expected is string OR string[]. actual is string OR string[].
-  // Match is "any-of": at least one expected value must appear in
-  // actual (or equal it when actual is scalar). Mirrors RFC 7519
-  // §4.1.3's tolerance for `aud` being an array.
-  var expectedList = Array.isArray(expected) ? expected : [expected];
-  var actualList   = Array.isArray(actual)   ? actual   : [actual];
-  for (var i = 0; i < expectedList.length; i++) {
-    if (actualList.indexOf(expectedList[i]) !== -1) return true;
-  }
-  return false;
-}
-
-async function verify(token, opts) {
-  opts = opts || {};
-  var allowed = Array.isArray(opts.algorithms) && opts.algorithms.length > 0
-    ? opts.algorithms
-    : [DEFAULT_ALGORITHM];
-  // Validate the allowlist itself — typoed entries should surface here,
-  // not as silent "every token rejected."
-  for (var i = 0; i < allowed.length; i++) {
-    if (!ALGORITHM_TO_NODE[allowed[i]]) {
-      throw new AuthError("auth-jwt/unsupported-algorithm",
-        "opts.algorithms[" + i + "] = '" + allowed[i] + "' is not in the supported list (" +
-        SUPPORTED_ALGORITHMS.join(", ") + ")");
-    }
-  }
-  var key = _toKeyObject(opts.publicKey, "public");
-  var decoded = decode(token);
-
-  // Reject unknown critical-header extensions outright (RFC 7515 §4.1.11)
-  if (decoded.header.crit !== undefined) {
-    throw new AuthError("auth-jwt/unknown-crit",
-      "token declares critical extensions which this verifier does not support");
-  }
-
-  // Algorithm must be in the allowed list AND match what we know how
-  // to verify (i.e. one of SUPPORTED_ALGORITHMS).
-  if (allowed.indexOf(decoded.header.alg) === -1) {
-    throw new AuthError("auth-jwt/algorithm-not-allowed",
-      "token alg='" + decoded.header.alg + "' is not in the allowed list [" + allowed.join(", ") + "]");
-  }
-
-  var verified = false;
-  try {
-    verified = nodeCrypto.verify(null, Buffer.from(decoded.signingInput, "ascii"), key, decoded.signature);
-  } catch (e) {
-    // node:crypto throws on key/signature shape mismatches (e.g. ML-DSA
-    // signature against an SLH-DSA key). Treat as bad-signature so
-    // operators can audit a single class of "this token isn't ours."
-    throw new AuthError("auth-jwt/invalid-signature",
-      "signature verification failed: " + (e.message || String(e)));
-  }
-  if (!verified) {
-    throw new AuthError("auth-jwt/invalid-signature", "signature verification failed");
-  }
-
-  // Time-based claim validation
-  var nowSec = Math.floor((opts.now || Date.now()) / C.TIME.seconds(1));
-  if (opts.clockToleranceSec !== undefined && opts.clockToleranceSec !== null) {
-    if (typeof opts.clockToleranceSec !== "number" ||
-        !isFinite(opts.clockToleranceSec) ||
-        opts.clockToleranceSec < 0) {
-      // Throw at config time: a negative tolerance over-tightens the
-      // window (legit tokens get rejected as expired or not-yet-valid)
-      // and a non-finite value would NaN-poison the comparison. Catch
-      // both here rather than producing surprise rejections in production.
-      throw new AuthError("auth-jwt/bad-clock-tolerance",
-        "verify: clockToleranceSec must be a non-negative finite number, got " +
-        JSON.stringify(opts.clockToleranceSec));
-    }
-  }
-  var tol = typeof opts.clockToleranceSec === "number" ? opts.clockToleranceSec : 0;
-  var p = decoded.payload;
-
-  // Strict registered-claim typing per RFC 7519 §4.1. exp / nbf / iat MUST
-  // be NumericDate values (JSON numeric, seconds since epoch). A claim
-  // present-but-not-a-number is a malformed token — silently skipping the
-  // check would let a token with `exp: "0"` or `exp: "9999999999"` (string)
-  // bypass expiration enforcement entirely.
