grpc-flamingo 1.11.0

data/third_party/boringssl/ssl/ssl_lib.cc

@@ -0,0 +1,2650 @@
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ * 
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ * 
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ * 
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * 
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * 
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by 
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE. */
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/lhash.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+#include "../crypto/internal.h"
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_WINDOWS)
+#include <sys/timeb.h>
+#else
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+
+
+namespace bssl {
+
+// |SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL| is no longer emitted, but continue to define it
+// to avoid downstream churn.
+OPENSSL_DECLARE_ERROR_REASON(SSL, UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL)
+
+// The following errors are no longer emitted, but are used in nginx without
+// #ifdefs.
+OPENSSL_DECLARE_ERROR_REASON(SSL, BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG)
+OPENSSL_DECLARE_ERROR_REASON(SSL, NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED)
+
+// Some error codes are special. Ensure the make_errors.go script never
+// regresses this.
+static_assert(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_RENEGOTIATION ==
+                  SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION + SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET,
+              "alert reason code mismatch");
+
+// kMaxHandshakeSize is the maximum size, in bytes, of a handshake message.
+static const size_t kMaxHandshakeSize = (1u << 24) - 1;
+
+static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class_ssl =
+    CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT_WITH_APP_DATA;
+static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class_ssl_ctx =
+    CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT_WITH_APP_DATA;
+
+bool CBBFinishArray(CBB *cbb, Array<uint8_t> *out) {
+  uint8_t *ptr;
+  size_t len;
+  if (!CBB_finish(cbb, &ptr, &len)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return false;
+  }
+  out->Reset(ptr, len);
+  return true;
+}
+
+void ssl_reset_error_state(SSL *ssl) {
+  // Functions which use |SSL_get_error| must reset I/O and error state on
+  // entry.
+  ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+  ERR_clear_error();
+  ERR_clear_system_error();
+}
+
+void ssl_set_read_error(SSL* ssl) {
+  ssl->s3->read_shutdown = ssl_shutdown_error;
+  ssl->s3->read_error.reset(ERR_save_state());
+}
+
+static bool check_read_error(const SSL *ssl) {
+  if (ssl->s3->read_shutdown == ssl_shutdown_error) {
+    ERR_restore_state(ssl->s3->read_error.get());
+    return false;
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
+int ssl_can_write(const SSL *ssl) {
+  return !SSL_in_init(ssl) || ssl->s3->hs->can_early_write;
+}
+
+int ssl_can_read(const SSL *ssl) {
+  return !SSL_in_init(ssl) || ssl->s3->hs->can_early_read;
+}
+
+ssl_open_record_t ssl_open_handshake(SSL *ssl, size_t *out_consumed,
+                                     uint8_t *out_alert, Span<uint8_t> in) {
+  *out_consumed = 0;
+  if (!check_read_error(ssl)) {
+    *out_alert = 0;
+    return ssl_open_record_error;
+  }
+  auto ret = ssl->method->open_handshake(ssl, out_consumed, out_alert, in);
+  if (ret == ssl_open_record_error) {
+    ssl_set_read_error(ssl);
+  }
+  return ret;
+}
+
+ssl_open_record_t ssl_open_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl, size_t *out_consumed,
+                                              uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                              Span<uint8_t> in) {
+  *out_consumed = 0;
+  if (!check_read_error(ssl)) {
+    *out_alert = 0;
+    return ssl_open_record_error;
+  }
+  auto ret =
+      ssl->method->open_change_cipher_spec(ssl, out_consumed, out_alert, in);
+  if (ret == ssl_open_record_error) {
+    ssl_set_read_error(ssl);
+  }
+  return ret;
+}
+
+ssl_open_record_t ssl_open_app_data(SSL *ssl, Span<uint8_t> *out,
+                                    size_t *out_consumed, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                    Span<uint8_t> in) {
+  *out_consumed = 0;
+  if (!check_read_error(ssl)) {
+    *out_alert = 0;
+    return ssl_open_record_error;
+  }
+  auto ret = ssl->method->open_app_data(ssl, out, out_consumed, out_alert, in);
+  if (ret == ssl_open_record_error) {
+    ssl_set_read_error(ssl);
+  }
+  return ret;
+}
+
+void ssl_cipher_preference_list_free(
+    struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st *cipher_list) {
+  if (cipher_list == NULL) {
+    return;
+  }
+  sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipher_list->ciphers);
+  OPENSSL_free(cipher_list->in_group_flags);
+  OPENSSL_free(cipher_list);
+}
+
+void ssl_update_cache(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, int mode) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  SSL_CTX *ctx = ssl->session_ctx;
+  // Never cache sessions with empty session IDs.
+  if (ssl->s3->established_session->session_id_length == 0 ||
+      ssl->s3->established_session->not_resumable ||
+      (ctx->session_cache_mode & mode) != mode) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // Clients never use the internal session cache.
+  int use_internal_cache = ssl->server && !(ctx->session_cache_mode &
+                                            SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE);
+
+  // A client may see new sessions on abbreviated handshakes if the server
+  // decides to renew the ticket. Once the handshake is completed, it should be
+  // inserted into the cache.
+  if (ssl->s3->established_session.get() != ssl->session ||
+      (!ssl->server && hs->ticket_expected)) {
+    if (use_internal_cache) {
+      SSL_CTX_add_session(ctx, ssl->s3->established_session.get());
+    }
+    if (ctx->new_session_cb != NULL) {
+      SSL_SESSION_up_ref(ssl->s3->established_session.get());
+      if (!ctx->new_session_cb(ssl, ssl->s3->established_session.get())) {
+        // |new_session_cb|'s return value signals whether it took ownership.
+        SSL_SESSION_free(ssl->s3->established_session.get());
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (use_internal_cache &&
+      !(ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR)) {
+    // Automatically flush the internal session cache every 255 connections.
+    int flush_cache = 0;
+    CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&ctx->lock);
+    ctx->handshakes_since_cache_flush++;
+    if (ctx->handshakes_since_cache_flush >= 255) {
+      flush_cache = 1;
+      ctx->handshakes_since_cache_flush = 0;
+    }
+    CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&ctx->lock);
+
+    if (flush_cache) {
+      struct OPENSSL_timeval now;
+      ssl_get_current_time(ssl, &now);
+      SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(ctx, now.tv_sec);
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+static int cbb_add_hex(CBB *cbb, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) {
+  static const char hextable[] = "0123456789abcdef";
+  uint8_t *out;
+
+  if (!CBB_add_space(cbb, &out, in_len * 2)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < in_len; i++) {
+    *(out++) = (uint8_t)hextable[in[i] >> 4];
+    *(out++) = (uint8_t)hextable[in[i] & 0xf];
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_log_secret(const SSL *ssl, const char *label, const uint8_t *secret,
+                   size_t secret_len) {
+  if (ssl->ctx->keylog_callback == NULL) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  ScopedCBB cbb;
+  uint8_t *out;
+  size_t out_len;
+  if (!CBB_init(cbb.get(), strlen(label) + 1 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2 + 1 +
+                          secret_len * 2 + 1) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(cbb.get(), (const uint8_t *)label, strlen(label)) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(cbb.get(), (const uint8_t *)" ", 1) ||
+      !cbb_add_hex(cbb.get(), ssl->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(cbb.get(), (const uint8_t *)" ", 1) ||
+      !cbb_add_hex(cbb.get(), secret, secret_len) ||
+      !CBB_add_u8(cbb.get(), 0 /* NUL */) ||
+      !CBB_finish(cbb.get(), &out, &out_len)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  ssl->ctx->keylog_callback(ssl, (const char *)out);
+  OPENSSL_free(out);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+void ssl_do_info_callback(const SSL *ssl, int type, int value) {
+  void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int value) = NULL;
+  if (ssl->info_callback != NULL) {
+    cb = ssl->info_callback;
+  } else if (ssl->ctx->info_callback != NULL) {
+    cb = ssl->ctx->info_callback;
+  }
+
+  if (cb != NULL) {
+    cb(ssl, type, value);
+  }
+}
+
+void ssl_do_msg_callback(SSL *ssl, int is_write, int content_type,
+                         Span<const uint8_t> in) {
+  if (ssl->msg_callback == NULL) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // |version| is zero when calling for |SSL3_RT_HEADER| and |SSL2_VERSION| for
+  // a V2ClientHello.
+  int version;
+  switch (content_type) {
+    case 0:
+      // V2ClientHello
+      version = SSL2_VERSION;
+      break;
+    case SSL3_RT_HEADER:
+      version = 0;
+      break;
+    default:
+      version = SSL_version(ssl);
+  }
+
+  ssl->msg_callback(is_write, version, content_type, in.data(), in.size(), ssl,
+                    ssl->msg_callback_arg);
+}
+
+void ssl_get_current_time(const SSL *ssl, struct OPENSSL_timeval *out_clock) {
+  // TODO(martinkr): Change callers to |ssl_ctx_get_current_time| and drop the
+  // |ssl| arg from |current_time_cb| if possible.
