@blamejs/core 0.7.18 → 0.7.19

package/lib/backup/crypto.js

@@ -1,176 +1,176 @@
-"use strict";
-/**
- * backup-crypto — passphrase-based symmetric crypto for backup files.
- *
- * The primitive layer used by lib/backup.js and the backup/restore
- * workers. Argon2id key derivation + XChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD. Salt is
- * managed alongside the ciphertext so backups carry their KDF input
- * with them — restoring a backup needs the bundle's salt + the
- * operator passphrase, nothing else.
- *
- *   var bc = b.backupCrypto;
- *
- *   bc.ARGON2_OPTS                      // baseline KDF parameters
- *
- *   await bc.deriveKey(passphrase, saltHex)
- *     → Buffer(32)                      // raw key bytes for AEAD
- *
- *   await bc.encryptWithPassphrase(plain, passphrase, saltHex)
- *     → Buffer (24-byte nonce + ciphertext+tag)
- *   await bc.decryptWithPassphrase(buf, passphrase, saltHex)
- *     → Buffer (plaintext)
- *
- *   await bc.encryptWithFreshSalt(plain, passphrase)
- *     → { encrypted: Buffer, salt: hexString }
- *
- *   bc.checksum(buf)                    // sha3-512 hex; bundle integrity
- *
- * Argon2id parameters match lib/vault-wrap defaults — backup integrity
- * tracks the framework's at-rest discipline. Operators with stricter
- * requirements (longer passphrases, higher memoryCost) bypass these
- * defaults by passing a full Argon2 opts object to deriveKey.
- *
- * Algorithm choices are deliberate and locked:
- *   - KDF:  Argon2id (RFC 9106) — memory-hard, the only KDF the
- *           framework uses for password-derived keys
- *   - AEAD: XChaCha20-Poly1305 — 24-byte random nonce per message
- *           means we never need to track per-passphrase nonce counters
- *
- * Operators with non-standard cipher needs build their own primitive;
- * this one's whole point is "do the framework's PQC-aligned crypto
- * correctly without per-call decisions".
- */
-
-var nodeCrypto = require("node:crypto");
-var C = require("../constants");
-var safeBuffer = require("../safe-buffer");
-var { xchacha20poly1305 } = require("../vendor/noble-ciphers.cjs");
-var argon2 = require("../vendor/argon2");
-var { FrameworkError } = require("../framework-error");
-
-class BackupCryptoError extends FrameworkError {
-  constructor(code, message) {
-    super(message, code);
-    this.name = "BackupCryptoError";
-    this.permanent = true;
-    this.isBackupCryptoError = true;
-  }
-}
-
-// Baseline Argon2id parameters. Identical to vault-wrap's defaults so
-// operators see one set of numbers across the framework's password-
-// derivation surfaces. Tuned for: ~64 MiB memory, 3 passes, 4 lanes,
-// 32-byte raw output (matches XChaCha20-Poly1305 key length).
-var ARGON2_OPTS = Object.freeze({
-  type:        2,                       // 2 = argon2id
-  memoryCost:  C.BYTES.kib(64),         // 64 MiB expressed in argon2's KiB units
-  timeCost:    3,
-  parallelism: 4,
-  hashLength:  C.BYTES.bytes(32),       // matches XChaCha20-Poly1305 key length
-  raw:         true,
-});
-
-var SALT_BYTES  = C.BYTES.bytes(32);    // 256 bits — comfortable margin for global uniqueness
-var NONCE_BYTES = C.BYTES.bytes(24);    // XChaCha20 nonce length
-
-function checksum(buf) {
-  if (!Buffer.isBuffer(buf) && typeof buf !== "string") {
-    throw new BackupCryptoError("backup-crypto/bad-input",
-      "checksum: argument must be a Buffer or string");
-  }
-  return nodeCrypto.createHash("sha3-512").update(buf).digest("hex");
-}
-
-function _validateSaltHex(saltHex) {
-  if (!safeBuffer.isHex(saltHex) || saltHex.length % 2 !== 0) {
-    throw new BackupCryptoError("backup-crypto/bad-salt",
-      "saltHex must be a non-empty hex string with even length");
-  }
-}
-
-function _validatePassphrase(p) {
-  if (!Buffer.isBuffer(p) && typeof p !== "string") {
-    throw new BackupCryptoError("backup-crypto/bad-passphrase",
-      "passphrase must be a Buffer or string");
-  }
-  if (Buffer.isBuffer(p) ? p.length === 0 : p.length === 0) {
-    throw new BackupCryptoError("backup-crypto/bad-passphrase",
-      "passphrase must be non-empty");
-  }
-}
-
-async function deriveKey(passphrase, saltHex, opts) {
-  _validatePassphrase(passphrase);
-  _validateSaltHex(saltHex);
-  var argonOpts = Object.assign({}, ARGON2_OPTS, opts || {}, {
-    salt: Buffer.from(saltHex, "hex"),
-  });
-  var hash = await argon2.hash(passphrase, argonOpts);
-  // Argon2 raw mode returns a Buffer of hashLength bytes. Defensive
-  // length check — better to fail loudly than ship a short key into
-  // XChaCha20 and trip a later cryptic error.
