grpc-flamingo 1.11.0

data/third_party/boringssl/crypto/fipsmodule/rsa/rsa_impl.c

@@ -0,0 +1,1051 @@
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
+
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/thread.h>
+#include <openssl/type_check.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+#include "../bn/internal.h"
+#include "../../internal.h"
+#include "../delocate.h"
+
+
+static int check_modulus_and_exponent_sizes(const RSA *rsa) {
+  unsigned rsa_bits = BN_num_bits(rsa->n);
+
+  if (rsa_bits > 16 * 1024) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // Mitigate DoS attacks by limiting the exponent size. 33 bits was chosen as
+  // the limit based on the recommendations in [1] and [2]. Windows CryptoAPI
+  // doesn't support values larger than 32 bits [3], so it is unlikely that
+  // exponents larger than 32 bits are being used for anything Windows commonly
+  // does.
+  //
+  // [1] https://www.imperialviolet.org/2012/03/16/rsae.html
+  // [2] https://www.imperialviolet.org/2012/03/17/rsados.html
+  // [3] https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa387685(VS.85).aspx
+  static const unsigned kMaxExponentBits = 33;
+
+  if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > kMaxExponentBits) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // Verify |n > e|. Comparing |rsa_bits| to |kMaxExponentBits| is a small
+  // shortcut to comparing |n| and |e| directly. In reality, |kMaxExponentBits|
+  // is much smaller than the minimum RSA key size that any application should
+  // accept.
+  if (rsa_bits <= kMaxExponentBits) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  assert(BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) > 0);
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+size_t rsa_default_size(const RSA *rsa) {
+  return BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+}
+
+int RSA_encrypt(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out,
+                const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, int padding) {
+  if (rsa->n == NULL || rsa->e == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  const unsigned rsa_size = RSA_size(rsa);
+  BIGNUM *f, *result;
+  uint8_t *buf = NULL;
+  BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+  int i, ret = 0;
+
+  if (max_out < rsa_size) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (!check_modulus_and_exponent_sizes(rsa)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+  if (ctx == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+  f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  result = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  buf = OPENSSL_malloc(rsa_size);
+  if (!f || !result || !buf) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  switch (padding) {
+    case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+      i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf, rsa_size, in, in_len);
+      break;
+    case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
+      // Use the default parameters: SHA-1 for both hashes and no label.
+      i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(buf, rsa_size, in, in_len,
+                                          NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
+      break;
+    case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+      i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, rsa_size, in, in_len);
+      break;
+    default:
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+      goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (i <= 0) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (BN_bin2bn(buf, rsa_size, f) == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) {
+    // usually the padding functions would catch this
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->mont_n, &rsa->lock, rsa->n, ctx) ||
+      !BN_mod_exp_mont(result, f, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx, rsa->mont_n)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  // put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the length of the
+  // modulus
+  if (!BN_bn2bin_padded(out, rsa_size, result)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  *out_len = rsa_size;
+  ret = 1;
+
+err:
+  if (ctx != NULL) {
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+  }
+  OPENSSL_free(buf);
+
+  return ret;
+}
+
+// MAX_BLINDINGS_PER_RSA defines the maximum number of cached BN_BLINDINGs per
+// RSA*. Then this limit is exceeded, BN_BLINDING objects will be created and
+// destroyed as needed.
+#define MAX_BLINDINGS_PER_RSA 1024
+
+// rsa_blinding_get returns a BN_BLINDING to use with |rsa|. It does this by
+// allocating one of the cached BN_BLINDING objects in |rsa->blindings|. If
+// none are free, the cache will be extended by a extra element and the new
+// BN_BLINDING is returned.
+//
+// On success, the index of the assigned BN_BLINDING is written to
+// |*index_used| and must be passed to |rsa_blinding_release| when finished.