+  ssl_ctx_get_current_time(ssl->ctx, out_clock);
+}
+
+void ssl_ctx_get_current_time(const SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                              struct OPENSSL_timeval *out_clock) {
+  if (ctx->current_time_cb != NULL) {
+    // TODO(davidben): Update current_time_cb to use OPENSSL_timeval. See
+    // https://crbug.com/boringssl/155.
+    struct timeval clock;
+    ctx->current_time_cb(nullptr /* ssl */, &clock);
+    if (clock.tv_sec < 0) {
+      assert(0);
+      out_clock->tv_sec = 0;
+      out_clock->tv_usec = 0;
+    } else {
+      out_clock->tv_sec = (uint64_t)clock.tv_sec;
+      out_clock->tv_usec = (uint32_t)clock.tv_usec;
+    }
+    return;
+  }
+
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_DETERMINISTIC_MODE)
+  out_clock->tv_sec = 1234;
+  out_clock->tv_usec = 1234;
+#elif defined(OPENSSL_WINDOWS)
+  struct _timeb time;
+  _ftime(&time);
+  if (time.time < 0) {
+    assert(0);
+    out_clock->tv_sec = 0;
+    out_clock->tv_usec = 0;
+  } else {
+    out_clock->tv_sec = time.time;
+    out_clock->tv_usec = time.millitm * 1000;
+  }
+#else
+  struct timeval clock;
+  gettimeofday(&clock, NULL);
+  if (clock.tv_sec < 0) {
+    assert(0);
+    out_clock->tv_sec = 0;
+    out_clock->tv_usec = 0;
+  } else {
+    out_clock->tv_sec = (uint64_t)clock.tv_sec;
+    out_clock->tv_usec = (uint32_t)clock.tv_usec;
+  }
+#endif
+}
+
+}  // namespace bssl
+
+using namespace bssl;
+
+int SSL_library_init(void) {
+  CRYPTO_library_init();
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int OPENSSL_init_ssl(uint64_t opts, const OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS *settings) {
+  CRYPTO_library_init();
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static uint32_t ssl_session_hash(const SSL_SESSION *sess) {
+  const uint8_t *session_id = sess->session_id;
+
+  uint8_t tmp_storage[sizeof(uint32_t)];
+  if (sess->session_id_length < sizeof(tmp_storage)) {
+    OPENSSL_memset(tmp_storage, 0, sizeof(tmp_storage));
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(tmp_storage, sess->session_id, sess->session_id_length);
+    session_id = tmp_storage;
+  }
+
+  uint32_t hash =
+      ((uint32_t)session_id[0]) |
+      ((uint32_t)session_id[1] << 8) |
+      ((uint32_t)session_id[2] << 16) |
+      ((uint32_t)session_id[3] << 24);
+
+  return hash;
+}
+
+// NB: If this function (or indeed the hash function which uses a sort of
+// coarser function than this one) is changed, ensure
+// SSL_CTX_has_matching_session_id() is checked accordingly. It relies on being
+// able to construct an SSL_SESSION that will collide with any existing session
+// with a matching session ID.
+static int ssl_session_cmp(const SSL_SESSION *a, const SSL_SESSION *b) {
+  if (a->ssl_version != b->ssl_version) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  if (a->session_id_length != b->session_id_length) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  return OPENSSL_memcmp(a->session_id, b->session_id, a->session_id_length);
+}
+
+SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *method) {
+  SSL_CTX *ret = NULL;
+
+  if (method == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  ret = (SSL_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_CTX));
+  if (ret == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  OPENSSL_memset(ret, 0, sizeof(SSL_CTX));
+
+  ret->method = method->method;
+  ret->x509_method = method->x509_method;
+
+  CRYPTO_MUTEX_init(&ret->lock);
+
+  ret->session_cache_mode = SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER;
+  ret->session_cache_size = SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT;
+
+  ret->session_timeout = SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_TIMEOUT;
+  ret->session_psk_dhe_timeout = SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_PSK_DHE_TIMEOUT;
+
+  ret->references = 1;
+
+  ret->max_cert_list = SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT;
+  ret->verify_mode = SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
+  ret->cert = ssl_cert_new(method->x509_method);
+  if (ret->cert == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  ret->sessions = lh_SSL_SESSION_new(ssl_session_hash, ssl_session_cmp);
+  if (ret->sessions == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (!ret->x509_method->ssl_ctx_new(ret)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (!SSL_CTX_set_strict_cipher_list(ret, SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST)) {
+    goto err2;
+  }
+
+  ret->client_CA = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_null();
+  if (ret->client_CA == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&ret->ex_data);
+
+  ret->max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
+
+  // Disable the auto-chaining feature by default. Once this has stuck without
+  // problems, the feature will be removed entirely.
+  ret->mode = SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN;
+
+  // Lock the SSL_CTX to the specified version, for compatibility with legacy
+  // uses of SSL_METHOD, but we do not set the minimum version for
+  // |SSLv3_method|.
+  if (!SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(ret, method->version) ||
+      !SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(ret, method->version == SSL3_VERSION
+                                              ? 0  // default
+                                              : method->version)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    goto err2;
+  }
+
+  return ret;
+
+err:
+  OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+err2:
+  SSL_CTX_free(ret);
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_up_ref(SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+  CRYPTO_refcount_inc(&ctx->references);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+  if (ctx == NULL ||
+      !CRYPTO_refcount_dec_and_test_zero(&ctx->references)) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // Free internal session cache. However: the remove_cb() may reference the
+  // ex_data of SSL_CTX, thus the ex_data store can only be removed after the
+  // sessions were flushed. As the ex_data handling routines might also touch
+  // the session cache, the most secure solution seems to be: empty (flush) the
+  // cache, then free ex_data, then finally free the cache. (See ticket
+  // [openssl.org #212].)
+  SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(ctx, 0);
+
+  CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class_ssl_ctx, ctx, &ctx->ex_data);
+
+  CRYPTO_MUTEX_cleanup(&ctx->lock);
+  lh_SSL_SESSION_free(ctx->sessions);
+  ssl_cipher_preference_list_free(ctx->cipher_list);
+  ssl_cert_free(ctx->cert);
+  sk_SSL_CUSTOM_EXTENSION_pop_free(ctx->client_custom_extensions,
+                                   SSL_CUSTOM_EXTENSION_free);
+  sk_SSL_CUSTOM_EXTENSION_pop_free(ctx->server_custom_extensions,
+                                   SSL_CUSTOM_EXTENSION_free);
+  sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(ctx->client_CA, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free);
+  ctx->x509_method->ssl_ctx_free(ctx);
+  sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(ctx->srtp_profiles);
+  OPENSSL_free(ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+  OPENSSL_free(ctx->supported_group_list);
+  OPENSSL_free(ctx->alpn_client_proto_list);
+  EVP_PKEY_free(ctx->tlsext_channel_id_private);
+  OPENSSL_free(ctx->verify_sigalgs);
+  OPENSSL_free(ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current);
+  OPENSSL_free(ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_prev);
+
+  OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+}
+
+SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+  if (ctx == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  if (ctx->method == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_CTX_HAS_NO_DEFAULT_SSL_VERSION);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  SSL *ssl = (SSL *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL));
+  if (ssl == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  OPENSSL_memset(ssl, 0, sizeof(SSL));
+
+  ssl->conf_min_version = ctx->conf_min_version;
+  ssl->conf_max_version = ctx->conf_max_version;
+  ssl->tls13_variant = ctx->tls13_variant;
+
+  // RFC 6347 states that implementations SHOULD use an initial timer value of
+  // 1 second.