-  if (!Buffer.isBuffer(hash) || hash.length !== ARGON2_OPTS.hashLength) {
-    throw new BackupCryptoError("backup-crypto/derive-failed",
-      "argon2 hash returned unexpected output (expected " + ARGON2_OPTS.hashLength +
-      "-byte Buffer, got " + (hash && hash.length) + ")");
-  }
-  return hash;
-}
-
-async function encryptWithPassphrase(plaintext, passphrase, saltHex) {
-  if (!Buffer.isBuffer(plaintext) && typeof plaintext !== "string") {
-    throw new BackupCryptoError("backup-crypto/bad-plaintext",
-      "encryptWithPassphrase: plaintext must be a Buffer or string");
-  }
-  var plainBuf = Buffer.isBuffer(plaintext) ? plaintext : Buffer.from(plaintext, "utf8");
-  var key = await deriveKey(passphrase, saltHex);
-  var nonce = nodeCrypto.randomBytes(NONCE_BYTES);
-  var ct = xchacha20poly1305(new Uint8Array(key), nonce).encrypt(new Uint8Array(plainBuf));
-  return Buffer.concat([nonce, Buffer.from(ct)]);
-}
-
-async function decryptWithPassphrase(encrypted, passphrase, saltHex) {
-  if (!Buffer.isBuffer(encrypted)) {
-    throw new BackupCryptoError("backup-crypto/bad-input",
-      "decryptWithPassphrase: encrypted must be a Buffer");
-  }
-  if (encrypted.length <= NONCE_BYTES) {
-    throw new BackupCryptoError("backup-crypto/bad-input",
-      "decryptWithPassphrase: encrypted buffer is too short to contain nonce + tag");
-  }
-  var key = await deriveKey(passphrase, saltHex);
-  var nonce = encrypted.subarray(0, NONCE_BYTES);
-  var ct    = encrypted.subarray(NONCE_BYTES);
-  var plain;
-  try {
-    plain = xchacha20poly1305(new Uint8Array(key), new Uint8Array(nonce))
-      .decrypt(new Uint8Array(ct));
-  } catch (e) {
-    throw new BackupCryptoError("backup-crypto/decrypt-failed",
-      "XChaCha20-Poly1305 decryption failed (wrong passphrase or tampered ciphertext): " +
-      ((e && e.message) || String(e)));
-  }
-  return Buffer.from(plain);
-}
-
-// Convenience for the common "encrypt this with a fresh salt" pattern.
-// Returns the salt as hex so callers can store it alongside the
-// ciphertext in the bundle manifest.
-async function encryptWithFreshSalt(plaintext, passphrase) {
-  var salt = nodeCrypto.randomBytes(SALT_BYTES);
-  var saltHex = salt.toString("hex");
-  var encrypted = await encryptWithPassphrase(plaintext, passphrase, saltHex);
-  return { encrypted: encrypted, salt: saltHex };
-}
-
-module.exports = {
-  deriveKey:             deriveKey,
-  encryptWithPassphrase: encryptWithPassphrase,
-  decryptWithPassphrase: decryptWithPassphrase,
-  encryptWithFreshSalt:  encryptWithFreshSalt,
-  checksum:              checksum,
-  ARGON2_OPTS:           ARGON2_OPTS,
-  SALT_BYTES:            SALT_BYTES,
-  NONCE_BYTES:           NONCE_BYTES,
-  BackupCryptoError:     BackupCryptoError,
-};
+"use strict";
+/**
+ * backup-crypto — passphrase-based symmetric crypto for backup files.
