grpc-flamingo 1.11.0

data/third_party/boringssl/crypto/fipsmodule/bn/montgomery.c

@@ -0,0 +1,483 @@
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/thread.h>
+#include <openssl/type_check.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+#include "../../internal.h"
+
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) &&                         \
+    (defined(OPENSSL_X86) || defined(OPENSSL_X86_64) || \
+     defined(OPENSSL_ARM) || defined(OPENSSL_AARCH64))
+#define OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT
+#endif
+
+static int bn_mod_mul_montgomery_fallback(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
+                                          const BIGNUM *b,
+                                          const BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+
+BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_new(void) {
+  BN_MONT_CTX *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(BN_MONT_CTX));
+
+  if (ret == NULL) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  OPENSSL_memset(ret, 0, sizeof(BN_MONT_CTX));
+  BN_init(&ret->RR);
+  BN_init(&ret->N);
+
+  return ret;
+}
+
+void BN_MONT_CTX_free(BN_MONT_CTX *mont) {
+  if (mont == NULL) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  BN_free(&mont->RR);
+  BN_free(&mont->N);
+  OPENSSL_free(mont);
+}
+
+BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_copy(BN_MONT_CTX *to, const BN_MONT_CTX *from) {
+  if (to == from) {
+    return to;
+  }
+
+  if (!BN_copy(&to->RR, &from->RR) ||
+      !BN_copy(&to->N, &from->N)) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  to->n0[0] = from->n0[0];
+  to->n0[1] = from->n0[1];
+  return to;
+}
+
+OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS == 1 || BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS == 2,
+                       BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS_VALUE_INVALID);
+OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(BN_ULONG) * BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS ==
+                       sizeof(uint64_t), BN_MONT_CTX_set_64_bit_mismatch);
+
+int BN_MONT_CTX_set(BN_MONT_CTX *mont, const BIGNUM *mod, BN_CTX *ctx) {
+  if (BN_is_zero(mod)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_DIV_BY_ZERO);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  if (!BN_is_odd(mod)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_CALLED_WITH_EVEN_MODULUS);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  if (BN_is_negative(mod)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_NEGATIVE_NUMBER);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // Save the modulus.
+  if (!BN_copy(&mont->N, mod)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // Find n0 such that n0 * N == -1 (mod r).
+  //
+  // Only certain BN_BITS2<=32 platforms actually make use of n0[1]. For the
+  // others, we could use a shorter R value and use faster |BN_ULONG|-based
+  // math instead of |uint64_t|-based math, which would be double-precision.
+  // However, currently only the assembler files know which is which.
+  uint64_t n0 = bn_mont_n0(mod);
+  mont->n0[0] = (BN_ULONG)n0;
+#if BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS == 2
+  mont->n0[1] = (BN_ULONG)(n0 >> BN_BITS2);
+#else
+  mont->n0[1] = 0;
+#endif
+
+  // Save RR = R**2 (mod N). R is the smallest power of 2**BN_BITS2 such that R
+  // > mod. Even though the assembly on some 32-bit platforms works with 64-bit
+  // values, using |BN_BITS2| here, rather than |BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS *
+  // BN_BITS2|, is correct because R**2 will still be a multiple of the latter
+  // as |BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS| is either one or two.
+  //
+  // XXX: This is not constant time with respect to |mont->N|, but it should be.
