grpc-flamingo 1.11.0

data/third_party/boringssl/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c

@@ -0,0 +1,840 @@
+/*
+ * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
+ * 2004.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2004 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/obj.h>
+#include <openssl/stack.h>
+#include <openssl/thread.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+#include "pcy_int.h"
+#include "../internal.h"
+
+/*
+ * Enable this to print out the complete policy tree at various point during
+ * evaluation.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * #define OPENSSL_POLICY_DEBUG
+ */
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_POLICY_DEBUG
+
+static void expected_print(BIO *err, X509_POLICY_LEVEL *lev,
+                           X509_POLICY_NODE *node, int indent)
+{
+    if ((lev->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP)
+        || !(node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAP_MASK))
+        BIO_puts(err, "  Not Mapped\n");
+    else {
+        int i;
+        STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *pset = node->data->expected_policy_set;
+        ASN1_OBJECT *oid;
+        BIO_puts(err, "  Expected: ");
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(pset); i++) {
+            oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(pset, i);
+            if (i)
+                BIO_puts(err, ", ");
+            i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(err, oid);
+        }
+        BIO_puts(err, "\n");
+    }
+}
+
+static void tree_print(char *str, X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
+                       X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr)
+{
+    X509_POLICY_LEVEL *plev;
+    X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
+    int i;
+    BIO *err;
+    err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+    if (!curr)
+        curr = tree->levels + tree->nlevel;
+    else
+        curr++;
+    BIO_printf(err, "Level print after %s\n", str);
+    BIO_printf(err, "Printing Up to Level %ld\n", curr - tree->levels);
+    for (plev = tree->levels; plev != curr; plev++) {
+        BIO_printf(err, "Level %ld, flags = %x\n",
+                   plev - tree->levels, plev->flags);
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(plev->nodes); i++) {
+            node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(plev->nodes, i);
+            X509_POLICY_NODE_print(err, node, 2);
+            expected_print(err, plev, node, 2);
+            BIO_printf(err, "  Flags: %x\n", node->data->flags);
+        }
+        if (plev->anyPolicy)
+            X509_POLICY_NODE_print(err, plev->anyPolicy, 2);
+    }
+
+    BIO_free(err);
+
+}
+#else
+
+# define tree_print(a,b,c)      /* */
+
+#endif
+
+/*-
+ * Initialize policy tree. Return values:
+ *  0 Some internal error occurred.
+ * -1 Inconsistent or invalid extensions in certificates.
+ *  1 Tree initialized OK.
+ *  2 Policy tree is empty.
+ *  5 Tree OK and requireExplicitPolicy true.
+ *  6 Tree empty and requireExplicitPolicy true.
+ */
+
+static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+                     unsigned int flags)
+{
+    X509_POLICY_TREE *tree;
+    X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level;
+    const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache;
+    X509_POLICY_DATA *data = NULL;
+    X509 *x;
+    int ret = 1;
+    int i, n;
+    int explicit_policy;
+    int any_skip;
+    int map_skip;
+    *ptree = NULL;
+    n = sk_X509_num(certs);
+
+#if 0
+    /* Disable policy mapping for now... */
+    flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP;
+#endif
+
+    if (flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY)
+        explicit_policy = 0;
+    else
+        explicit_policy = n + 1;
+
+    if (flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY)
+        any_skip = 0;
+    else
+        any_skip = n + 1;
+
+    if (flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP)
+        map_skip = 0;
+    else
+        map_skip = n + 1;
+
+    /* Can't do anything with just a trust anchor */
+    if (n == 1)
+        return 1;
+    /*
+     * First setup policy cache in all certificates apart from the trust
+     * anchor. Note any bad cache results on the way. Also can calculate
+     * explicit_policy value at this point.
+     */
+    for (i = n - 2; i >= 0; i--) {
+        x = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
+        X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1);
+        cache = policy_cache_set(x);
+        /* If cache NULL something bad happened: return immediately */
+        if (cache == NULL)
+            return 0;
+        /*
+         * If inconsistent extensions keep a note of it but continue
+         */
+        if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY)
+            ret = -1;
+        /*
+         * Otherwise if we have no data (hence no CertificatePolicies) and
+         * haven't already set an inconsistent code note it.