+ *
+ * The primitive layer used by lib/backup.js and the backup/restore
+ * workers. Argon2id key derivation + XChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD. Salt is
+ * managed alongside the ciphertext so backups carry their KDF input
+ * with them — restoring a backup needs the bundle's salt + the
+ * operator passphrase, nothing else.
+ *
+ *   var bc = b.backupCrypto;
+ *
+ *   bc.ARGON2_OPTS                      // baseline KDF parameters
+ *
+ *   await bc.deriveKey(passphrase, saltHex)
+ *     → Buffer(32)                      // raw key bytes for AEAD
+ *
+ *   await bc.encryptWithPassphrase(plain, passphrase, saltHex)
+ *     → Buffer (24-byte nonce + ciphertext+tag)
+ *   await bc.decryptWithPassphrase(buf, passphrase, saltHex)
+ *     → Buffer (plaintext)
+ *
+ *   await bc.encryptWithFreshSalt(plain, passphrase)
+ *     → { encrypted: Buffer, salt: hexString }
+ *
+ *   bc.checksum(buf)                    // sha3-512 hex; bundle integrity
+ *
+ * Argon2id parameters match lib/vault-wrap defaults — backup integrity
+ * tracks the framework's at-rest discipline. Operators with stricter
+ * requirements (longer passphrases, higher memoryCost) bypass these
+ * defaults by passing a full Argon2 opts object to deriveKey.
+ *
+ * Algorithm choices are deliberate and locked:
+ *   - KDF:  Argon2id (RFC 9106) — memory-hard, the only KDF the
+ *           framework uses for password-derived keys
+ *   - AEAD: XChaCha20-Poly1305 — 24-byte random nonce per message
+ *           means we never need to track per-passphrase nonce counters
+ *
+ * Operators with non-standard cipher needs build their own primitive;
+ * this one's whole point is "do the framework's PQC-aligned crypto
+ * correctly without per-call decisions".
+ */
+
+var nodeCrypto = require("node:crypto");
+var C = require("../constants");
+var safeBuffer = require("../safe-buffer");
+var { xchacha20poly1305 } = require("../vendor/noble-ciphers.cjs");
+var argon2 = require("../vendor/argon2");
+var { FrameworkError } = require("../framework-error");
+
+class BackupCryptoError extends FrameworkError {
+  constructor(code, message) {
+    super(message, code);
+    this.name = "BackupCryptoError";
+    this.permanent = true;
+    this.isBackupCryptoError = true;
+  }
+}
+
+// Baseline Argon2id parameters. Identical to vault-wrap's defaults so
+// operators see one set of numbers across the framework's password-
+// derivation surfaces. Tuned for: ~64 MiB memory, 3 passes, 4 lanes,
+// 32-byte raw output (matches XChaCha20-Poly1305 key length).
+var ARGON2_OPTS = Object.freeze({
+  type:        2,                       // 2 = argon2id
+  memoryCost:  C.BYTES.kib(64),         // 64 MiB expressed in argon2's KiB units
+  timeCost:    3,
+  parallelism: 4,
+  hashLength:  C.BYTES.bytes(32),       // matches XChaCha20-Poly1305 key length
+  raw:         true,
+});
+
+var SALT_BYTES  = C.BYTES.bytes(32);    // 256 bits — comfortable margin for global uniqueness
+var NONCE_BYTES = C.BYTES.bytes(24);    // XChaCha20 nonce length
+
+function checksum(buf) {
+  if (!Buffer.isBuffer(buf) && typeof buf !== "string") {
+    throw new BackupCryptoError("backup-crypto/bad-input",
+      "checksum: argument must be a Buffer or string");
+  }
+  return nodeCrypto.createHash("sha3-512").update(buf).digest("hex");
+}
+
+function _validateSaltHex(saltHex) {
+  if (!safeBuffer.isHex(saltHex) || saltHex.length % 2 !== 0) {
+    throw new BackupCryptoError("backup-crypto/bad-salt",
+      "saltHex must be a non-empty hex string with even length");
+  }
+}
+
+function _validatePassphrase(p) {
+  if (!Buffer.isBuffer(p) && typeof p !== "string") {
+    throw new BackupCryptoError("backup-crypto/bad-passphrase",
+      "passphrase must be a Buffer or string");
+  }
+  if (Buffer.isBuffer(p) ? p.length === 0 : p.length === 0) {
+    throw new BackupCryptoError("backup-crypto/bad-passphrase",
+      "passphrase must be non-empty");
+  }
+}
+
+async function deriveKey(passphrase, saltHex, opts) {
+  _validatePassphrase(passphrase);
+  _validateSaltHex(saltHex);
+  var argonOpts = Object.assign({}, ARGON2_OPTS, opts || {}, {
+    salt: Buffer.from(saltHex, "hex"),
+  });
+  var hash = await argon2.hash(passphrase, argonOpts);
+  // Argon2 raw mode returns a Buffer of hashLength bytes. Defensive
+  // length check — better to fail loudly than ship a short key into
+  // XChaCha20 and trip a later cryptic error.