-  function _requireNumericDate(name, value) {
-    if (typeof value !== "number" || !isFinite(value)) {
-      throw new AuthError("auth-jwt/malformed",
-        "claim '" + name + "' must be a finite number (RFC 7519 NumericDate), got " +
-        (value === null ? "null" : typeof value));
-    }
-  }
-  if (p.exp !== undefined) _requireNumericDate("exp", p.exp);
-  if (p.nbf !== undefined) _requireNumericDate("nbf", p.nbf);
-  if (p.iat !== undefined) _requireNumericDate("iat", p.iat);
-
-  if (p.exp !== undefined && p.exp + tol < nowSec) {
-    throw new AuthError("auth-jwt/expired",
-      "token expired at exp=" + p.exp + " (now=" + nowSec + ", tolerance=" + tol + "s)");
-  }
-  if (p.nbf !== undefined && p.nbf - tol > nowSec) {
-    throw new AuthError("auth-jwt/not-yet-valid",
-      "token not yet valid: nbf=" + p.nbf + " (now=" + nowSec + ", tolerance=" + tol + "s)");
-  }
-
-  // String-claim assertions
-  if (opts.issuer !== undefined && !_matchClaim(p.iss, opts.issuer, "iss")) {
-    throw new AuthError("auth-jwt/iss-mismatch",
-      "iss='" + p.iss + "' does not match expected " + JSON.stringify(opts.issuer));
-  }
-  if (opts.audience !== undefined && !_matchClaim(p.aud, opts.audience, "aud")) {
-    throw new AuthError("auth-jwt/aud-mismatch",
-      "aud=" + JSON.stringify(p.aud) + " does not match expected " + JSON.stringify(opts.audience));
-  }
-  if (opts.subject !== undefined && p.sub !== opts.subject) {
-    throw new AuthError("auth-jwt/sub-mismatch",
-      "sub='" + p.sub + "' does not match expected '" + opts.subject + "'");
-  }
-
-  return p;
-}
-
-module.exports = {
-  sign:                  sign,
-  verify:                verify,
-  decode:                decode,
-  DEFAULT_ALGORITHM:     DEFAULT_ALGORITHM,
-  SUPPORTED_ALGORITHMS:  SUPPORTED_ALGORITHMS,
-};
+"use strict";
+/**
+ * JWT (RFC 7519) — PQC-signed JSON Web Tokens.
+ *
+ * Default signing algorithm: SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256f (FIPS 205, hash-only,
+ * Cat-5 PQC). Matches the framework's SHAKE-family hash posture and
+ * the audit-sign default — long-lived signed claims should sit on the
+ * worst-case-PQC side of the choice. ML-DSA-87 (FIPS 204, lattice-
+ * based, Cat-5 PQC) is the opt-in for high-throughput JWT issuance
+ * paths where the ~80× sign-time penalty of SLH-DSA matters more than
+ * the conservative-PQC argument.
+ *
+ * Caveats on emitting PQC-signed JWTs to the wild:
+ *
+ *   - Signature size: SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256f signatures are ~50 KB. A
+ *     base64url-encoded JWT containing one is ~67 KB on the wire.
+ *     Acceptable for stored long-lived tokens (license attestations,
+ *     refresh tokens with multi-day validity, signed compliance
+ *     receipts) — not for high-frequency request-bearer tokens.
+ *     ML-DSA-87 brings this down to ~6 KB encoded.
+ *
+ *   - Algorithm naming is NOT in the IANA JOSE registry yet. The
+ *     framework uses the IETF working-draft names ("SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256f",
+ *     "ML-DSA-87") — when those become registered, the header `alg`
+ *     value may shift; verify accepts whatever the supported-list
+ *     declares. Expect to re-issue tokens at registry-stabilization
+ *     time the same way you'd re-issue at any algorithm rotation.
