grpc-flamingo 1.11.0

data/third_party/boringssl/ssl/tls13_enc.cc

@@ -0,0 +1,563 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2016, Google Inc.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
+ * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
+ * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <utility>
+
+#include <openssl/aead.h>
+#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
+#include <openssl/digest.h>
+#include <openssl/hkdf.h>
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+
+#include "../crypto/internal.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+namespace bssl {
+
+static int init_key_schedule(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint16_t version,
+                             const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  if (!hs->transcript.InitHash(version, cipher)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  hs->hash_len = hs->transcript.DigestLen();
+
+  // Initialize the secret to the zero key.
+  OPENSSL_memset(hs->secret, 0, hs->hash_len);
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int tls13_init_key_schedule(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const uint8_t *psk,
+                            size_t psk_len) {
+  if (!init_key_schedule(hs, ssl_protocol_version(hs->ssl), hs->new_cipher)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  hs->transcript.FreeBuffer();
+  return HKDF_extract(hs->secret, &hs->hash_len, hs->transcript.Digest(), psk,
+                      psk_len, hs->secret, hs->hash_len);
+}
+
+int tls13_init_early_key_schedule(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const uint8_t *psk,
+                                  size_t psk_len) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  return init_key_schedule(hs, ssl_session_protocol_version(ssl->session),
+                           ssl->session->cipher) &&
+         HKDF_extract(hs->secret, &hs->hash_len, hs->transcript.Digest(), psk,
+                      psk_len, hs->secret, hs->hash_len);
+}
+
+static int hkdf_expand_label(uint8_t *out, uint16_t version,
+                             const EVP_MD *digest, const uint8_t *secret,
+                             size_t secret_len, const uint8_t *label,
+                             size_t label_len, const uint8_t *hash,
+                             size_t hash_len, size_t len) {
+  const char *kTLS13LabelVersion =
+      ssl_is_draft21(version) ? "tls13 " : "TLS 1.3, ";
+
+  ScopedCBB cbb;
+  CBB child;
+  uint8_t *hkdf_label;
+  size_t hkdf_label_len;
+  if (!CBB_init(cbb.get(), 2 + 1 + strlen(kTLS13LabelVersion) + label_len + 1 +
+                               hash_len) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16(cbb.get(), len) ||
+      !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(cbb.get(), &child) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&child, (const uint8_t *)kTLS13LabelVersion,
+                     strlen(kTLS13LabelVersion)) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&child, label, label_len) ||
+      !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(cbb.get(), &child) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&child, hash, hash_len) ||
+      !CBB_finish(cbb.get(), &hkdf_label, &hkdf_label_len)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  int ret = HKDF_expand(out, len, digest, secret, secret_len, hkdf_label,
+                        hkdf_label_len);
+  OPENSSL_free(hkdf_label);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+static const char kTLS13LabelDerived[] = "derived";
+
+int tls13_advance_key_schedule(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const uint8_t *in,
+                               size_t len) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+
+  // Draft 18 does not include the extra Derive-Secret step.
+  if (ssl_is_draft21(ssl->version)) {
+    uint8_t derive_context[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    unsigned derive_context_len;
+    if (!EVP_Digest(nullptr, 0, derive_context, &derive_context_len,
+                    hs->transcript.Digest(), nullptr)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!hkdf_expand_label(hs->secret, ssl->version, hs->transcript.Digest(),
+                           hs->secret, hs->hash_len,
+                           (const uint8_t *)kTLS13LabelDerived,
+                           strlen(kTLS13LabelDerived), derive_context,
+                           derive_context_len, hs->hash_len)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return HKDF_extract(hs->secret, &hs->hash_len, hs->transcript.Digest(), in,
+                      len, hs->secret, hs->hash_len);
+}
+
+// derive_secret derives a secret of length |len| and writes the result in |out|
+// with the given label and the current base secret and most recently-saved
+// handshake context. It returns one on success and zero on error.
