grpc-flamingo 1.11.0

data/src/core/tsi/alts/crypt/aes_gcm.cc

@@ -0,0 +1,687 @@
+/*
+ *
+ * Copyright 2018 gRPC authors.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <grpc/support/port_platform.h>
+
+#include "src/core/tsi/alts/crypt/gsec.h"
+
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <grpc/support/alloc.h>
+
+constexpr size_t kKdfKeyLen = 32;
+constexpr size_t kKdfCounterLen = 6;
+constexpr size_t kKdfCounterOffset = 2;
+constexpr size_t kRekeyAeadKeyLen = kAes128GcmKeyLength;
+
+/* Struct for additional data required if rekeying is enabled. */
+struct gsec_aes_gcm_aead_rekey_data {
+  uint8_t kdf_counter[kKdfCounterLen];
+  uint8_t nonce_mask[kAesGcmNonceLength];
+};
+
+/* Main struct for AES_GCM crypter interface. */
+struct gsec_aes_gcm_aead_crypter {
+  gsec_aead_crypter crypter;
+  size_t key_length;
+  size_t nonce_length;
+  size_t tag_length;
+  uint8_t* key;
+  gsec_aes_gcm_aead_rekey_data* rekey_data;
+  EVP_CIPHER_CTX* ctx;
+};
+
+static char* aes_gcm_get_openssl_errors() {
+  BIO* bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+  ERR_print_errors(bio);
+  BUF_MEM* mem = nullptr;
+  char* error_msg = nullptr;
+  BIO_get_mem_ptr(bio, &mem);
+  if (mem != nullptr) {
+    error_msg = static_cast<char*>(gpr_malloc(mem->length + 1));
+    memcpy(error_msg, mem->data, mem->length);
+    error_msg[mem->length] = '\0';
+  }
+  BIO_free_all(bio);
+  return error_msg;
+}
+
+static void aes_gcm_format_errors(const char* error_msg, char** error_details) {
+  if (error_details == nullptr) {
+    return;
+  }
+  unsigned long error = ERR_get_error();
+  if (error == 0 && error_msg != nullptr) {
+    *error_details = static_cast<char*>(gpr_malloc(strlen(error_msg) + 1));
+    memcpy(*error_details, error_msg, strlen(error_msg) + 1);
+    return;
+  }
+  char* openssl_errors = aes_gcm_get_openssl_errors();
+  if (openssl_errors != nullptr && error_msg != nullptr) {
+    size_t len = strlen(error_msg) + strlen(openssl_errors) + 2; /* ", " */
+    *error_details = static_cast<char*>(gpr_malloc(len + 1));
+    snprintf(*error_details, len + 1, "%s, %s", error_msg, openssl_errors);
+    gpr_free(openssl_errors);
+  }
+}
+
+static grpc_status_code gsec_aes_gcm_aead_crypter_max_ciphertext_and_tag_length(
+    const gsec_aead_crypter* crypter, size_t plaintext_length,
+    size_t* max_ciphertext_and_tag_length, char** error_details) {
+  if (max_ciphertext_and_tag_length == nullptr) {
+    aes_gcm_format_errors("max_ciphertext_and_tag_length is nullptr.",
+                          error_details);
+    return GRPC_STATUS_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+  }
+  gsec_aes_gcm_aead_crypter* aes_gcm_crypter =
+      reinterpret_cast<gsec_aes_gcm_aead_crypter*>(
+          const_cast<gsec_aead_crypter*>(crypter));
+  *max_ciphertext_and_tag_length =
+      plaintext_length + aes_gcm_crypter->tag_length;
+  return GRPC_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+static grpc_status_code gsec_aes_gcm_aead_crypter_max_plaintext_length(
+    const gsec_aead_crypter* crypter, size_t ciphertext_and_tag_length,
+    size_t* max_plaintext_length, char** error_details) {
+  if (max_plaintext_length == nullptr) {
+    aes_gcm_format_errors("max_plaintext_length is nullptr.", error_details);
+    return GRPC_STATUS_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+  }
+  gsec_aes_gcm_aead_crypter* aes_gcm_crypter =
+      reinterpret_cast<gsec_aes_gcm_aead_crypter*>(
+          const_cast<gsec_aead_crypter*>(crypter));
+  if (ciphertext_and_tag_length < aes_gcm_crypter->tag_length) {
+    *max_plaintext_length = 0;
+    aes_gcm_format_errors(
+        "ciphertext_and_tag_length is smaller than tag_length.", error_details);
+    return GRPC_STATUS_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+  }
+  *max_plaintext_length =
+      ciphertext_and_tag_length - aes_gcm_crypter->tag_length;
+  return GRPC_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+static grpc_status_code gsec_aes_gcm_aead_crypter_nonce_length(