+static BN_BLINDING *rsa_blinding_get(RSA *rsa, unsigned *index_used,
+                                     BN_CTX *ctx) {
+  assert(ctx != NULL);
+  assert(rsa->mont_n != NULL);
+
+  BN_BLINDING *ret = NULL;
+  BN_BLINDING **new_blindings;
+  uint8_t *new_blindings_inuse;
+  char overflow = 0;
+
+  CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&rsa->lock);
+
+  unsigned i;
+  for (i = 0; i < rsa->num_blindings; i++) {
+    if (rsa->blindings_inuse[i] == 0) {
+      rsa->blindings_inuse[i] = 1;
+      ret = rsa->blindings[i];
+      *index_used = i;
+      break;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (ret != NULL) {
+    CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&rsa->lock);
+    return ret;
+  }
+
+  overflow = rsa->num_blindings >= MAX_BLINDINGS_PER_RSA;
+
+  // We didn't find a free BN_BLINDING to use so increase the length of
+  // the arrays by one and use the newly created element.
+
+  CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&rsa->lock);
+  ret = BN_BLINDING_new();
+  if (ret == NULL) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  if (overflow) {
+    // We cannot add any more cached BN_BLINDINGs so we use |ret|
+    // and mark it for destruction in |rsa_blinding_release|.
+    *index_used = MAX_BLINDINGS_PER_RSA;
+    return ret;
+  }
+
+  CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&rsa->lock);
+
+  new_blindings =
+      OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(BN_BLINDING *) * (rsa->num_blindings + 1));
+  if (new_blindings == NULL) {
+    goto err1;
+  }
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(new_blindings, rsa->blindings,
+         sizeof(BN_BLINDING *) * rsa->num_blindings);
+  new_blindings[rsa->num_blindings] = ret;
+
+  new_blindings_inuse = OPENSSL_malloc(rsa->num_blindings + 1);
+  if (new_blindings_inuse == NULL) {
+    goto err2;
+  }
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(new_blindings_inuse, rsa->blindings_inuse, rsa->num_blindings);
+  new_blindings_inuse[rsa->num_blindings] = 1;
+  *index_used = rsa->num_blindings;
+
+  OPENSSL_free(rsa->blindings);
+  rsa->blindings = new_blindings;
+  OPENSSL_free(rsa->blindings_inuse);
+  rsa->blindings_inuse = new_blindings_inuse;
+  rsa->num_blindings++;
+
+  CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&rsa->lock);
+  return ret;
+
+err2:
+  OPENSSL_free(new_blindings);
+
+err1:
+  CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&rsa->lock);
+  BN_BLINDING_free(ret);
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+// rsa_blinding_release marks the cached BN_BLINDING at the given index as free
+// for other threads to use.
+static void rsa_blinding_release(RSA *rsa, BN_BLINDING *blinding,
+                                 unsigned blinding_index) {
+  if (blinding_index == MAX_BLINDINGS_PER_RSA) {
+    // This blinding wasn't cached.
+    BN_BLINDING_free(blinding);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&rsa->lock);
+  rsa->blindings_inuse[blinding_index] = 0;
+  CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&rsa->lock);
+}
+
+// signing
+int rsa_default_sign_raw(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out,
+                         size_t max_out, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
+                         int padding) {
+  const unsigned rsa_size = RSA_size(rsa);
+  uint8_t *buf = NULL;
+  int i, ret = 0;
+
+  if (max_out < rsa_size) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  buf = OPENSSL_malloc(rsa_size);
+  if (buf == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  switch (padding) {
+    case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+      i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf, rsa_size, in, in_len);
+      break;
+    case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+      i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, rsa_size, in, in_len);
+      break;
+    default:
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+      goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (i <= 0) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (!RSA_private_transform(rsa, out, buf, rsa_size)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  *out_len = rsa_size;
+  ret = 1;
+
+err:
+  OPENSSL_free(buf);
+
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int rsa_default_decrypt(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out,
+                        const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, int padding) {
+  const unsigned rsa_size = RSA_size(rsa);
+  uint8_t *buf = NULL;
+  int ret = 0;
+
+  if (max_out < rsa_size) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (padding == RSA_NO_PADDING) {
+    buf = out;
+  } else {
+    // Allocate a temporary buffer to hold the padded plaintext.
