visaljs 0.0.2 → 0.0.4

package/runtime/third_party/boringssl/ssl/ssl_session.cc

@@ -0,0 +1,1273 @@
+// Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+// Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <utility>
+
+#include <openssl/cipher.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/pool.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+#include "../crypto/internal.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
+
+// The address of this is a magic value, a pointer to which is returned by
+// SSL_magic_pending_session_ptr(). It allows a session callback to indicate
+// that it needs to asynchronously fetch session information.
+static const char g_pending_session_magic = 0;
+
+static ExDataClass g_ex_data_class(/*with_app_data=*/true);
+
+static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSLContext *ctx, SSLSession *session);
+static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSLContext *ctx, SSLSession *session);
+
+static Span<const uint8_t> ssl_handshake_session_id_context(
+    const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  if (hs->ssl->server && hs->credential != nullptr &&
+      !hs->credential->sid_ctx.empty()) {
+    return hs->credential->sid_ctx;
+  }
+  return hs->config->cert->sid_ctx;
+}
+
+UniquePtr<SSLSession> ssl_session_new(const SSL_X509_METHOD *x509_method) {
+  return MakeUnique<SSLSession>(x509_method);
+}
+
+uint32_t ssl_hash_session_id(Span<const uint8_t> session_id) {
+  // Take the first four bytes of `session_id`. Session IDs are generated by the
+  // server randomly, so we can assume even using the first four bytes results
+  // in a good distribution.
+  uint8_t tmp_storage[sizeof(uint32_t)];
+  if (session_id.size() < sizeof(tmp_storage)) {
+    OPENSSL_memset(tmp_storage, 0, sizeof(tmp_storage));
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(tmp_storage, session_id.data(), session_id.size());
+    session_id = tmp_storage;
+  }
+
+  uint32_t hash = ((uint32_t)session_id[0]) | ((uint32_t)session_id[1] << 8) |
+                  ((uint32_t)session_id[2] << 16) |
+                  ((uint32_t)session_id[3] << 24);
+
+  return hash;
+}
+
+UniquePtr<SSLSession> SSL_SESSION_dup(const SSLSession *session,
+                                      int dup_flags) {
+  UniquePtr<SSLSession> new_session = ssl_session_new(session->x509_method);
+  if (!new_session) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  new_session->is_server = session->is_server;
+  new_session->ssl_version = session->ssl_version;
+  new_session->is_quic = session->is_quic;
+  new_session->sid_ctx = session->sid_ctx;
+
+  // Copy the key material.
+  new_session->secret = session->secret;
+  new_session->cipher = session->cipher;
+
+  // Copy authentication state.
+  if (session->psk_identity != nullptr) {
+    new_session->psk_identity.reset(
+        OPENSSL_strdup(session->psk_identity.get()));
+    if (new_session->psk_identity == nullptr) {
+      return nullptr;
+    }
+  }
+  new_session->peer_cert_type = session->peer_cert_type;
+  if (session->certs != nullptr) {
+    new_session->certs.reset(sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_deep_copy(
+        session->certs.get(), CRYPTO_BUFFER_dup_ref, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free));
+    if (new_session->certs == nullptr) {
+      return nullptr;
+    }
+  }
+  if (session->peer_raw_public_key != nullptr) {
+    new_session->peer_raw_public_key = UpRef(session->peer_raw_public_key);
+  }
+
+  if (!session->x509_method->session_dup(new_session.get(), session)) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  new_session->verify_result = session->verify_result;
+
+  new_session->ocsp_response = UpRef(session->ocsp_response);
+  new_session->signed_cert_timestamp_list =
+      UpRef(session->signed_cert_timestamp_list);
+
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(new_session->peer_sha256, session->peer_sha256,
+                 SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+  new_session->peer_sha256_valid = session->peer_sha256_valid;
+
+  new_session->peer_signature_algorithm = session->peer_signature_algorithm;
+
+  new_session->timeout = session->timeout;
+  new_session->auth_timeout = session->auth_timeout;
+  new_session->time = session->time;
+
+  // Copy non-authentication connection properties.
+  if (dup_flags & SSL_SESSION_INCLUDE_NONAUTH) {
+    new_session->session_id = session->session_id;
+    new_session->group_id = session->group_id;
+    new_session->original_handshake_hash = session->original_handshake_hash;
+    new_session->ticket_lifetime_hint = session->ticket_lifetime_hint;
+    new_session->ticket_age_add = session->ticket_age_add;
+    new_session->ticket_max_early_data = session->ticket_max_early_data;
+    new_session->extended_master_secret = session->extended_master_secret;
+    new_session->has_application_settings = session->has_application_settings;
+
+    if (!new_session->early_alpn.CopyFrom(session->early_alpn) ||
+        !new_session->quic_early_data_context.CopyFrom(
+            session->quic_early_data_context) ||
+        !new_session->local_application_settings.CopyFrom(
+            session->local_application_settings) ||
+        !new_session->peer_application_settings.CopyFrom(
+            session->peer_application_settings)) {
+      return nullptr;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Copy the ticket.
+  if (dup_flags & SSL_SESSION_INCLUDE_TICKET &&
+      !new_session->ticket.CopyFrom(session->ticket)) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  // The new_session does not get a copy of the ex_data.