+static int derive_secret(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out, size_t len,
+                         const uint8_t *label, size_t label_len) {
+  uint8_t context_hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+  size_t context_hash_len;
+  if (!hs->transcript.GetHash(context_hash, &context_hash_len)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return hkdf_expand_label(out, SSL_get_session(hs->ssl)->ssl_version,
+                           hs->transcript.Digest(), hs->secret, hs->hash_len,
+                           label, label_len, context_hash, context_hash_len,
+                           len);
+}
+
+int tls13_set_traffic_key(SSL *ssl, enum evp_aead_direction_t direction,
+                          const uint8_t *traffic_secret,
+                          size_t traffic_secret_len) {
+  const SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl);
+  uint16_t version = ssl_session_protocol_version(session);
+
+  if (traffic_secret_len > 0xff) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // Look up cipher suite properties.
+  const EVP_AEAD *aead;
+  size_t discard;
+  if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp_aead(&aead, &discard, &discard, session->cipher,
+                               version, SSL_is_dtls(ssl))) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  const EVP_MD *digest = ssl_session_get_digest(session);
+
+  // Derive the key.
+  size_t key_len = EVP_AEAD_key_length(aead);
+  uint8_t key[EVP_AEAD_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
+  if (!hkdf_expand_label(key, session->ssl_version, digest, traffic_secret,
+                         traffic_secret_len, (const uint8_t *)"key", 3, NULL, 0,
+                         key_len)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // Derive the IV.
+  size_t iv_len = EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead);
+  uint8_t iv[EVP_AEAD_MAX_NONCE_LENGTH];
+  if (!hkdf_expand_label(iv, session->ssl_version, digest, traffic_secret,
+                         traffic_secret_len, (const uint8_t *)"iv", 2, NULL, 0,
+                         iv_len)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  UniquePtr<SSLAEADContext> traffic_aead =
+      SSLAEADContext::Create(direction, session->ssl_version, SSL_is_dtls(ssl),
+                             session->cipher, MakeConstSpan(key, key_len),
+                             Span<const uint8_t>(), MakeConstSpan(iv, iv_len));
+  if (!traffic_aead) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (direction == evp_aead_open) {
+    if (!ssl->method->set_read_state(ssl, std::move(traffic_aead))) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  } else {
+    if (!ssl->method->set_write_state(ssl, std::move(traffic_aead))) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Save the traffic secret.
+  if (direction == evp_aead_open) {
+    OPENSSL_memmove(ssl->s3->read_traffic_secret, traffic_secret,
+                    traffic_secret_len);
+    ssl->s3->read_traffic_secret_len = traffic_secret_len;
+  } else {
+    OPENSSL_memmove(ssl->s3->write_traffic_secret, traffic_secret,
+                    traffic_secret_len);
+    ssl->s3->write_traffic_secret_len = traffic_secret_len;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static const char kTLS13LabelExporter[] = "exporter master secret";
+static const char kTLS13LabelEarlyExporter[] = "early exporter master secret";
+
+static const char kTLS13LabelClientEarlyTraffic[] =
+    "client early traffic secret";
+static const char kTLS13LabelClientHandshakeTraffic[] =
+    "client handshake traffic secret";
+static const char kTLS13LabelServerHandshakeTraffic[] =
+    "server handshake traffic secret";
+static const char kTLS13LabelClientApplicationTraffic[] =
+    "client application traffic secret";
+static const char kTLS13LabelServerApplicationTraffic[] =
+    "server application traffic secret";
+
+static const char kTLS13Draft21LabelExporter[] = "exp master";
+static const char kTLS13Draft21LabelEarlyExporter[] = "e exp master";
+
+static const char kTLS13Draft21LabelClientEarlyTraffic[] = "c e traffic";
+static const char kTLS13Draft21LabelClientHandshakeTraffic[] = "c hs traffic";
+static const char kTLS13Draft21LabelServerHandshakeTraffic[] = "s hs traffic";
+static const char kTLS13Draft21LabelClientApplicationTraffic[] = "c ap traffic";
+static const char kTLS13Draft21LabelServerApplicationTraffic[] = "s ap traffic";
+
+int tls13_derive_early_secrets(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  uint16_t version = SSL_get_session(ssl)->ssl_version;
+
+  const char *early_traffic_label = ssl_is_draft21(version)
+                                        ? kTLS13Draft21LabelClientEarlyTraffic
+                                        : kTLS13LabelClientEarlyTraffic;
+  const char *early_exporter_label = ssl_is_draft21(version)
+                                         ? kTLS13Draft21LabelEarlyExporter
+                                         : kTLS13LabelEarlyExporter;
+  return derive_secret(hs, hs->early_traffic_secret, hs->hash_len,
+                       (const uint8_t *)early_traffic_label,
+                       strlen(early_traffic_label)) &&