+  unsigned lgBigR = (BN_num_bits(mod) + (BN_BITS2 - 1)) / BN_BITS2 * BN_BITS2;
+  if (!bn_mod_exp_base_2_vartime(&mont->RR, lgBigR * 2, &mont->N)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(BN_MONT_CTX **pmont, CRYPTO_MUTEX *lock,
+                           const BIGNUM *mod, BN_CTX *bn_ctx) {
+  CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_read(lock);
+  BN_MONT_CTX *ctx = *pmont;
+  CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_read(lock);
+
+  if (ctx) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(lock);
+  ctx = *pmont;
+  if (ctx) {
+    goto out;
+  }
+
+  ctx = BN_MONT_CTX_new();
+  if (ctx == NULL) {
+    goto out;
+  }
+  if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(ctx, mod, bn_ctx)) {
+    BN_MONT_CTX_free(ctx);
+    ctx = NULL;
+    goto out;
+  }
+  *pmont = ctx;
+
+out:
+  CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(lock);
+  return ctx != NULL;
+}
+
+int BN_to_montgomery(BIGNUM *ret, const BIGNUM *a, const BN_MONT_CTX *mont,
+                     BN_CTX *ctx) {
+  return BN_mod_mul_montgomery(ret, a, &mont->RR, mont, ctx);
+}
+
+static int bn_from_montgomery_in_place(BN_ULONG *r, size_t num_r, BN_ULONG *a,
+                                       size_t num_a, const BN_MONT_CTX *mont) {
+  const BN_ULONG *n = mont->N.d;
+  size_t num_n = mont->N.top;
+  if (num_r != num_n || num_a != 2 * num_n) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // Add multiples of |n| to |r| until R = 2^(nl * BN_BITS2) divides it. On
+  // input, we had |r| < |n| * R, so now |r| < 2 * |n| * R. Note that |r|
+  // includes |carry| which is stored separately.
+  BN_ULONG n0 = mont->n0[0];
+  BN_ULONG carry = 0;
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < num_n; i++) {
+    BN_ULONG v = bn_mul_add_words(a + i, n, num_n, a[i] * n0);
+    v += carry + a[i + num_n];
+    carry |= (v != a[i + num_n]);
+    carry &= (v <= a[i + num_n]);
+    a[i + num_n] = v;
+  }
+
+  // Shift |num_n| words to divide by R. We have |a| < 2 * |n|. Note that |a|
+  // includes |carry| which is stored separately.
+  a += num_n;
+
+  // |a| thus requires at most one additional subtraction |n| to be reduced.
+  // Subtract |n| and select the answer in constant time.
+  OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(BN_ULONG) <= sizeof(crypto_word_t),
+                         crypto_word_t_too_small);
+  BN_ULONG v = bn_sub_words(r, a, n, num_n) - carry;
+  // |v| is one if |a| - |n| underflowed or zero if it did not. Note |v| cannot
+  // be -1. That would imply the subtraction did not fit in |num_n| words, and
+  // we know at most one subtraction is needed.
+  v = 0u - v;
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < num_n; i++) {
+    r[i] = constant_time_select_w(v, a[i], r[i]);
+    a[i] = 0;
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int BN_from_montgomery_word(BIGNUM *ret, BIGNUM *r,
+                                   const BN_MONT_CTX *mont) {
+  const BIGNUM *n = &mont->N;
+  if (n->top == 0) {
+    ret->top = 0;
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  int max = (2 * n->top);  // carry is stored separately
+  if (!bn_wexpand(r, max) ||
+      !bn_wexpand(ret, n->top)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  // Clear the top words of |r|.
+  if (max > r->top) {
+    OPENSSL_memset(r->d + r->top, 0, (max - r->top) * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
+  }
+  r->top = max;
+  ret->top = n->top;
+
+  if (!bn_from_montgomery_in_place(ret->d, ret->top, r->d, r->top, mont)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  ret->neg = r->neg;
+
+  bn_correct_top(r);
+  bn_correct_top(ret);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int BN_from_montgomery(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BN_MONT_CTX *mont,
+                       BN_CTX *ctx) {
+  int ret = 0;
+  BIGNUM *t;
+
+  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+  t = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  if (t == NULL ||
+      !BN_copy(t, a)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  ret = BN_from_montgomery_word(r, t, mont);
+
+err:
+  BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int BN_mod_mul_montgomery(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
+                          const BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx) {
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT)
+  return bn_mod_mul_montgomery_fallback(r, a, b, mont, ctx);
+#else
+  int num = mont->N.top;
+
+  // |bn_mul_mont| requires at least 128 bits of limbs, at least for x86.