+    const gsec_aead_crypter* crypter, size_t* nonce_length,
+    char** error_details) {
+  if (nonce_length == nullptr) {
+    aes_gcm_format_errors("nonce_length is nullptr.", error_details);
+    return GRPC_STATUS_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+  }
+  gsec_aes_gcm_aead_crypter* aes_gcm_crypter =
+      reinterpret_cast<gsec_aes_gcm_aead_crypter*>(
+          const_cast<gsec_aead_crypter*>(crypter));
+  *nonce_length = aes_gcm_crypter->nonce_length;
+  return GRPC_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+static grpc_status_code gsec_aes_gcm_aead_crypter_key_length(
+    const gsec_aead_crypter* crypter, size_t* key_length,
+    char** error_details) {
+  if (key_length == nullptr) {
+    aes_gcm_format_errors("key_length is nullptr.", error_details);
+    return GRPC_STATUS_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+  }
+  gsec_aes_gcm_aead_crypter* aes_gcm_crypter =
+      reinterpret_cast<gsec_aes_gcm_aead_crypter*>(
+          const_cast<gsec_aead_crypter*>(crypter));
+  *key_length = aes_gcm_crypter->key_length;
+  return GRPC_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+static grpc_status_code gsec_aes_gcm_aead_crypter_tag_length(
+    const gsec_aead_crypter* crypter, size_t* tag_length,
+    char** error_details) {
+  if (tag_length == nullptr) {
+    aes_gcm_format_errors("tag_length is nullptr.", error_details);
+    return GRPC_STATUS_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+  }
+  gsec_aes_gcm_aead_crypter* aes_gcm_crypter =
+      reinterpret_cast<gsec_aes_gcm_aead_crypter*>(
+          const_cast<gsec_aead_crypter*>(crypter));
+  *tag_length = aes_gcm_crypter->tag_length;
+  return GRPC_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+static void aes_gcm_mask_nonce(uint8_t* dst, const uint8_t* nonce,
+                               const uint8_t* mask) {
+  uint64_t mask1;
+  uint32_t mask2;
+  memcpy(&mask1, mask, sizeof(mask1));
+  memcpy(&mask2, mask + sizeof(mask1), sizeof(mask2));
+  uint64_t nonce1;
+  uint32_t nonce2;
+  memcpy(&nonce1, nonce, sizeof(nonce1));
+  memcpy(&nonce2, nonce + sizeof(nonce1), sizeof(nonce2));
+  nonce1 ^= mask1;
+  nonce2 ^= mask2;
+  memcpy(dst, &nonce1, sizeof(nonce1));
+  memcpy(dst + sizeof(nonce1), &nonce2, sizeof(nonce2));
+}
+
+static grpc_status_code aes_gcm_derive_aead_key(uint8_t* dst,
+                                                const uint8_t* kdf_key,
+                                                const uint8_t* kdf_counter) {
+  unsigned char buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+  unsigned char ctr = 1;
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+  HMAC_CTX hmac;
+  HMAC_CTX_init(&hmac);
+  if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hmac, kdf_key, kKdfKeyLen, EVP_sha256(), nullptr) ||
+      !HMAC_Update(&hmac, kdf_counter, kKdfCounterLen) ||
+      !HMAC_Update(&hmac, &ctr, 1) || !HMAC_Final(&hmac, buf, nullptr)) {
+    HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hmac);
+    return GRPC_STATUS_INTERNAL;
+  }
+  HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hmac);
+#else
+  HMAC_CTX* hmac = HMAC_CTX_new();
+  if (hmac == nullptr) {
+    return GRPC_STATUS_INTERNAL;
+  }
+  if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hmac, kdf_key, kKdfKeyLen, EVP_sha256(), nullptr) ||
+      !HMAC_Update(hmac, kdf_counter, kKdfCounterLen) ||
+      !HMAC_Update(hmac, &ctr, 1) || !HMAC_Final(hmac, buf, nullptr)) {
+    HMAC_CTX_free(hmac);
+    return GRPC_STATUS_INTERNAL;
+  }
+  HMAC_CTX_free(hmac);
+#endif
+  memcpy(dst, buf, kRekeyAeadKeyLen);
+  return GRPC_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+static grpc_status_code aes_gcm_rekey_if_required(
+    gsec_aes_gcm_aead_crypter* aes_gcm_crypter, const uint8_t* nonce,
+    char** error_details) {
+  // If rekey_data is nullptr, then rekeying is not supported and not required.