+         ssl_log_secret(ssl, "CLIENT_EARLY_TRAFFIC_SECRET",
+                        hs->early_traffic_secret, hs->hash_len) &&
+         derive_secret(hs, ssl->s3->early_exporter_secret, hs->hash_len,
+                       (const uint8_t *)early_exporter_label,
+                       strlen(early_exporter_label));
+}
+
+int tls13_derive_handshake_secrets(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  const char *client_label = ssl_is_draft21(ssl->version)
+                                 ? kTLS13Draft21LabelClientHandshakeTraffic
+                                 : kTLS13LabelClientHandshakeTraffic;
+  const char *server_label = ssl_is_draft21(ssl->version)
+                                 ? kTLS13Draft21LabelServerHandshakeTraffic
+                                 : kTLS13LabelServerHandshakeTraffic;
+  return derive_secret(hs, hs->client_handshake_secret, hs->hash_len,
+                       (const uint8_t *)client_label, strlen(client_label)) &&
+         ssl_log_secret(ssl, "CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET",
+                        hs->client_handshake_secret, hs->hash_len) &&
+         derive_secret(hs, hs->server_handshake_secret, hs->hash_len,
+                       (const uint8_t *)server_label, strlen(server_label)) &&
+         ssl_log_secret(ssl, "SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET",
+                        hs->server_handshake_secret, hs->hash_len);
+}
+
+int tls13_derive_application_secrets(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  ssl->s3->exporter_secret_len = hs->hash_len;
+  const char *client_label = ssl_is_draft21(ssl->version)
+                                 ? kTLS13Draft21LabelClientApplicationTraffic
+                                 : kTLS13LabelClientApplicationTraffic;
+  const char *server_label = ssl_is_draft21(ssl->version)
+                                 ? kTLS13Draft21LabelServerApplicationTraffic
+                                 : kTLS13LabelServerApplicationTraffic;
+  const char *exporter_label = ssl_is_draft21(ssl->version)
+                                   ? kTLS13Draft21LabelExporter
+                                   : kTLS13LabelExporter;
+  return derive_secret(hs, hs->client_traffic_secret_0, hs->hash_len,
+                       (const uint8_t *)client_label, strlen(client_label)) &&
+         ssl_log_secret(ssl, "CLIENT_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0",
+                        hs->client_traffic_secret_0, hs->hash_len) &&
+         derive_secret(hs, hs->server_traffic_secret_0, hs->hash_len,
+                       (const uint8_t *)server_label, strlen(server_label)) &&
+         ssl_log_secret(ssl, "SERVER_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0",
+                        hs->server_traffic_secret_0, hs->hash_len) &&
+         derive_secret(hs, ssl->s3->exporter_secret, hs->hash_len,
+                       (const uint8_t *)exporter_label,
+                       strlen(exporter_label)) &&
+         ssl_log_secret(ssl, "EXPORTER_SECRET", ssl->s3->exporter_secret,
+                        hs->hash_len);
+}
+
+static const char kTLS13LabelApplicationTraffic[] =
+    "application traffic secret";
+static const char kTLS13Draft21LabelApplicationTraffic[] = "traffic upd";
+
+int tls13_rotate_traffic_key(SSL *ssl, enum evp_aead_direction_t direction) {
+  uint8_t *secret;
+  size_t secret_len;
+  if (direction == evp_aead_open) {
+    secret = ssl->s3->read_traffic_secret;
+    secret_len = ssl->s3->read_traffic_secret_len;
+  } else {
+    secret = ssl->s3->write_traffic_secret;
+    secret_len = ssl->s3->write_traffic_secret_len;
+  }
+
+  const char *traffic_label = ssl_is_draft21(ssl->version)
+                                  ? kTLS13Draft21LabelApplicationTraffic
+                                  : kTLS13LabelApplicationTraffic;
+
+  const EVP_MD *digest = ssl_session_get_digest(SSL_get_session(ssl));
+  if (!hkdf_expand_label(secret, ssl->version, digest, secret, secret_len,
+                         (const uint8_t *)traffic_label, strlen(traffic_label),
+                         NULL, 0, secret_len)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return tls13_set_traffic_key(ssl, direction, secret, secret_len);
+}
+
+static const char kTLS13LabelResumption[] = "resumption master secret";
+static const char kTLS13Draft21LabelResumption[] = "res master";
+
+int tls13_derive_resumption_secret(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  if (hs->hash_len > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  const char *resumption_label = ssl_is_draft21(hs->ssl->version)
+                                     ? kTLS13Draft21LabelResumption
+                                     : kTLS13LabelResumption;
+  hs->new_session->master_key_length = hs->hash_len;
+  return derive_secret(
+      hs, hs->new_session->master_key, hs->new_session->master_key_length,
+      (const uint8_t *)resumption_label, strlen(resumption_label));
+}
+
+static const char kTLS13LabelFinished[] = "finished";
+
+// tls13_verify_data sets |out| to be the HMAC of |context| using a derived
+// Finished key for both Finished messages and the PSK binder.