+  if (num < (128 / BN_BITS2) ||
+      a->top != num ||
+      b->top != num) {
+    return bn_mod_mul_montgomery_fallback(r, a, b, mont, ctx);
+  }
+
+  if (!bn_wexpand(r, num)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  if (!bn_mul_mont(r->d, a->d, b->d, mont->N.d, mont->n0, num)) {
+    // The check above ensures this won't happen.
+    assert(0);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  r->neg = a->neg ^ b->neg;
+  r->top = num;
+  bn_correct_top(r);
+
+  return 1;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int bn_mod_mul_montgomery_fallback(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
+                                          const BIGNUM *b,
+                                          const BN_MONT_CTX *mont,
+                                          BN_CTX *ctx) {
+  int ret = 0;
+
+  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+  BIGNUM *tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  if (tmp == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (a == b) {
+    if (!BN_sqr(tmp, a, ctx)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  } else {
+    if (!BN_mul(tmp, a, b, ctx)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // reduce from aRR to aR
+  if (!BN_from_montgomery_word(r, tmp, mont)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  ret = 1;
+
+err:
+  BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int bn_to_montgomery_small(BN_ULONG *r, size_t num_r, const BN_ULONG *a,
+                           size_t num_a, const BN_MONT_CTX *mont) {
+  return bn_mod_mul_montgomery_small(r, num_r, a, num_a, mont->RR.d,
+                                     mont->RR.top, mont);
+}
+
+int bn_from_montgomery_small(BN_ULONG *r, size_t num_r, const BN_ULONG *a,
+                             size_t num_a, const BN_MONT_CTX *mont) {
+  size_t num_n = mont->N.top;
+  if (num_a > 2 * num_n || num_r != num_n || num_n > BN_SMALL_MAX_WORDS) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  BN_ULONG tmp[BN_SMALL_MAX_WORDS * 2];
+  size_t num_tmp = 2 * num_n;
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(tmp, a, num_a * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
+  OPENSSL_memset(tmp + num_a, 0, (num_tmp - num_a) * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
+  int ret = bn_from_montgomery_in_place(r, num_r, tmp, num_tmp, mont);
+  OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp, num_tmp * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int bn_mod_mul_montgomery_small(BN_ULONG *r, size_t num_r, const BN_ULONG *a,
+                                size_t num_a, const BN_ULONG *b, size_t num_b,
+                                const BN_MONT_CTX *mont) {
+  size_t num_n = mont->N.top;
+  if (num_r != num_n || num_a + num_b > 2 * num_n ||
+      num_n > BN_SMALL_MAX_WORDS) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT)
+  // |bn_mul_mont| requires at least 128 bits of limbs, at least for x86.
+  if (num_n >= (128 / BN_BITS2) &&
+      num_a == num_n &&
+      num_b == num_n) {
+    if (!bn_mul_mont(r, a, b, mont->N.d, mont->n0, num_n)) {
+      assert(0);  // The check above ensures this won't happen.
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+  }
+#endif
+
+  // Compute the product.
+  BN_ULONG tmp[2 * BN_SMALL_MAX_WORDS];
+  size_t num_tmp = 2 * num_n;
+  size_t num_ab = num_a + num_b;
+  if (a == b && num_a == num_b) {
+    if (!bn_sqr_small(tmp, num_ab, a, num_a)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  } else if (!bn_mul_small(tmp, num_ab, a, num_a, b, num_b)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // Zero-extend to full width and reduce.
+  OPENSSL_memset(tmp + num_ab, 0, (num_tmp - num_ab) * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
+  int ret = bn_from_montgomery_in_place(r, num_r, tmp, num_tmp, mont);
+  OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp, num_tmp * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
+  return ret;
+}

data/third_party/boringssl/crypto/fipsmodule/bn/montgomery_inv.c

@@ -0,0 +1,207 @@
+/* Copyright 2016 Brian Smith.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
+ * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
+ * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+#include "../../internal.h"
+
+
+static uint64_t bn_neg_inv_mod_r_u64(uint64_t n);
+
+OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS == 1 || BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS == 2,
+                       BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS_VALUE_INVALID_2);
+OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(uint64_t) ==
+                       BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS * sizeof(BN_ULONG),
+                       BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS_DOES_NOT_MATCH_UINT64_T);
+
+// LG_LITTLE_R is log_2(r).