+  // If bytes 2-7 of kdf_counter differ from the (per message) nonce, then the
+  // encryption key is recomputed from a new kdf_counter to ensure that we don't
+  // encrypt more than 2^16 messages per encryption key (in each direction).
+  if (aes_gcm_crypter->rekey_data == nullptr ||
+      memcmp(aes_gcm_crypter->rekey_data->kdf_counter,
+             nonce + kKdfCounterOffset, kKdfCounterLen) == 0) {
+    return GRPC_STATUS_OK;
+  }
+  memcpy(aes_gcm_crypter->rekey_data->kdf_counter, nonce + kKdfCounterOffset,
+         kKdfCounterLen);
+  uint8_t aead_key[kRekeyAeadKeyLen];
+  if (aes_gcm_derive_aead_key(aead_key, aes_gcm_crypter->key,
+                              aes_gcm_crypter->rekey_data->kdf_counter) !=
+      GRPC_STATUS_OK) {
+    aes_gcm_format_errors("Rekeying failed in key derivation.", error_details);
+    return GRPC_STATUS_INTERNAL;
+  }
+  if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(aes_gcm_crypter->ctx, nullptr, nullptr, aead_key,
+                          nullptr)) {
+    aes_gcm_format_errors("Rekeying failed in context update.", error_details);
+    return GRPC_STATUS_INTERNAL;
+  }
+  return GRPC_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+static grpc_status_code gsec_aes_gcm_aead_crypter_encrypt_iovec(
+    gsec_aead_crypter* crypter, const uint8_t* nonce, size_t nonce_length,
+    const struct iovec* aad_vec, size_t aad_vec_length,
+    const struct iovec* plaintext_vec, size_t plaintext_vec_length,
+    struct iovec ciphertext_vec, size_t* ciphertext_bytes_written,
+    char** error_details) {
+  gsec_aes_gcm_aead_crypter* aes_gcm_crypter =
+      reinterpret_cast<gsec_aes_gcm_aead_crypter*>(crypter);
+  // Input checks
+  if (nonce == nullptr) {
+    aes_gcm_format_errors("Nonce buffer is nullptr.", error_details);
+    return GRPC_STATUS_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+  }
+  if (kAesGcmNonceLength != nonce_length) {
+    aes_gcm_format_errors("Nonce buffer has the wrong length.", error_details);
+    return GRPC_STATUS_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+  }
+  if (aad_vec_length > 0 && aad_vec == nullptr) {
+    aes_gcm_format_errors("Non-zero aad_vec_length but aad_vec is nullptr.",
+                          error_details);
+    return GRPC_STATUS_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+  }
+  if (plaintext_vec_length > 0 && plaintext_vec == nullptr) {
+    aes_gcm_format_errors(
+        "Non-zero plaintext_vec_length but plaintext_vec is nullptr.",
+        error_details);
+    return GRPC_STATUS_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+  }
+  if (ciphertext_bytes_written == nullptr) {
+    aes_gcm_format_errors("bytes_written is nullptr.", error_details);
+    return GRPC_STATUS_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+  }
+  *ciphertext_bytes_written = 0;
+  // rekey if required
+  if (aes_gcm_rekey_if_required(aes_gcm_crypter, nonce, error_details) !=
+      GRPC_STATUS_OK) {
+    return GRPC_STATUS_INTERNAL;
+  }
+  // mask nonce if required
+  const uint8_t* nonce_aead = nonce;
+  uint8_t nonce_masked[kAesGcmNonceLength];
+  if (aes_gcm_crypter->rekey_data != nullptr) {
+    aes_gcm_mask_nonce(nonce_masked, aes_gcm_crypter->rekey_data->nonce_mask,
+                       nonce);
+    nonce_aead = nonce_masked;
+  }
+  // init openssl context
+  if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(aes_gcm_crypter->ctx, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr,
+                          nonce_aead)) {