+    buf = OPENSSL_malloc(rsa_size);
+    if (buf == NULL) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (in_len != rsa_size) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_DATA_LEN_NOT_EQUAL_TO_MOD_LEN);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (!RSA_private_transform(rsa, buf, in, rsa_size)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  switch (padding) {
+    case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+      ret =
+          RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(out, out_len, rsa_size, buf, rsa_size);
+      break;
+    case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
+      // Use the default parameters: SHA-1 for both hashes and no label.
+      ret = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(out, out_len, rsa_size, buf,
+                                              rsa_size, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
+      break;
+    case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+      *out_len = rsa_size;
+      ret = 1;
+      break;
+    default:
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+      goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (!ret) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
+  }
+
+err:
+  if (padding != RSA_NO_PADDING) {
+    OPENSSL_free(buf);
+  }
+
+  return ret;
+}
+
+static int mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+int RSA_verify_raw(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out,
+                   const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, int padding) {
+  if (rsa->n == NULL || rsa->e == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  const unsigned rsa_size = RSA_size(rsa);
+  BIGNUM *f, *result;
+
+  if (max_out < rsa_size) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (in_len != rsa_size) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_DATA_LEN_NOT_EQUAL_TO_MOD_LEN);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (!check_modulus_and_exponent_sizes(rsa)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+  if (ctx == NULL) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  int ret = 0;
+  uint8_t *buf = NULL;
+
+  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+  f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  result = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  if (f == NULL || result == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (padding == RSA_NO_PADDING) {
+    buf = out;
+  } else {
+    // Allocate a temporary buffer to hold the padded plaintext.
+    buf = OPENSSL_malloc(rsa_size);
+    if (buf == NULL) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (BN_bin2bn(in, in_len, f) == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->mont_n, &rsa->lock, rsa->n, ctx) ||
+      !BN_mod_exp_mont(result, f, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx, rsa->mont_n)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (!BN_bn2bin_padded(buf, rsa_size, result)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  switch (padding) {
+    case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+      ret =
+          RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(out, out_len, rsa_size, buf, rsa_size);
+      break;
+    case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+      ret = 1;
+      *out_len = rsa_size;
+      break;
+    default:
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+      goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (!ret) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+err:
+  BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+  BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+  if (buf != out) {
+    OPENSSL_free(buf);
+  }
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int rsa_default_private_transform(RSA *rsa, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in,
+                                  size_t len) {
+  if (rsa->n == NULL || rsa->d == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  BIGNUM *f, *result;
+  BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+  unsigned blinding_index = 0;
+  BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
+  int ret = 0;
+
+  ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+  if (ctx == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+  f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  result = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+
+  if (f == NULL || result == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (BN_bin2bn(in, len, f) == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) {
+    // Usually the padding functions would catch this.
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->mont_n, &rsa->lock, rsa->n, ctx)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  const int do_blinding = (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING) == 0;
+
+  if (rsa->e == NULL && do_blinding) {
+    // We cannot do blinding or verification without |e|, and continuing without
+    // those countermeasures is dangerous. However, the Java/Android RSA API
+    // requires support for keys where only |d| and |n| (and not |e|) are known.
+    // The callers that require that bad behavior set |RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING|.
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_NO_PUBLIC_EXPONENT);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (do_blinding) {
+    blinding = rsa_blinding_get(rsa, &blinding_index, ctx);
+    if (blinding == NULL) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      goto err;
+    }
+    if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(f, blinding, rsa->e, rsa->mont_n, ctx)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (rsa->p != NULL && rsa->q != NULL && rsa->e != NULL && rsa->dmp1 != NULL &&
+      rsa->dmq1 != NULL && rsa->iqmp != NULL) {
+    if (!mod_exp(result, f, rsa, ctx)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  } else if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(result, f, rsa->d, rsa->n, ctx,
+                                        rsa->mont_n)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  // Verify the result to protect against fault attacks as described in the
+  // 1997 paper "On the Importance of Checking Cryptographic Protocols for
+  // Faults" by Dan Boneh, Richard A. DeMillo, and Richard J. Lipton. Some
+  // implementations do this only when the CRT is used, but we do it in all
+  // cases. Section 6 of the aforementioned paper describes an attack that
+  // works when the CRT isn't used. That attack is much less likely to succeed
+  // than the CRT attack, but there have likely been improvements since 1997.