+  ssl->initial_timeout_duration_ms = 1000;
+
+  ssl->options = ctx->options;
+  ssl->mode = ctx->mode;
+  ssl->max_cert_list = ctx->max_cert_list;
+
+  ssl->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert);
+  if (ssl->cert == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  ssl->msg_callback = ctx->msg_callback;
+  ssl->msg_callback_arg = ctx->msg_callback_arg;
+  ssl->verify_mode = ctx->verify_mode;
+  ssl->verify_callback = ctx->default_verify_callback;
+  ssl->custom_verify_callback = ctx->custom_verify_callback;
+  ssl->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs =
+      ctx->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs;
+
+  ssl->quiet_shutdown = ctx->quiet_shutdown;
+  ssl->max_send_fragment = ctx->max_send_fragment;
+
+  SSL_CTX_up_ref(ctx);
+  ssl->ctx = ctx;
+  SSL_CTX_up_ref(ctx);
+  ssl->session_ctx = ctx;
+
+  if (!ssl->ctx->x509_method->ssl_new(ssl)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (ctx->supported_group_list) {
+    ssl->supported_group_list = (uint16_t *)BUF_memdup(
+        ctx->supported_group_list, ctx->supported_group_list_len * 2);
+    if (!ssl->supported_group_list) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+    ssl->supported_group_list_len = ctx->supported_group_list_len;
+  }
+
+  if (ctx->alpn_client_proto_list) {
+    ssl->alpn_client_proto_list = (uint8_t *)BUF_memdup(
+        ctx->alpn_client_proto_list, ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
+    if (ssl->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+    ssl->alpn_client_proto_list_len = ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
+  }
+
+  ssl->method = ctx->method;
+
+  if (!ssl->method->ssl_new(ssl)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&ssl->ex_data);
+
+  ssl->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
+  if (ctx->psk_identity_hint) {
+    ssl->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+    if (ssl->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+  ssl->psk_client_callback = ctx->psk_client_callback;
+  ssl->psk_server_callback = ctx->psk_server_callback;
+
+  ssl->tlsext_channel_id_enabled = ctx->tlsext_channel_id_enabled;
+  if (ctx->tlsext_channel_id_private) {
+    EVP_PKEY_up_ref(ctx->tlsext_channel_id_private);
+    ssl->tlsext_channel_id_private = ctx->tlsext_channel_id_private;
+  }
+
+  ssl->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled = ctx->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled;
+  ssl->ocsp_stapling_enabled = ctx->ocsp_stapling_enabled;
+
+  return ssl;
+
+err:
+  SSL_free(ssl);
+  OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+void SSL_free(SSL *ssl) {
+  if (ssl == NULL) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (ssl->ctx != NULL) {
+    ssl->ctx->x509_method->ssl_free(ssl);
+  }
+
+  CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class_ssl, ssl, &ssl->ex_data);
+
+  BIO_free_all(ssl->rbio);
+  BIO_free_all(ssl->wbio);
+
+  // add extra stuff
+  ssl_cipher_preference_list_free(ssl->cipher_list);
+
+  SSL_SESSION_free(ssl->session);
+
+  ssl_cert_free(ssl->cert);
+
+  OPENSSL_free(ssl->tlsext_hostname);
+  SSL_CTX_free(ssl->session_ctx);
+  OPENSSL_free(ssl->supported_group_list);
+  OPENSSL_free(ssl->alpn_client_proto_list);
+  EVP_PKEY_free(ssl->tlsext_channel_id_private);
+  OPENSSL_free(ssl->psk_identity_hint);
+  sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(ssl->client_CA, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free);
+  sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(ssl->srtp_profiles);
+
+  if (ssl->method != NULL) {
+    ssl->method->ssl_free(ssl);
+  }
+  SSL_CTX_free(ssl->ctx);
+
+  OPENSSL_free(ssl);
+}
+
+void SSL_set_connect_state(SSL *ssl) {
+  ssl->server = false;
+  ssl->do_handshake = ssl_client_handshake;
+}
+
+void SSL_set_accept_state(SSL *ssl) {
+  ssl->server = true;
+  ssl->do_handshake = ssl_server_handshake;
+}
+
+void SSL_set0_rbio(SSL *ssl, BIO *rbio) {
+  BIO_free_all(ssl->rbio);
+  ssl->rbio = rbio;
+}
+
+void SSL_set0_wbio(SSL *ssl, BIO *wbio) {
+  BIO_free_all(ssl->wbio);
+  ssl->wbio = wbio;
+}
+
+void SSL_set_bio(SSL *ssl, BIO *rbio, BIO *wbio) {
+  // For historical reasons, this function has many different cases in ownership
+  // handling.
+
+  // If nothing has changed, do nothing
+  if (rbio == SSL_get_rbio(ssl) && wbio == SSL_get_wbio(ssl)) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // If the two arguments are equal, one fewer reference is granted than
+  // taken.
+  if (rbio != NULL && rbio == wbio) {
+    BIO_up_ref(rbio);
+  }
+
+  // If only the wbio is changed, adopt only one reference.
+  if (rbio == SSL_get_rbio(ssl)) {
+    SSL_set0_wbio(ssl, wbio);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // There is an asymmetry here for historical reasons. If only the rbio is
+  // changed AND the rbio and wbio were originally different, then we only adopt
+  // one reference.
+  if (wbio == SSL_get_wbio(ssl) && SSL_get_rbio(ssl) != SSL_get_wbio(ssl)) {
+    SSL_set0_rbio(ssl, rbio);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // Otherwise, adopt both references.
+  SSL_set0_rbio(ssl, rbio);
+  SSL_set0_wbio(ssl, wbio);
+}
+
+BIO *SSL_get_rbio(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->rbio; }
+
+BIO *SSL_get_wbio(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->wbio; }
+
+int SSL_do_handshake(SSL *ssl) {
+  ssl_reset_error_state(ssl);
+
+  if (ssl->do_handshake == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  if (!SSL_in_init(ssl)) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  // Run the handshake.
+  SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs = ssl->s3->hs.get();
+
+  bool early_return = false;
+  int ret = ssl_run_handshake(hs, &early_return);
+  ssl_do_info_callback(
+      ssl, ssl->server ? SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT : SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT, ret);
+  if (ret <= 0) {
+    return ret;
+  }
+
+  // Destroy the handshake object if the handshake has completely finished.
+  if (!early_return) {
+    ssl->s3->hs.reset();
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_connect(SSL *ssl) {
+  if (ssl->do_handshake == NULL) {
+    // Not properly initialized yet
+    SSL_set_connect_state(ssl);
+  }
+
+  return SSL_do_handshake(ssl);
+}
+
+int SSL_accept(SSL *ssl) {
+  if (ssl->do_handshake == NULL) {
+    // Not properly initialized yet
+    SSL_set_accept_state(ssl);
+  }
+
+  return SSL_do_handshake(ssl);
+}
+
+static int ssl_do_post_handshake(SSL *ssl, const SSLMessage &msg) {
+  if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    return tls13_post_handshake(ssl, msg);
+  }
+
+  // We do not accept renegotiations as a server or SSL 3.0. SSL 3.0 will be
+  // removed entirely in the future and requires retaining more data for
+  // renegotiation_info.
+  if (ssl->server || ssl->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
+    goto no_renegotiation;
+  }
+
+  if (msg.type != SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST || CBS_len(&msg.body) != 0) {
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  switch (ssl->renegotiate_mode) {
+    case ssl_renegotiate_ignore:
+      // Ignore the HelloRequest.
+      return 1;
+
+    case ssl_renegotiate_once:
+      if (ssl->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) {
+        goto no_renegotiation;
+      }
+      break;
+
+    case ssl_renegotiate_never:
+      goto no_renegotiation;
+
+    case ssl_renegotiate_freely:
+      break;
+  }
+
+  // Renegotiation is only supported at quiescent points in the application
+  // protocol, namely in HTTPS, just before reading the HTTP response. Require
+  // the record-layer be idle and avoid complexities of sending a handshake
+  // record while an application_data record is being written.
+  if (!ssl->s3->write_buffer.empty() ||
+      ssl->s3->write_shutdown != ssl_shutdown_none) {
+    goto no_renegotiation;
+  }
+
+  // Begin a new handshake.
+  if (ssl->s3->hs != nullptr) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  ssl->s3->hs = ssl_handshake_new(ssl);
+  if (ssl->s3->hs == nullptr) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  ssl->s3->total_renegotiations++;
+  return 1;
+
+no_renegotiation:
+  OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
+  ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
+  return 0;
+}
+
+static int ssl_read_impl(SSL *ssl) {
+  ssl_reset_error_state(ssl);
+
+  if (ssl->do_handshake == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  // Replay post-handshake message errors.
+  if (!check_read_error(ssl)) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  while (ssl->s3->pending_app_data.empty()) {
+    // Complete the current handshake, if any. False Start will cause
+    // |SSL_do_handshake| to return mid-handshake, so this may require multiple
+    // iterations.
+    while (!ssl_can_read(ssl)) {
+      int ret = SSL_do_handshake(ssl);
+      if (ret < 0) {
+        return ret;
+      }
+      if (ret == 0) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+        return -1;
+      }
+    }
+
+    // Process any buffered post-handshake messages.
+    SSLMessage msg;
+    if (ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
+      // If we received an interrupt in early read (EndOfEarlyData), loop again
+      // for the handshake to process it.
+      if (SSL_in_init(ssl)) {
+        ssl->s3->hs->can_early_read = false;
+        continue;
+      }
+
+      // Handle the post-handshake message and try again.
+      if (!ssl_do_post_handshake(ssl, msg)) {
+        ssl_set_read_error(ssl);
+        return -1;
+      }
+      ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
+      continue;  // Loop again. We may have begun a new handshake.
+    }
+
+    uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+    size_t consumed = 0;
+    auto ret = ssl_open_app_data(ssl, &ssl->s3->pending_app_data, &consumed,
+                                 &alert, ssl->s3->read_buffer.span());
+    bool retry;
+    int bio_ret = ssl_handle_open_record(ssl, &retry, ret, consumed, alert);
+    if (bio_ret <= 0) {
+      return bio_ret;
+    }
+    if (!retry) {
+      assert(!ssl->s3->pending_app_data.empty());
+      ssl->s3->key_update_count = 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_read(SSL *ssl, void *buf, int num) {
+  int ret = SSL_peek(ssl, buf, num);
+  if (ret <= 0) {
+    return ret;
+  }
+  // TODO(davidben): In DTLS, should the rest of the record be discarded?  DTLS
+  // is not a stream. See https://crbug.com/boringssl/65.