+ *
+ *   - JWS-RFC-7515-required `crit` header parameter handling is NOT
+ *     implemented (no critical extensions defined here). A token
+ *     bearing an unknown `crit` is rejected as malformed.
+ *
+ * Public API (b.auth.jwt.*):
+ *
+ *   jwt.sign(claims, opts)        → string    (compact JWS, async)
+ *   jwt.verify(token, opts)       → claims    (async; throws AuthError)
+ *   jwt.decode(token)             → { header, payload, signature }
+ *                                   (NO verification — inspection only)
+ *
+ * Sign opts:
+ *   algorithm:    "SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256f" (default) | "ML-DSA-87"
+ *   privateKey:   PEM string OR KeyObject from node:crypto.createPrivateKey
+ *   kid:          optional key ID embedded in header (rotation hint)
+ *   typ:          "JWT" (default) — operators emitting access-tokens may
+ *                  want "at+jwt" per RFC 9068
+ *   issuer:       claims.iss override (also accepts claims.iss directly)
+ *   audience:     claims.aud override (string or string[])
+ *   subject:      claims.sub override
+ *   expiresInSec: relative exp (claims.exp = now + expiresInSec)
+ *   notBeforeSec: relative nbf (claims.nbf = now + notBeforeSec)
+ *   jti:          claims.jti override (string; if missing, no jti is added —
+ *                  the framework doesn't auto-mint without an operator request
+ *                  since jti has uniqueness/replay-tracking semantics that
+ *                  belong at the application layer)
+ *   now:          test-time clock injection (epoch milliseconds)
+ *
+ * Verify opts:
+ *   publicKey:           PEM string OR KeyObject (required)
+ *   algorithms:          [string]   allowed alg list. Default: [DEFAULT_ALGORITHM]
+ *                        Pass an explicit list when accepting tokens
+ *                        signed with multiple algos (e.g. mid-rotation).
+ *   issuer:              expected iss (string OR string[]; matched any-of)
+ *   audience:            expected aud (same shape; matches any-of, since
+ *                        aud itself can be array per RFC 7519 §4.1.3)
+ *   subject:             expected sub (string)
+ *   clockToleranceSec:   leeway on exp/nbf comparisons. Default 0.
+ *   now:                 test-time clock injection
+ *
+ * Errors are AuthError(code, message) with permanent=true. Distinct
+ * codes per failure class so callers can branch (display "expired"
+ * vs "not yet valid" UX, audit "bad-signature" attempts separately).
+ */
+var nodeCrypto = require("crypto");
+var C = require("../constants");
+var safeJson = require("../safe-json");
+var { AuthError } = require("../framework-error");
+
+// Algorithm registry. The string keys are the JWT header `alg` values
+// the framework emits + accepts. The values map to Node's
+// generateKeyPairSync / sign / verify identifiers.
+var ALGORITHM_TO_NODE = {
+  "SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256f": "slh-dsa-shake-256f",
+  "ML-DSA-87":          "ml-dsa-87",
+};
+var DEFAULT_ALGORITHM    = "SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256f";
+var SUPPORTED_ALGORITHMS = Object.freeze(Object.keys(ALGORITHM_TO_NODE));
+
+function _b64urlEncode(buf) {
+  if (typeof buf === "string") buf = Buffer.from(buf, "utf8");
+  return buf.toString("base64").replace(/=+$/g, "").replace(/\+/g, "-").replace(/\//g, "_");
+}
+
+function _b64urlDecode(s) {
+  if (typeof s !== "string") throw new AuthError("auth-jwt/malformed", "expected base64url string");
+  var padded = s.replace(/-/g, "+").replace(/_/g, "/");
+  while (padded.length % 4) padded += "=";
+  return Buffer.from(padded, "base64");
+}
+
+function _toKeyObject(pemOrKey, kind) {
+  // kind is 'private' or 'public' — passes through if already a KeyObject;
+  // converts PEM string via createPrivateKey/createPublicKey.