+    aes_gcm_format_errors("Initializing nonce failed", error_details);
+    return GRPC_STATUS_INTERNAL;
+  }
+  // process aad
+  size_t i;
+  for (i = 0; i < aad_vec_length; i++) {
+    const uint8_t* aad = static_cast<uint8_t*>(aad_vec[i].iov_base);
+    size_t aad_length = aad_vec[i].iov_len;
+    if (aad_length == 0) {
+      continue;
+    }
+    size_t aad_bytes_read = 0;
+    if (aad == nullptr) {
+      aes_gcm_format_errors("aad is nullptr.", error_details);
+      return GRPC_STATUS_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+    }
+    if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(aes_gcm_crypter->ctx, nullptr,
+                           reinterpret_cast<int*>(&aad_bytes_read), aad,
+                           static_cast<int>(aad_length)) ||
+        aad_bytes_read != aad_length) {
+      aes_gcm_format_errors("Setting authenticated associated data failed",
+                            error_details);
+      return GRPC_STATUS_INTERNAL;
+    }
+  }
+  uint8_t* ciphertext = static_cast<uint8_t*>(ciphertext_vec.iov_base);
+  size_t ciphertext_length = ciphertext_vec.iov_len;
+  if (ciphertext == nullptr) {
+    aes_gcm_format_errors("ciphertext is nullptr.", error_details);
+    return GRPC_STATUS_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+  }
+  // process plaintext
+  for (i = 0; i < plaintext_vec_length; i++) {
+    const uint8_t* plaintext = static_cast<uint8_t*>(plaintext_vec[i].iov_base);
+    size_t plaintext_length = plaintext_vec[i].iov_len;
+    if (plaintext == nullptr) {
+      if (plaintext_length == 0) {
+        continue;
+      }
+      aes_gcm_format_errors("plaintext is nullptr.", error_details);
+      return GRPC_STATUS_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+    }
+    if (ciphertext_length < plaintext_length) {
+      aes_gcm_format_errors(
+          "ciphertext is not large enough to hold the result.", error_details);
+      return GRPC_STATUS_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+    }
+    int bytes_written = 0;
+    int bytes_to_write = static_cast<int>(plaintext_length);
+    if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(aes_gcm_crypter->ctx, ciphertext, &bytes_written,
+                           plaintext, bytes_to_write)) {
+      aes_gcm_format_errors("Encrypting plaintext failed.", error_details);
+      return GRPC_STATUS_INTERNAL;
+    }
+    if (bytes_written > bytes_to_write) {
+      aes_gcm_format_errors("More bytes written than expected.", error_details);
+      return GRPC_STATUS_INTERNAL;
+    }
+    ciphertext += bytes_written;
+    ciphertext_length -= bytes_written;
+  }
+  int bytes_written_temp = 0;
+  if (!EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(aes_gcm_crypter->ctx, nullptr,
+                           &bytes_written_temp)) {
+    aes_gcm_format_errors("Finalizing encryption failed.", error_details);
+    return GRPC_STATUS_INTERNAL;
+  }
+  if (bytes_written_temp != 0) {
+    aes_gcm_format_errors("Openssl wrote some unexpected bytes.",
+                          error_details);
+    return GRPC_STATUS_INTERNAL;
+  }
+  if (ciphertext_length < kAesGcmTagLength) {
+    aes_gcm_format_errors("ciphertext is too small to hold a tag.",
+                          error_details);
+    return GRPC_STATUS_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+  }
+
+  if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(aes_gcm_crypter->ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG,