+  ssl->s3->pending_app_data =
+      ssl->s3->pending_app_data.subspan(static_cast<size_t>(ret));
+  if (ssl->s3->pending_app_data.empty()) {
+    ssl->s3->read_buffer.DiscardConsumed();
+  }
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int SSL_peek(SSL *ssl, void *buf, int num) {
+  int ret = ssl_read_impl(ssl);
+  if (ret <= 0) {
+    return ret;
+  }
+  if (num <= 0) {
+    return num;
+  }
+  size_t todo =
+      std::min(ssl->s3->pending_app_data.size(), static_cast<size_t>(num));
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(buf, ssl->s3->pending_app_data.data(), todo);
+  return static_cast<int>(todo);
+}
+
+int SSL_write(SSL *ssl, const void *buf, int num) {
+  ssl_reset_error_state(ssl);
+
+  if (ssl->do_handshake == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  if (ssl->s3->write_shutdown != ssl_shutdown_none) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  int ret = 0;
+  bool needs_handshake = false;
+  do {
+    // If necessary, complete the handshake implicitly.
+    if (!ssl_can_write(ssl)) {
+      ret = SSL_do_handshake(ssl);
+      if (ret < 0) {
+        return ret;
+      }
+      if (ret == 0) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+        return -1;
+      }
+    }
+
+    ret = ssl->method->write_app_data(ssl, &needs_handshake,
+                                      (const uint8_t *)buf, num);
+  } while (needs_handshake);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int SSL_shutdown(SSL *ssl) {
+  ssl_reset_error_state(ssl);
+
+  if (ssl->do_handshake == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  // If we are in the middle of a handshake, silently succeed. Consumers often
+  // call this function before |SSL_free|, whether the handshake succeeded or
+  // not. We assume the caller has already handled failed handshakes.
+  if (SSL_in_init(ssl)) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  if (ssl->quiet_shutdown) {
+    // Do nothing if configured not to send a close_notify.
+    ssl->s3->write_shutdown = ssl_shutdown_close_notify;
+    ssl->s3->read_shutdown = ssl_shutdown_close_notify;
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  // This function completes in two stages. It sends a close_notify and then it
+  // waits for a close_notify to come in. Perform exactly one action and return
+  // whether or not it succeeds.
+
+  if (ssl->s3->write_shutdown != ssl_shutdown_close_notify) {
+    // Send a close_notify.
+    if (ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) <= 0) {
+      return -1;
+    }
+  } else if (ssl->s3->alert_dispatch) {
+    // Finish sending the close_notify.
+    if (ssl->method->dispatch_alert(ssl) <= 0) {
+      return -1;
+    }
+  } else if (ssl->s3->read_shutdown != ssl_shutdown_close_notify) {
+    if (SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
+      // Bidirectional shutdown doesn't make sense for an unordered
+      // transport. DTLS alerts also aren't delivered reliably, so we may even
+      // time out because the peer never received our close_notify. Report to
+      // the caller that the channel has fully shut down.
+      if (ssl->s3->read_shutdown == ssl_shutdown_error) {
+        ERR_restore_state(ssl->s3->read_error.get());
+        return -1;
+      }
+      ssl->s3->read_shutdown = ssl_shutdown_close_notify;
+    } else {
+      // Keep discarding data until we see a close_notify.
+      for (;;) {
+        ssl->s3->pending_app_data = Span<uint8_t>();
+        int ret = ssl_read_impl(ssl);
+        if (ret <= 0) {
+          break;
+        }
+      }
+      if (ssl->s3->read_shutdown != ssl_shutdown_close_notify) {
+        return -1;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Return 0 for unidirectional shutdown and 1 for bidirectional shutdown.
+  return ssl->s3->read_shutdown == ssl_shutdown_close_notify;
+}
+
+int SSL_send_fatal_alert(SSL *ssl, uint8_t alert) {
+  if (ssl->s3->alert_dispatch) {
+    if (ssl->s3->send_alert[0] != SSL3_AL_FATAL ||
+        ssl->s3->send_alert[1] != alert) {
+      // We are already attempting to write a different alert.
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN);
+      return -1;
+    }
+    return ssl->method->dispatch_alert(ssl);
+  }
+
+  return ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_early_data_enabled(SSL_CTX *ctx, int enabled) {
+  ctx->cert->enable_early_data = !!enabled;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_tls13_variant(SSL_CTX *ctx, enum tls13_variant_t variant) {
+  ctx->tls13_variant = variant;
+}
+
+void SSL_set_tls13_variant(SSL *ssl, enum tls13_variant_t variant) {
+  ssl->tls13_variant = variant;
+}
+
+void SSL_set_early_data_enabled(SSL *ssl, int enabled) {
+  ssl->cert->enable_early_data = !!enabled;
+}
+
+int SSL_in_early_data(const SSL *ssl) {
+  if (ssl->s3->hs == NULL) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return ssl->s3->hs->in_early_data;
+}
+
+int SSL_early_data_accepted(const SSL *ssl) {
+  return ssl->early_data_accepted;
+}
+
+void SSL_reset_early_data_reject(SSL *ssl) {
+  SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs = ssl->s3->hs.get();
+  if (hs == NULL ||
+      hs->wait != ssl_hs_early_data_rejected) {
+    abort();
+  }
+
+  hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
+  hs->in_early_data = false;
+  hs->early_session.reset();
+
+  // Discard any unfinished writes from the perspective of |SSL_write|'s
+  // retry. The handshake will transparently flush out the pending record
+  // (discarded by the server) to keep the framing correct.
+  ssl->s3->wpend_pending = false;
+}
+
+static int bio_retry_reason_to_error(int reason) {
+  switch (reason) {
+    case BIO_RR_CONNECT:
+      return SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT;
+    case BIO_RR_ACCEPT:
+      return SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT;
+    default:
+      return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL;
+  }
+}
+
+int SSL_get_error(const SSL *ssl, int ret_code) {
+  if (ret_code > 0) {
+    return SSL_ERROR_NONE;
+  }
+
+  // Make things return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL when doing SSL_do_handshake etc,
+  // where we do encode the error
+  uint32_t err = ERR_peek_error();
+  if (err != 0) {
+    if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_SYS) {
+      return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL;
+    }
+    return SSL_ERROR_SSL;
+  }
+
+  if (ret_code == 0) {
+    if (ssl->s3->read_shutdown == ssl_shutdown_close_notify) {
+      return SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN;
+    }
+    // An EOF was observed which violates the protocol, and the underlying
+    // transport does not participate in the error queue. Bubble up to the
+    // caller.
+    return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL;
+  }
+
+  switch (ssl->s3->rwstate) {
+    case SSL_PENDING_SESSION:
+      return SSL_ERROR_PENDING_SESSION;
+
+    case SSL_CERTIFICATE_SELECTION_PENDING:
+      return SSL_ERROR_PENDING_CERTIFICATE;
+
+    case SSL_READING: {
+      BIO *bio = SSL_get_rbio(ssl);
+      if (BIO_should_read(bio)) {
+        return SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ;
+      }
+
+      if (BIO_should_write(bio)) {
+        // TODO(davidben): OpenSSL historically checked for writes on the read
+        // BIO. Can this be removed?
+        return SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE;
+      }
+
+      if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) {
+        return bio_retry_reason_to_error(BIO_get_retry_reason(bio));
+      }
+
+      break;
+    }
+
+    case SSL_WRITING: {
+      BIO *bio = SSL_get_wbio(ssl);
+      if (BIO_should_write(bio)) {
+        return SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE;
+      }
+
+      if (BIO_should_read(bio)) {
+        // TODO(davidben): OpenSSL historically checked for reads on the write
+        // BIO. Can this be removed?
+        return SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ;
+      }
+
+      if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) {
+        return bio_retry_reason_to_error(BIO_get_retry_reason(bio));
+      }
+
+      break;
+    }
+
+    case SSL_X509_LOOKUP:
+      return SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP;
+
+    case SSL_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP:
+      return SSL_ERROR_WANT_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP;
+
+    case SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_OPERATION:
+      return SSL_ERROR_WANT_PRIVATE_KEY_OPERATION;
+
+    case SSL_PENDING_TICKET:
+      return SSL_ERROR_PENDING_TICKET;
+
+    case SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED:
+      return SSL_ERROR_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED;
+
+    case SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY:
+      return SSL_ERROR_WANT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
+  }
+
+  return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL;
+}
+
+uint32_t SSL_CTX_set_options(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint32_t options) {
+  ctx->options |= options;
+  return ctx->options;
+}
+
+uint32_t SSL_CTX_clear_options(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint32_t options) {
+  ctx->options &= ~options;
+  return ctx->options;
+}
+
+uint32_t SSL_CTX_get_options(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->options; }
+
+uint32_t SSL_set_options(SSL *ssl, uint32_t options) {
+  ssl->options |= options;
+  return ssl->options;
+}
+
+uint32_t SSL_clear_options(SSL *ssl, uint32_t options) {
+  ssl->options &= ~options;
+  return ssl->options;
+}
+
+uint32_t SSL_get_options(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->options; }
+
+uint32_t SSL_CTX_set_mode(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint32_t mode) {
+  ctx->mode |= mode;
+  return ctx->mode;
+}
+
+uint32_t SSL_CTX_clear_mode(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint32_t mode) {
+  ctx->mode &= ~mode;
+  return ctx->mode;
+}
+
+uint32_t SSL_CTX_get_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->mode; }
+
+uint32_t SSL_set_mode(SSL *ssl, uint32_t mode) {
+  ssl->mode |= mode;
+  return ssl->mode;
+}
+
+uint32_t SSL_clear_mode(SSL *ssl, uint32_t mode) {
+  ssl->mode &= ~mode;
+  return ssl->mode;
+}
+
+uint32_t SSL_get_mode(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->mode; }
+
+void SSL_CTX_set0_buffer_pool(SSL_CTX *ctx, CRYPTO_BUFFER_POOL *pool) {
+  ctx->pool = pool;
+}
+
+int SSL_get_tls_unique(const SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
+                       size_t max_out) {
+  *out_len = 0;
+  OPENSSL_memset(out, 0, max_out);
+
+  // tls-unique is not defined for SSL 3.0 or TLS 1.3.