+
+  new_session->not_resumable = true;
+  return new_session;
+}
+
+void ssl_session_rebase_time(SSLImpl *ssl, SSLSession *session) {
+  OPENSSL_timeval now = ssl_ctx_get_current_time(ssl->ctx.get());
+
+  // To avoid overflows and underflows, if we've gone back in time, update the
+  // time, but mark the session expired.
+  if (session->time > now.tv_sec) {
+    session->time = now.tv_sec;
+    session->timeout = 0;
+    session->auth_timeout = 0;
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // Adjust the session time and timeouts. If the session has already expired,
+  // clamp the timeouts at zero.
+  uint64_t delta = now.tv_sec - session->time;
+  session->time = now.tv_sec;
+  if (session->timeout < delta) {
+    session->timeout = 0;
+  } else {
+    session->timeout -= delta;
+  }
+  if (session->auth_timeout < delta) {
+    session->auth_timeout = 0;
+  } else {
+    session->auth_timeout -= delta;
+  }
+}
+
+void ssl_session_renew_timeout(SSLImpl *ssl, SSLSession *session,
+                               uint32_t timeout) {
+  // Rebase the timestamp relative to the current time so `timeout` is measured
+  // correctly.
+  ssl_session_rebase_time(ssl, session);
+
+  if (session->timeout > timeout) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  session->timeout = timeout;
+  if (session->timeout > session->auth_timeout) {
+    session->timeout = session->auth_timeout;
+  }
+}
+
+uint16_t ssl_session_protocol_version(const SSLSession *session) {
+  uint16_t ret;
+  if (!ssl_protocol_version_from_wire(&ret, session->ssl_version)) {
+    // An `SSL_SESSION` will never have an invalid version. This is enforced by
+    // the parser.
+    assert(0);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return ret;
+}
+
+const EVP_MD *ssl_session_get_digest(const SSLSession *session) {
+  return ssl_get_handshake_digest(ssl_session_protocol_version(session),
+                                  session->cipher);
+}
+
+bool ssl_get_new_session(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  SSLImpl *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  if (ssl->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_SESSION_CREATION) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  UniquePtr<SSLSession> session = ssl_session_new(ssl->ctx->x509_method);
+  if (session == nullptr) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  session->is_server = ssl->server;
+  session->ssl_version = ssl->s3->version;
+  session->is_quic = SSL_is_quic(ssl);
+
+  // Fill in the time from the `SSL_CTX`'s clock.
+  OPENSSL_timeval now = ssl_ctx_get_current_time(ssl->ctx.get());
+  session->time = now.tv_sec;
+
+  uint16_t version = ssl_protocol_version(ssl);
+  if (version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    // TLS 1.3 uses tickets as authenticators, so we are willing to use them for
+    // longer.
+    session->timeout = ssl->session_ctx->session_psk_dhe_timeout;
+    session->auth_timeout = SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_AUTH_TIMEOUT;
+  } else {
+    // TLS 1.2 resumption does not incorporate new key material, so we use a
+    // much shorter timeout.
+    session->timeout = ssl->session_ctx->session_timeout;
+    session->auth_timeout = ssl->session_ctx->session_timeout;
+  }
+
+  if (!session->sid_ctx.TryCopyFrom(ssl_handshake_session_id_context(hs))) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // The session is marked not resumable until it is completely filled in.
+  session->not_resumable = true;
+  session->verify_result = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
+
+  hs->new_session = std::move(session);
+  ssl_set_session(ssl, nullptr);
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool ssl_ctx_rotate_ticket_encryption_key(SSLContext *ctx) {
+  OPENSSL_timeval now = ssl_ctx_get_current_time(ctx);
+  {
+    // Avoid acquiring a write lock in the common case (i.e. a non-default key
+    // is used or the default keys have not expired yet).
+    MutexReadLock lock(&ctx->lock);
+    if (ctx->ticket_key_current &&
+        (ctx->ticket_key_current->next_rotation_tv_sec == 0 ||
+         ctx->ticket_key_current->next_rotation_tv_sec > now.tv_sec) &&
+        (!ctx->ticket_key_prev ||
+         ctx->ticket_key_prev->next_rotation_tv_sec > now.tv_sec)) {
+      return true;
+    }
+  }
+
+  MutexWriteLock lock(&ctx->lock);
+  if (!ctx->ticket_key_current ||
+      (ctx->ticket_key_current->next_rotation_tv_sec != 0 &&
+       ctx->ticket_key_current->next_rotation_tv_sec <= now.tv_sec)) {
+    // The current key has not been initialized or it is expired.
+    auto new_key = bssl::MakeUnique<TicketKey>();
+    if (!new_key) {
+      return false;
+    }
+    RAND_bytes(new_key->name, 16);
+    RAND_bytes(new_key->hmac_key, 16);
+    RAND_bytes(new_key->aes_key, 16);
+    new_key->next_rotation_tv_sec =
+        now.tv_sec + SSL_DEFAULT_TICKET_KEY_ROTATION_INTERVAL;
+    if (ctx->ticket_key_current) {
+      // The current key expired. Rotate it to prev and bump up its rotation
+      // timestamp. Note that even with the new rotation time it may still be
+      // expired and get dropped below.
+      ctx->ticket_key_current->next_rotation_tv_sec +=
+          SSL_DEFAULT_TICKET_KEY_ROTATION_INTERVAL;
+      ctx->ticket_key_prev = std::move(ctx->ticket_key_current);
+    }
+    ctx->ticket_key_current = std::move(new_key);
+  }
+
+  // Drop an expired prev key.