+                           kAesGcmTagLength, ciphertext)) {
+    aes_gcm_format_errors("Writing tag failed.", error_details);
+    return GRPC_STATUS_INTERNAL;
+  }
+  ciphertext += kAesGcmTagLength;
+  ciphertext_length -= kAesGcmTagLength;
+  *ciphertext_bytes_written = ciphertext_vec.iov_len - ciphertext_length;
+  return GRPC_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+static grpc_status_code gsec_aes_gcm_aead_crypter_decrypt_iovec(
+    gsec_aead_crypter* crypter, const uint8_t* nonce, size_t nonce_length,
+    const struct iovec* aad_vec, size_t aad_vec_length,
+    const struct iovec* ciphertext_vec, size_t ciphertext_vec_length,
+    struct iovec plaintext_vec, size_t* plaintext_bytes_written,
+    char** error_details) {
+  gsec_aes_gcm_aead_crypter* aes_gcm_crypter =
+      reinterpret_cast<gsec_aes_gcm_aead_crypter*>(
+          const_cast<gsec_aead_crypter*>(crypter));
+  if (nonce == nullptr) {
+    aes_gcm_format_errors("Nonce buffer is nullptr.", error_details);
+    return GRPC_STATUS_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+  }
+  if (kAesGcmNonceLength != nonce_length) {
+    aes_gcm_format_errors("Nonce buffer has the wrong length.", error_details);
+    return GRPC_STATUS_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+  }
+  if (aad_vec_length > 0 && aad_vec == nullptr) {
+    aes_gcm_format_errors("Non-zero aad_vec_length but aad_vec is nullptr.",
+                          error_details);
+    return GRPC_STATUS_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+  }
+  if (ciphertext_vec_length > 0 && ciphertext_vec == nullptr) {
+    aes_gcm_format_errors(
+        "Non-zero plaintext_vec_length but plaintext_vec is nullptr.",
+        error_details);
+    return GRPC_STATUS_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+  }
+  // Compute the total length so we can ensure we don't pass the tag into
+  // EVP_decrypt.
+  size_t total_ciphertext_length = 0;
+  size_t i;
+  for (i = 0; i < ciphertext_vec_length; i++) {
+    total_ciphertext_length += ciphertext_vec[i].iov_len;
+  }
+  if (total_ciphertext_length < kAesGcmTagLength) {
+    aes_gcm_format_errors("ciphertext is too small to hold a tag.",
+                          error_details);
+    return GRPC_STATUS_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+  }
+  if (plaintext_bytes_written == nullptr) {
+    aes_gcm_format_errors("bytes_written is nullptr.", error_details);
+    return GRPC_STATUS_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+  }
+  *plaintext_bytes_written = 0;
+  // rekey if required
+  if (aes_gcm_rekey_if_required(aes_gcm_crypter, nonce, error_details) !=
+      GRPC_STATUS_OK) {
+    aes_gcm_format_errors("Rekeying failed.", error_details);
+    return GRPC_STATUS_INTERNAL;
+  }
+  // mask nonce if required
+  const uint8_t* nonce_aead = nonce;
+  uint8_t nonce_masked[kAesGcmNonceLength];
+  if (aes_gcm_crypter->rekey_data != nullptr) {
+    aes_gcm_mask_nonce(nonce_masked, aes_gcm_crypter->rekey_data->nonce_mask,
+                       nonce);
+    nonce_aead = nonce_masked;
+  }
+  // init openssl context
+  if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(aes_gcm_crypter->ctx, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr,
+                          nonce_aead)) {
+    aes_gcm_format_errors("Initializing nonce failed.", error_details);
+    return GRPC_STATUS_INTERNAL;
+  }
+  // process aad
+  for (i = 0; i < aad_vec_length; i++) {
+    const uint8_t* aad = static_cast<uint8_t*>(aad_vec[i].iov_base);