+         */
+        else if ((ret == 1) && !cache->data)
+            ret = 2;
+        if (explicit_policy > 0) {
+            if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
+                explicit_policy--;
+            if ((cache->explicit_skip != -1)
+                && (cache->explicit_skip < explicit_policy))
+                explicit_policy = cache->explicit_skip;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (ret != 1) {
+        if (ret == 2 && !explicit_policy)
+            return 6;
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    /* If we get this far initialize the tree */
+
+    tree = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_POLICY_TREE));
+
+    if (!tree)
+        return 0;
+
+    tree->flags = 0;
+    tree->levels = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_POLICY_LEVEL) * n);
+    tree->nlevel = 0;
+    tree->extra_data = NULL;
+    tree->auth_policies = NULL;
+    tree->user_policies = NULL;
+
+    if (!tree->levels) {
+        OPENSSL_free(tree);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    OPENSSL_memset(tree->levels, 0, n * sizeof(X509_POLICY_LEVEL));
+
+    tree->nlevel = n;
+
+    level = tree->levels;
+
+    /* Root data: initialize to anyPolicy */
+
+    data = policy_data_new(NULL, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_any_policy), 0);
+
+    if (!data || !level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree))
+        goto bad_tree;
+
+    for (i = n - 2; i >= 0; i--) {
+        level++;
+        x = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
+        cache = policy_cache_set(x);
+        X509_up_ref(x);
+        level->cert = x;
+
+        if (!cache->anyPolicy)
+            level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY;
+
+        /* Determine inhibit any and inhibit map flags */
+        if (any_skip == 0) {
+            /*
+             * Any matching allowed if certificate is self issued and not the
+             * last in the chain.
+             */
+            if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) || (i == 0))
+                level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY;
+        } else {
+            if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
+                any_skip--;
+            if ((cache->any_skip >= 0)
+                && (cache->any_skip < any_skip))
+                any_skip = cache->any_skip;
+        }
+
+        if (map_skip == 0)
+            level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP;
+        else {
+            if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
+                map_skip--;
+            if ((cache->map_skip >= 0)
+                && (cache->map_skip < map_skip))
+                map_skip = cache->map_skip;
+        }
+
+    }
+
+    *ptree = tree;
+
+    if (explicit_policy)
+        return 1;
+    else
+        return 5;
+
+ bad_tree:
+
+    X509_policy_tree_free(tree);
+
+    return 0;
+
+}
+
+static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
+                                    X509_POLICY_DATA *data)
+{
+    X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1;
+    X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
+    int matched = 0;
+    size_t i;
+    /* Iterate through all in nodes linking matches */
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(last->nodes); i++) {
+        node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(last->nodes, i);
+        if (policy_node_match(last, node, data->valid_policy)) {
+            if (!level_add_node(curr, data, node, NULL))
+                return 0;
+            matched = 1;
+        }
+    }
+    if (!matched && last->anyPolicy) {
+        if (!level_add_node(curr, data, last->anyPolicy, NULL))
+            return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This corresponds to RFC3280 6.1.3(d)(1): link any data from
+ * CertificatePolicies onto matching parent or anyPolicy if no match.
+ */
+
+static int tree_link_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
+                           const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache)
+{
+    size_t i;
+    X509_POLICY_DATA *data;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_num(cache->data); i++) {
+        data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_value(cache->data, i);
+        /*
+         * If a node is mapped any it doesn't have a corresponding
+         * CertificatePolicies entry. However such an identical node would
+         * be created if anyPolicy matching is enabled because there would be
+         * no match with the parent valid_policy_set. So we create link
+         * because then it will have the mapping flags right and we can prune
+         * it later.
+         */
+#if 0
+        if ((data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAPPED_ANY)
+            && !(curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY))
+            continue;
+#endif
+        /* Look for matching nodes in previous level */
+        if (!tree_link_matching_nodes(curr, data))
+            return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This corresponds to RFC3280 6.1.3(d)(2): Create new data for any unmatched
+ * policies in the parent and link to anyPolicy.