+  if (ctx->ticket_key_prev &&
+      ctx->ticket_key_prev->next_rotation_tv_sec <= now.tv_sec) {
+    ctx->ticket_key_prev.reset();
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+static int ssl_encrypt_ticket_with_cipher_ctx(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out,
+                                              const uint8_t *session_buf,
+                                              size_t session_len) {
+  ScopedEVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
+  ScopedHMAC_CTX hctx;
+
+  // If the session is too long, decline to send a ticket.
+  static const size_t kMaxTicketOverhead =
+      16 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE;
+  if (session_len > 0xffff - kMaxTicketOverhead) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  // Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does all the
+  // work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
+  SSLContext *tctx = hs->ssl->session_ctx.get();
+  uint8_t iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+  uint8_t key_name[16];
+  if (tctx->ticket_key_cb != nullptr) {
+    int ret = tctx->ticket_key_cb(hs->ssl, key_name, iv, ctx.get(), hctx.get(),
+                                  1 /* encrypt */);
+    if (ret < 0) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+    if (ret == 0) {
+      // The caller requested to send no ticket, so write nothing to `out`.
+      return 1;
+    }
+  } else {
+    // Rotate ticket key if necessary.
+    if (!ssl_ctx_rotate_ticket_encryption_key(tctx)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+    MutexReadLock lock(&tctx->lock);
+    if (!RAND_bytes(iv, 16) ||
+        !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx.get(), EVP_aes_128_cbc(), nullptr,
+                            tctx->ticket_key_current->aes_key, iv) ||
+        !HMAC_Init_ex(hctx.get(), tctx->ticket_key_current->hmac_key, 16,
+                      tlsext_tick_md(), nullptr)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(key_name, tctx->ticket_key_current->name, 16);
+  }
+
+  uint8_t *ptr;
+  if (!CBB_add_bytes(out, key_name, 16) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(out, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx.get())) ||
+      !CBB_reserve(out, &ptr, session_len + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  size_t total = 0;
+  if (CRYPTO_fuzzer_mode_enabled()) {
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(ptr, session_buf, session_len);
+    total = session_len;
+  } else {
+    size_t len;
+    if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate_ex(ctx.get(), ptr + total, &len,
+                              session_len + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH - total,
+                              session_buf, session_len)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+    total += len;
+    if (!EVP_EncryptFinal_ex2(ctx.get(), ptr + total, &len,
+                              session_len + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH - total)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+    total += len;
+  }
+  if (!CBB_did_write(out, total)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  unsigned hlen;
+  if (!HMAC_Update(hctx.get(), CBB_data(out), CBB_len(out)) ||  //
+      !CBB_reserve(out, &ptr, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE) ||               //
+      !HMAC_Final(hctx.get(), ptr, &hlen) ||                    //
+      !CBB_did_write(out, hlen)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int ssl_encrypt_ticket_with_method(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out,
+                                          const uint8_t *session_buf,
+                                          size_t session_len) {
+  SSLImpl *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  const SSL_TICKET_AEAD_METHOD *method = ssl->session_ctx->ticket_aead_method;
+  const size_t max_overhead = method->max_overhead(ssl);
+  const size_t max_out = session_len + max_overhead;
+  if (max_out < max_overhead) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  uint8_t *ptr;
+  if (!CBB_reserve(out, &ptr, max_out)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  size_t out_len;
+  if (!method->seal(ssl, ptr, &out_len, max_out, session_buf, session_len)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_TICKET_ENCRYPTION_FAILED);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (!CBB_did_write(out, out_len)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+bool ssl_encrypt_ticket(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out,
+                        const SSLSession *session) {
+  // Serialize the SSL_SESSION to be encoded into the ticket.
+  uint8_t *session_buf = nullptr;
+  size_t session_len;
+  if (!SSL_SESSION_to_bytes_for_ticket(session, &session_buf, &session_len)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> free_session_buf(session_buf);
+
+  if (hs->ssl->session_ctx->ticket_aead_method) {
+    return ssl_encrypt_ticket_with_method(hs, out, session_buf, session_len);
+  } else {
+    return ssl_encrypt_ticket_with_cipher_ctx(hs, out, session_buf,
+                                              session_len);
+  }
+}
+
+SSLSessionType ssl_session_get_type(const SSLSession *session) {
+  if (session->not_resumable) {
+    return SSLSessionType::kNotResumable;
+  }
+  if (ssl_session_protocol_version(session) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    return session->ticket.empty() ? SSLSessionType::kNotResumable
+                                   : SSLSessionType::kPreSharedKey;
+  }
+  if (!session->ticket.empty()) {
+    return SSLSessionType::kTicket;
+  }
+  if (!session->session_id.empty()) {
+    return SSLSessionType::kID;
+  }
+  return SSLSessionType::kNotResumable;
+}
+
+bool ssl_session_is_context_valid(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                  const SSLSession *session) {
+  return session != nullptr &&
+         Span(session->sid_ctx) == ssl_handshake_session_id_context(hs);
+}
+
+bool ssl_session_is_time_valid(const SSLImpl *ssl, const SSLSession *session) {
+  if (session == nullptr) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  OPENSSL_timeval now = ssl_ctx_get_current_time(ssl->ctx.get());
+
+  // Reject tickets from the future to avoid underflow.