+static int tls13_verify_data(const EVP_MD *digest, uint16_t version,
+                             uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
+                             const uint8_t *secret, size_t hash_len,
+                             uint8_t *context, size_t context_len) {
+  uint8_t key[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+  unsigned len;
+  if (!hkdf_expand_label(key, version, digest, secret, hash_len,
+                         (const uint8_t *)kTLS13LabelFinished,
+                         strlen(kTLS13LabelFinished), NULL, 0, hash_len) ||
+      HMAC(digest, key, hash_len, context, context_len, out, &len) == NULL) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  *out_len = len;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int tls13_finished_mac(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
+                       int is_server) {
+  const uint8_t *traffic_secret;
+  if (is_server) {
+    traffic_secret = hs->server_handshake_secret;
+  } else {
+    traffic_secret = hs->client_handshake_secret;
+  }
+
+  uint8_t context_hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+  size_t context_hash_len;
+  if (!hs->transcript.GetHash(context_hash, &context_hash_len) ||
+      !tls13_verify_data(hs->transcript.Digest(), hs->ssl->version, out,
+                         out_len, traffic_secret, hs->hash_len, context_hash,
+                         context_hash_len)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static const char kTLS13LabelResumptionPSK[] = "resumption";
+
+bool tls13_derive_session_psk(SSL_SESSION *session, Span<const uint8_t> nonce) {
+  if (!ssl_is_draft21(session->ssl_version)) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  const EVP_MD *digest = ssl_session_get_digest(session);
+  return hkdf_expand_label(session->master_key, session->ssl_version, digest,
+                           session->master_key, session->master_key_length,
+                           (const uint8_t *)kTLS13LabelResumptionPSK,
+                           strlen(kTLS13LabelResumptionPSK), nonce.data(),
+                           nonce.size(), session->master_key_length);
+}
+
+static const char kTLS13LabelExportKeying[] = "exporter";
+
+int tls13_export_keying_material(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t out_len,
+                                 const char *label, size_t label_len,
+                                 const uint8_t *context_in,
+                                 size_t context_in_len, int use_context) {
+  const uint8_t *context = NULL;
+  size_t context_len = 0;
+  if (use_context) {
+    context = context_in;
+    context_len = context_in_len;
+  }
+
+  if (!ssl_is_draft21(ssl->version)) {
+    const EVP_MD *digest = ssl_session_get_digest(SSL_get_session(ssl));
+    return hkdf_expand_label(
+        out, ssl->version, digest, ssl->s3->exporter_secret,
+        ssl->s3->exporter_secret_len, (const uint8_t *)label, label_len,
+        context, context_len, out_len);
+  }
+
+  const EVP_MD *digest = ssl_session_get_digest(SSL_get_session(ssl));
+
+  uint8_t hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+  uint8_t export_context[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+  uint8_t derived_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+  unsigned hash_len;
+  unsigned export_context_len;
+  unsigned derived_secret_len = EVP_MD_size(digest);
+  if (!EVP_Digest(context, context_len, hash, &hash_len, digest, NULL) ||
+      !EVP_Digest(NULL, 0, export_context, &export_context_len, digest, NULL)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return hkdf_expand_label(
+             derived_secret, ssl->version, digest, ssl->s3->exporter_secret,
+             ssl->s3->exporter_secret_len, (const uint8_t *)label, label_len,
+             export_context, export_context_len, derived_secret_len) &&
+         hkdf_expand_label(
+             out, ssl->version, digest, derived_secret, derived_secret_len,
+             (const uint8_t *)kTLS13LabelExportKeying,
+             strlen(kTLS13LabelExportKeying), hash, hash_len, out_len);
+}
+
+static const char kTLS13LabelPSKBinder[] = "resumption psk binder key";
+static const char kTLS13Draft21LabelPSKBinder[] = "res binder";
+
+static int tls13_psk_binder(uint8_t *out, uint16_t version,
+                            const EVP_MD *digest, uint8_t *psk, size_t psk_len,