+  //
+  // This check is cheap assuming |e| is small; it almost always is.
+  if (rsa->e != NULL) {
+    BIGNUM *vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (vrfy == NULL ||
+        !BN_mod_exp_mont(vrfy, result, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx, rsa->mont_n) ||
+        !BN_equal_consttime(vrfy, f)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+  }
+
+  if (do_blinding &&
+      !BN_BLINDING_invert(result, blinding, rsa->mont_n, ctx)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (!BN_bn2bin_padded(out, len, result)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  ret = 1;
+
+err:
+  if (ctx != NULL) {
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+  }
+  if (blinding != NULL) {
+    rsa_blinding_release(rsa, blinding, blinding_index);
+  }
+
+  return ret;
+}
+
+static int mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx) {
+  assert(ctx != NULL);
+
+  assert(rsa->n != NULL);
+  assert(rsa->e != NULL);
+  assert(rsa->d != NULL);
+  assert(rsa->p != NULL);
+  assert(rsa->q != NULL);
+  assert(rsa->dmp1 != NULL);
+  assert(rsa->dmq1 != NULL);
+  assert(rsa->iqmp != NULL);
+
+  BIGNUM *r1, *m1, *vrfy;
+  int ret = 0;
+
+  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+  r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  if (r1 == NULL ||
+      m1 == NULL ||
+      vrfy == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->mont_p, &rsa->lock, rsa->p, ctx) ||
+      !BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->mont_q, &rsa->lock, rsa->q, ctx)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->mont_n, &rsa->lock, rsa->n, ctx)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  // compute I mod q
+  if (!BN_mod(r1, I, rsa->q, ctx)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  // compute r1^dmq1 mod q
+  if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(m1, r1, rsa->dmq1, rsa->q, ctx, rsa->mont_q)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  // compute I mod p
+  if (!BN_mod(r1, I, rsa->p, ctx)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  // compute r1^dmp1 mod p
+  if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(r0, r1, rsa->dmp1, rsa->p, ctx, rsa->mont_p)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (!BN_sub(r0, r0, m1)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  // This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does
+  // affect the multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size
+  if (BN_is_negative(r0)) {
+    if (!BN_add(r0, r0, rsa->p)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (!BN_mul(r1, r0, rsa->iqmp, ctx)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (!BN_mod(r0, r1, rsa->p, ctx)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  // If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of
+  // adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still
+  // negative. This can break the private key operations: the following
+  // second correction should *always* correct this rare occurrence.
+  // This will *never* happen with OpenSSL generated keys because
+  // they ensure p > q [steve]
+  if (BN_is_negative(r0)) {
+    if (!BN_add(r0, r0, rsa->p)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+  if (!BN_mul(r1, r0, rsa->q, ctx)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  if (!BN_add(r0, r1, m1)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  ret = 1;
+
+err:
+  BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+static int ensure_bignum(BIGNUM **out) {
+  if (*out == NULL) {
+    *out = BN_new();
+  }
+  return *out != NULL;
+}
+
+// kBoringSSLRSASqrtTwo is the BIGNUM representation of ⌊2¹⁵³⁵×√2⌋. This is
+// chosen to give enough precision for 3072-bit RSA, the largest key size FIPS
+// specifies. Key sizes beyond this will round up.