+  if (!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete ||
+      ssl_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_VERSION ||
+      ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // The tls-unique value is the first Finished message in the handshake, which
+  // is the client's in a full handshake and the server's for a resumption. See
+  // https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5929#section-3.1.
+  const uint8_t *finished = ssl->s3->previous_client_finished;
+  size_t finished_len = ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len;
+  if (ssl->session != NULL) {
+    // tls-unique is broken for resumed sessions unless EMS is used.
+    if (!ssl->session->extended_master_secret) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+    finished = ssl->s3->previous_server_finished;
+    finished_len = ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len;
+  }
+
+  *out_len = finished_len;
+  if (finished_len > max_out) {
+    *out_len = max_out;
+  }
+
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(out, finished, *out_len);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int set_session_id_context(CERT *cert, const uint8_t *sid_ctx,
+                                   size_t sid_ctx_len) {
+  if (sid_ctx_len > sizeof(cert->sid_ctx)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  static_assert(sizeof(cert->sid_ctx) < 256, "sid_ctx too large");
+  cert->sid_ctx_length = (uint8_t)sid_ctx_len;
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(cert->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(SSL_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *sid_ctx,
+                                   size_t sid_ctx_len) {
+  return set_session_id_context(ctx->cert, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len);
+}
+
+int SSL_set_session_id_context(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *sid_ctx,
+                               size_t sid_ctx_len) {
+  return set_session_id_context(ssl->cert, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len);
+}
+
+const uint8_t *SSL_get0_session_id_context(const SSL *ssl, size_t *out_len) {
+  *out_len = ssl->cert->sid_ctx_length;
+  return ssl->cert->sid_ctx;
+}
+
+void SSL_certs_clear(SSL *ssl) { ssl_cert_clear_certs(ssl->cert); }
+
+int SSL_get_fd(const SSL *ssl) { return SSL_get_rfd(ssl); }
+
+int SSL_get_rfd(const SSL *ssl) {
+  int ret = -1;
+  BIO *b = BIO_find_type(SSL_get_rbio(ssl), BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR);
+  if (b != NULL) {
+    BIO_get_fd(b, &ret);
+  }
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int SSL_get_wfd(const SSL *ssl) {
+  int ret = -1;
+  BIO *b = BIO_find_type(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR);
+  if (b != NULL) {
+    BIO_get_fd(b, &ret);
+  }
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int SSL_set_fd(SSL *ssl, int fd) {
+  BIO *bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket());
+  if (bio == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+  SSL_set_bio(ssl, bio, bio);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_set_wfd(SSL *ssl, int fd) {
+  BIO *rbio = SSL_get_rbio(ssl);
+  if (rbio == NULL || BIO_method_type(rbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET ||
+      BIO_get_fd(rbio, NULL) != fd) {
+    BIO *bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket());
+    if (bio == NULL) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+      return 0;
+    }
+    BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+    SSL_set0_wbio(ssl, bio);
+  } else {
+    // Copy the rbio over to the wbio.
+    BIO_up_ref(rbio);
+    SSL_set0_wbio(ssl, rbio);
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_set_rfd(SSL *ssl, int fd) {
+  BIO *wbio = SSL_get_wbio(ssl);
+  if (wbio == NULL || BIO_method_type(wbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET ||
+      BIO_get_fd(wbio, NULL) != fd) {
+    BIO *bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket());
+    if (bio == NULL) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+      return 0;
+    }
+    BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+    SSL_set0_rbio(ssl, bio);
+  } else {
+    // Copy the wbio over to the rbio.
+    BIO_up_ref(wbio);
+    SSL_set0_rbio(ssl, wbio);
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static size_t copy_finished(void *out, size_t out_len, const uint8_t *in,
+                            size_t in_len) {
+  if (out_len > in_len) {
+    out_len = in_len;
+  }
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(out, in, out_len);
+  return in_len;
+}
+
+size_t SSL_get_finished(const SSL *ssl, void *buf, size_t count) {
+  if (!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete ||
+      ssl_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_VERSION ||
+      ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (ssl->server) {
+    return copy_finished(buf, count, ssl->s3->previous_server_finished,
+                         ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len);
+  }
+
+  return copy_finished(buf, count, ssl->s3->previous_client_finished,
+                       ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len);
+}
+
+size_t SSL_get_peer_finished(const SSL *ssl, void *buf, size_t count) {
+  if (!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete ||
+      ssl_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_VERSION ||
+      ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (ssl->server) {
+    return copy_finished(buf, count, ssl->s3->previous_client_finished,
+                         ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len);
+  }
+
+  return copy_finished(buf, count, ssl->s3->previous_server_finished,
+                       ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len);
+}
+
+int SSL_get_verify_mode(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->verify_mode; }
+
+int SSL_get_extms_support(const SSL *ssl) {
+  // TLS 1.3 does not require extended master secret and always reports as
+  // supporting it.
+  if (!ssl->s3->have_version) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  // If the initial handshake completed, query the established session.
+  if (ssl->s3->established_session != NULL) {
+    return ssl->s3->established_session->extended_master_secret;
+  }
+
+  // Otherwise, query the in-progress handshake.
+  if (ssl->s3->hs != NULL) {
+    return ssl->s3->hs->extended_master_secret;
+  }
+  assert(0);
+  return 0;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_get_read_ahead(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; }
+
+int SSL_get_read_ahead(const SSL *ssl) { return 0; }
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(SSL_CTX *ctx, int yes) { }
+
+void SSL_set_read_ahead(SSL *ssl, int yes) { }
+
+int SSL_pending(const SSL *ssl) {
+  return static_cast<int>(ssl->s3->pending_app_data.size());
+}
+
+// Fix this so it checks all the valid key/cert options
+int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+  return ssl_cert_check_private_key(ctx->cert, ctx->cert->privatekey);
+}
+
+// Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter
+int SSL_check_private_key(const SSL *ssl) {
+  return ssl_cert_check_private_key(ssl->cert, ssl->cert->privatekey);
+}
+
+long SSL_get_default_timeout(const SSL *ssl) {
+  return SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_TIMEOUT;
+}
+
+int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *ssl) {
+  // Caller-initiated renegotiation is not supported.
+  OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+  return 0;
+}
+
+int SSL_renegotiate_pending(SSL *ssl) {
+  return SSL_in_init(ssl) && ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete;
+}
+
+int SSL_total_renegotiations(const SSL *ssl) {
+  return ssl->s3->total_renegotiations;
+}
+
+size_t SSL_CTX_get_max_cert_list(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+  return ctx->max_cert_list;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_max_cert_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t max_cert_list) {
+  if (max_cert_list > kMaxHandshakeSize) {
+    max_cert_list = kMaxHandshakeSize;
+  }
+  ctx->max_cert_list = (uint32_t)max_cert_list;
+}
+
+size_t SSL_get_max_cert_list(const SSL *ssl) {
+  return ssl->max_cert_list;
+}
+
+void SSL_set_max_cert_list(SSL *ssl, size_t max_cert_list) {
+  if (max_cert_list > kMaxHandshakeSize) {
+    max_cert_list = kMaxHandshakeSize;
+  }
+  ssl->max_cert_list = (uint32_t)max_cert_list;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_max_send_fragment(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t max_send_fragment) {
+  if (max_send_fragment < 512) {
+    max_send_fragment = 512;
+  }
+  if (max_send_fragment > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
+    max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
+  }
+  ctx->max_send_fragment = (uint16_t)max_send_fragment;
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_set_max_send_fragment(SSL *ssl, size_t max_send_fragment) {
+  if (max_send_fragment < 512) {
+    max_send_fragment = 512;
+  }
+  if (max_send_fragment > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
+    max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
+  }
+  ssl->max_send_fragment = (uint16_t)max_send_fragment;
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_set_mtu(SSL *ssl, unsigned mtu) {
+  if (!SSL_is_dtls(ssl) || mtu < dtls1_min_mtu()) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  ssl->d1->mtu = mtu;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(const SSL *ssl) {
+  if (!ssl->s3->have_version) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION ||
+         ssl->s3->send_connection_binding;
+}
+
+size_t SSL_CTX_sess_number(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+  MutexReadLock lock(const_cast<CRYPTO_MUTEX *>(&ctx->lock));
+  return lh_SSL_SESSION_num_items(ctx->sessions);
+}
+
+unsigned long SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned long size) {
+  unsigned long ret = ctx->session_cache_size;
+  ctx->session_cache_size = size;
+  return ret;
+}
+
+unsigned long SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+  return ctx->session_cache_size;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode) {
+  int ret = ctx->session_cache_mode;
+  ctx->session_cache_mode = mode;
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_get_session_cache_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+  return ctx->session_cache_mode;
+}
+
+
+int SSL_CTX_get_tlsext_ticket_keys(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *out, size_t len) {
+  if (out == NULL) {
+    return 48;
+  }
+  if (len != 48) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_TICKET_KEYS_LENGTH);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // The default ticket keys are initialized lazily. Trigger a key
+  // rotation to initialize them.