+  if (now.tv_sec < session->time) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return session->timeout > now.tv_sec - session->time;
+}
+
+bool ssl_session_is_resumable(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                              const SSLSession *session) {
+  const SSLImpl *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  return ssl_session_is_context_valid(hs, session) &&
+         // The session must have been created by the same type of end point as
+         // we're now using it with.
+         ssl->server == session->is_server &&
+         // The session must not be expired.
+         ssl_session_is_time_valid(ssl, session) &&
+         // Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
+         // version.
+         ssl->s3->version == session->ssl_version &&
+         // Only resume if the session's cipher matches the negotiated one. This
+         // is stricter than necessary for TLS 1.3, which allows cross-cipher
+         // resumption if the PRF hashes match. We require an exact match for
+         // simplicity. If loosening this, the 0-RTT accept logic must be
+         // updated to check the cipher.
+         hs->new_cipher == session->cipher &&
+         // If the session contains a client certificate/RPK (either the full
+         // certificate/RPK or just the hash) then require that the form of the
+         // certificate/RPK matches the current configuration.
+         (!ssl_session_has_peer_cred(session) ||
+          session->peer_sha256_valid ==
+              hs->config->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs) &&
+         // Only resume if the underlying transport protocol hasn't changed.
+         // This is to prevent cross-protocol resumption between QUIC and TCP.
+         SSL_is_quic(ssl) == int{session->is_quic};
+}
+
+// ssl_lookup_session looks up `session_id` in the session cache and sets
+// `*out_session` to an `SSL_SESSION` object if found.
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t ssl_lookup_session(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                             UniquePtr<SSLSession> *out_session,
+                                             Span<const uint8_t> session_id) {
+  SSLImpl *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  out_session->reset();
+
+  if (session_id.empty() || session_id.size() > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
+    return ssl_hs_ok;
+  }
+
+  UniquePtr<SSLSession> session;
+  // Try the internal cache, if it exists.
+  if (!(ssl->session_ctx->session_cache_mode &
+        SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP)) {
+    uint32_t hash = ssl_hash_session_id(session_id);
+    // TODO(crbug.com/565766495): Use `SSLSession` when the lhash does.
+    auto cmp = [](const void *key, const SSL_SESSION *sess) -> int {
+      Span<const uint8_t> key_id =
+          *reinterpret_cast<const Span<const uint8_t> *>(key);
+      return key_id == FromOpaque(sess)->session_id ? 0 : 1;
+    };
+    MutexReadLock lock(&ssl->session_ctx->lock);
+    // `lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve_key` returns a non-owning pointer.
+    session = UpRef(FromOpaque(lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve_key(
+        ssl->session_ctx->sessions, &session_id, hash, cmp)));
+    // TODO(davidben): This should probably move it to the front of the list.
+  }
+
+  // Fall back to the external cache, if it exists.
+  if (!session && ssl->session_ctx->get_session_cb != nullptr) {
+    int copy = 1;
+    SSL_SESSION *cb_session = ssl->session_ctx->get_session_cb(
+        ssl, session_id.data(), session_id.size(), &copy);
+    if (cb_session == nullptr) {
+      return ssl_hs_ok;
+    }
+
+    if (cb_session == SSL_magic_pending_session_ptr()) {
+      // This pointer is not actually a session.
+      return ssl_hs_pending_session;
+    }
+    session.reset(FromOpaque(cb_session));
+
+    // Increment reference count now if the session callback asks us to do so
+    // (note that if the session structures returned by the callback are shared
+    // between threads, it must handle the reference count itself [i.e. copy ==
+    // 0], or things won't be thread-safe).
+    if (copy) {
+      SSL_SESSION_up_ref(session.get());
+    }
+
+    // Add the externally cached session to the internal cache if necessary.
+    if (!(ssl->session_ctx->session_cache_mode &
+          SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE)) {
+      SSL_CTX_add_session(ssl->session_ctx.get(), session.get());
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (session && !ssl_session_is_time_valid(ssl, session.get())) {
+    // The session was from the cache, so remove it.
+    SSL_CTX_remove_session(ssl->session_ctx.get(), session.get());
+    session.reset();
+  }
+
+  *out_session = std::move(session);
+  return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+enum ssl_hs_wait_t ssl_get_prev_session(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                        UniquePtr<SSLSession> *out_session,
+                                        bool *out_tickets_supported,
+                                        bool *out_renew_ticket,
+                                        const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello) {
+  // This is used only by servers.
+  assert(hs->ssl->server);
+  UniquePtr<SSLSession> session;
+  bool renew_ticket = false;
+
+  // If tickets are disabled, always behave as if no tickets are present.
+  CBS ticket;
+  const bool tickets_supported =
+      !(SSL_get_options(hs->ssl) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) &&
+      ssl_client_hello_get_extension(client_hello, &ticket,
+                                     TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket);
+  if (tickets_supported && CBS_len(&ticket) != 0) {
+    switch (ssl_process_ticket(
+        hs, &session, &renew_ticket, ticket,
+        Span(client_hello->session_id, client_hello->session_id_len),
+        /*save_ticket=*/false)) {
+      case ssl_ticket_aead_success:
+        break;
+      case ssl_ticket_aead_ignore_ticket:
+        assert(!session);
+        break;
+      case ssl_ticket_aead_error:
+        return ssl_hs_error;
+      case ssl_ticket_aead_retry:
+        return ssl_hs_pending_ticket;
+    }
+  } else {
+    // The client didn't send a ticket, so the session ID is a real ID.