+//
+// To verify this number, check that n² < 2³⁰⁷¹ < (n+1)², where n is value
+// represented here. Note the components are listed in little-endian order. Here
+// is some sample Python code to check:
+//
+//   >>> TOBN = lambda a, b: a << 32 | b
+//   >>> l = [ <paste the contents of kSqrtTwo> ]
+//   >>> n = sum(a * 2**(64*i) for i, a in enumerate(l))
+//   >>> n**2 < 2**3071 < (n+1)**2
+//   True
+const BN_ULONG kBoringSSLRSASqrtTwo[] = {
+    TOBN(0xdea06241, 0xf7aa81c2), TOBN(0xf6a1be3f, 0xca221307),
+    TOBN(0x332a5e9f, 0x7bda1ebf), TOBN(0x0104dc01, 0xfe32352f),
+    TOBN(0xb8cf341b, 0x6f8236c7), TOBN(0x4264dabc, 0xd528b651),
+    TOBN(0xf4d3a02c, 0xebc93e0c), TOBN(0x81394ab6, 0xd8fd0efd),
+    TOBN(0xeaa4a089, 0x9040ca4a), TOBN(0xf52f120f, 0x836e582e),
+    TOBN(0xcb2a6343, 0x31f3c84d), TOBN(0xc6d5a8a3, 0x8bb7e9dc),
+    TOBN(0x460abc72, 0x2f7c4e33), TOBN(0xcab1bc91, 0x1688458a),
+    TOBN(0x53059c60, 0x11bc337b), TOBN(0xd2202e87, 0x42af1f4e),
+    TOBN(0x78048736, 0x3dfa2768), TOBN(0x0f74a85e, 0x439c7b4a),
+    TOBN(0xa8b1fe6f, 0xdc83db39), TOBN(0x4afc8304, 0x3ab8a2c3),
+    TOBN(0xed17ac85, 0x83339915), TOBN(0x1d6f60ba, 0x893ba84c),
+    TOBN(0x597d89b3, 0x754abe9f), TOBN(0xb504f333, 0xf9de6484),
+};
+const size_t kBoringSSLRSASqrtTwoLen = OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kBoringSSLRSASqrtTwo);
+
+int rsa_greater_than_pow2(const BIGNUM *b, int n) {
+  if (BN_is_negative(b) || n == INT_MAX) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  int b_bits = BN_num_bits(b);
+  return b_bits > n + 1 || (b_bits == n + 1 && !BN_is_pow2(b));
+}
+
+// generate_prime sets |out| to a prime with length |bits| such that |out|-1 is
+// relatively prime to |e|. If |p| is non-NULL, |out| will also not be close to
+// |p|.
+static int generate_prime(BIGNUM *out, int bits, const BIGNUM *e,
+                          const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_GENCB *cb) {
+  if (bits < 128 || (bits % BN_BITS2) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // See FIPS 186-4 appendix B.3.3, steps 4 and 5. Note |bits| here is nlen/2.
+
+  // Use the limit from steps 4.7 and 5.8 for most values of |e|. When |e| is 3,
+  // the 186-4 limit is too low, so we use a higher one. Note this case is not
+  // reachable from |RSA_generate_key_fips|.
+  if (bits >= INT_MAX/32) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  int limit = BN_is_word(e, 3) ? bits * 32 : bits * 5;
+
+  int ret = 0, tries = 0, rand_tries = 0;
+  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+  BIGNUM *tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  if (tmp == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  for (;;) {
+    // Generate a random number of length |bits| where the bottom bit is set
+    // (steps 4.2, 4.3, 5.2 and 5.3) and the top bit is set (implied by the
+    // bound checked below in steps 4.4 and 5.5).
+    if (!BN_rand(out, bits, BN_RAND_TOP_ONE, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ODD) ||
+        !BN_GENCB_call(cb, BN_GENCB_GENERATED, rand_tries++)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (p != NULL) {
+      // If |p| and |out| are too close, try again (step 5.4).
+      if (!BN_sub(tmp, out, p)) {
+        goto err;
+      }
+      BN_set_negative(tmp, 0);
+      if (!rsa_greater_than_pow2(tmp, bits - 100)) {
+        continue;
+      }
+    }
+
+    // If out < 2^(bits-1)×√2, try again (steps 4.4 and 5.5).