+  if (!ssl_ctx_rotate_ticket_encryption_key(ctx)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  uint8_t *out_bytes = reinterpret_cast<uint8_t *>(out);
+  MutexReadLock lock(&ctx->lock);
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(out_bytes, ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current->name, 16);
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(out_bytes + 16, ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current->hmac_key, 16);
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(out_bytes + 32, ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current->aes_key, 16);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_keys(SSL_CTX *ctx, const void *in, size_t len) {
+  if (in == NULL) {
+    return 48;
+  }
+  if (len != 48) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_TICKET_KEYS_LENGTH);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  if (!ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current) {
+    ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current =
+        (tlsext_ticket_key *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(tlsext_ticket_key));
+    if (!ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+  OPENSSL_memset(ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current, 0, sizeof(tlsext_ticket_key));
+  const uint8_t *in_bytes = reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(in);
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current->name, in_bytes, 16);
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current->hmac_key, in_bytes + 16, 16);
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current->aes_key, in_bytes + 32, 16);
+  OPENSSL_free(ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_prev);
+  ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_prev = nullptr;
+  // Disable automatic key rotation.
+  ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current->next_rotation_tv_sec = 0;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb(
+    SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*callback)(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *key_name, uint8_t *iv,
+                                  EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, HMAC_CTX *hmac_ctx,
+                                  int encrypt)) {
+  ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb = callback;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set1_curves(SSL_CTX *ctx, const int *curves, size_t curves_len) {
+  return tls1_set_curves(&ctx->supported_group_list,
+                         &ctx->supported_group_list_len, curves,
+                         curves_len);
+}
+
+int SSL_set1_curves(SSL *ssl, const int *curves, size_t curves_len) {
+  return tls1_set_curves(&ssl->supported_group_list,
+                         &ssl->supported_group_list_len, curves,
+                         curves_len);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set1_curves_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *curves) {
+  return tls1_set_curves_list(&ctx->supported_group_list,
+                              &ctx->supported_group_list_len, curves);
+}
+
+int SSL_set1_curves_list(SSL *ssl, const char *curves) {
+  return tls1_set_curves_list(&ssl->supported_group_list,
+                              &ssl->supported_group_list_len, curves);
+}
+
+uint16_t SSL_get_curve_id(const SSL *ssl) {
+  // TODO(davidben): This checks the wrong session if there is a renegotiation
+  // in progress.
+  SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl);
+  if (session == NULL) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return session->group_id;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(SSL_CTX *ctx, const DH *dh) {
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_set_tmp_dh(SSL *ssl, const DH *dh) {
+  return 1;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_CTX_get_ciphers(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+  return ctx->cipher_list->ciphers;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_cipher_in_group(const SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t i) {
+  if (i >= sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ctx->cipher_list->ciphers)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return ctx->cipher_list->in_group_flags[i];
+}
+
+STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_ciphers(const SSL *ssl) {
+  if (ssl == NULL) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  const struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st *prefs =
+      ssl_get_cipher_preferences(ssl);
+  if (prefs == NULL) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  return prefs->ciphers;
+}
+
+const char *SSL_get_cipher_list(const SSL *ssl, int n) {
+  if (ssl == NULL) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk = SSL_get_ciphers(ssl);
+  if (sk == NULL || n < 0 || (size_t)n >= sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk)) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, n);
+  if (c == NULL) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  return c->name;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str) {
+  return ssl_create_cipher_list(&ctx->cipher_list, str, false /* not strict */);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_strict_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str) {
+  return ssl_create_cipher_list(&ctx->cipher_list, str, true /* strict */);
+}
+
+int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *ssl, const char *str) {
+  return ssl_create_cipher_list(&ssl->cipher_list, str, false /* not strict */);
+}
+
+int SSL_set_strict_cipher_list(SSL *ssl, const char *str) {
+  return ssl_create_cipher_list(&ssl->cipher_list, str, true /* strict */);
+}
+
+const char *SSL_get_servername(const SSL *ssl, const int type) {
+  if (type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  // Historically, |SSL_get_servername| was also the configuration getter
+  // corresponding to |SSL_set_tlsext_host_name|.
+  if (ssl->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
+    return ssl->tlsext_hostname;
+  }
+
+  return ssl->s3->hostname.get();
+}
+
+int SSL_get_servername_type(const SSL *ssl) {
+  if (SSL_get_servername(ssl, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) == NULL) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+  return TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_custom_verify(
+    SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode,
+    enum ssl_verify_result_t (*callback)(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert)) {
+  ctx->verify_mode = mode;
+  ctx->custom_verify_callback = callback;
+}
+
+void SSL_set_custom_verify(
+    SSL *ssl, int mode,
+    enum ssl_verify_result_t (*callback)(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert)) {
+  ssl->verify_mode = mode;
+  ssl->custom_verify_callback = callback;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_enable_signed_cert_timestamps(SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+  ctx->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled = true;
+}
+
+void SSL_enable_signed_cert_timestamps(SSL *ssl) {
+  ssl->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled = true;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_enable_ocsp_stapling(SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+  ctx->ocsp_stapling_enabled = true;
+}
+
+void SSL_enable_ocsp_stapling(SSL *ssl) {
+  ssl->ocsp_stapling_enabled = true;
+}
+
+void SSL_get0_signed_cert_timestamp_list(const SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out,
+                                         size_t *out_len) {
+  SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl);
+  if (ssl->server || !session || !session->signed_cert_timestamp_list) {
+    *out_len = 0;
+    *out = NULL;
+    return;
+  }
+
+  *out = CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(session->signed_cert_timestamp_list);
+  *out_len = CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(session->signed_cert_timestamp_list);
+}
+
+void SSL_get0_ocsp_response(const SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out,
+                            size_t *out_len) {
+  SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl);
+  if (ssl->server || !session || !session->ocsp_response) {
+    *out_len = 0;
+    *out = NULL;
+    return;
+  }
+
+  *out = CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(session->ocsp_response);
+  *out_len = CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(session->ocsp_response);
+}
+
+int SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(SSL *ssl, const char *name) {
+  OPENSSL_free(ssl->tlsext_hostname);
+  ssl->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
+
+  if (name == NULL) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  size_t len = strlen(name);
+  if (len == 0 || len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  ssl->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(name);
+  if (ssl->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(
+    SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*callback)(SSL *ssl, int *out_alert, void *arg)) {
+  ctx->tlsext_servername_callback = callback;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg) {
+  ctx->tlsext_servername_arg = arg;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_select_next_proto(uint8_t **out, uint8_t *out_len, const uint8_t *peer,
+                          unsigned peer_len, const uint8_t *supported,
+                          unsigned supported_len) {
+  const uint8_t *result;
+  int status;
+
+  // For each protocol in peer preference order, see if we support it.
+  for (unsigned i = 0; i < peer_len;) {
+    for (unsigned j = 0; j < supported_len;) {
+      if (peer[i] == supported[j] &&
+          OPENSSL_memcmp(&peer[i + 1], &supported[j + 1], peer[i]) == 0) {
+        // We found a match
+        result = &peer[i];
+        status = OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED;
+        goto found;
+      }
+      j += supported[j];
+      j++;
+    }
+    i += peer[i];
+    i++;
+  }
+
+  // There's no overlap between our protocols and the peer's list.