+ */
+
+static int tree_add_unmatched(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
+                              const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache,
+                              const ASN1_OBJECT *id,
+                              X509_POLICY_NODE *node, X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
+{
+    X509_POLICY_DATA *data;
+    if (id == NULL)
+        id = node->data->valid_policy;
+    /*
+     * Create a new node with qualifiers from anyPolicy and id from unmatched
+     * node.
+     */
+    data = policy_data_new(NULL, id, node_critical(node));
+
+    if (data == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    /* Curr may not have anyPolicy */
+    data->qualifier_set = cache->anyPolicy->qualifier_set;
+    data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS;
+    if (!level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree)) {
+        policy_data_free(data);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int tree_link_unmatched(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
+                               const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache,
+                               X509_POLICY_NODE *node, X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
+{
+    const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1;
+    size_t i;
+
+    if ((last->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP)
+        || !(node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAPPED)) {
+        /* If no policy mapping: matched if one child present */
+        if (node->nchild)
+            return 1;
+        if (!tree_add_unmatched(curr, cache, NULL, node, tree))
+            return 0;
+        /* Add it */
+    } else {
+        /* If mapping: matched if one child per expected policy set */
+        STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *expset = node->data->expected_policy_set;
+        if ((size_t)node->nchild == sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(expset))
+            return 1;
+        /* Locate unmatched nodes */
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(expset); i++) {
+            ASN1_OBJECT *oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(expset, i);
+            if (level_find_node(curr, node, oid))
+                continue;
+            if (!tree_add_unmatched(curr, cache, oid, node, tree))
+                return 0;
+        }
+
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+
+}
+
+static int tree_link_any(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
+                         const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache,
+                         X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
+{
+    size_t i;
+    /*
+     * X509_POLICY_DATA *data;
+     */
+    X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
+    X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(last->nodes); i++) {
+        node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(last->nodes, i);
+
+        if (!tree_link_unmatched(curr, cache, node, tree))
+            return 0;
+
+#if 0
+
+        /*
+         * Skip any node with any children: we only want unmathced nodes.
+         * Note: need something better for policy mapping because each node
+         * may have multiple children
+         */
+        if (node->nchild)
+            continue;
+
+        /*
+         * Create a new node with qualifiers from anyPolicy and id from
+         * unmatched node.
+         */
+        data = policy_data_new(NULL, node->data->valid_policy,
+                               node_critical(node));
+
+        if (data == NULL)
+            return 0;
+        /* Curr may not have anyPolicy */
+        data->qualifier_set = cache->anyPolicy->qualifier_set;
+        data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS;
+        if (!level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree)) {
+            policy_data_free(data);
+            return 0;
+        }
+#endif
+
+    }
+    /* Finally add link to anyPolicy */
+    if (last->anyPolicy) {
+        if (!level_add_node(curr, cache->anyPolicy, last->anyPolicy, NULL))
+            return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Prune the tree: delete any child mapped child data on the current level
+ * then proceed up the tree deleting any data with no children. If we ever
+ * have no data on a level we can halt because the tree will be empty.