+                            uint8_t *context, size_t context_len,
+                            size_t hash_len) {
+  uint8_t binder_context[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+  unsigned binder_context_len;
+  if (!EVP_Digest(NULL, 0, binder_context, &binder_context_len, digest, NULL)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  uint8_t early_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE] = {0};
+  size_t early_secret_len;
+  if (!HKDF_extract(early_secret, &early_secret_len, digest, psk, hash_len,
+                    NULL, 0)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  const char *binder_label = ssl_is_draft21(version)
+                                 ? kTLS13Draft21LabelPSKBinder
+                                 : kTLS13LabelPSKBinder;
+
+  uint8_t binder_key[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE] = {0};
+  size_t len;
+  if (!hkdf_expand_label(binder_key, version, digest, early_secret, hash_len,
+                         (const uint8_t *)binder_label, strlen(binder_label),
+                         binder_context, binder_context_len, hash_len) ||
+      !tls13_verify_data(digest, version, out, &len, binder_key, hash_len,
+                         context, context_len)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int tls13_write_psk_binder(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *msg, size_t len) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  const EVP_MD *digest = ssl_session_get_digest(ssl->session);
+  size_t hash_len = EVP_MD_size(digest);
+
+  if (len < hash_len + 3) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  ScopedEVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+  uint8_t context[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+  unsigned context_len;
+
+  if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx.get(), digest, NULL) ||
+      !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx.get(), hs->transcript.buffer().data(),
+                        hs->transcript.buffer().size()) ||
+      !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx.get(), msg, len - hash_len - 3) ||
+      !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx.get(), context, &context_len)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  uint8_t verify_data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE] = {0};
+  if (!tls13_psk_binder(verify_data, ssl->session->ssl_version, digest,
+                        ssl->session->master_key,
+                        ssl->session->master_key_length, context, context_len,
+                        hash_len)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(msg + len - hash_len, verify_data, hash_len);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int tls13_verify_psk_binder(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, SSL_SESSION *session,
+                            const SSLMessage &msg, CBS *binders) {
+  size_t hash_len = hs->transcript.DigestLen();
+
+  // The message must be large enough to exclude the binders.
+  if (CBS_len(&msg.raw) < CBS_len(binders) + 2) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // Hash a ClientHello prefix up to the binders. This includes the header. For
+  // now, this assumes we only ever verify PSK binders on initial
+  // ClientHellos.
+  uint8_t context[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+  unsigned context_len;
+  if (!EVP_Digest(CBS_data(&msg.raw), CBS_len(&msg.raw) - CBS_len(binders) - 2,
+                  context, &context_len, hs->transcript.Digest(), NULL)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  uint8_t verify_data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE] = {0};
+  CBS binder;
+  if (!tls13_psk_binder(verify_data, hs->ssl->version, hs->transcript.Digest(),
+                        session->master_key, session->master_key_length,
+                        context, context_len, hash_len) ||
+      // We only consider the first PSK, so compare against the first binder.
+      !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(binders, &binder)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  int binder_ok =
+      CBS_len(&binder) == hash_len &&
+      CRYPTO_memcmp(CBS_data(&binder), verify_data, hash_len) == 0;
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
+  binder_ok = 1;
+#endif
+  if (!binder_ok) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+}  // namespace bssl