+  if (pemOrKey == null) {
+    throw new AuthError("auth-jwt/missing-key", kind + "Key is required");
+  }
+  if (typeof pemOrKey === "object" && typeof pemOrKey.asymmetricKeyType === "string") {
+    return pemOrKey;
+  }
+  if (typeof pemOrKey === "string") {
+    if (kind === "private") return nodeCrypto.createPrivateKey({ key: pemOrKey, format: "pem" });
+    return nodeCrypto.createPublicKey({ key: pemOrKey, format: "pem" });
+  }
+  throw new AuthError("auth-jwt/bad-key", kind + "Key must be PEM string or KeyObject");
+}
+
+function _resolveAlgorithm(alg) {
+  if (typeof alg !== "string" || !ALGORITHM_TO_NODE[alg]) {
+    throw new AuthError("auth-jwt/unsupported-algorithm",
+      "algorithm must be one of " + SUPPORTED_ALGORITHMS.join(", ") + " (got: " + alg + ")");
+  }
+  return ALGORITHM_TO_NODE[alg];
+}
+
+// ---- sign ----
+
+async function sign(claims, opts) {
+  if (typeof claims !== "object" || claims === null) {
+    throw new AuthError("auth-jwt/bad-claims", "claims must be an object");
+  }
+  opts = opts || {};
+  var alg = opts.algorithm || DEFAULT_ALGORITHM;
+  _resolveAlgorithm(alg);
+  var key = _toKeyObject(opts.privateKey, "private");
+
+  var nowMs = opts.now || Date.now();
+  var nowSec = Math.floor(nowMs / C.TIME.seconds(1));
+
+  // Build the claims object. Operator-provided claim values take
+  // precedence over opts shorthand to avoid surprising overrides.
+  var payload = Object.assign({}, claims);
+  if (payload.iat === undefined) payload.iat = nowSec;
+  if (opts.issuer !== undefined && payload.iss === undefined)   payload.iss = opts.issuer;
+  if (opts.audience !== undefined && payload.aud === undefined) payload.aud = opts.audience;
+  if (opts.subject !== undefined && payload.sub === undefined)  payload.sub = opts.subject;
+  if (opts.jti !== undefined && payload.jti === undefined)      payload.jti = opts.jti;
+  if (typeof opts.expiresInSec === "number" && payload.exp === undefined) {
+    payload.exp = nowSec + opts.expiresInSec;
+  }
+  if (typeof opts.notBeforeSec === "number" && payload.nbf === undefined) {
+    payload.nbf = nowSec + opts.notBeforeSec;
+  }
+
+  var header = { alg: alg, typ: opts.typ || "JWT" };
+  if (opts.kid) header.kid = String(opts.kid);
+
+  var headerB64  = _b64urlEncode(JSON.stringify(header));
+  var payloadB64 = _b64urlEncode(JSON.stringify(payload));
+  var signingInput = headerB64 + "." + payloadB64;
+
+  // node:crypto.sign with null algorithm — KeyObject knows its own alg.
+  var sig = nodeCrypto.sign(null, Buffer.from(signingInput, "ascii"), key);
+  return signingInput + "." + _b64urlEncode(sig);
+}
+
+// ---- decode (no verify — for inspection) ----
+
+function decode(token) {
+  if (typeof token !== "string" || token.length === 0) {
+    throw new AuthError("auth-jwt/malformed", "token must be a non-empty string");
+  }
+  var parts = token.split(".");
+  if (parts.length !== 3) {
+    throw new AuthError("auth-jwt/malformed", "token must have three dot-separated parts");
+  }
+  var header, payload;
+  try { header  = safeJson.parse(_b64urlDecode(parts[0])); }
+  catch (_e) { throw new AuthError("auth-jwt/malformed", "header is not valid base64url-JSON"); }
+  try { payload = safeJson.parse(_b64urlDecode(parts[1])); }
+  catch (_e) { throw new AuthError("auth-jwt/malformed", "payload is not valid base64url-JSON"); }
+  var signature;
+  try { signature = _b64urlDecode(parts[2]); }
+  catch (_e) { throw new AuthError("auth-jwt/malformed", "signature is not valid base64url"); }
+  return { header: header, payload: payload, signature: signature, signingInput: parts[0] + "." + parts[1] };
+}
+
+// ---- verify ----
+
+function _matchClaim(actual, expected, claimName) {
+  // expected is string OR string[]. actual is string OR string[].