+ */
+
+static int tree_prune(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr)
+{
+    STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes;
+    X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
+    int i;
+    nodes = curr->nodes;
+    if (curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) {
+        for (i = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+            node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(nodes, i);
+            /* Delete any mapped data: see RFC3280 XXXX */
+            if (node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAP_MASK) {
+                node->parent->nchild--;
+                OPENSSL_free(node);
+                (void)sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete(nodes, i);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    for (;;) {
+        --curr;
+        nodes = curr->nodes;
+        for (i = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+            node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(nodes, i);
+            if (node->nchild == 0) {
+                node->parent->nchild--;
+                OPENSSL_free(node);
+                (void)sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete(nodes, i);
+            }
+        }
+        if (curr->anyPolicy && !curr->anyPolicy->nchild) {
+            if (curr->anyPolicy->parent)
+                curr->anyPolicy->parent->nchild--;
+            OPENSSL_free(curr->anyPolicy);
+            curr->anyPolicy = NULL;
+        }
+        if (curr == tree->levels) {
+            /* If we zapped anyPolicy at top then tree is empty */
+            if (!curr->anyPolicy)
+                return 2;
+            return 1;
+        }
+    }
+
+}
+
+static int tree_add_auth_node(STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) **pnodes,
+                              X509_POLICY_NODE *pcy)
+{
+    if (!*pnodes) {
+        *pnodes = policy_node_cmp_new();
+        if (!*pnodes)
+            return 0;
+    } else if (sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_find(*pnodes, NULL, pcy))
+        return 1;
+
+    if (!sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(*pnodes, pcy))
+        return 0;
+
+    return 1;
+
+}
+
+/*
+ * Calculate the authority set based on policy tree. The 'pnodes' parameter
+ * is used as a store for the set of policy nodes used to calculate the user
+ * set. If the authority set is not anyPolicy then pnodes will just point to
+ * the authority set. If however the authority set is anyPolicy then the set
+ * of valid policies (other than anyPolicy) is store in pnodes. The return
+ * value of '2' is used in this case to indicate that pnodes should be freed.
+ */
+
+static int tree_calculate_authority_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
+                                        STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) **pnodes)
+{
+    X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr;
+    X509_POLICY_NODE *node, *anyptr;
+    STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) **addnodes;
+    int i;
+    size_t j;
+    curr = tree->levels + tree->nlevel - 1;
+
+    /* If last level contains anyPolicy set is anyPolicy */
+    if (curr->anyPolicy) {
+        if (!tree_add_auth_node(&tree->auth_policies, curr->anyPolicy))
+            return 0;
+        addnodes = pnodes;
+    } else
+        /* Add policies to authority set */
+        addnodes = &tree->auth_policies;
+
+    curr = tree->levels;
+    for (i = 1; i < tree->nlevel; i++) {
+        /*
+         * If no anyPolicy node on this this level it can't appear on lower
+         * levels so end search.
+         */
+        if (!(anyptr = curr->anyPolicy))
+            break;
+        curr++;
+        for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(curr->nodes); j++) {
+            node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(curr->nodes, j);
+            if ((node->parent == anyptr)
+                && !tree_add_auth_node(addnodes, node))
+                return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (addnodes == pnodes)
+        return 2;
+
+    *pnodes = tree->auth_policies;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int tree_calculate_user_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
+                                   STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policy_oids,
+                                   STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *auth_nodes)
+{
+    size_t i;
+    X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
+    ASN1_OBJECT *oid;
+
+    X509_POLICY_NODE *anyPolicy;
+    X509_POLICY_DATA *extra;
+
+    /*
+     * Check if anyPolicy present in authority constrained policy set: this
+     * will happen if it is a leaf node.
+     */
+
+    if (sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policy_oids) <= 0)
+        return 1;
+
+    anyPolicy = tree->levels[tree->nlevel - 1].anyPolicy;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policy_oids); i++) {
+        oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(policy_oids, i);
+        if (OBJ_obj2nid(oid) == NID_any_policy) {
+            tree->flags |= POLICY_FLAG_ANY_POLICY;
+            return 1;
+        }
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policy_oids); i++) {
+        oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(policy_oids, i);
+        node = tree_find_sk(auth_nodes, oid);
+        if (!node) {
+            if (!anyPolicy)
+                continue;
+            /*
+             * Create a new node with policy ID from user set and qualifiers
+             * from anyPolicy.