+    size_t aad_length = aad_vec[i].iov_len;
+    if (aad_length == 0) {
+      continue;
+    }
+    size_t aad_bytes_read = 0;
+    if (aad == nullptr) {
+      aes_gcm_format_errors("aad is nullptr.", error_details);
+      return GRPC_STATUS_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+    }
+    if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(aes_gcm_crypter->ctx, nullptr,
+                           reinterpret_cast<int*>(&aad_bytes_read), aad,
+                           static_cast<int>(aad_length)) ||
+        aad_bytes_read != aad_length) {
+      aes_gcm_format_errors("Setting authenticated associated data failed.",
+                            error_details);
+      return GRPC_STATUS_INTERNAL;
+    }
+  }
+  // process ciphertext
+  uint8_t* plaintext = static_cast<uint8_t*>(plaintext_vec.iov_base);
+  size_t plaintext_length = plaintext_vec.iov_len;
+  if (plaintext_length > 0 && plaintext == nullptr) {
+    aes_gcm_format_errors(
+        "plaintext is nullptr, but plaintext_length is positive.",
+        error_details);
+    return GRPC_STATUS_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+  }
+  const uint8_t* ciphertext = nullptr;
+  size_t ciphertext_length = 0;
+  for (i = 0;
+       i < ciphertext_vec_length && total_ciphertext_length > kAesGcmTagLength;
+       i++) {
+    ciphertext = static_cast<uint8_t*>(ciphertext_vec[i].iov_base);
+    ciphertext_length = ciphertext_vec[i].iov_len;
+    if (ciphertext == nullptr) {
+      if (ciphertext_length == 0) {
+        continue;
+      }
+      aes_gcm_format_errors("ciphertext is nullptr.", error_details);
+      memset(plaintext_vec.iov_base, 0x00, plaintext_vec.iov_len);
+      return GRPC_STATUS_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+    }
+    size_t bytes_written = 0;
+    size_t bytes_to_write = ciphertext_length;
+    // Don't include the tag
+    if (bytes_to_write > total_ciphertext_length - kAesGcmTagLength) {
+      bytes_to_write = total_ciphertext_length - kAesGcmTagLength;
+    }
+    if (plaintext_length < bytes_to_write) {
+      aes_gcm_format_errors(
+          "Not enough plaintext buffer to hold encrypted ciphertext.",
+          error_details);
+      return GRPC_STATUS_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+    }
+    if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(aes_gcm_crypter->ctx, plaintext,
+                           reinterpret_cast<int*>(&bytes_written), ciphertext,
+                           static_cast<int>(bytes_to_write))) {
+      aes_gcm_format_errors("Decrypting ciphertext failed.", error_details);
+      memset(plaintext_vec.iov_base, 0x00, plaintext_vec.iov_len);
+      return GRPC_STATUS_INTERNAL;
+    }
+    if (bytes_written > ciphertext_length) {
+      aes_gcm_format_errors("More bytes written than expected.", error_details);
+      memset(plaintext_vec.iov_base, 0x00, plaintext_vec.iov_len);
+      return GRPC_STATUS_INTERNAL;
+    }
+    ciphertext += bytes_written;
+    ciphertext_length -= bytes_written;
+    total_ciphertext_length -= bytes_written;
+    plaintext += bytes_written;
+    plaintext_length -= bytes_written;
+  }
+  if (total_ciphertext_length > kAesGcmTagLength) {
+    aes_gcm_format_errors(
+        "Not enough plaintext buffer to hold encrypted ciphertext.",
+        error_details);
+    memset(plaintext_vec.iov_base, 0x00, plaintext_vec.iov_len);
+    return GRPC_STATUS_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+  }