+    enum ssl_hs_wait_t lookup_ret = ssl_lookup_session(
+        hs, &session,
+        Span(client_hello->session_id, client_hello->session_id_len));
+    if (lookup_ret != ssl_hs_ok) {
+      return lookup_ret;
+    }
+  }
+
+  *out_session = std::move(session);
+  *out_tickets_supported = tickets_supported;
+  *out_renew_ticket = renew_ticket;
+  return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+static bool remove_session(SSLContext *ctx, SSLSession *session, bool lock) {
+  if (session == nullptr || session->session_id.empty()) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (lock) {
+    ctx->lock.LockWrite();
+  }
+
+  // TODO(crbug.com/565766495): Use `SSLSession` when the lhash does.
+  SSL_SESSION *found_session = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ctx->sessions, session);
+  bool found = found_session == session;
+  if (found) {
+    found_session = lh_SSL_SESSION_delete(ctx->sessions, session);
+    SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, session);
+  }
+
+  if (lock) {
+    ctx->lock.UnlockWrite();
+  }
+
+  if (found) {
+    // TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/251): Callbacks should not be called
+    // under a lock.
+    if (ctx->remove_session_cb != nullptr) {
+      ctx->remove_session_cb(ctx, found_session);
+    }
+    SSL_SESSION_free(found_session);
+  }
+
+  return found;
+}
+
+void ssl_set_session(SSLImpl *ssl, SSLSession *session) {
+  if (ssl->session.get() == session) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  ssl->session = UpRef(session);
+}
+
+// locked by SSL_CTX in the calling function
+static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSLContext *ctx, SSLSession *session) {
+  if (session->next == nullptr || session->prev == nullptr) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (session->next == (SSLSession *)&ctx->session_cache_tail) {
+    // last element in list
+    if (session->prev == (SSLSession *)&ctx->session_cache_head) {
+      // only one element in list
+      ctx->session_cache_head = nullptr;
+      ctx->session_cache_tail = nullptr;
+    } else {
+      ctx->session_cache_tail = session->prev;
+      session->prev->next = (SSLSession *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail);
+    }
+  } else {
+    if (session->prev == (SSLSession *)&ctx->session_cache_head) {
+      // first element in list
+      ctx->session_cache_head = session->next;
+      session->next->prev = (SSLSession *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
+    } else {  // middle of list
+      session->next->prev = session->prev;
+      session->prev->next = session->next;
+    }
+  }
+  session->prev = session->next = nullptr;
+}
+
+static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSLContext *ctx, SSLSession *session) {
+  if (session->next != nullptr && session->prev != nullptr) {
+    SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, session);
+  }
+
+  if (ctx->session_cache_head == nullptr) {
+    ctx->session_cache_head = session;
+    ctx->session_cache_tail = session;
+    session->prev = (SSLSession *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
+    session->next = (SSLSession *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail);
+  } else {
+    session->next = ctx->session_cache_head;
+    session->next->prev = session;
+    session->prev = (SSLSession *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
+    ctx->session_cache_head = session;
+  }
+}
+
+static bool add_session_locked(SSLContext *ctx, UniquePtr<SSLSession> session) {
+  SSLSession *new_session = session.get();
+
+  // Sessions have intrusive linked lists, so they cannot be stored in two
+  // SSLContexts at once.
+  // TODO(crbug.com/527997772): Remove this restriction.
+  if ((new_session->prev != nullptr || new_session->next != nullptr)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // TODO(crbug.com/565766495): Use `SSLSession` when the lhash does.
+  SSL_SESSION *old_session_opaque;
+  if (!lh_SSL_SESSION_insert(ctx->sessions, &old_session_opaque, new_session)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  SSLSession *old_session = FromOpaque(old_session_opaque);
+  // `ctx->sessions` took ownership of `new_session` and gave us back a
+  // reference to `old_session`. (`old_session` may be the same as
+  // `new_session`, in which case we traded identical references with
+  // `ctx->sessions`.)
+  session.release();
+  session.reset(old_session);
+
+  if (old_session != nullptr) {
+    // The session cannot have been in the session, due to the check above.
+    // TODO(crbug.com/527997772): Revisit this when we remove the check.
+    BSSL_CHECK(old_session != new_session);
+
+    // There was a session ID collision. `old_session` was replaced with
+    // `session` in the hash table, so `old_session` must be removed from the
+    // linked list to match.
+    SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, old_session);
+  }
+
+  // This does not increment the reference count. Although `session` is inserted
+  // into two structures (a doubly-linked list and the hash table), `ctx` only
+  // takes one reference.
+  SSL_SESSION_list_add(ctx, new_session);
+
+  // Enforce any cache size limits.
+  if (SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx) > 0) {
+    while (lh_SSL_SESSION_num_items(ctx->sessions) >
+           SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx)) {
+      if (!remove_session(ctx, ctx->session_cache_tail,
+                          /*lock=*/false)) {
+        break;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+void ssl_update_cache(SSLImpl *ssl) {
+  SSLContext *ctx = ssl->session_ctx.get();
+  SSLSession *session = ssl->s3->established_session.get();
+  int mode = SSL_is_server(ssl) ? SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER : SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT;
+  if (!SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(session) ||
+      (ctx->session_cache_mode & mode) != mode) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // Clients never use the internal session cache.