+  result = supported;
+  status = OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
+
+found:
+  *out = (uint8_t *)result + 1;
+  *out_len = result[0];
+  return status;
+}
+
+void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out_data,
+                                    unsigned *out_len) {
+  *out_data = ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated.data();
+  *out_len = ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated.size();
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(
+    SSL_CTX *ctx,
+    int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out, unsigned *out_len, void *arg),
+    void *arg) {
+  ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb = cb;
+  ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg = arg;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(
+    SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, uint8_t **out, uint8_t *out_len,
+                            const uint8_t *in, unsigned in_len, void *arg),
+    void *arg) {
+  ctx->next_proto_select_cb = cb;
+  ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg = arg;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(SSL_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *protos,
+                            unsigned protos_len) {
+  OPENSSL_free(ctx->alpn_client_proto_list);
+  ctx->alpn_client_proto_list = (uint8_t *)BUF_memdup(protos, protos_len);
+  if (!ctx->alpn_client_proto_list) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+  ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len = protos_len;
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+int SSL_set_alpn_protos(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *protos, unsigned protos_len) {
+  OPENSSL_free(ssl->alpn_client_proto_list);
+  ssl->alpn_client_proto_list = (uint8_t *)BUF_memdup(protos, protos_len);
+  if (!ssl->alpn_client_proto_list) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+  ssl->alpn_client_proto_list_len = protos_len;
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out,
+                                          uint8_t *out_len, const uint8_t *in,
+                                          unsigned in_len, void *arg),
+                                void *arg) {
+  ctx->alpn_select_cb = cb;
+  ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg = arg;
+}
+
+void SSL_get0_alpn_selected(const SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out_data,
+                            unsigned *out_len) {
+  if (SSL_in_early_data(ssl) && !ssl->server) {
+    *out_data = ssl->s3->hs->early_session->early_alpn;
+    *out_len = ssl->s3->hs->early_session->early_alpn_len;
+  } else {
+    *out_data = ssl->s3->alpn_selected.data();
+    *out_len = ssl->s3->alpn_selected.size();
+  }
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_allow_unknown_alpn_protos(SSL_CTX *ctx, int enabled) {
+  ctx->allow_unknown_alpn_protos = !!enabled;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_tls_channel_id_enabled(SSL_CTX *ctx, int enabled) {
+  ctx->tlsext_channel_id_enabled = !!enabled;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_enable_tls_channel_id(SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+  SSL_CTX_set_tls_channel_id_enabled(ctx, 1);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+void SSL_set_tls_channel_id_enabled(SSL *ssl, int enabled) {
+  ssl->tlsext_channel_id_enabled = !!enabled;
+}
+
+int SSL_enable_tls_channel_id(SSL *ssl) {
+  SSL_set_tls_channel_id_enabled(ssl, 1);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int is_p256_key(EVP_PKEY *private_key) {
+  const EC_KEY *ec_key = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(private_key);
+  return ec_key != NULL &&
+         EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec_key)) ==
+             NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set1_tls_channel_id(SSL_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *private_key) {
+  if (!is_p256_key(private_key)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_NOT_P256);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  EVP_PKEY_free(ctx->tlsext_channel_id_private);
+  EVP_PKEY_up_ref(private_key);
+  ctx->tlsext_channel_id_private = private_key;
+  ctx->tlsext_channel_id_enabled = true;
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_set1_tls_channel_id(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY *private_key) {
+  if (!is_p256_key(private_key)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_NOT_P256);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  EVP_PKEY_free(ssl->tlsext_channel_id_private);
+  EVP_PKEY_up_ref(private_key);
+  ssl->tlsext_channel_id_private = private_key;
+  ssl->tlsext_channel_id_enabled = true;
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+size_t SSL_get_tls_channel_id(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out) {
+  if (!ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(out, ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id,
+                 (max_out < 64) ? max_out : 64);
+  return 64;
+}
+
+size_t SSL_get0_certificate_types(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out_types) {
+  if (ssl->server || ssl->s3->hs == NULL) {
+    *out_types = NULL;
+    return 0;
+  }
+  *out_types = ssl->s3->hs->certificate_types.data();
+  return ssl->s3->hs->certificate_types.size();
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *SSL_get_privatekey(const SSL *ssl) {
+  if (ssl->cert != NULL) {
+    return ssl->cert->privatekey;
+  }
+
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *SSL_CTX_get0_privatekey(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+  if (ctx->cert != NULL) {
+    return ctx->cert->privatekey;
+  }
+
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_current_cipher(const SSL *ssl) {
+  return ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->cipher();
+}
+
+int SSL_session_reused(const SSL *ssl) {
+  return ssl->s3->session_reused || SSL_in_early_data(ssl);
+}
+
+const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *ssl) { return NULL; }
+
+const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *ssl) { return NULL; }
+
+int *SSL_get_server_tmp_key(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY **out_key) { return 0; }
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode) {
+  ctx->quiet_shutdown = (mode != 0);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+  return ctx->quiet_shutdown;
+}
+
+void SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL *ssl, int mode) {
+  ssl->quiet_shutdown = (mode != 0);
+}
+
+int SSL_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->quiet_shutdown; }
+
+void SSL_set_shutdown(SSL *ssl, int mode) {
+  // It is an error to clear any bits that have already been set. (We can't try
+  // to get a second close_notify or send two.)
+  assert((SSL_get_shutdown(ssl) & mode) == SSL_get_shutdown(ssl));
+
+  if (mode & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN &&
+      ssl->s3->read_shutdown == ssl_shutdown_none) {
+    ssl->s3->read_shutdown = ssl_shutdown_close_notify;
+  }
+
+  if (mode & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN &&
+      ssl->s3->write_shutdown == ssl_shutdown_none) {
+    ssl->s3->write_shutdown = ssl_shutdown_close_notify;
+  }
+}
+
+int SSL_get_shutdown(const SSL *ssl) {
+  int ret = 0;
+  if (ssl->s3->read_shutdown != ssl_shutdown_none) {
+    // Historically, OpenSSL set |SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN| on both close_notify
+    // and fatal alert.
+    ret |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
+  }
+  if (ssl->s3->write_shutdown == ssl_shutdown_close_notify) {
+    // Historically, OpenSSL set |SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN| on only close_notify.
+    ret |= SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN;
+  }
+  return ret;
+}
+
+SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->ctx; }
+
+SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+  if (ssl->ctx == ctx) {
+    return ssl->ctx;
+  }
+
+  // One cannot change the X.509 callbacks during a connection.
+  if (ssl->ctx->x509_method != ctx->x509_method) {
+    assert(0);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  if (ctx == NULL) {
+    ctx = ssl->session_ctx;
+  }
+
+  ssl_cert_free(ssl->cert);
+  ssl->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert);
+
+  SSL_CTX_up_ref(ctx);
+  SSL_CTX_free(ssl->ctx);
+  ssl->ctx = ctx;
+
+  return ssl->ctx;
+}
+
+void SSL_set_info_callback(SSL *ssl,
+                           void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int value)) {
+  ssl->info_callback = cb;
+}
+
+void (*SSL_get_info_callback(const SSL *ssl))(const SSL *ssl, int type,
+                                              int value) {
+  return ssl->info_callback;
+}
+
+int SSL_state(const SSL *ssl) {
+  return SSL_in_init(ssl) ? SSL_ST_INIT : SSL_ST_OK;
+}
+
+void SSL_set_state(SSL *ssl, int state) { }
+
+char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *ssl, char *buf, int len) {
+  if (len <= 0) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  buf[0] = '\0';
+  return buf;
+}
+
+int SSL_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_unused *unused,
+                         CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_unused, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) {
+  int index;
+  if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class_ssl, &index, argl, argp,
+                               free_func)) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+  return index;
+}
+
+int SSL_set_ex_data(SSL *ssl, int idx, void *data) {
+  return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ssl->ex_data, idx, data);
+}
+
+void *SSL_get_ex_data(const SSL *ssl, int idx) {
+  return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ssl->ex_data, idx);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_unused *unused,
+                             CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_unused,
+                             CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) {
+  int index;
+  if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class_ssl_ctx, &index, argl, argp,
+                               free_func)) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+  return index;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(SSL_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data) {
+  return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data);
+}
+
+void *SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *ctx, int idx) {
+  return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx);
+}
+
+int SSL_want(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->s3->rwstate; }
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                  RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl, int is_export,
+                                             int keylength)) {}
+
+void SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL *ssl, RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl, int is_export,
+                                                   int keylength)) {}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                 DH *(*cb)(SSL *ssl, int is_export,
+                                           int keylength)) {}
+
+void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl, DH *(*cb)(SSL *ssl, int is_export,
+                                                 int keylength)) {}
+
+static int use_psk_identity_hint(char **out, const char *identity_hint) {
+  if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // Clear currently configured hint, if any.
+  OPENSSL_free(*out);
+  *out = NULL;
+
+  // Treat the empty hint as not supplying one. Plain PSK makes it possible to
+  // send either no hint (omit ServerKeyExchange) or an empty hint, while
+  // ECDHE_PSK can only spell empty hint. Having different capabilities is odd,
+  // so we interpret empty and missing as identical.