+  uint8_t tag[kAesGcmTagLength];
+  uint8_t* tag_tmp = tag;
+  if (ciphertext_length > 0) {
+    memcpy(tag_tmp, ciphertext, ciphertext_length);
+    tag_tmp += ciphertext_length;
+    total_ciphertext_length -= ciphertext_length;
+  }
+  for (; i < ciphertext_vec_length; i++) {
+    ciphertext = static_cast<uint8_t*>(ciphertext_vec[i].iov_base);
+    ciphertext_length = ciphertext_vec[i].iov_len;
+    if (ciphertext == nullptr) {
+      if (ciphertext_length == 0) {
+        continue;
+      }
+      aes_gcm_format_errors("ciphertext is nullptr.", error_details);
+      memset(plaintext_vec.iov_base, 0x00, plaintext_vec.iov_len);
+      return GRPC_STATUS_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+    }
+    memcpy(tag_tmp, ciphertext, ciphertext_length);
+    tag_tmp += ciphertext_length;
+    total_ciphertext_length -= ciphertext_length;
+  }
+  if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(aes_gcm_crypter->ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG,
+                           kAesGcmTagLength, reinterpret_cast<void*>(tag))) {
+    aes_gcm_format_errors("Setting tag failed.", error_details);
+    memset(plaintext_vec.iov_base, 0x00, plaintext_vec.iov_len);
+    return GRPC_STATUS_INTERNAL;
+  }
+  int bytes_written_temp = 0;
+  if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(aes_gcm_crypter->ctx, nullptr,
+                           &bytes_written_temp)) {
+    aes_gcm_format_errors("Checking tag failed.", error_details);
+    memset(plaintext_vec.iov_base, 0x00, plaintext_vec.iov_len);
+    return GRPC_STATUS_FAILED_PRECONDITION;
+  }
+  if (bytes_written_temp != 0) {
+    aes_gcm_format_errors("Openssl wrote some unexpected bytes.",
+                          error_details);
+    memset(plaintext_vec.iov_base, 0x00, plaintext_vec.iov_len);
+    return GRPC_STATUS_INTERNAL;
+  }
+  *plaintext_bytes_written = plaintext_vec.iov_len - plaintext_length;
+  return GRPC_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+static void gsec_aes_gcm_aead_crypter_destroy(gsec_aead_crypter* crypter) {
+  gsec_aes_gcm_aead_crypter* aes_gcm_crypter =
+      reinterpret_cast<gsec_aes_gcm_aead_crypter*>(
+          const_cast<gsec_aead_crypter*>(crypter));
+  gpr_free(aes_gcm_crypter->key);
+  gpr_free(aes_gcm_crypter->rekey_data);
+  EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(aes_gcm_crypter->ctx);
+}
+
+static const gsec_aead_crypter_vtable vtable = {
+    gsec_aes_gcm_aead_crypter_encrypt_iovec,
+    gsec_aes_gcm_aead_crypter_decrypt_iovec,
+    gsec_aes_gcm_aead_crypter_max_ciphertext_and_tag_length,
+    gsec_aes_gcm_aead_crypter_max_plaintext_length,
+    gsec_aes_gcm_aead_crypter_nonce_length,
+    gsec_aes_gcm_aead_crypter_key_length,
+    gsec_aes_gcm_aead_crypter_tag_length,
+    gsec_aes_gcm_aead_crypter_destroy};
+
+static grpc_status_code aes_gcm_new_evp_cipher_ctx(
+    gsec_aes_gcm_aead_crypter* aes_gcm_crypter, char** error_details) {
+  const EVP_CIPHER* cipher = nullptr;
+  bool is_rekey = aes_gcm_crypter->rekey_data != nullptr;
+  switch (is_rekey ? kRekeyAeadKeyLen : aes_gcm_crypter->key_length) {
+    case kAes128GcmKeyLength:
+      cipher = EVP_aes_128_gcm();
+      break;
+    case kAes256GcmKeyLength:
+      cipher = EVP_aes_256_gcm();
+      break;
+  }
+  const uint8_t* aead_key = aes_gcm_crypter->key;
+  uint8_t aead_key_rekey[kRekeyAeadKeyLen];
+  if (is_rekey) {
+    if (aes_gcm_derive_aead_key(aead_key_rekey, aes_gcm_crypter->key,
+                                aes_gcm_crypter->rekey_data->kdf_counter) !=