+  if (ssl->server &&
+      !(ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE)) {
+    UniquePtr<SSLSession> ref = UpRef(session);
+    bool remove_expired_sessions = false;
+    {
+      MutexWriteLock lock(&ctx->lock);
+      add_session_locked(ctx, std::move(ref));
+
+      if (!(ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR)) {
+        // Automatically flush the internal session cache every 255 connections.
+        ctx->handshakes_since_cache_flush++;
+        if (ctx->handshakes_since_cache_flush >= 255) {
+          remove_expired_sessions = true;
+          ctx->handshakes_since_cache_flush = 0;
+        }
+      }
+    }
+
+    if (remove_expired_sessions) {
+      // `SSL_CTX_flush_sessions` takes the lock we just released. We could
+      // merge the critical sections, but we'd then call user code under a
+      // lock, or compute `now` earlier, even when not flushing.
+      OPENSSL_timeval now = ssl_ctx_get_current_time(ssl->ctx.get());
+      SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(ctx, now.tv_sec);
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (ctx->new_session_cb != nullptr) {
+    UniquePtr<SSLSession> ref = UpRef(session);
+    if (ctx->new_session_cb(ssl, ref.get())) {
+      // `new_session_cb`'s return value signals whether it took ownership.
+      ref.release();
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+bool ssl_session_has_peer_cred(const SSLSession *session) {
+  return sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(SSL_SESSION_get0_peer_certificates(session)) >
+             0 ||
+         SSL_SESSION_get0_peer_rpk(session) != nullptr ||
+         session->peer_sha256_valid;
+}
+
+SSLSession *ssl_get_session(const SSLImpl *ssl) {
+  // Once the initial handshake completes, we return the most recently
+  // established session. In particular, if there is a pending renegotiation, we
+  // do not return information about it until it completes.
+  //
+  // Code in the handshake must either use `hs->new_session` (if updating a
+  // partial session) or `ssl_handshake_session` (if trying to query properties
+  // consistently across TLS 1.2 resumption and other handshakes).
+  if (ssl->s3->established_session != nullptr) {
+    return ssl->s3->established_session.get();
+  }
+
+  // Otherwise, we must be in the initial handshake.
+  SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs = ssl->s3->hs.get();
+  assert(hs != nullptr);
+  assert(!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete);
+
+  // Return the 0-RTT session, if in the 0-RTT state. While the handshake has
+  // not actually completed, the public accessors all report properties as if
+  // it has.
+  if (hs->early_session) {
+    return hs->early_session.get();
+  }
+
+  // Otherwise, return the partial session.
+  return const_cast<SSLSession *>(ssl_handshake_session(hs));
+}
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_END
+
+using namespace bssl;
+
+SSLSession::SSLSession(const SSL_X509_METHOD *method)
+    : RefCounted(CheckSubClass()),
+      x509_method(method),
+      extended_master_secret(false),
+      peer_sha256_valid(false),
+      not_resumable(false),
+      ticket_age_add_valid(false),
+      is_server(false),
+      is_quic(false),
+      has_application_settings(false),
+      is_resumable_across_names(false) {
+  CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&ex_data);
+  time = ::time(nullptr);
+}
+
+SSLSession::~SSLSession() {
+  CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, &ex_data);
+  x509_method->session_clear(this);
+}
+
+SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+  return ssl_session_new(FromOpaque(ctx)->x509_method).release();
+}
+
+int SSL_SESSION_up_ref(SSL_SESSION *session) {
+  FromOpaque(session)->UpRefInternal();
+  return 1;
+}
+
+void SSL_SESSION_free(SSL_SESSION *session) {
+  if (session == nullptr) {
+    return;
+  }
+  FromOpaque(session)->DecRefInternal();
+}
+
+const uint8_t *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *session,
+                                  unsigned *out_len) {
+  const auto *session_impl = FromOpaque(session);
+  if (out_len != nullptr) {
+    *out_len = session_impl->session_id.size();
+  }
+  return session_impl->session_id.data();
+}
+
+int SSL_SESSION_set1_id(SSL_SESSION *session, const uint8_t *sid,
+                        size_t sid_len) {
+  if (!FromOpaque(session)->session_id.TryCopyFrom(Span(sid, sid_len))) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+uint32_t SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(const SSL_SESSION *session) {
+  return FromOpaque(session)->timeout;
+}
+
+uint64_t SSL_SESSION_get_time(const SSL_SESSION *session) {
+  if (session == nullptr) {
+    // NULL should crash, but silently accept it here for compatibility.