+#define LG_LITTLE_R (BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS * BN_BITS2)
+
+uint64_t bn_mont_n0(const BIGNUM *n) {
+  // These conditions are checked by the caller, |BN_MONT_CTX_set|.
+  assert(!BN_is_zero(n));
+  assert(!BN_is_negative(n));
+  assert(BN_is_odd(n));
+
+  // r == 2**(BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS * BN_BITS2) and LG_LITTLE_R == lg(r). This
+  // ensures that we can do integer division by |r| by simply ignoring
+  // |BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS| limbs. Similarly, we can calculate values modulo
+  // |r| by just looking at the lowest |BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS| limbs. This is
+  // what makes Montgomery multiplication efficient.
+  //
+  // As shown in Algorithm 1 of "Fast Prime Field Elliptic Curve Cryptography
+  // with 256 Bit Primes" by Shay Gueron and Vlad Krasnov, in the loop of a
+  // multi-limb Montgomery multiplication of |a * b (mod n)|, given the
+  // unreduced product |t == a * b|, we repeatedly calculate:
+  //
+  //    t1 := t % r         |t1| is |t|'s lowest limb (see previous paragraph).
+  //    t2 := t1*n0*n
+  //    t3 := t + t2
+  //    t := t3 / r         copy all limbs of |t3| except the lowest to |t|.
+  //
+  // In the last step, it would only make sense to ignore the lowest limb of
+  // |t3| if it were zero. The middle steps ensure that this is the case:
+  //
+  //                            t3 ==  0 (mod r)
+  //                        t + t2 ==  0 (mod r)
+  //                   t + t1*n0*n ==  0 (mod r)
+  //                       t1*n0*n == -t (mod r)
+  //                        t*n0*n == -t (mod r)
+  //                          n0*n == -1 (mod r)
+  //                            n0 == -1/n (mod r)
+  //
+  // Thus, in each iteration of the loop, we multiply by the constant factor
+  // |n0|, the negative inverse of n (mod r).
+
+  // n_mod_r = n % r. As explained above, this is done by taking the lowest
+  // |BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS| limbs of |n|.
+  uint64_t n_mod_r = n->d[0];
+#if BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS == 2
+  if (n->top > 1) {
+    n_mod_r |= (uint64_t)n->d[1] << BN_BITS2;
+  }
+#endif
+
+  return bn_neg_inv_mod_r_u64(n_mod_r);
+}
+
+// bn_neg_inv_r_mod_n_u64 calculates the -1/n mod r; i.e. it calculates |v|
+// such that u*r - v*n == 1. |r| is the constant defined in |bn_mont_n0|. |n|
+// must be odd.
+//
+// This is derived from |xbinGCD| in Henry S. Warren, Jr.'s "Montgomery
+// Multiplication" (http://www.hackersdelight.org/MontgomeryMultiplication.pdf).
+// It is very similar to the MODULAR-INVERSE function in Stephen R. Dussé's and
+// Burton S. Kaliski Jr.'s "A Cryptographic Library for the Motorola DSP56000"
+// (http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F3-540-46877-3_21).
+//
+// This is inspired by Joppe W. Bos's "Constant Time Modular Inversion"
+// (http://www.joppebos.com/files/CTInversion.pdf) so that the inversion is
+// constant-time with respect to |n|. We assume uint64_t additions,
+// subtractions, shifts, and bitwise operations are all constant time, which
+// may be a large leap of faith on 32-bit targets. We avoid division and
+// multiplication, which tend to be the most problematic in terms of timing
+// leaks.
+//
+// Most GCD implementations return values such that |u*r + v*n == 1|, so the
+// caller would have to negate the resultant |v| for the purpose of Montgomery
+// multiplication. This implementation does the negation implicitly by doing
+// the computations as a difference instead of a sum.
+static uint64_t bn_neg_inv_mod_r_u64(uint64_t n) {
+  assert(n % 2 == 1);
+
+  // alpha == 2**(lg r - 1) == r / 2.