+             */
+            extra = policy_data_new(NULL, oid, node_critical(anyPolicy));
+            if (!extra)
+                return 0;
+            extra->qualifier_set = anyPolicy->data->qualifier_set;
+            extra->flags = POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS
+                | POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE;
+            node = level_add_node(NULL, extra, anyPolicy->parent, tree);
+        }
+        if (!tree->user_policies) {
+            tree->user_policies = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new_null();
+            if (!tree->user_policies)
+                return 1;
+        }
+        if (!sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(tree->user_policies, node))
+            return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+
+}
+
+static int tree_evaluate(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
+{
+    int ret, i;
+    X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr = tree->levels + 1;
+    const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache;
+
+    for (i = 1; i < tree->nlevel; i++, curr++) {
+        cache = policy_cache_set(curr->cert);
+        if (!tree_link_nodes(curr, cache))
+            return 0;
+
+        if (!(curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY)
+            && !tree_link_any(curr, cache, tree))
+            return 0;
+        tree_print("before tree_prune()", tree, curr);
+        ret = tree_prune(tree, curr);
+        if (ret != 1)
+            return ret;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+
+}
+
+static void exnode_free(X509_POLICY_NODE *node)
+{
+    if (node->data && (node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE))
+        OPENSSL_free(node);
+}
+
+void X509_policy_tree_free(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
+{
+    X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr;
+    int i;
+
+    if (!tree)
+        return;
+
+    sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_free(tree->auth_policies);
+    sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop_free(tree->user_policies, exnode_free);
+
+    for (i = 0, curr = tree->levels; i < tree->nlevel; i++, curr++) {
+        if (curr->cert)
+            X509_free(curr->cert);
+        if (curr->nodes)
+            sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop_free(curr->nodes, policy_node_free);
+        if (curr->anyPolicy)
+            policy_node_free(curr->anyPolicy);
+    }
+
+    if (tree->extra_data)
+        sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_pop_free(tree->extra_data, policy_data_free);
+
+    OPENSSL_free(tree->levels);
+    OPENSSL_free(tree);
+
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Application policy checking function.
+ * Return codes:
+ *  0   Internal Error.
+ *  1   Successful.
+ * -1   One or more certificates contain invalid or inconsistent extensions
+ * -2   User constrained policy set empty and requireExplicit true.
+ */
+
+int X509_policy_check(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, int *pexplicit_policy,
+                      STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+                      STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policy_oids, unsigned int flags)
+{
+    int ret;
+    int calc_ret;
+    X509_POLICY_TREE *tree = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes, *auth_nodes = NULL;
+    *ptree = NULL;
+
+    *pexplicit_policy = 0;
+    ret = tree_init(&tree, certs, flags);
+
+    switch (ret) {
+
+        /* Tree empty requireExplicit False: OK */
+    case 2:
+        return 1;
+
+        /* Some internal error */
+    case -1:
+        return -1;
+
+        /* Some internal error */
+    case 0:
+        return 0;
+
+        /* Tree empty requireExplicit True: Error */
+
+    case 6:
+        *pexplicit_policy = 1;
+        return -2;
+
+        /* Tree OK requireExplicit True: OK and continue */
+    case 5:
+        *pexplicit_policy = 1;
+        break;
+
+        /* Tree OK: continue */
+
+    case 1:
+        if (!tree)
+            /*
+             * tree_init() returns success and a null tree
+             * if it's just looking at a trust anchor.
+             * I'm not sure that returning success here is
+             * correct, but I'm sure that reporting this
+             * as an internal error which our caller
+             * interprets as a malloc failure is wrong.
+             */
+            return 1;
+        break;
+    }
+
+    if (!tree)
+        goto error;
+    ret = tree_evaluate(tree);
+
+    tree_print("tree_evaluate()", tree, NULL);
+
+    if (ret <= 0)
+        goto error;
+
+    /* Return value 2 means tree empty */
+    if (ret == 2) {
+        X509_policy_tree_free(tree);
+        if (*pexplicit_policy)
+            return -2;
+        else
+            return 1;
+    }
+
+    /* Tree is not empty: continue */
+
+    calc_ret = tree_calculate_authority_set(tree, &auth_nodes);
+
+    if (!calc_ret)
+        goto error;
+
+    ret = tree_calculate_user_set(tree, policy_oids, auth_nodes);
+
+    if (calc_ret == 2)
+        sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_free(auth_nodes);
+
+    if (!ret)
+        goto error;
+
+
+    if (tree)
+        *ptree = tree;
+
+    if (*pexplicit_policy) {
+        nodes = X509_policy_tree_get0_user_policies(tree);
+        if (sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes) <= 0)
+            return -2;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+
+ error:
+
+    X509_policy_tree_free(tree);
+
+    return 0;
+
+}