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return FromOpaque(session)->time;
+}
+
+X509 *SSL_SESSION_get0_peer(const SSL_SESSION *session) {
+  return FromOpaque(session)->x509_peer;
+}
+
+const STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) *SSL_SESSION_get0_peer_certificates(
+    const SSL_SESSION *session) {
+  return FromOpaque(session)->certs.get();
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *SSL_SESSION_get0_peer_rpk(const SSL_SESSION *session) {
+  return FromOpaque(session)->peer_raw_public_key.get();
+}
+
+void SSL_SESSION_get0_signed_cert_timestamp_list(const SSL_SESSION *session,
+                                                 const uint8_t **out,
+                                                 size_t *out_len) {
+  const auto *session_impl = FromOpaque(session);
+  if (session_impl->signed_cert_timestamp_list) {
+    *out = CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(session_impl->signed_cert_timestamp_list.get());
+    *out_len =
+        CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(session_impl->signed_cert_timestamp_list.get());
+  } else {
+    *out = nullptr;
+    *out_len = 0;
+  }
+}
+
+void SSL_SESSION_get0_ocsp_response(const SSL_SESSION *session,
+                                    const uint8_t **out, size_t *out_len) {
+  const auto *session_impl = FromOpaque(session);
+  if (session_impl->ocsp_response) {
+    *out = CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(session_impl->ocsp_response.get());
+    *out_len = CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(session_impl->ocsp_response.get());
+  } else {
+    *out = nullptr;
+    *out_len = 0;
+  }
+}
+
+size_t SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(const SSL_SESSION *session, uint8_t *out,
+                                  size_t max_out) {
+  const auto *session_impl = FromOpaque(session);
+  if (max_out == 0) {
+    return session_impl->secret.size();
+  }
+  if (max_out > session_impl->secret.size()) {
+    max_out = session_impl->secret.size();
+  }
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(out, session_impl->secret.data(), max_out);
+  return max_out;
+}
+
+uint64_t SSL_SESSION_set_time(SSL_SESSION *session, uint64_t time) {
+  if (session == nullptr) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  FromOpaque(session)->time = time;
+  return time;
+}
+
+uint32_t SSL_SESSION_set_timeout(SSL_SESSION *session, uint32_t timeout) {
+  auto *session_impl = FromOpaque(session);
+  if (session_impl == nullptr) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  session_impl->timeout = timeout;
+  session_impl->auth_timeout = timeout;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+const uint8_t *SSL_SESSION_get0_id_context(const SSL_SESSION *session,
+                                           unsigned *out_len) {
+  const auto *session_impl = FromOpaque(session);
+  if (out_len != nullptr) {
+    *out_len = session_impl->sid_ctx.size();
+  }
+  return session_impl->sid_ctx.data();
+}
+
+int SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context(SSL_SESSION *session, const uint8_t *sid_ctx,
+                                size_t sid_ctx_len) {
+  if (!FromOpaque(session)->sid_ctx.TryCopyFrom(Span(sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len))) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_SESSION_should_be_single_use(const SSL_SESSION *session) {
+  return ssl_session_protocol_version(FromOpaque(session)) >= TLS1_3_VERSION;
+}
+
+int SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(const SSL_SESSION *session) {
+  return ssl_session_get_type(FromOpaque(session)) !=
+         SSLSessionType::kNotResumable;
+}
+
+int SSL_SESSION_has_ticket(const SSL_SESSION *session) {
+  return !FromOpaque(session)->ticket.empty();
+}
+
+void SSL_SESSION_get0_ticket(const SSL_SESSION *session,
+                             const uint8_t **out_ticket, size_t *out_len) {
+  const auto *session_impl = FromOpaque(session);
+  if (out_ticket != nullptr) {
+    *out_ticket = session_impl->ticket.data();
+  }
+  *out_len = session_impl->ticket.size();
+}
+
+int SSL_SESSION_set_ticket(SSL_SESSION *session, const uint8_t *ticket,
+                           size_t ticket_len) {
+  return FromOpaque(session)->ticket.CopyFrom(Span(ticket, ticket_len));
+}
+
+uint32_t SSL_SESSION_get_ticket_lifetime_hint(const SSL_SESSION *session) {
+  return FromOpaque(session)->ticket_lifetime_hint;
+}
+
+const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(const SSL_SESSION *session) {
+  return FromOpaque(session)->cipher;
+}
+
+int SSL_SESSION_has_peer_sha256(const SSL_SESSION *session) {
+  return FromOpaque(session)->peer_sha256_valid;
+}
+
+void SSL_SESSION_get0_peer_sha256(const SSL_SESSION *session,
+                                  const uint8_t **out_ptr, size_t *out_len) {
+  const auto *session_impl = FromOpaque(session);
+  if (session_impl->peer_sha256_valid) {
+    *out_ptr = session_impl->peer_sha256;
+    *out_len = sizeof(session_impl->peer_sha256);
+  } else {
+    *out_ptr = nullptr;
+    *out_len = 0;
+  }
+}
+
+int SSL_SESSION_is_resumable_across_names(const SSL_SESSION *session) {
+  return FromOpaque(session)->is_resumable_across_names;
+}
+
+int SSL_SESSION_early_data_capable(const SSL_SESSION *session) {
+  const auto *session_impl = FromOpaque(session);
+  return ssl_session_protocol_version(session_impl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION &&
+         session_impl->ticket_max_early_data != 0;
+}
+
+SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_copy_without_early_data(SSL_SESSION *session) {
+  auto *session_impl = FromOpaque(session);
+  if (!SSL_SESSION_early_data_capable(session)) {
+    return UpRef(session).release();
+  }
+
+  UniquePtr<SSLSession> copy =
+      SSL_SESSION_dup(session_impl, SSL_SESSION_DUP_ALL);
+  if (!copy) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  copy->ticket_max_early_data = 0;
+  // Copied sessions are non-resumable until they're completely filled in.