+        GRPC_STATUS_OK) {
+      aes_gcm_format_errors("Deriving key failed.", error_details);
+      return GRPC_STATUS_INTERNAL;
+    }
+    aead_key = aead_key_rekey;
+  }
+  if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(aes_gcm_crypter->ctx, cipher, nullptr, aead_key,
+                          nullptr)) {
+    aes_gcm_format_errors("Setting key failed.", error_details);
+    return GRPC_STATUS_INTERNAL;
+  }
+  if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(aes_gcm_crypter->ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN,
+                           static_cast<int>(aes_gcm_crypter->nonce_length),
+                           nullptr)) {
+    aes_gcm_format_errors("Setting nonce length failed.", error_details);
+    return GRPC_STATUS_INTERNAL;
+  }
+  return GRPC_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+grpc_status_code gsec_aes_gcm_aead_crypter_create(const uint8_t* key,
+                                                  size_t key_length,
+                                                  size_t nonce_length,
+                                                  size_t tag_length, bool rekey,
+                                                  gsec_aead_crypter** crypter,
+                                                  char** error_details) {
+  if (key == nullptr) {
+    aes_gcm_format_errors("key is nullptr.", error_details);
+    return GRPC_STATUS_FAILED_PRECONDITION;
+  }
+  if (crypter == nullptr) {
+    aes_gcm_format_errors("crypter is nullptr.", error_details);
+    return GRPC_STATUS_FAILED_PRECONDITION;
+  }
+  *crypter = nullptr;
+  if ((rekey && key_length != kAes128GcmRekeyKeyLength) ||
+      (!rekey && key_length != kAes128GcmKeyLength &&
+       key_length != kAes256GcmKeyLength) ||
+      (tag_length != kAesGcmTagLength) ||
+      (nonce_length != kAesGcmNonceLength)) {
+    aes_gcm_format_errors(
+        "Invalid key and/or nonce and/or tag length are provided at AEAD "
+        "crypter instance construction time.",
+        error_details);
+    return GRPC_STATUS_FAILED_PRECONDITION;
+  }
+  gsec_aes_gcm_aead_crypter* aes_gcm_crypter =
+      static_cast<gsec_aes_gcm_aead_crypter*>(
+          gpr_malloc(sizeof(gsec_aes_gcm_aead_crypter)));
+  aes_gcm_crypter->crypter.vtable = &vtable;
+  aes_gcm_crypter->nonce_length = nonce_length;
+  aes_gcm_crypter->tag_length = tag_length;
+  if (rekey) {
+    aes_gcm_crypter->key_length = kKdfKeyLen;
+    aes_gcm_crypter->rekey_data = static_cast<gsec_aes_gcm_aead_rekey_data*>(
+        gpr_malloc(sizeof(gsec_aes_gcm_aead_rekey_data)));
+    memcpy(aes_gcm_crypter->rekey_data->nonce_mask, key + kKdfKeyLen,
+           kAesGcmNonceLength);
+    // Set kdf_counter to all-zero for initial key derivation.
+    memset(aes_gcm_crypter->rekey_data->kdf_counter, 0, kKdfCounterLen);
+  } else {
+    aes_gcm_crypter->key_length = key_length;
+    aes_gcm_crypter->rekey_data = nullptr;
+  }
+  aes_gcm_crypter->key =
+      static_cast<uint8_t*>(gpr_malloc(aes_gcm_crypter->key_length));
+  memcpy(aes_gcm_crypter->key, key, aes_gcm_crypter->key_length);
+  aes_gcm_crypter->ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+  grpc_status_code status =
+      aes_gcm_new_evp_cipher_ctx(aes_gcm_crypter, error_details);
+  if (status != GRPC_STATUS_OK) {
+    gsec_aes_gcm_aead_crypter_destroy(&aes_gcm_crypter->crypter);
+    gpr_free(aes_gcm_crypter);
+    return status;
+  }
+  *crypter = &aes_gcm_crypter->crypter;
+  return GRPC_STATUS_OK;
+}