+  static const uint64_t alpha = UINT64_C(1) << (LG_LITTLE_R - 1);
+
+  const uint64_t beta = n;
+
+  uint64_t u = 1;
+  uint64_t v = 0;
+
+  // The invariant maintained from here on is:
+  // 2**(lg r - i) == u*2*alpha - v*beta.
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < LG_LITTLE_R; ++i) {
+#if BN_BITS2 == 64 && defined(BN_ULLONG)
+    assert((BN_ULLONG)(1) << (LG_LITTLE_R - i) ==
+           ((BN_ULLONG)u * 2 * alpha) - ((BN_ULLONG)v * beta));
+#endif
+
+    // Delete a common factor of 2 in u and v if |u| is even. Otherwise, set
+    // |u = (u + beta) / 2| and |v = (v / 2) + alpha|.
+
+    uint64_t u_is_odd = UINT64_C(0) - (u & 1);  // Either 0xff..ff or 0.
+
+    // The addition can overflow, so use Dietz's method for it.
+    //
+    // Dietz calculates (x+y)/2 by (x⊕y)>>1 + x&y. This is valid for all
+    // (unsigned) x and y, even when x+y overflows. Evidence for 32-bit values
+    // (embedded in 64 bits to so that overflow can be ignored):
+    //
+    // (declare-fun x () (_ BitVec 64))
+    // (declare-fun y () (_ BitVec 64))
+    // (assert (let (
+    //    (one (_ bv1 64))
+    //    (thirtyTwo (_ bv32 64)))
+    //    (and
+    //      (bvult x (bvshl one thirtyTwo))
+    //      (bvult y (bvshl one thirtyTwo))
+    //      (not (=
+    //        (bvadd (bvlshr (bvxor x y) one) (bvand x y))
+    //        (bvlshr (bvadd x y) one)))
+    // )))
+    // (check-sat)
+    uint64_t beta_if_u_is_odd = beta & u_is_odd;  // Either |beta| or 0.
+    u = ((u ^ beta_if_u_is_odd) >> 1) + (u & beta_if_u_is_odd);
+
+    uint64_t alpha_if_u_is_odd = alpha & u_is_odd;  // Either |alpha| or 0.
+    v = (v >> 1) + alpha_if_u_is_odd;
+  }
+
+  // The invariant now shows that u*r - v*n == 1 since r == 2 * alpha.
+#if BN_BITS2 == 64 && defined(BN_ULLONG)
+  assert(1 == ((BN_ULLONG)u * 2 * alpha) - ((BN_ULLONG)v * beta));
+#endif
+
+  return v;
+}
+
+// bn_mod_exp_base_2_vartime calculates r = 2**p (mod n). |p| must be larger
+// than log_2(n); i.e. 2**p must be larger than |n|. |n| must be positive and
+// odd.
+int bn_mod_exp_base_2_vartime(BIGNUM *r, unsigned p, const BIGNUM *n) {
+  assert(!BN_is_zero(n));
+  assert(!BN_is_negative(n));
+  assert(BN_is_odd(n));
+
+  BN_zero(r);
+
+  unsigned n_bits = BN_num_bits(n);
+  assert(n_bits != 0);
+  if (n_bits == 1) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  // Set |r| to the smallest power of two larger than |n|.
+  assert(p > n_bits);
+  if (!BN_set_bit(r, n_bits)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // Unconditionally reduce |r|.
+  assert(BN_cmp(r, n) > 0);
+  if (!BN_usub(r, r, n)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  assert(BN_cmp(r, n) < 0);
+
+  for (unsigned i = n_bits; i < p; ++i) {
+    // This is like |BN_mod_lshift1_quick| except using |BN_usub|.
+    //
+    // TODO: Replace this with the use of a constant-time variant of
+    // |BN_mod_lshift1_quick|.
+    if (!BN_lshift1(r, r)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+    if (BN_cmp(r, n) >= 0) {
+      if (!BN_usub(r, r, n)) {
+        return 0;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}