+    //
+    // We check the most significant words, so we retry if ⌊out/2^k⌋ <= ⌊b/2^k⌋,
+    // where b = 2^(bits-1)×√2 and k = max(0, bits - 1536). For key sizes up to
+    // 3072 (bits = 1536), k = 0, so we are testing that ⌊out⌋ <= ⌊b⌋. out is an
+    // integer and b is not, so this is equivalent to out < b. That is, the
+    // comparison is exact for FIPS key sizes.
+    //
+    // For larger keys, the comparison is approximate, leaning towards
+    // retrying. That is, we reject a negligible fraction of primes that are
+    // within the FIPS bound, but we will never accept a prime outside the
+    // bound, ensuring the resulting RSA key is the right size. Specifically, if
+    // the FIPS bound holds, we have ⌊out/2^k⌋ < out/2^k < b/2^k. This implies
+    // ⌊out/2^k⌋ <= ⌊b/2^k⌋. That is, the FIPS bound implies our bound and so we
+    // are slightly tighter.
+    size_t out_len = (size_t)out->top;
+    assert(out_len == (size_t)bits / BN_BITS2);
+    size_t to_check = kBoringSSLRSASqrtTwoLen;
+    if (to_check > out_len) {
+      to_check = out_len;
+    }
+    if (!bn_less_than_words(
+            kBoringSSLRSASqrtTwo + kBoringSSLRSASqrtTwoLen - to_check,
+            out->d + out_len - to_check, to_check)) {
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    // Check gcd(out-1, e) is one (steps 4.5 and 5.6).
+    if (!BN_sub(tmp, out, BN_value_one()) ||
+        !BN_gcd(tmp, tmp, e, ctx)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+    if (BN_is_one(tmp)) {
+      // Test |out| for primality (steps 4.5.1 and 5.6.1).
+      int is_probable_prime;
+      if (!BN_primality_test(&is_probable_prime, out, BN_prime_checks, ctx, 1,
+                             cb)) {
+        goto err;
+      }
+      if (is_probable_prime) {
+        ret = 1;
+        goto err;
+      }
+    }
+
+    // If we've tried too many times to find a prime, abort (steps 4.7 and
+    // 5.8).
+    tries++;
+    if (tries >= limit) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_TOO_MANY_ITERATIONS);
+      goto err;
+    }
+    if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, tries)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+err:
+  BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb) {
+  // See FIPS 186-4 appendix B.3. This function implements a generalized version
+  // of the FIPS algorithm. |RSA_generate_key_fips| performs additional checks
+  // for FIPS-compliant key generation.
+
+  // Always generate RSA keys which are a multiple of 128 bits. Round |bits|
+  // down as needed.
+  bits &= ~127;
+
+  // Reject excessively small keys.
+  if (bits < 256) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  int ret = 0;
+  BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+  if (ctx == NULL) {
+    goto bn_err;
+  }
+  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+  BIGNUM *totient = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  BIGNUM *pm1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  BIGNUM *qm1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  BIGNUM *gcd = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  if (totient == NULL || pm1 == NULL || qm1 == NULL || gcd == NULL) {
+    goto bn_err;
+  }
+
+  // We need the RSA components non-NULL.
+  if (!ensure_bignum(&rsa->n) ||
+      !ensure_bignum(&rsa->d) ||
+      !ensure_bignum(&rsa->e) ||
+      !ensure_bignum(&rsa->p) ||
+      !ensure_bignum(&rsa->q) ||
+      !ensure_bignum(&rsa->dmp1) ||
+      !ensure_bignum(&rsa->dmq1) ||
+      !ensure_bignum(&rsa->iqmp)) {
+    goto bn_err;
+  }
+
+  if (!BN_copy(rsa->e, e_value)) {
+    goto bn_err;
+  }
+
+  int prime_bits = bits / 2;
+  do {
+    // Generate p and q, each of size |prime_bits|, using the steps outlined in
+    // appendix FIPS 186-4 appendix B.3.3.