+  copy->not_resumable = session_impl->not_resumable;
+  assert(!SSL_SESSION_early_data_capable(copy.get()));
+  return copy.release();
+}
+
+SSL_SESSION *SSL_magic_pending_session_ptr() {
+  return (SSL_SESSION *)&g_pending_session_magic;
+}
+
+SSL_SESSION *SSL_get_session(const SSL *ssl) {
+  return ssl_get_session(FromOpaque(ssl));
+}
+
+SSL_SESSION *SSL_get1_session(SSL *ssl) {
+  SSL_SESSION *ret = SSL_get_session(ssl);
+  if (ret != nullptr) {
+    SSL_SESSION_up_ref(ret);
+  }
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp,
+                                 CRYPTO_EX_unused *unused,
+                                 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_unused,
+                                 CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) {
+  return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index_ex(&g_ex_data_class, argl, argp, free_func);
+}
+
+int SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(SSL_SESSION *session, int idx, void *arg) {
+  return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&FromOpaque(session)->ex_data, idx, arg);
+}
+
+void *SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(const SSL_SESSION *session, int idx) {
+  return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&FromOpaque(session)->ex_data, idx);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_add_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *session) {
+  auto *ctx_impl = FromOpaque(ctx);
+  UniquePtr<SSLSession> owned_session = UpRef(FromOpaque(session));
+  MutexWriteLock lock(&ctx_impl->lock);
+  return add_session_locked(ctx_impl, std::move(owned_session));
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_remove_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *session) {
+  return remove_session(FromOpaque(ctx), FromOpaque(session), /*lock=*/true);
+}
+
+int SSL_set_session(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session) {
+  auto *ssl_impl = FromOpaque(ssl);
+  // SSL_set_session may only be called before the handshake has started.
+  if (ssl_impl->s3->initial_handshake_complete ||  //
+      ssl_impl->s3->hs == nullptr ||               //
+      ssl_impl->s3->hs->state != 0) {
+    abort();
+  }
+
+  ssl_set_session(ssl_impl, FromOpaque(session));
+  return 1;
+}
+
+uint32_t SSL_CTX_set_timeout(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint32_t timeout) {
+  if (ctx == nullptr) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // Historically, zero was treated as `SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_TIMEOUT`.
+  if (timeout == 0) {
+    timeout = SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_TIMEOUT;
+  }
+
+  return std::exchange(FromOpaque(ctx)->session_timeout, timeout);
+}
+
+uint32_t SSL_CTX_get_timeout(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+  if (ctx == nullptr) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return FromOpaque(ctx)->session_timeout;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_session_psk_dhe_timeout(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint32_t timeout) {
+  FromOpaque(ctx)->session_psk_dhe_timeout = timeout;
+}
+
+typedef struct timeout_param_st {
+  SSLContext *ctx;
+  uint64_t time;
+  LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *cache;
+} TIMEOUT_PARAM;
+
+// TODO(crbug.com/565766495): Take `SSLSession` when the lhash does.
+static void timeout_doall_arg(SSL_SESSION *session, void *void_param) {
+  TIMEOUT_PARAM *param = reinterpret_cast<TIMEOUT_PARAM *>(void_param);
+  auto *session_impl = FromOpaque(session);
+
+  if (param->time == 0 ||                                                 //
+      session_impl->time + session_impl->timeout < session_impl->time ||  //
+      param->time > (session_impl->time + session_impl->timeout)) {
+    // TODO(davidben): This can probably just call `remove_session`.
+    (void)lh_SSL_SESSION_delete(param->cache, session);
+    SSL_SESSION_list_remove(param->ctx, session_impl);
+    // TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/251): Callbacks should not be called
+    // under a lock.
+    if (param->ctx->remove_session_cb != nullptr) {
+      param->ctx->remove_session_cb(param->ctx, session);
+    }
+    SSL_SESSION_free(session);
+  }
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint64_t time) {
+  auto *ctx_impl = FromOpaque(ctx);
+  TIMEOUT_PARAM tp;
+  tp.ctx = ctx_impl;
+  tp.cache = ctx_impl->sessions;
+  if (tp.cache == nullptr) {
+    return;
+  }
+  tp.time = time;
+  MutexWriteLock lock(&ctx_impl->lock);
+  lh_SSL_SESSION_doall_arg(tp.cache, timeout_doall_arg, &tp);
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                             int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session)) {
+  FromOpaque(ctx)->new_session_cb = cb;
+}
+
+int (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session) {
+  return FromOpaque(ctx)->new_session_cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                void (*cb)(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                           SSL_SESSION *session)) {
+  FromOpaque(ctx)->remove_session_cb = cb;
+}
+
+void (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                                 SSL_SESSION *session) {
+  return FromOpaque(ctx)->remove_session_cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                             SSL_SESSION *(*cb)(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *id,
+                                                int id_len, int *out_copy)) {
+  FromOpaque(ctx)->get_session_cb = cb;
+}
+
+SSL_SESSION *(*SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl,
+                                                      const uint8_t *id,
+                                                      int id_len,
+                                                      int *out_copy) {
+  return FromOpaque(ctx)->get_session_cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_resumption_across_names_enabled(SSL_CTX *ctx, int enabled) {
+  FromOpaque(ctx)->resumption_across_names_enabled = !!enabled;
+}
+
+void SSL_set_resumption_across_names_enabled(SSL *ssl, int enabled) {
+  FromOpaque(ssl)->resumption_across_names_enabled = !!enabled;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,
+                                                        int type, int value)) {
+  FromOpaque(ctx)->info_callback = cb;
+}
+
+void (*SSL_CTX_get_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx))(const SSL *ssl, int type,
+                                                int value) {
+  return FromOpaque(ctx)->info_callback;
+}