+  // Match is "any-of": at least one expected value must appear in
+  // actual (or equal it when actual is scalar). Mirrors RFC 7519
+  // §4.1.3's tolerance for `aud` being an array.
+  var expectedList = Array.isArray(expected) ? expected : [expected];
+  var actualList   = Array.isArray(actual)   ? actual   : [actual];
+  for (var i = 0; i < expectedList.length; i++) {
+    if (actualList.indexOf(expectedList[i]) !== -1) return true;
+  }
+  return false;
+}
+
+async function verify(token, opts) {
+  opts = opts || {};
+  var allowed = Array.isArray(opts.algorithms) && opts.algorithms.length > 0
+    ? opts.algorithms
+    : [DEFAULT_ALGORITHM];
+  // Validate the allowlist itself — typoed entries should surface here,
+  // not as silent "every token rejected."
+  for (var i = 0; i < allowed.length; i++) {
+    if (!ALGORITHM_TO_NODE[allowed[i]]) {
+      throw new AuthError("auth-jwt/unsupported-algorithm",
+        "opts.algorithms[" + i + "] = '" + allowed[i] + "' is not in the supported list (" +
+        SUPPORTED_ALGORITHMS.join(", ") + ")");
+    }
+  }
+  var decoded = decode(token);
+
+  // keyResolver — operator-supplied per-token key lookup (typically by
+  // header.kid against a rotation table or remote JWKS). Mutually
+  // exclusive with opts.publicKey: pass one or the other, not both.
+  // The resolver receives the FULL decoded header and returns either
+  // the key (sync) or a Promise<key> (async).
+  var key;
+  if (typeof opts.keyResolver === "function") {
+    if (opts.publicKey !== undefined) {
+      throw new AuthError("auth-jwt/conflicting-key-source",
+        "verify: pass keyResolver OR publicKey, not both");
+    }
+    var resolved;
+    try { resolved = await opts.keyResolver(decoded.header); }
+    catch (e) {
+      throw new AuthError("auth-jwt/key-resolver-failed",
+        "keyResolver threw: " + ((e && e.message) || String(e)));
+    }
+    if (!resolved) {
+      throw new AuthError("auth-jwt/key-not-found",
+        "keyResolver returned no key for kid='" +
+        (decoded.header.kid || "<absent>") + "'");
+    }
+    key = _toKeyObject(resolved, "public");
+  } else {
+    key = _toKeyObject(opts.publicKey, "public");
+  }
+
+  // Reject unknown critical-header extensions outright (RFC 7515 §4.1.11)
+  if (decoded.header.crit !== undefined) {
+    throw new AuthError("auth-jwt/unknown-crit",
+      "token declares critical extensions which this verifier does not support");
+  }
+
+  // Algorithm must be in the allowed list AND match what we know how
+  // to verify (i.e. one of SUPPORTED_ALGORITHMS).
+  if (allowed.indexOf(decoded.header.alg) === -1) {
+    throw new AuthError("auth-jwt/algorithm-not-allowed",
+      "token alg='" + decoded.header.alg + "' is not in the allowed list [" + allowed.join(", ") + "]");
+  }
+
+  var verified = false;
+  try {
+    verified = nodeCrypto.verify(null, Buffer.from(decoded.signingInput, "ascii"), key, decoded.signature);
+  } catch (e) {
+    // node:crypto throws on key/signature shape mismatches (e.g. ML-DSA
+    // signature against an SLH-DSA key). Treat as bad-signature so
+    // operators can audit a single class of "this token isn't ours."