+    if (!generate_prime(rsa->p, prime_bits, rsa->e, NULL, ctx, cb) ||
+        !BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0) ||
+        !generate_prime(rsa->q, prime_bits, rsa->e, rsa->p, ctx, cb) ||
+        !BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 1)) {
+      goto bn_err;
+    }
+
+    if (BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) < 0) {
+      BIGNUM *tmp = rsa->p;
+      rsa->p = rsa->q;
+      rsa->q = tmp;
+    }
+
+    // Calculate d = e^(-1) (mod lcm(p-1, q-1)), per FIPS 186-4. This differs
+    // from typical RSA implementations which use (p-1)*(q-1).
+    //
+    // Note this means the size of d might reveal information about p-1 and
+    // q-1. However, we do operations with Chinese Remainder Theorem, so we only
+    // use d (mod p-1) and d (mod q-1) as exponents. Using a minimal totient
+    // does not affect those two values.
+    if (!BN_sub(pm1, rsa->p, BN_value_one()) ||
+        !BN_sub(qm1, rsa->q, BN_value_one()) ||
+        !BN_mul(totient, pm1, qm1, ctx) ||
+        !BN_gcd(gcd, pm1, qm1, ctx) ||
+        !BN_div(totient, NULL, totient, gcd, ctx) ||
+        !BN_mod_inverse(rsa->d, rsa->e, totient, ctx)) {
+      goto bn_err;
+    }
+
+    // Check that |rsa->d| > 2^|prime_bits| and try again if it fails. See
+    // appendix B.3.1's guidance on values for d.
+  } while (!rsa_greater_than_pow2(rsa->d, prime_bits));
+
+  if (// Calculate n.
+      !BN_mul(rsa->n, rsa->p, rsa->q, ctx) ||
+      // Calculate d mod (p-1).
+      !BN_mod(rsa->dmp1, rsa->d, pm1, ctx) ||
+      // Calculate d mod (q-1)
+      !BN_mod(rsa->dmq1, rsa->d, qm1, ctx)) {
+    goto bn_err;
+  }
+
+  // Sanity-check that |rsa->n| has the specified size. This is implied by
+  // |generate_prime|'s bounds.
+  if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) != (unsigned)bits) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  // Calculate inverse of q mod p. Note that although RSA key generation is far
+  // from constant-time, |bn_mod_inverse_secret_prime| uses the same modular
+  // exponentation logic as in RSA private key operations and, if the RSAZ-1024
+  // code is enabled, will be optimized for common RSA prime sizes.
+  if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->mont_p, &rsa->lock, rsa->p, ctx) ||
+      !bn_mod_inverse_secret_prime(rsa->iqmp, rsa->q, rsa->p, ctx,
+                                   rsa->mont_p)) {
+    goto bn_err;
+  }
+
+  // The key generation process is complex and thus error-prone. It could be
+  // disastrous to generate and then use a bad key so double-check that the key
+  // makes sense.
+  if (!RSA_check_key(rsa)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  ret = 1;
+
+bn_err:
+  if (!ret) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_LIB_BN);
+  }
+err:
+  if (ctx != NULL) {
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+  }
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int RSA_generate_key_fips(RSA *rsa, int bits, BN_GENCB *cb) {
+  // FIPS 186-4 allows 2048-bit and 3072-bit RSA keys (1024-bit and 1536-bit
+  // primes, respectively) with the prime generation method we use.
+  if (bits != 2048 && bits != 3072) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_RSA_PARAMETERS);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  BIGNUM *e = BN_new();
+  int ret = e != NULL &&
+            BN_set_word(e, RSA_F4) &&
+            RSA_generate_key_ex(rsa, bits, e, cb) &&
+            RSA_check_fips(rsa);
+  BN_free(e);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(RSA_METHOD, RSA_default_method) {
+  // All of the methods are NULL to make it easier for the compiler/linker to
+  // drop unused functions. The wrapper functions will select the appropriate
+  // |rsa_default_*| implementation.
+  OPENSSL_memset(out, 0, sizeof(RSA_METHOD));
+  out->common.is_static = 1;
+  out->flags = RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC | RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE;
+}