+  if (!Buffer.isBuffer(hash) || hash.length !== ARGON2_OPTS.hashLength) {
+    throw new BackupCryptoError("backup-crypto/derive-failed",
+      "argon2 hash returned unexpected output (expected " + ARGON2_OPTS.hashLength +
+      "-byte Buffer, got " + (hash && hash.length) + ")");
+  }
+  return hash;
+}
+
+async function encryptWithPassphrase(plaintext, passphrase, saltHex) {
+  if (!Buffer.isBuffer(plaintext) && typeof plaintext !== "string") {
+    throw new BackupCryptoError("backup-crypto/bad-plaintext",
+      "encryptWithPassphrase: plaintext must be a Buffer or string");
+  }
+  var plainBuf = Buffer.isBuffer(plaintext) ? plaintext : Buffer.from(plaintext, "utf8");
+  var key = await deriveKey(passphrase, saltHex);
+  var nonce = nodeCrypto.randomBytes(NONCE_BYTES);
+  var ct = xchacha20poly1305(new Uint8Array(key), nonce).encrypt(new Uint8Array(plainBuf));
+  return Buffer.concat([nonce, Buffer.from(ct)]);
+}
+
+async function decryptWithPassphrase(encrypted, passphrase, saltHex) {
+  if (!Buffer.isBuffer(encrypted)) {
+    throw new BackupCryptoError("backup-crypto/bad-input",
+      "decryptWithPassphrase: encrypted must be a Buffer");
+  }
+  if (encrypted.length <= NONCE_BYTES) {
+    throw new BackupCryptoError("backup-crypto/bad-input",
+      "decryptWithPassphrase: encrypted buffer is too short to contain nonce + tag");
+  }
+  var key = await deriveKey(passphrase, saltHex);
+  var nonce = encrypted.subarray(0, NONCE_BYTES);
+  var ct    = encrypted.subarray(NONCE_BYTES);
+  var plain;
+  try {
+    plain = xchacha20poly1305(new Uint8Array(key), new Uint8Array(nonce))
+      .decrypt(new Uint8Array(ct));
+  } catch (e) {
+    throw new BackupCryptoError("backup-crypto/decrypt-failed",
+      "XChaCha20-Poly1305 decryption failed (wrong passphrase or tampered ciphertext): " +
+      ((e && e.message) || String(e)));
+  }
+  return Buffer.from(plain);
+}
+
+// Convenience for the common "encrypt this with a fresh salt" pattern.
+// Returns the salt as hex so callers can store it alongside the
+// ciphertext in the bundle manifest.
+async function encryptWithFreshSalt(plaintext, passphrase) {
+  var salt = nodeCrypto.randomBytes(SALT_BYTES);
+  var saltHex = salt.toString("hex");
+  var encrypted = await encryptWithPassphrase(plaintext, passphrase, saltHex);
+  return { encrypted: encrypted, salt: saltHex };
+}
+
+module.exports = {
+  deriveKey:             deriveKey,
+  encryptWithPassphrase: encryptWithPassphrase,
+  decryptWithPassphrase: decryptWithPassphrase,
+  encryptWithFreshSalt:  encryptWithFreshSalt,
+  checksum:              checksum,
+  ARGON2_OPTS:           ARGON2_OPTS,
+  SALT_BYTES:            SALT_BYTES,
+  NONCE_BYTES:           NONCE_BYTES,
+  BackupCryptoError:     BackupCryptoError,
+};