+    throw new AuthError("auth-jwt/invalid-signature",
+      "signature verification failed: " + (e.message || String(e)));
+  }
+  if (!verified) {
+    throw new AuthError("auth-jwt/invalid-signature", "signature verification failed");
+  }
+
+  // Time-based claim validation
+  var nowSec = Math.floor((opts.now || Date.now()) / C.TIME.seconds(1));
+  if (opts.clockToleranceSec !== undefined && opts.clockToleranceSec !== null) {
+    if (typeof opts.clockToleranceSec !== "number" ||
+        !isFinite(opts.clockToleranceSec) ||
+        opts.clockToleranceSec < 0) {
+      // Throw at config time: a negative tolerance over-tightens the
+      // window (legit tokens get rejected as expired or not-yet-valid)
+      // and a non-finite value would NaN-poison the comparison. Catch
+      // both here rather than producing surprise rejections in production.
+      throw new AuthError("auth-jwt/bad-clock-tolerance",
+        "verify: clockToleranceSec must be a non-negative finite number, got " +
+        JSON.stringify(opts.clockToleranceSec));
+    }
+  }
+  var tol = typeof opts.clockToleranceSec === "number" ? opts.clockToleranceSec : 0;
+  var p = decoded.payload;
+
+  // Strict registered-claim typing per RFC 7519 §4.1. exp / nbf / iat MUST
+  // be NumericDate values (JSON numeric, seconds since epoch). A claim
+  // present-but-not-a-number is a malformed token — silently skipping the
+  // check would let a token with `exp: "0"` or `exp: "9999999999"` (string)
+  // bypass expiration enforcement entirely.
+  function _requireNumericDate(name, value) {
+    if (typeof value !== "number" || !isFinite(value)) {
+      throw new AuthError("auth-jwt/malformed",
+        "claim '" + name + "' must be a finite number (RFC 7519 NumericDate), got " +
+        (value === null ? "null" : typeof value));
+    }
+  }
+  if (p.exp !== undefined) _requireNumericDate("exp", p.exp);
+  if (p.nbf !== undefined) _requireNumericDate("nbf", p.nbf);
+  if (p.iat !== undefined) _requireNumericDate("iat", p.iat);
+
+  if (p.exp !== undefined && p.exp + tol < nowSec) {
+    throw new AuthError("auth-jwt/expired",
+      "token expired at exp=" + p.exp + " (now=" + nowSec + ", tolerance=" + tol + "s)");
+  }
+  if (p.nbf !== undefined && p.nbf - tol > nowSec) {
+    throw new AuthError("auth-jwt/not-yet-valid",
+      "token not yet valid: nbf=" + p.nbf + " (now=" + nowSec + ", tolerance=" + tol + "s)");
+  }
+
+  // String-claim assertions
+  if (opts.issuer !== undefined && !_matchClaim(p.iss, opts.issuer, "iss")) {
+    throw new AuthError("auth-jwt/iss-mismatch",
+      "iss='" + p.iss + "' does not match expected " + JSON.stringify(opts.issuer));
+  }
+  if (opts.audience !== undefined && !_matchClaim(p.aud, opts.audience, "aud")) {
+    throw new AuthError("auth-jwt/aud-mismatch",
+      "aud=" + JSON.stringify(p.aud) + " does not match expected " + JSON.stringify(opts.audience));
+  }
+  if (opts.subject !== undefined && p.sub !== opts.subject) {
+    throw new AuthError("auth-jwt/sub-mismatch",
+      "sub='" + p.sub + "' does not match expected '" + opts.subject + "'");
+  }
+
+  return p;
+}
+
+module.exports = {
+  sign:                  sign,
+  verify:                verify,
+  decode:                decode,
+  DEFAULT_ALGORITHM:     DEFAULT_ALGORITHM,
+  SUPPORTED_ALGORITHMS:  SUPPORTED_ALGORITHMS,
+};