+  if (identity_hint != NULL && identity_hint[0] != '\0') {
+    *out = BUF_strdup(identity_hint);
+    if (*out == NULL) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *identity_hint) {
+  return use_psk_identity_hint(&ctx->psk_identity_hint, identity_hint);
+}
+
+int SSL_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL *ssl, const char *identity_hint) {
+  return use_psk_identity_hint(&ssl->psk_identity_hint, identity_hint);
+}
+
+const char *SSL_get_psk_identity_hint(const SSL *ssl) {
+  if (ssl == NULL) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  return ssl->psk_identity_hint;
+}
+
+const char *SSL_get_psk_identity(const SSL *ssl) {
+  if (ssl == NULL) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl);
+  if (session == NULL) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  return session->psk_identity;
+}
+
+void SSL_set_psk_client_callback(
+    SSL *ssl, unsigned (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity,
+                             unsigned max_identity_len, uint8_t *psk,
+                             unsigned max_psk_len)) {
+  ssl->psk_client_callback = cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(
+    SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity,
+                                 unsigned max_identity_len, uint8_t *psk,
+                                 unsigned max_psk_len)) {
+  ctx->psk_client_callback = cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_set_psk_server_callback(
+    SSL *ssl, unsigned (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity, uint8_t *psk,
+                             unsigned max_psk_len)) {
+  ssl->psk_server_callback = cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback(
+    SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity,
+                                 uint8_t *psk, unsigned max_psk_len)) {
+  ctx->psk_server_callback = cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                              void (*cb)(int write_p, int version,
+                                         int content_type, const void *buf,
+                                         size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)) {
+  ctx->msg_callback = cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg) {
+  ctx->msg_callback_arg = arg;
+}
+
+void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl,
+                          void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type,
+                                     const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl,
+                                     void *arg)) {
+  ssl->msg_callback = cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(SSL *ssl, void *arg) {
+  ssl->msg_callback_arg = arg;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_keylog_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, const char *line)) {
+  ctx->keylog_callback = cb;
+}
+
+void (*SSL_CTX_get_keylog_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx))(const SSL *ssl,
+                                                        const char *line) {
+  return ctx->keylog_callback;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_current_time_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,
+                                            struct timeval *out_clock)) {
+  ctx->current_time_cb = cb;
+}
+
+int SSL_is_init_finished(const SSL *ssl) {
+  return !SSL_in_init(ssl);
+}
+
+int SSL_in_init(const SSL *ssl) {
+  // This returns false once all the handshake state has been finalized, to
+  // allow callbacks and getters based on SSL_in_init to return the correct
+  // values.
+  SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs = ssl->s3->hs.get();
+  return hs != nullptr && !hs->handshake_finalized;
+}
+
+int SSL_in_false_start(const SSL *ssl) {
+  if (ssl->s3->hs == NULL) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return ssl->s3->hs->in_false_start;
+}
+
+int SSL_cutthrough_complete(const SSL *ssl) {
+  return SSL_in_false_start(ssl);
+}
+
+void SSL_get_structure_sizes(size_t *ssl_size, size_t *ssl_ctx_size,
+                             size_t *ssl_session_size) {
+  *ssl_size = sizeof(SSL);
+  *ssl_ctx_size = sizeof(SSL_CTX);
+  *ssl_session_size = sizeof(SSL_SESSION);
+}
+
+int SSL_is_server(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->server; }
+
+int SSL_is_dtls(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->method->is_dtls; }
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_select_certificate_cb(
+    SSL_CTX *ctx,
+    enum ssl_select_cert_result_t (*cb)(const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *)) {
+  ctx->select_certificate_cb = cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_dos_protection_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                   int (*cb)(const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *)) {
+  ctx->dos_protection_cb = cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_set_renegotiate_mode(SSL *ssl, enum ssl_renegotiate_mode_t mode) {
+  ssl->renegotiate_mode = mode;
+}
+
+int SSL_get_ivs(const SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out_read_iv,
+                const uint8_t **out_write_iv, size_t *out_iv_len) {
+  size_t write_iv_len;
+  if (!ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx->GetIV(out_read_iv, out_iv_len) ||
+      !ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->GetIV(out_write_iv, &write_iv_len) ||
+      *out_iv_len != write_iv_len) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static uint64_t be_to_u64(const uint8_t in[8]) {
+  return (((uint64_t)in[0]) << 56) | (((uint64_t)in[1]) << 48) |
+         (((uint64_t)in[2]) << 40) | (((uint64_t)in[3]) << 32) |
+         (((uint64_t)in[4]) << 24) | (((uint64_t)in[5]) << 16) |
+         (((uint64_t)in[6]) << 8) | ((uint64_t)in[7]);
+}
+
+uint64_t SSL_get_read_sequence(const SSL *ssl) {
+  // TODO(davidben): Internally represent sequence numbers as uint64_t.
+  if (SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
+    // max_seq_num already includes the epoch.
+    assert(ssl->d1->r_epoch == (ssl->d1->bitmap.max_seq_num >> 48));
+    return ssl->d1->bitmap.max_seq_num;
+  }
+  return be_to_u64(ssl->s3->read_sequence);
+}
+
+uint64_t SSL_get_write_sequence(const SSL *ssl) {
+  uint64_t ret = be_to_u64(ssl->s3->write_sequence);
+  if (SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
+    assert((ret >> 48) == 0);
+    ret |= ((uint64_t)ssl->d1->w_epoch) << 48;
+  }
+  return ret;
+}
+
+uint16_t SSL_get_peer_signature_algorithm(const SSL *ssl) {
+  // TODO(davidben): This checks the wrong session if there is a renegotiation
+  // in progress.
+  SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl);
+  if (session == NULL) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return session->peer_signature_algorithm;
+}
+
+size_t SSL_get_client_random(const SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out) {
+  if (max_out == 0) {
+    return sizeof(ssl->s3->client_random);
+  }
+  if (max_out > sizeof(ssl->s3->client_random)) {
+    max_out = sizeof(ssl->s3->client_random);
+  }
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(out, ssl->s3->client_random, max_out);
+  return max_out;
+}
+
+size_t SSL_get_server_random(const SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out) {
+  if (max_out == 0) {
+    return sizeof(ssl->s3->server_random);
+  }
+  if (max_out > sizeof(ssl->s3->server_random)) {
+    max_out = sizeof(ssl->s3->server_random);
+  }
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(out, ssl->s3->server_random, max_out);
+  return max_out;
+}
+
+const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_pending_cipher(const SSL *ssl) {
+  SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs = ssl->s3->hs.get();
+  if (hs == NULL) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  return hs->new_cipher;
+}
+
+void SSL_set_retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs(SSL *ssl, int enabled) {
+  ssl->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs = !!enabled;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs(SSL_CTX *ctx, int enabled) {
+  ctx->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs = !!enabled;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_grease_enabled(SSL_CTX *ctx, int enabled) {
+  ctx->grease_enabled = !!enabled;
+}
+
+int32_t SSL_get_ticket_age_skew(const SSL *ssl) {
+  return ssl->s3->ticket_age_skew;
+}
+
+int SSL_clear(SSL *ssl) {
+  // In OpenSSL, reusing a client |SSL| with |SSL_clear| causes the previously
+  // established session to be offered the next time around. wpa_supplicant
+  // depends on this behavior, so emulate it.
+  UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> session;
+  if (!ssl->server && ssl->s3->established_session != NULL) {
+    session.reset(ssl->s3->established_session.get());
+    SSL_SESSION_up_ref(session.get());
+  }
+
+  // The ssl->d1->mtu is simultaneously configuration (preserved across
+  // clear) and connection-specific state (gets reset).
+  //
+  // TODO(davidben): Avoid this.
+  unsigned mtu = 0;
+  if (ssl->d1 != NULL) {
+    mtu = ssl->d1->mtu;
+  }
+
+  ssl->method->ssl_free(ssl);
+  if (!ssl->method->ssl_new(ssl)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (SSL_is_dtls(ssl) && (SSL_get_options(ssl) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) {
+    ssl->d1->mtu = mtu;
+  }
+
+  if (session != nullptr) {
+    SSL_set_session(ssl, session.get());
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_sess_connect(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; }
+int SSL_CTX_sess_connect_good(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; }
+int SSL_CTX_sess_connect_renegotiate(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; }
+int SSL_CTX_sess_accept(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; }
+int SSL_CTX_sess_accept_renegotiate(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; }
+int SSL_CTX_sess_accept_good(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; }
+int SSL_CTX_sess_hits(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; }
+int SSL_CTX_sess_cb_hits(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; }
+int SSL_CTX_sess_misses(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; }
+int SSL_CTX_sess_timeouts(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; }
+int SSL_CTX_sess_cache_full(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; }
+
+int SSL_num_renegotiations(const SSL *ssl) {
+  return SSL_total_renegotiations(ssl);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_need_tmp_RSA(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; }
+int SSL_need_tmp_RSA(const SSL *ssl) { return 0; }
+int SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa(SSL_CTX *ctx, const RSA *rsa) { return 1; }
+int SSL_set_tmp_rsa(SSL *ssl, const RSA *rsa) { return 1; }
+void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void) {}
+void SSL_load_error_strings(void) {}
+int SSL_cache_hit(SSL *ssl) { return SSL_session_reused(ssl); }
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh(SSL_CTX *ctx, const EC_KEY *ec_key) {
+  if (ec_key == NULL || EC_KEY_get0_group(ec_key) == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  int nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec_key));
+  return SSL_CTX_set1_curves(ctx, &nid, 1);
+}
+
+int SSL_set_tmp_ecdh(SSL *ssl, const EC_KEY *ec_key) {
+  if (ec_key == NULL || EC_KEY_get0_group(ec_key) == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  int nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec_key));
+  return SSL_set1_curves(ssl, &nid, 1);
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_ticket_aead_method(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                    const SSL_TICKET_AEAD_METHOD *aead_method) {
+  ctx->ticket_aead_method = aead_method;
+}